The financial behaviour of immigrants to Australia by Gatina, L
  
 
 
 
THE FINANCIAL BEHAVIOUR OF IMMIGRANTS 
TO AUSTRALIA 
 
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy (Economics and Finance) 
 
 
Liliya Gatina 
Higher Degree (Diploma) in Mathematics (Tashkent State University) 
Master of International and Development Economics (ANU) 
 
 
 
School of Economics, Finance and Marketing 
College of Business 
RMIT University 
November 2012 
ii 
 
DECLARATION 
 
I , Liliya Gatina, declare that: 
a) except where due acknowledgement has been made, the work is that of the author 
alone; 
b) the work has not been submitted previously, in whole or in part, to qualify for any 
other academic award; 
c) the content of the thesis is the result of work which has been carried out since the 
official commencement date of the approved research program; 
d) Ms Annie Ryan was paid for copyediting and proofreading this work. 
 
 
 
Signed         Date 
iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This thesis is a product of my own work, but this has not been a solo journey. First and 
foremost, I would like to thank RMIT University, and the College of Business in particular, 
for providing me with financial assistance. Second, it would not have been possible to carry 
this project through till the end without the help and support of people around me who 
contributed to this research in different ways.  
The greatest share of this contribution has come from my primary supervisor, Professor 
Heather Mitchell. Her guidance and expertise have helped me to shape this research from the 
very start to its current state. I appreciate the thoroughness of her revisions and am grateful 
for her efficiency in coordinating administrative matters.  
I would also like to thank my second supervisor, Associate Professor Simon Feeny, for his 
direction, encouragement and technical advice. His ability to explain things in a simple and 
accessible way and his contagious positive attitude made my job a lot easier.  
My special thanks go to Professor Richard Heaney, who was the first person in the School of 
Economics, Finance and Marketing I met and who encouraged my pursuits. His benevolence 
left a long-lasting impression although our encounter was short due to his move to the 
University of Western Australia.  
I also wish to acknowledge the support from the Business Research Office and especially the 
human touch of Ms Prue Lamont. 
Finally and most importantly, I want to acknowledge the contribution of my family and 
especially my husband, Yazdi Bhote. My deep involvement with the research inevitably 
affected those close to me. My darling husband who is also my closest friend walked together 
with me through the ups and downs of this long journey. Our discussions inspired me, and his 
patient proofreading enhanced my confidence. But most of all, I appreciate his continuous 
moral support which gave me the strength to continue during some of the most challenging 
phases of this research.  
iv 
 
CONTENTS 
DECLARATION ................................................................................................................... ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................. iii 
CONTENTS .......................................................................................................................... iv 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................... vii 
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................... xi 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .............................................................................................. xii 
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... xiii 
CHAPTER  1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Theories of international migration .................................................................................. 2 
1.2 Migration to Australia: past and present .......................................................................... 5 
1.3 Data description.............................................................................................................. 11 
1.4 Contributions of the thesis.............................................................................................. 12 
CHAPTER  2. THE FINANCIAL RISK-TAKING OF IMMIGRANTS TO 
AUSTRALIA AND THE INFLUENCE OF HOME-COUNTRY INSTITUTIONS ....... 18 
2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 18 
2.2 Literature review ............................................................................................................ 20 
2.3 Data and methodology ................................................................................................... 24 
2.3.1 Methodology ........................................................................................................... 24 
2.3.2 Personal data ........................................................................................................... 25 
2.3.3 Country data ............................................................................................................ 30 
2.4 Equity investment: results and analysis ......................................................................... 32 
2.4.1 Difference in equity investment between immigrants and native-born individuals33 
2.4.2 Equity investment and institutional quality: baseline findings ............................... 37 
2.4.3 Robustness checks .................................................................................................. 46 
2.4.4 Effects and persistence of institutional constraints ................................................. 48 
2.5 Self-reported financial risk: results and analysis ............................................................ 51 
2.5.1 Difference in self-reported financial risk-taking between immigrants and native-
born individuals ............................................................................................................... 51 
v 
 
2.5.2 Self-reported financial risk-taking and institutional quality: baseline findings ...... 56 
2.5.3 Robustness checks .................................................................................................. 65 
2.5.4 Effects and persistence of institutional constraints ................................................. 66 
2.6 Conclusions .................................................................................................................... 68 
CHAPTER  3. THE SAVING BEHAVIOUR OF IMMIGRANTS TO AUSTRALIA 
AND HOME-COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS .............................................................. 72 
3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 72 
3.2 Literature review ............................................................................................................ 73 
3.3 Data and methodology ................................................................................................... 78 
3.3.1 Personal data ........................................................................................................... 82 
3.3.2 Country data ............................................................................................................ 85 
3.4 Empirical results ............................................................................................................. 87 
3.4.1 Difference in the saving behaviour between Australian-born and foreign-born 
residents: households and individuals .............................................................................. 87 
3.4.2 Country-of-origin effect on household savings ...................................................... 93 
3.5 Conclusions .................................................................................................................. 114 
CHAPTER  4. REMITTANCES OF AUSTRALIAN IMMIGRANTS: DO 
IMMIGRATION LAWS MATTER? ................................................................................ 117 
4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 117 
4.2 Recent immigration patterns ........................................................................................ 119 
4.3 Literature review .......................................................................................................... 123 
4.4 Data and methodology ................................................................................................. 127 
4.4.1 Description of data and variables .......................................................................... 127 
4.4.2 Descriptive statistics ............................................................................................. 131 
4.4.3 Models .................................................................................................................. 134 
4.5 Empirical results ........................................................................................................... 139 
4.5.1 Two-part model ..................................................................................................... 139 
4.5.2 Tobit model ........................................................................................................... 148 
4.5.3 Heckman two-step model ..................................................................................... 151 
4.5.4 Summary ............................................................................................................... 155 
4.6 Conclusions .................................................................................................................. 162 
vi 
 
CHAPTER  5. DOES MONEY BUY HAPPINESS? FINANCIAL AND GENERAL 
WELL-BEING OF IMMIGRANTS IN AUSTRALIA .................................................... 166 
5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 166 
5.2 Literature review .......................................................................................................... 168 
5.3 Data and methodology ................................................................................................. 173 
5.3.1 HILDA survey ...................................................................................................... 173 
5.3.2 LSIA survey .......................................................................................................... 178 
5.4 Empirical results ........................................................................................................... 181 
5.4.1 General well-being of Australian residents........................................................... 181 
5.4.2 Financial well-being of Australian household heads ............................................ 184 
5.4.3 Country-of-origin effects on general well-being and financial well-being .......... 188 
5.4.3.1 Country-of-origin effects on life satisfaction and financial well-being of 
immigrant household heads from HILDA ................................................................. 189 
5.4.3.2 Country-of-origin effect on life satisfaction of Primary Applicants from LSIA
.................................................................................................................................... 195 
5.5 Conclusions .................................................................................................................. 197 
CHAPTER  6. CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................................... 200 
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................... 207 
APPENDICES .................................................................................................................... 216 
Appendix A Extra tables for Chapter 2 ......................................................................... 216 
Appendix B Extra tables for Chapter 3 ......................................................................... 233 
Appendix C Extra tables for Chapter 4 ......................................................................... 238 
Appendix D Extra tables for Chapter 5 ......................................................................... 240 
vii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 2.1 Characteristics of foreign and Australian-born individuals ..................................... 28 
Table 2.2 Characteristics of immigrants .................................................................................. 30 
Table 2.3 Factors affecting the probability of equity investment by Australian residents (aged 
15 or older) ............................................................................................................................... 33 
Table 2.4 Factors affecting the probability of equity investment by Australian residents (aged 
36 or older) ............................................................................................................................... 36 
Table 2.5 Quality of institutions' effect on the probability of equity investment by immigrants
.................................................................................................................................................. 39 
Table 2.6 Effects of additional country controls on the probability of equity investment by 
immigrants aged 15 or older (panel data) ................................................................................ 44 
Table 2.7 Effects of home institutions on the probability of equity investment by immigrants 
aged 15 or older, depending on their age at migration to Australia (panel data) ..................... 48 
Table 2.8 Effects of home institutions on the probability of equity investment by immigrants 
aged 15 or older, depending on years spent in Australia, with age at arrival controls ............ 50 
Table 2.9 Factors affecting SRFRT of Australian residents (aged 15 or older) ...................... 53 
Table 2.10 Factors affecting SRFRT of Australian residents (aged 36 or older) .................... 54 
Table 2.11 Quality of institutions' effect on SRFRT by immigrants ....................................... 58 
Table 2.12 Effects of additional country controls on SRFRT by immigrants aged 15 or older 
(panel data)............................................................................................................................... 63 
Table 2.13 Effects of home institutions on SRFRT by immigrants aged 15 or older, 
depending on their age at migration to Australia (panel data) ................................................. 66 
Table 2.14 Effects of home institutions on SRFRT by immigrants aged 15 years or older, 
depending on years spent in Australia, with age at arrival controls ........................................ 68 
Table 3.1 Factors affecting saving rates of Australian households (household heads only) ... 89 
Table 3.2 Factors affecting saving rates of Australian households (all household members) . 91 
Table 3.3 Effects of institutional variables on the saving behaviour of immigrants ............... 97 
Table 3.4 Effects of additional country variables on the saving behaviour of immigrants ... 105 
Table 3.5 Comparison of immigrants’ household saving rates in Australia averaged by their 
countries of origin, with the respective countries-of-origin national saving rates ................. 113 
Table 4.1 Visa categories available in LSIA ......................................................................... 120 
Table 4.2 Comparison of the points testing system before and after amendment on 1 July 
1999........................................................................................................................................ 121 
viii 
 
Table 4.3 Characteristics of Primary Applicants for Australian residency, LSIA1 and LSIA2 
(combined data) ..................................................................................................................... 133 
Table 4.4 Results of the probit model predicting determinants of immigrants' decision to 
remit money overseas, LSIA1 and LSIA2 (panel data) ......................................................... 140 
Table 4.5 Results of the ordered probit model predicting factors affecting the amounts 
immigrants remit overseas, LSIA1 and LSIA2 (panel data) .................................................. 144 
Table 4.6 Results of the linear panel model predicting factors affecting the amounts 
immigrants remit overseas, LSIA1 and LSIA2 ...................................................................... 146 
Table 4.7 Results of the Tobit model predicting factors affecting the remittances of 
immigrants, LSIA1 and LSIA2 (panel data) .......................................................................... 149 
Table 4.8 Results of the Heckman model predicting factors affecting the choice of 
participating and the choice of amounts immigrants remit overseas, LSIA1 and LSIA2 (panel 
data)........................................................................................................................................ 152 
Table 4.9 Summary of results for all models applied to 1993–1995 arrivals, LSIA1 ........... 156 
Table 4.10 Summary of results for all models applied to 1999–2000 arrivals, LSIA2 ......... 157 
Table 4.11 Independent variables not influencing remitting decisions, LSIA1 and LSIA2 .. 158 
Table 5.1 Dependent variables (HILDA)............................................................................... 174 
Table 5.2 Characteristics of foreign-born and Australian-born household heads, HILDA 
(combined data for 2002 and 2006) ....................................................................................... 177 
Table 5.3 Comparison of characteristics of Primary Applicants from LSIA (2001–2002 data) 
and immigrant household heads from HILDA (2002 and 2006 data) ................................... 180 
Table 5.4 Distribution of LSIA respondents by levels of living standards in Australia and 
living standards before migration (combined data for 2001–2002)....................................... 182 
Table 5.5 Factors affecting life satisfaction of Australian households, HILDA (panel data for 
2002 and 2006) ...................................................................................................................... 183 
Table 5.6 Factors affecting inability to pay bills on time, difficulty in raising $2,000, financial 
satisfaction and financial prosperity of Australian households, HILDA (panel data for 2002 
and 2006) ............................................................................................................................... 185 
Table 5.7 Factors affecting difficulty in raising $2,000, financial prosperity and life 
satisfaction of immigrants to Australia when continents of origin are controlled for, HILDA 
(panel data for 2002 and 2006) .............................................................................................. 191 
Table 5.8 Factors affecting difficulty in raising $2,000, financial prosperity and life 
satisfaction of immigrants to Australia when continents of origin and home country’s religion 
are controlled for, HILDA (panel data for 2002 and 2006) ................................................... 194 
Table 5.9 Factors affecting life satisfaction of immigrants to Australia when continents of 
origin and home country’s religion are controlled for, LSIA (panel data for 2001–2002) ... 196 
 
ix 
 
Table A.1 Definition of variables: individual characteristics ................................................ 216 
Table A.2 Definition of variables: country variables............................................................. 217 
Table A.3 Country-level variables summary statistics (combined data) ............................... 218 
Table A.4 Correlation between institutional qualities (combined data) ................................ 219 
Table A.5 Effects of additional country controls on probability of equity investment by 
immigrants aged 15 or older (2002 data) ............................................................................... 220 
Table A.6 Effects of additional country controls on the probability of equity investment by 
immigrants aged 15 or older (2006 data) ............................................................................... 222 
Table A.7 Effects of home institutions on the probability of equity investment by immigrants 
aged 15 or older, depending on their age at migration to Australia (2002 and 2006 data) .... 224 
Table A.8 Effects of home institutions on probability of equity investment by immigrants 
aged 36 or older, depending on years spent in Australia (panel data) ................................... 225 
Table A.9 Effects of additional country controls on SRFRT by immigrants aged 15 or older 
(2002 data) ............................................................................................................................. 226 
Table A.10 Effects of additional country controls on SRFRT by immigrants aged 15 or older 
(2006 data) ............................................................................................................................. 228 
Table A.11 Effects of home institutions on SRFRT by immigrants aged 15 or older, 
depending on their age at migration to Australia (2002 data) ............................................... 230 
Table A.12 Effects of home institutions on SRFRT by immigrants aged 36 or older, 
depending on their age at migration (panel data)................................................................... 231 
Table A.13 Effects of home institutions on SRFRT by immigrants aged 36 years or older, 
depending on years spent in Australia ................................................................................... 232 
Table B.1 Definition of variables: individual characteristics ................................................ 233 
Table B.2 Results of Hausman endogeneity test and post-estimation test measuring the 
relevance of the excluded exogenous variables ..................................................................... 234 
Table B.3 Definition of variables: country characteristics .................................................... 235 
Table B.4 Effect of additional country variables on the saving behaviour of immigrants aged 
36 or older (individual level) ................................................................................................. 236 
Table C.1 Definition of variables: individual characteristics ................................................ 238 
Table D.1 Definition of variables: individual characteristics (HILDA) ................................ 240 
Table D.2 Definition of variables: individual characteristics (LSIA).................................... 242 
Table D.3 Distribution of HILDA household heads by continents of origin and dominant 
religion in the country of origin (combined data for 2002 and 2006) ................................... 243 
Table D.4 Factors affecting life satisfaction of immigrants to Australia when continents-of-
origin are controlled for, LSIA (panel data for 2001-2002) .................................................. 244 
x 
 
Table D.5 Distribution of Primary Applicants by continents of origin and dominant religion 
in the country of origin, LSIA (combined data for 2001-2002) ............................................ 245 
 
  
xi 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.1 Net overseas migration from 1901 to 2010 (in persons) .......................................... 6 
Figure 1.2 The composition of immigrants by birthplace in 2008 (in persons) ........................ 8 
Figure 1.3 Permanent migration to Australia programs............................................................. 9 
Figure 1.4 Immigrants by eligibility category in 2007–2008 (in persons) .............................. 11 
Figure 4.1 Immigration flows to Australia, 1990–2007 (in persons) .................................... 122 
Figure 4.2 Remittances outflows from Australia, 1990–2008 (in million USD)................... 123 
 
  
xii 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Abbreviation Meaning 
2SLS Two-Stage Least Squares 
ABS Australian Bureau of Statistics 
DIAC 
Department of Immigration and Citizenship (formerly the 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs) 
DIMIA Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs  
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
HILDA Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia 
LSIA Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia 
MLE Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
MSR Major Statistical Region 
NOM Net Overseas Migration 
NUMAS Numerical Multifactor Assessment System 
SRFRT Self-Reported Financial Risk-Taking 
 
xiii 
 
ABSTRACT 
As acknowledged by the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, immigration is a main 
driver of population growth in Australia, with almost 30 per cent of the increase in population 
in 2010 brought about by migration (DIAC 2011). Immigrants’ contribution to the growth of 
the Australian workforce in the last five years is even higher, with almost half of this growth 
attributable to the employment of recent immigrants. This means that the Australian economy 
is dependent on immigration, and immigrants’ financial behaviour can potentially have a 
huge impact on the Australian financial system and economy. 
This thesis investigates the financial behaviour of immigrants, whether and how this 
behaviour differs from that of native-born Australians, how it is affected by both the 
immigrants’ home-country characteristics such as institutional quality and by Australian 
immigration policies, and what is its effect on immigrants’ well-being. In this research, 
immigrants are defined as people who migrated across country boundaries to establish a new 
residence in Australia. The financial behaviour of immigrants is described by two wealth 
accumulation aspects – their financial risk-taking ability and their saving habits – and by one 
spending aspect – remittances sent to friends and families overseas. 
This research first investigates what affects the financial risk-taking of Australian residents, 
which is self-assessed by individuals and also measured by their equity investments, and what 
influence home-country institutions might have on immigrants’ participation in Australian 
financial markets. Second, the research analyses the determinants of the saving rates of 
Australian households, and the relationship between the saving rates of immigrants and their 
home countries’ characteristics. Third, the research determines the factors that affect whether 
and how much immigrants remit money abroad, and it examines the effects on remittance 
outflows from Australia of the Australian immigration reforms of the late 1990s. Finally, the 
components of the well-being of Australian residents, including if their country of origin is 
different from Australia, are examined. In line with the primary focus of the thesis, special 
attention is given to the financial aspect of immigrants’ well-being.  
Two data sources are used to answer these research questions: the Household, Income and 
Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey and the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants 
to Australia (LSIA). HILDA’s sample includes Australians both born in the country and born 
overseas, enabling comparison between the two groups. A detail questionnaire covering the 
xiv 
 
financial aspects of Australian households is another distinct feature of this dataset, which 
allows the analysis of people’s tendency to take financial risk and their saving behaviour. The 
immigrant-only data of LSIA, on the other hand, contains immigrant-specific information 
such as their remittances and type of entry visa. Both datasets provide different data on 
immigrants’ well-being and complement each other. 
Different methodologies are applied to answer the research questions. First, probit models 
describe an individual’s probability of investing in the share market and their probability of 
remitting . Second, ordered probit models are used for modelling an individual’s self-assessed 
ability to take financial risk and their remitted amount expressed in levels. Third, an 
immigrant’s actual remitted amount is estimated by using a linear panel model. Remittances 
are then estimated by the two-part model, with the probit model used at the first stage and 
either the ordered probit model or the linear panel model at the second. Fourth, the remitting 
decisions of immigrants are also described by the Tobit model and the Heckman two-step 
model. Finally, a two-stage least squares procedure is employed to analyse the saving 
behaviour of Australian residents.    
The analysis of the financial risk-taking ability of immigrants revealed that both the level of 
stock market investment and the level of self-reported financial risk-taking are lower for 
immigrants to Australia than for other Australians. The difference in these risk attitudes can 
be explained by the institutional environment in the country of origin. Not only do 
immigrants participate less in financial markets, they also tend to save less than their native-
born counterparts. The quality of the institutional environment in the country of origin was 
found to be positively correlated, and national saving rates negatively correlated, with 
immigrants’ saving rates, although the latter was evident only in the extended sample which 
included all household members. Immigrants’ need to support their families who were not 
able to join them in Australia can also potentially reduce their funds available for investment 
in the Australian economy. This research found that the remitting behaviour of immigrants 
depends not only on their income or wealth but also on other factors such as having family 
members overseas or their type of entry visa. The visa effect, however, changed after the 
1999 immigration reform due to the changed profile of the average independent applicant 
whose earning potential became higher. Finally, it was found that, despite their improved 
financial situation, immigrants to Australia are less satisfied with their lives than native-born 
Australians. The similar levels of income and wealth of these two groups suggest that other 
factors apart from absolute income increase matter for people’s well-being.  
xv 
 
Findings from this research could serve as a basis for recommendations for policy reform that 
would enhance the financial development of Australia. For example, to encourage more 
active participation of immigrants in the Australian financial markets, it may be beneficial to 
provide more information about the reliability and efficiency of Australian financial 
institutions to newly arrived migrants. Similarly, immigration policies which are more lenient 
towards the immigration of family members of primary applicants for Australian visas, 
especially their children, could result in lower outward remittances from Australia.  
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CHAPTER  1.  INTRODUCTION 
According to data from the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (formerly the 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs), at June 2010 the 
Australian population was estimated as 22.3 million people, an increase of 377,100 from the 
previous year (ABS 2011; DIAC 2011). As acknowledged by the Minister for this 
Department, immigration is a main driver of population growth, with almost 30 per cent of 
this increase brought about by immigration. This percentage is even higher in the workforce 
where more than 45 per cent of labour force growth in the last five years was due to the 
employment of recent immigrants (DIAC 2011). The demographic and economic input of 
immigrants is encouraged in societies with an ageing population and low fertility rates, such 
as Australia, whose economies are becoming increasingly dependent on immigration.  
This thesis investigates the financial behaviour of immigrants, whether and how it differs 
from that of native-born Australians, how this behaviour is affected by the immigrants’ 
home-country characteristics such as institutional quality as well as by Australian 
immigration policies, and how it is related to immigrants’ well-being. Immigrants in this 
research are defined as people who migrated across country boundaries to establish a new 
residence (Fan 2009). As this definition suggests, only first-generation immigrants are 
considered and it is assumed that the children and grandchildren of immigrants have 
assimilated with the local population. 
This research may be beneficial to countries with a high concentration of immigrants from 
different countries, like Australia. It is expected that findings from this thesis can serve as a 
basis for recommendations for policy reform that would enhance the financial development 
of Australia.  
The principal research questions are:  
1. What determines the level of financial risk-taking of Australian residents, and 
what is the role of home-country institutions in explaining any difference in the 
propensity to take financial risk between Australian-born and non-Australian-born 
residents? 
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2. Does being born overseas, among other factors, affect Australians’ personal 
saving rates, and do immigrants’ home-country characteristics influence their 
saving habits after migration to Australia?  
3. What constitutes immigrants’ willingness and ability to remit, and what is the 
effect of Australian Government policies on the outflow of remittances from the 
country? 
4. What determines the well-being of Australian residents, and is it different for 
Australians born overseas? How is the general well-being of immigrants related to 
their financial well-being?  
This introductory chapter first provides a general background on immigration, its causes and 
effects, particularly for Australia. Accordingly, Section 1.1 provides a concise review of 
international migration theories and Section 1.2 presents milestones in the history of 
migration to Australia and describes its current situation. Section 1.3 describes the main 
features of the data used in the research. Section 1.4 provides a brief description of the 
content of the subsequent chapters of the thesis and summarises its findings.   
1.1 Theories of international migration 
International migration has become a basic structural feature of most of the world’s 
developed countries, with the majority of them becoming diverse, multiethnic societies 
(Massey et al. 1993). Understanding the nature of the forces underlying this phenomenon 
therefore is crucial for these immigrant-receiving countries. Awareness of the factors 
conducive to migration can be beneficial in planning immigration policies or government 
social programs, for example. Likewise, accurate predictions of immigration inflows make it 
feasible to foresee possible issues associated with population growth.  
At present, however, according to Massey et al. (1993), there is no single commonly accepted 
theoretical framework explaining international migration. Massey et al. group all theoretical 
approaches to international migration into two categories: approaches explaining the 
initiation of migration and approaches explaining the perpetuation of such international 
movements. Theories explaining the initiation of migration include neoclassical economic 
theory, dual labour market theory, the new economics of labour migration and world systems 
theory. Network theory, institutional theory and the theory of cumulative causation, on the 
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other hand, clarify the reasons for transnational population flows continuing to exist across 
space and time.  
Theoretical models providing initiating causes of international migration, as argued by 
Massey et al. (1993), employ different concepts. For example, the neoclassical economic 
theory, the oldest theory of migration, focuses on the differences in wages between regions, 
which, in turn, are caused mainly by the geographic differences in labour demand and labour 
supply (Jennissen 2007). For example, a country can experience a labour shortage as a result 
of its economic expansion, a mismatch between labour demand and local labour supply in 
specific sectors or its ageing population (Fan 2009). According to the neoclassical theory, 
high wages in countries with a shortage of labour attract labour from countries with a 
relatively high labour supply, thus initiating migration (Borjas 1989; Jennissen 2007; Massey 
et al. 1993). Stark and Bloom (1985), on the other hand, in their approach, called the ‘new 
economics of migration’, argued that not only labour market conditions but also conditions of 
other markets affect a decision to become a labour migrant. This decision is no longer made 
at an individual level but involves other members of household, and remittances received by 
households are used to minimise risks to family income or to overcome capital constraints on 
family production activities (Jennissen 2007; Taylor 1999).  
The dual labour market theory and the world systems theory were described by Massey et al. 
(1993) as theories that look beyond these micro-level decision models of individuals or 
households who maximise their income or minimise their risks. The dual labour market 
theory sees labour demand from the labour-intensive segments of industrialised immigrant-
receiving societies as the main pull factor causing international labour flows. The world 
systems theory considers interaction between societies such as trade as an incentive for 
migration. In the conditions produced by trade between weaker and advanced economies, 
stronger economies drain weaker economies, thus creating the better living conditions which 
attract immigrants (Amankwaa 1995).  
Although some factors such as wage differentials and relative risks may continue to cause 
people to move, there are also other circumstances that keep migration flows going. Massey 
et al. (1993) named other causes that arise during the course of migration and become 
independent themselves, such as the spread of migrant networks, the development of 
institutions supporting international migration and the alteration of social contexts in ways 
that cause more migration, a process called cumulative causation. Migrant networks help to 
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sustain transnational movement by, for example, providing information about education and 
access to social security or helping to find work and accommodation for potential immigrants 
of the same ethnic origin (Jennissen 2007). Institutional theory suggests that international 
migration also facilitates the creation of private institutions and voluntary organisations to fill 
the gap between the large number of those wishing to enter a developed country and the 
limited number of visas offered by that country. These organisations, both legal and illegal, 
as claimed by Massey et al. (1993), receive profit for providing services such as transport, 
labour contracts, documents and legal advice for migrants. In addition, Massey et al. (1993) 
listed six socioeconomic factors that are affected by immigration in the cumulative way: the 
distribution of income, the distribution of land, the organisation of agriculture, culture, the 
regional distribution of human capital and the social meaning of work. The cumulative effects 
of income distribution, for instance, are reflected in the increasing urge to migrate after 
observing the improved financial situation of the families receiving financial support from 
their members overseas.  
The theories outlined above are not entirely contradictory but nevertheless can require 
different strategies for the formulation of relevant policies. Depending on the preferred 
model, the policy makers in the destination country might, for example, amend wages or 
employment conditions, whereas the governments of sending countries might decide to 
accentuate their economic development. Policy recommendations would also depend on the 
geographical location and other characteristics of a destination country as well as the 
objectives of its immigration policy. 
Australia is a country with a high population of immigrants, with its immigration policies 
changing with changes in the global environment as well as the country’s needs. For 
example, to meet labour demand, in April 2005 the government introduced changes to the 
Working Holiday Maker Program to allow workers who had done a minimum of three 
months seasonal harvest work in regional Australia to apply for the extension of their visas 
for another year (Shah & Burke 2005). The focus of permanent immigration is also shifting to 
meet the needs of the labour market and regional development. Specifically, to ease the 
population pressure on infrastructure and land, Australian immigration policies encourage 
immigrants’ settlement away from an urban area. An increased emphasis is also placed on 
skilled immigration to increase Australia’s competitiveness in the global marketplace (Walsh 
2008).  
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The next section describes the immigration policies of Australia and, accordingly, the 
changing profile of its new settlers.  
1.2 Migration to Australia: past and present 
Even though, as stated by Borooah and Mangan (2007), Australia has one of the highest 
percentage of residents born overseas and one of the highest rates of ethnic diversity, this has 
not always been the case. A strong preference for white British citizens was the prominent 
feature of the early Australian immigration programs. The ‘White Australia Policy’ 
originated in the 1850s when the governments of Victoria and New South Wales introduced 
restrictions on Chinese migration in response to white miners’ resentment towards Chinese 
diggers (DIAC 2009a). The formal implementation of the ‘White Australia Policy’ by the 
Federal Government in the form of the Immigration Restriction Act in 1901 was welcomed 
by most of society. Not only did it eliminate non-European immigration but it also imposed 
additional restrictions on the health, occupation and language of prospective immigrants. 
According to Borooah and Mangan (2007) and the Department of Immigration and 
Citizenship (DIAC 2009a), the infamous dictation test was seen as the main policy instrument 
of the ‘White Policy’. This fifty-word test, conducted in any European language generally not 
known by an applicant and selected by the immigration officer, was applied to all ‘aboriginal 
inhabitants of Africa, Asia and Polynesia’ but only to a few ‘undesirable’ whites. If a person 
failed the test, he or she was refused entry to Australia or, if the immigrant was already in 
Australia, he or she was imprisoned for six months before being deported (ABC 2001).  
Nevertheless, until 1914, Australia grew rapidly, reaching a population of almost five million, 
with most settlers arriving from the traditional source – the British Isles (DIMIA 2001). After 
the virtual cessation of immigration during World War I, it picked up again in the 1920s. The 
migrants who arrived during this decade were not only from Britain but also Italy and Greece, 
and majority of them were given the financial assistance with travel expenses by the 
Australian Government as an incentive to migrate to Australia
1
. The Great Depression of the 
1930s brought assisted arrivals to a standstill with Jews from Austria and Germany being the 
last to receive help with settling in Australia. The Department of Immigration and Citizenship 
(DIAC) fact sheet (DIAC 2009a) reveals that there were many non-white refugees during 
                                                 
1
 Although initially the financial assistance was offered to encourage migration from certain countries, since 
April 1981 this assistance has only been given to refugees.  
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World War II and some of them were allowed to stay, marking the first crack in the 
discriminatory  immigration policy. 
The post-war economic boom as well as the feeling of insecurity caused by World War II set 
the scene for an immigration program to increase the small Australian population, with the 
assisted passage programs extended to include migrants from the US, Netherlands, Norway, 
France, Belgium and Denmark. The restrictions on non-European nationals were also slightly 
eased, allowing non-European businessmen to stay after they had lived continuously in 
Australia for fifteen years under temporary work permits (DIMIA 2001). As a result, Net 
Overseas Migration (NOM)
2
 in 1950 reached the third highest figure of the 20th century of 
153,685 people (the highest and the second highest numbers were 172,794 in 1988 and 
166,303 in 1918, respectively). The 20th century low of -128,737 registered in 1916, mostly 
due to the departure of Australians to serve in World War I, preceded a sharp increase in net 
migration in 1918, reflecting the return of the soldiers. Figure 1.1 reports NOM to Australia 
for the 20th century and the subsequent 10 years when the general upward trend in NOM is 
even more prominent
3
. 
Figure 1.1 Net overseas migration from 1901 to 2010 (in persons) 
 
Source: DIMIA(2001) up to 1997 and the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS 2012) from 1998. 
                                                 
2 Net Overseas Migration (NOM) is defined by the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs  
(DIMIA 2001) as a measure of net addition or loss to Australia’s resident population. Under the current method, 
estimation of final NOM is based on arrivals and departures from Australia for 12 months or more in a 16-
month period (DIAC 2011). 
3 In 2008, NOM to Australia reached its absolute maximum of 315,000 people due to an increase in the number 
of temporary arrivals dominated by international students (DIAC 2012). This increase was followed by a sharp 
decline as a result of the reforms to the student visa program.  
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As emigrants from more and more European countries settled in Australia, non-Europeans 
were first allowed to become Australian citizens in 1957 after fifteen years of residence. This 
was followed by the revised Migration Act of 1958 that introduced simplified entry permits 
and abolished the controversial dictation test. However, according to the Department of 
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA) (2001), non-British 
immigrants were still subjected to stricter requirements for social service benefits than 
Australian-born citizens and British migrants, who had equal rights. At that time, immigrants 
from Britain were treated like Australian citizens and were also eligible to vote after residing 
in Australia for six months (Neumann & Tavan 2009). After a review of the non-European 
migration policy in March 1966, the requirements for successful applicants for Australian 
residency were extended to include other criteria apart from race, such as qualifications and 
ability to settle. In the same year, the required length of residence in Australia for non-
Europeans to become permanent residents or citizens was reduced to five years. 
These changes were the beginning of the end of the ‘White Australia Policy’ with the number 
of non-European settlers rising annually from 746 in 1966 to 2,696 in 1971 (DIAC 2009a). 
Yet, as reports from DIAC suggest (DIAC 2009a; DIMIA 2001), subsequent steps taken by 
the Whitlam Labour Government in 1973 to further eradicate racial discrimination, had little 
impact due to a reduced overall migration intake in response to the end of a long economic 
boom. The planned migration intake continued to decrease until the Fraser Government came 
into power in 1976. Although the size of the migration program was increased to 70,000 
(DIMIA 2001), controls on entry requirements were also tightened due to an increased 
number of illegal immigrants and many visitors overstaying their visitor visas. New extensive 
immigration policies were developed in 1978 including three-year rolling programs to replace 
immigration targets and a more consistent approach to migrant selection without racial 
discrimination.  
At around the same time, Asian immigration took off with the arrival of Indo-Chinese 
refugees from Thailand in 1976. The first refugee boats started to arrive from Vietnam in the 
same year (Borooah & Mangan 2007; DIMIA 2001). In response to growing numbers of 
refugees coming from forty countries, in 1977 the government announced new procedures for 
the assessment and handling of refugee situations. Refugee immigration, including arrivals by 
boat, continued to increase throughout the 1980s and 1990s and resulted in the development 
of programs to provide a safer means of escape from life-threatening environments. For 
example, the Special Humanitarian Program was designed in 1981 for relatives of Australian 
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residents who were not eligible for migration under existing refugee programs. Similarly, the 
Orderly Departure Program was developed in 1982 as a legal migration program for the 
Vietnamese (DIMIA 2001). The termination of assisted passages in 1981 did not apply to 
refugees. 
The policies mentioned above contributed to the current ethnic composition of Australian 
population, 25 per cent of which in 2007 were born overseas (ABS 2011). Figure 1.2, based 
on 2008 data collected by the DIAC (2009c) and the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS 
2011), depicts the ethnic distribution of almost 5.3 million immigrants. Although the 
immigrant population is still dominated by migrants from Britain (1.15 million) and New 
Zealand (almost 0.5 million), the composition of immigration changed substantially after the 
end of the discriminatory migration policies. For example, more than a third of all immigrants 
currently originate from Asia with most of them being born in China, India and Vietnam. The 
proportions of the resident population from each of these countries currently amount to 4 to 5 
per cent, whereas, as data from DIMIA (2001) shows, until 1990s these percentages did not 
even reach 1.5 per cent. Likewise, the number of migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa has 
equalled the number of migrants from the American continents at more than 230,000 people. 
Among Southern European countries, Italian immigrants represent the biggest group of 
225,000 people. 
Figure 1.2 The composition of immigrants by birthplace in 2008 (in persons) 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on the data from ABS (2011) and DIAC (2009c). 
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The categories for permanent migration to Australia, as can be seen in Figure 1.3, are skilled, 
family, humanitarian, special eligibility programs and a program for New Zealand citizens. 
The special eligibility stream contains a very small number of people such as former 
Australian residents who have maintained their ties with Australia (DIAC 2009c). New 
Zealanders travelling to Australia in most cases do not need a visa and are only required to 
have a valid New Zealand passport (DIAC 2009b). Hence, Borooah and Mangan (2007) 
suggested that the Australian immigration policy is designed to accommodate three main 
categories: business and skills related, family reunion and humanitarian. After ending 
discriminatory policies, Australia initially gave higher priority to humanitarian migration and 
family reunification, as argued by Walsh (2008), but this phase did not last long. 
Globalisation and the increasing importance of advanced manufacturing and specialised 
services stimulated recognition by the Australian Government of the potential economic 
impacts of their immigration policy. Following the Canadian example, the Numerical 
Multifactor Assessment System (NUMAS), which is equivalent to the current points test in 
Australia, was introduced in 1979. This points system created a numerical scale for skilled 
applicants only, in which points are given for certain characteristic predetermined by the 
government, such as age or education. Entry for these applicants would be granted only if 
they could accumulate enough points to get a pass mark.  
Figure 1.3 Permanent migration to Australia programs 
 
Source: DIAC (2009c) 
With the increasing life span and declining fertility of the populations of potential immigrant-
receiving countries, their governments have used their migration policies as population 
policies. With the emergence of post-industrial societies, the quality rather than quantity of 
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the introduction of the Business class as a faster-processing subset of the Skilled category 
aimed to bring wealthy professionals and entrepreneurs to the country. The importance of 
economic migration was intensified by making the points system more restrictive and 
reversing the ratio of skilled to family/humanitarian migrants. Prior to 1996, the majority of 
immigrants entered through the family and refugee categories, whereas after that, the skilled 
independent program exceeded the humanitarian category and steadily grew to reach the size 
of the family category (DIAC 2008; DIMIA 2002; Walsh 2008). Likewise, Borooah and 
Mangan (2007) showed that in 2000–2001, 54 per cent of migration was in the skills stream. 
These arrangements ensured an increase in the number of wealthy and educated Australian 
immigrants who are no longer viewed as a labour from abroad. As noted by Walsh (2008), 
these immigrants should be also able to afford to pay significantly higher fees for processing 
visa and citizenship applications, which are among the modifications to the points system as a 
‘user pays’ model. In addition to offsetting its expenditure by increasing fees for migrants, 
the government also cut migration program expenses such as language classes and settlement 
assistance, and reduced access to social security entitlements.  
The DIAC Report (DIAC 2008) confirmed that the skilled migration class remains the 
primary category in Australia. Figure 1.4 shows the distribution of the main categories of the 
2007–2008 migration program which, according to DIAC (2009c), was the largest4 since the 
previous peak registered in 1988 (Spinks 2010). As these data suggest, skilled independent 
immigrants are the biggest group at 39 per cent, exceeding the size of the group of migrants 
that arrive to unite with their families. The smallest group of 8 per cent is recorded under the 
humanitarian program. The steady increase in the arrivals of qualified immigrants in the 
independent stream after 1997 can be seen in the reports produced by DIAC (2008), while the 
number of immigrants in other categories has been fluctuating, suggesting that the 
government’s strategy to expand economically beneficial sectors has proved to be successful. 
At the same time, the high number of qualified residents raises concerns about their 
integration into the labour market and whether the economic performance of these 
immigrants contributes to the welfare of Australia.  
  
                                                 
4
 This 2007–2008 migration program outcome of 158,630 persons, however, was outperformed by the 2008–
2009 outcome of 171,318 persons – the highest number for the decade (DIAC 2010, 2011). 
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Figure 1.4 Immigrants by eligibility category in 2007–2008 (in persons) 
 
Notes: Does not include immigrants arrived under Special Eligibility Program and the non-program migration 
mostly used for migration by New Zealand citizens. 
a
 includes Business Skills, Employer Nomination Scheme and Distinguished Talents programs. 
Source: DIAC (2008). 
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Australian-born and foreign-born residents, it is possible to compare the financial behaviour 
of these two groups, as reported in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and Chapter 5.  
Unlike HILDA, LSIA surveys only foreign-born residents who have recently arrived in 
Australia. This longitudinal survey was designed to collect information about problems faced 
by immigrants on their arrival and in their first few years in Australia. The Department of 
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs has managed LSIA since its start in 
1993. Although LSIA covers three cohorts arrived between September 1993 and August 1995 
(LSIA1), from September 1999 to August 2000 (LSIA2) and from December 2004 to March 
2005 (LSIA3), only the first two are used for this research since the last cohort was 
interviewed with a very limited questionnaire. Most of the LSIA questions are aimed at 
Primary Applicants for Australian Residency, defined as individuals whose characteristics 
served as the basis of their approval for migration to Australia. For that reason, samples of 
LSIA1 and LSIA2 are limited to this category of applicants, which is represented by 5,192 
persons in the first survey and 3,118 persons in the second. The remitting behaviour of these 
two cohorts of immigrants is examined and compared in Chapter 4. The well-being of the 
second cohort is compared with the well-being of the immigrant-only sample from HILDA in 
Chapter 5. 
As each dataset contains some information not available in the other, using both HILDA and 
LSIA enabled a more complete analysis of immigrants’ financial behaviour. For example, 
HILDA, despite being a source of rich information about household finances, lacks detailed 
information related to immigrants’ arrival in Australia and their families overseas. Using 
LSIA data, on the other hand, provided useful immigrant-specific data, such as information 
about their entry visas to Australia and their remitted amounts, but the data were not 
sufficient to estimate their financial risk-taking ability or saving habits. Therefore, the 
application of both HILDA and LSIA data allowed a more detailed investigation of 
immigrants’ attitudes to their finances than using each dataset on its own.  
1.4 Contributions of the thesis 
This section clarifies the contributions of this thesis to the existing literature and describes the 
key findings of the following four chapters. Chapter 2 investigates what affects the financial 
market participation of Australians, and whether the home-country institutions of immigrants 
to Australia influence their participation in Australian financial markets. Chapter 3 analyses 
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the determinants of the saving rates of Australian households and, for those who arrived from 
overseas, how these rates are related to their home countries’ characteristics, such as the 
national saving rate. Chapter 4 changes the focus from wealth accumulation to a 
decumulation aspect of immigrants’ financial behaviour, that is, the provision of financial 
help to their friends and relatives overseas. In particular, it analyses what determines how 
often and how much immigrants remit money abroad, and how changes in Australian 
immigration policies in the late 1990s affected remittance outflows from Australia. Finally, 
Chapter 5 looks at the overall well-being of Australians and whether well-being, among other 
factors, depends on a person’s country of origin. The financial well-being of immigrants is 
given special attention as one of the key domains of general well-being.  
The analysis of the financial behaviour of immigrants to Australia starts by looking at their 
ability to take financial risk. Participation in financial markets is associated with financial risk 
which, in turn, increases with higher returns. Hence, stock market investment is a popular 
measure of financial risk-taking. The additional measure, uniquely used in this research, is 
financial risk-taking self-measured by individuals on a scale from 1 to 4. These two measures 
are used for the first time for the estimation of the financial risk-taking of Australian 
residents, reported in Chapter 2. This chapter first investigates what determines financial risk-
taking behaviour and if it differs for Australians born overseas. Subsequently, it is 
investigated if any detected differences can be attributed to the effects of immigrants’ home-
country institutions. Although the importance of institutional quality for the financial 
development of a country is a widely accepted fact, the effect of informal institutions on a 
country’s economy through international migration has not been broadly explored. The 
quality of institutions in immigrants’ home countries, reflected in their customs and beliefs, 
can become an informal constraint to the financial development of Australia by preventing 
immigrants from taking part in the financial market activities. Hence, Chapter 2 also attempts 
to address this important issue by applying to Australian data an approach similar to the one 
used by Osili and Paulson (2008) for immigrants to the US, and extending the approach by 
using an additional measure of financial risk.  
Consequently, Chapter 2 analyses the determinants of the financial risk-taking of Australian 
residents and whether this ability differs between native-born and foreign-born Australians. If 
this is the case, this chapter investigates to what extent this differential can be explained by 
the difference in the quality of home institutions. The findings reported in this chapter reveal 
that, among other factors, both the level of stock market investment and the level of self-
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reported financial risk-taking, at some periods, are dependent on whether an individual was 
born in Australia or abroad. In particular, both these measurements of financial risk take on 
lower values for immigrants to Australia than for other Australians. The difference in these 
risk attitudes can be explained by the institutional environment in the country of origin. 
However, institutions affect the financial behaviour of individuals through their investment 
and their risk-taking decisions in different  ways. 
The analysis proceeds in Chapter 3 by examining personal as well as home-country 
characteristics that affect the saving behaviour of immigrants to Australia. The importance of 
this kind of research for Australia is undeniable considering its ageing population and low 
fertility rate. Current literature focuses on more general aspects of the financial performance 
of Australian migrants such as income and wealth. Adding to the previous chapter, this 
chapter, for the first time to the best of the author’s knowledge, investigates whether the 
quality of home institutions plays a significant role in immigrants’ saving behaviour. In 
addition, the chapter contributes to the literature that attempts to explain the national saving 
rates differential, by using Australian data, also for the first time. 
Chapter 3 begins by investigating whether the saving rates of immigrant households are 
different from those of Australia-born households, using both a houshold-head-only sample 
and an extended sample of all household members. Then, if differences are detected, it is 
investigated if country-of-birth characteristics contribute to this gap. Since personal savings 
affect the savings of the nation, personal saving rates are supposed to be correlated with 
national saving rates. Hence, Chapter 3 also tests whether the national saving rates of 
immigrants’ home countries affect their saving decisions after migration to Australia. The 
results suggest that immigrants have lower saving rates than their native-born counterparts. 
Among the determinants, the quality of the institutional environment in the country of origin 
is found to be positively correlated and the national saving rate negatively correlated with the 
immigrants’ saving rates in Australia. The latter effect, though, is evident only in the 
extended sample of all household members. 
Another determinant of immigrants’ saving rates is the amount they send overseas to support 
their families and friends, which is examined in Chapter 4. Understanding the factors 
influencing immigrants’ remitting decisions is beneficial not only for the recipient economies 
but also for the governments of countries with a high proportion of immigrant population, 
such as Australia. The immigration rates to Australia in the last decade have skyrocketed, and 
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the remitted amount from Australia has increased to an even greater degree, which may 
prejudice the positive effect from international migration for the country’s economy. This 
coincides with the recent reform of Australian immigration policies aimed to attract more 
qualified immigrants whose higher earning potential could have also contributed to the rise in 
outward remittances. Thus, Chapter 4 contributes to the analysis of Australian immigrants’ 
attitudes to finance by analysing their remitting behaviour.  
Unlike the data from the HILDA survey used in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, LSIA has 
information about remittances in addition to other data relevant only for immigrants, such as 
their visa type used for entering Australia. This enables a unique analysis of the factors 
contributing to an immigrant’s ability and willingness to remit, with special emphasis on the 
effects of Australian immigration policies in Chapter 4. This chapter first selects the best 
model to decribe an immigrant’s remitting behaviour from three popular approaches: the two-
part model, the Tobit model and the Heckman two-step model. The chosen model is then 
used to identify factors influencing an immigrant’s remitting performance with the category 
of their entry visa being one of the variables considered. A comparison of the estimates for 
the cohorts of immigrants who arrived in Australia during different policy regimes should 
give some insight into how the 1990s government migration policies affected remittance 
outflows from Australia. The findings reported in Chapter 4 reveal that: first, the Heckman 
two-step model is the best approach for analysing the determinants of the remitting 
performance of the first cohort, and the two-part model is the most suitable for describing the 
factors affecting the remitting performance of the second cohort; and second, the effect of 
holding a certain visa category on the remitted amount, but not this effect on the remitting 
probability, changes between cohorts. This change could be attributed to the tougher 
requirements of the points test introduced in 1999 that, in turn, changed the profile of 
Independent Visa holders.  
Chapter 5, the last empirical chapter of the thesis, shifts the focus from the direct effects of 
immigration on the Australian economy to the indirect effects through immigrants’ well-
being. As argued by Oswald, Proto and Sgroi (2008), happier residents mean higher 
productivity, which facilitates the growth of a country’s output. The degree of happiness can 
be affected by a number of factors, including the residents’ financial situation, which can be 
measured not only by their income but also subjectively assessed by themselves. 
Nevertheless, to the best of the author’s knowledge, no research has been done to investigate 
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the difference in well-being between Australian-born and overseas-born individuals and its 
correlation with their financial well-being.   
Hence, the purpose of Chapter 5 is to investigate what determines the well-being of 
Australians defined as their life satisfaction, and to investigate if the level of well-being is 
different for people born overseas. Since the main purpose of people undergoing the 
numerous impediments associated with international migration is to improve their financial 
situation, the role of financial well-being in overall well-being is also analysed. Financial 
well-being is measured by objective measures such as the ability or inability to pay bills and 
difficulty in raising cash in an emergency, and subjective measures such as financial 
satisfaction and financial prosperity. The application of regression models using both HILDA 
and LSIA longitudinal data indicates that immigrants are less satisfied with their lives than 
Australian-born individuals, although the levels of their financial satisfaction are not 
different. Financial prosperity, in contrast, is lower for Australian-born than for Australians 
born overseas. Although immigrants experience a higher level of difficulty in raising 
additional cash in an emergency, their ability to pay basic bills is similar to that of native-
born Australians. These results may be attributed to the relative deterioration of immigrants’ 
financial situations after migration and to the cultural shock experienced by them, thus 
making the assessment of their well-being far more complex.  
Overall, the empirical findings of the research show that immigrants’ financial behaviour is 
different from that of native-born Australians. In particular, they save less and take lower 
financial risk. Their past influences their financial habits through customs and beliefs which 
take time to change. The lower financial risk-taking of new Australian residents could also be 
explained by their need to support families left in their home countries. Both the likelihood of  
remitting and the remitted amount do not depend solely on immigrants’ earning abilities. For 
example, having children in their home countries increases the probability of remitting, and 
having a secure job and higher earning potential affects the amounts of these transfers. 
Recent increases in immigration flows to Australia have also increased the remittance 
outflows from the country, mostly due to an increase in immigration under the independent 
program. This suggests that immigrants to Australia who arrived after 1999 immigration 
reform are financially better off on average than those who immigrated before this reform. 
However, these immigrants are still not as happy as native-born residents. The initial positive 
effect of their higher income in Australia could wear off due to their adjustment to the new 
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financial situation and using the incomes of native-born Australians as new points of 
comparison.  
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CHAPTER  2.  THE FINANCIAL RISK-TAKING OF IMMIGRANTS 
TO AUSTRALIA AND THE INFLUENCE OF HOME-COUNTRY 
INSTITUTIONS
5
 
2.1 Introduction 
In the year 2000, 24.6 per cent of Australian residents of working age were immigrants. This 
was the second highest rate of OECD countries after Luxemburg (27.4 per cent) (Docquier & 
Marfouk 2005). Moreover, ageing populations have resulted in the reduction in labour supply 
in many industrialised countries and, as a consequence, increased demand for labour from 
abroad. The forecast by the World Bank (2006b) was that an increase in immigration flows 
from developing to high-income countries would exceed the current annual growth of 3 per 
cent. This means that immigrants’ financial behaviour has a huge impact on the Australian 
financial system and this is likely to increase in the future. 
Over the last few decades, there has been a significant reduction in international trade barriers 
and financial transaction costs but, in contrast, international migration is still subject to high 
barriers. This is due to political controversy around migration in spite of its considerable 
economic benefits. There are gains to society from immigration such as reduced labour 
market pressures as well as some temporary impediments. When emigrating to another 
country, people carry their experiences and traditions from their home countries. An example 
of a temporary impediment is that if an immigrant had negative experiences with the financial 
market in their home country, this can prevent them from participating in the financial market 
of their host country and constrain its financial growth.  
Being aware of the factors which affect the financial risk-taking ability of a country’s citizens 
is important for the country’s financial development. Participation in any financial activity 
exposes individuals to some financial risks for higher return investments involving greater 
risk and requiring greater trust in institutions. Investing in equities, for instance, requires 
more confidence in institutions than opening a savings account in a bank (Osili & Paulson 
2008). Accordingly, a tendency to take a higher financial risk when investing in a country’s 
financial market is an indicator of a healthy economy with growth potential. Risk-taking 
behaviour, however, might differ between people of different countries depending on 
                                                 
5
 A version of this chapter was published in The International Journal of Diversity in Organizations, 
Communities and Nations, vol. 11, no. 4, pp. 37-54.  
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country-specific factors, such as a country’s institutional environment. The high proportion of 
immigrants in Australia suggests the need for analysis that identifies the factors affecting 
their participation in the financial market and includes their experience before migration to 
Australia.  
This research first investigated what determines the financial risk-taking of Australian 
residents, and whether it is different for residents born overseas. Because a difference was 
found, the study proceeded by testing if the home-country institutions of the immigrants play 
any part in this. Individuals’ risk-taking behaviour can be described by their self-assessed 
preparedness to take financial risk. Stock market investment is also a popular measure of 
financial risk. Cardak and Wilkins (2009) argued that shares or common stock represent the 
main group of risky financial assets. Thus, in addition to an individual’s own assessment, the 
probability of an individual investing in the stock market is also used to measure their 
propensity to take financial risk. These measures of financial risk-taking, however, are based 
on somewhat different concepts; hence this chapter also analyses if they can be used 
interchangeably. 
The findings reported in this chapter provided evidence that both the level of stock market 
investment and the level of self-reported financial risk-taking are lower at some periods for 
individuals born abroad than for native-born Australians. The difference in these risk 
attitudes can be explained by the institutional environment in immigrants’ home countries. 
However, institutions affect the financial behaviour of individuals who arrive in Australia as 
adults through their investment and risk-taking decisions in different ways. Thus, despite a 
close association between equity investment and financial risk-taking self-assessed by 
individuals, these terms are not interchangeable.  
Following the literature review and the discussion of data and methodology, the empirical 
results are presented in two stages in this chapter. At the first stage, the financial risk-taking 
of Australian residents was measured by the probability of their investment in the share 
market. Subsequently, it was investigated if an individual’s decision to own stocks depends, 
among other factors, on whether they were born in Australia or overseas. If this is the case, it 
was tested if immigrants’ home-country institutions affect their stock market participation, 
thus possibly explaining any variation from that of native-born Australians. A similar 
analysis was applied to the financial risk-taking self-assessed by individuals. Hence, at the 
second stage, it was investigated whether being born overseas is one of the factors affecting 
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the self-assessed financial risk-taking by Australian residents, and to what extent any detected 
differential between native and foreign-born Australians could be explained by the 
immigrants’ home institutions’ constraints. The results obtained at both stages were 
compared to check the appropriateness of using an individual’s participation in the share 
market in place of their self-assessed financial risk-taking. The description and analysis of 
results are followed by concluding remarks. 
The analysis of the financial risk-taking of Australian residents was performed by using 
individual attributes as well as country characteristics. The data from the Household, Income 
and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey contain a wide range of personal 
characteristics such as age, gender and education. Country data, which were employed to 
measure the effect of home-country institutions, were obtained from other international 
surveys and databases, such as World Bank Development Indicators. 
2.2 Literature review 
In 2008, one quarter of the Australian workforce was born overseas (DIAC 2009c). 
Immigrants contribute to the growth of Australian economy mainly by their high propensity 
to work, by their skills and by increasing the working-age population (DIAC 2010). Among 
other positive economic outcomes for the country are a ‘brain gain’ representing the net 
increase in the number of skilled workers in Australia and immigrants’ strong contribution to 
the Australian Government budget. Economic theory, as described by Giordani and Ruta 
(2011), also suggests that immigrant workers raise national welfare through the increase of 
benefits accrued to ‘native capitalists’. In addition to these obvious and direct benefits for the 
Australian economy, immigration can also affect the country’s economic growth indirectly by 
influencing its financial environment.  
Building a sound financial system is important for any country as it gives individuals and 
companies confidence to invest. Rousseau and Sylla (2001) defined the characteristics of a 
good financial system: sound public finances and public debt management; stable monetary 
arrangements; a variety of banks; a central bank to stabilise domestic finances and manage 
international financial relations; and well-functioning securities markets. A financial system 
that includes these components will be able to manage capital domestically and thus 
contribute to economic growth.  
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Levine (2004) reviewed a vast range of literature debating the advantages and disadvantages 
of different types of financial systems. Some studies argued for a market-based system, 
others for a bank-based financial system. However, the prevailing argument was that ‘both 
financial intermediaries and markets matter for growth even when controlling for potential 
simultaneity bias’ (Levine 2004, p. 85). Both systems contribute to financial development 
and both can perform better if the legal system, for example, the legal protection of investors 
and shareholders, is improved. Many of the authors Levine reviewed also suggested that there 
are other determinants of financial development such as political, cultural and geographical 
factors. Nevertheless, as emphasised by Levine (2004), more research is required for a better 
understanding of what contributes to financial growth and the interaction between financial 
development and economic growth. 
Although, according to Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004), all factors explaining 
differences in countries’ development can be grouped into three major strands  – geography, 
integration and institutions – the last group was found to be the most important. They argued 
that once institutions are controlled for, integration and geography have hardly any direct 
effects on incomes. This has been supported by findings from a number of studies 
investigating the link between institutions and economic performance (Efendic, Pugh & 
Adnett 2011; Rajan & Zingales 2003). This consensus supported the earlier proposition by 
North (1990) that institutions affect economic performance. He defined institutions as formal 
constraints devised by people and informal constraints that embody customs and traditions.  
Unlike most research on the importance of the institutional environment for financial growth 
which use cross-country data, Osili and Paulson (2008) used American data to analyse the 
effect of informal institutions on the financial behaviour of immigrants. The authors claimed 
that changing formal institutions by the government is not as challenging as changing culture 
and behavioural norms. Hence, they investigated two crucially important features of 
economic development: financial market development and immigration.  
A number of different measures of institutional quality were employed by Osili and Paulson 
(2008) to ensure the robustness of their results. First, they used the attributes of a developed 
financial system such as property rights protection and a transparent and reliable legal system 
that, in accordance with Rajan and Zingales (2003), could be regulated only by a country’s 
government. Osili and Paulson (2008) also accounted for a country’ geography to capture 
stronger institutional performance in countries located further from the equator (Rodrik, 
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Subramanian & Trebbi 2004), and they also took into account human capital that, as they 
argued, also determines a country’s institutional quality.  
The findings of Osili and Paulson (2008) suggested that the quality of home country 
institutions is an important determinant of immigrants’ financial behaviour in the US. In 
particular, they argued that: first, informal institutional constraints are enforced through 
immigrants’ behaviour; second, these institutional controls start influencing people at a very 
young age, presumably through school and family networks; and, finally, the informal 
institutional effects on immigrants’ financial behaviour differ from other cultural effects. For 
example, institutional constraints are not transferred through generations once the formal 
institution environment is altered, and they are not eradicated through obtaining more 
education.  
The institutional effects in Australia may be different from those experienced in the US due 
to their different immigration policies and sources of migrants. According to Garnaut (2003), 
the distribution of costs and benefits from immigration in Australia is vastly different from 
that in the US. Due to the higher education level of Australian immigrants, their arrival tends 
to raise the average income of relatively unskilled labour in Australia in contrast with the 
depressing effect of immigration on the income of low-skilled Americans. In addition, the 
‘multiculturalist policy’ followed in Australia is still a subject of debate  in the US (Tehranian 
2003).  
Some work has been done to analyse how migration to Australia influences its financial 
markets. For example, Cobb-Clark and Hildebrand (2008) compared and analysed the net 
worth and asset portfolios of immigrant-only, mixed and native Australian families. Their 
results suggested that ‘the nativity gap is much smaller in Australia than in other immigrant-
receiving countries’ (Cobb-Clark & Hildebrand 2008, p. 17). On average, they argued, single 
immigrants even have $185,000 more wealth than single natives do, whereas the net wealth 
of foreign-born couples is 83 per cent of that of native-born couples.  
The difference in risk preferences has been suggested as one of the reasons for the gap in 
wealth accumulation (Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo 2002). They claimed that risk preferences 
can affect wealth accumulation through investment and saving choices. Particularly, these 
preferences result in immigrants in the US saving less than natives. Additionally, Cardak and 
Wilkins (2009), in their study of determinants of risky assets holdings by Australian 
households, indicated a negative correlation of being an immigrant with a non-English-
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speaking background with household allocations to risky financial assets. Similarly, Bonin et 
al. (2007) argued that foreign nationals in Germany generally are more risk averse than 
natives are. 
However, despite the great significance of taking higher financial risk, immigrants should 
practice this with caution. Even though assets involving greater financial risk, such as 
equities, are important contributors to household wealth, Australian’s asset portfolios are still 
dominated by housing and superannuation (Headey, Warren & Wooden 2008). Similarly, as 
suggested by Doiron and Guttman (2009), government policies should be aimed at improving 
labour market performance and eliminating barriers to wealth accumulation for immigrants. 
This suggests a balanced approach to policy reforms which would consider all aspects 
contributing to the growth of wealth.  
The importance of financial development is undeniable. Hence, research on the factors 
contributing to financial growth is an area of great interest. Although the importance of the 
quality of institutions for financial growth is highlighted in the majority of papers, the effect 
of informal institutions on Australian financial markets through behaviour of its immigrants 
has not yet been investigated. In addition, risk preferences have been suggested as an 
important determinant of financial market outcomes in most studies; however, the factors 
affecting financial risk-taking have not been extensively explored. 
The popular definition of risk attitude used in finance is equivalent to a risky choice based on 
a risk-return framework. For example, an investment in riskier assets should be expected to 
provide higher benefits. Hence, some researchers have used equity investment with its higher 
than average returns and higher riskiness as a measure of financial risk-taking (Cardak & 
Wilkins 2009). However, Sarin and Weber (1993) argued that although expected return is a 
good measure of value, this measurement of risk is not so clear. Risk-taking ability might be 
affected by factors which are difficult to quantify and some risk measurements can be 
inferred from a person’s choice. For instance, risk premium and variance are measures of risk 
derived from an expected utility model. This research suggests that people’s perception of the 
risks involved, which affects their assessment of the financial risk they are prepared to take, 
can also measure financial risk. Hence, financial risk in this study is measured by both equity 
investment and individuals’ perceptions of their level of financial risk-taking. The application 
of the former measure is consistent with the other studies; however, the application of the 
24 
 
latter definition of financial risk and the interchangeability of both terms have not been tested 
yet.  
2.3 Data and methodology 
As discussed above, the ability of an individual to take financial risk can be represented by 
both equity investment and self-reported financial risk-taking (hereinafter referred to as 
SRFRT). The financial risk-taking in this research was estimated by two models which are 
described in the section below. The subsequent sections describe personal and country-level 
data used in this chapter.  
2.3.1 Methodology 
The methodology used discrete dependent variable models. Osili and Paulson (2008) 
investigated stock market investment decisions using a linear probability model. This study 
extended their analysis by using measures of SRFRT behaviour as well as stock market 
investment. As SRFRT contains four risk levels, discrete dependent variable models were 
used in this analysis instead of the linear probability model. In addition, estimations from two 
separate periods and combined data were compared. All analyses were performed by using 
STATA software (version 11). 
Since stock market participation is often used as a measure of financial risk-taking, the 
factors affecting the equity investment of Australian residents were investigated first. To be 
consistent with the model used by Osili and Paulson (2008), it was assumed that the 
probability density function of the error term is the standard normal distribution. 
Accordingly, the decision to participate in the stock market was described by the probit 
model, which expresses the probability that an individual has equity investment as: 
)()0Pr(),,,|1Pr( 212121 jiijjijiij ZXZXZXS  
,
(2.1) 
where  (εij) is the  probit function, which is the standard normal cumulative distribution 
function; Sij is the decision to own stocks by an immigrant i from country j which is equal to 1 
for positive equity investment and 0 for zero equity investment; Xi includes individual 
controls such as age, income and education; and Zj represents the quality of institutions in 
country j. Details of  these variables are given in Table A.1 and Table A.2 in Appendix A. 
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A second model measured the determinants of the financial risk-taking behaviour represented 
by SRFRT. HILDA provided a self-reported assessment of the financial risk a person is 
prepared to take. This variable takes values from 1 to 5, with 1 representing the highest risk, 4 
zero risk behaviour and 5 not having any spare cash for an investment. The dependent 
variable in this study was created by using only the first four options in an ascending order. 
Thus, the financial risk-taking (SRFRTij) variable was reformed to a scale from 1 to 4, with 4 
measuring the highest risk, which necessitates the use of an ordered dependent variable 
model with normal distribution. Since the probit link function is often employed for this kind 
of model, the ordered probit model was used to estimate SRFRT:  
)(1),,,,|Pr( 2121 JiMjiij ZXZXMSRFRT    , (2.2) 
where 4,...,1 MM , and other variables are as described above. 
The two models have similar features. The probit model used for equity investment describes 
the relationship between independent variables and an outcome expressed as a probability 
represented by a dichotonomous dependent variable. The probit model uses a normal 
distribution to estimate the possibility that a person will invest in shares given their personal 
attributes and country-of-origin characteristics. Rather like the probit model, the ordered 
dependent variable model measures the probability that a person will take a certain level of 
risk given their characteristics. It assumes the levels are ordered based on increasing risk-
taking behaviour.  
These models were estimated for both years separately, thus enabling the comparison of the 
results in different time periods. A panel data model was also used to provide further insights 
into financial risk-taking behaviour over time. The Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square statistic was 
used to test whether at least one of the regression coefficients in each model was not equal to 
zero and all models passed this test. Similarly, the random effect logit model used for the 
estimation of the equity investment of people from the panel dataset passed the Wald Chi-
Square test.  
2.3.2 Personal data 
The data on individuals were taken from the HILDA Survey. HILDA provides longitudinal 
data on randomly selected Australian residents occupying private dwellings all over the 
country and focuses on the subjects of families, income, employment and well-being 
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(Wilkins, Warren & Hahn 2009). As discussed in Chapter 1, only data from 2002 and 2006 
were used in this research due to the household finances module being included only in these 
two years. Data collected in 2002 consists of 18,295 individuals, and the 2006 survey has a 
sample size of 17,454, of whom 13,041 and 12,905 respectively were interviewed.  
Personal characteristics included in the models are age, wealth, income, employment, 
education, gender, marital status, number of resident children and Major Statistical Region 
(MSR). Since a better financial situation, generally measured by wealth and income, is  
conducive to an individual’s ability to take financial risk, it is expected that the variables that 
affect wealth accumulation also influence the propensity to take financial risk. According to 
Bauer et al. (2007), a household’s demographic characteristics such as age can explain a large 
portion of the nativity gap. They suggested that immigrant households in Australia are 
typically older and, therefore, are less likely to have dependent children than Australian-born 
households. The resultant immigrants’ relative educational advantage, even though it does 
not translate into a wealth advantage, reduces the immigrants’ wealth disadvantage, which 
otherwise could have been higher by $14,000. Accordingly, it is expected that the number of 
dependent children would have a negative effect on an individual’s financial risk-taking 
potential due to demands on family financial resources associated with raising a child, but 
older age and higher educational level, which are associated with a better financial situation, 
would have a postive effect. To see if there is a non-linear relationship between individuals’ 
financial risk-taking and their age, a squared age variable was included in addition to the 
actual age. Osili and Paulson (2006) suggested that married individuals show more active 
financial market participation, measured by their ownership of savings and cheque accounts. 
Hence, it is expected that they are financially better off than their single counterparts and, 
accordingly, are more prone to a risky attitude to finances. Financial risk-taking can also 
depend on an individual’s gender, with men having a lower probability of holding savings 
and cheque accounts (Osili & Paulson 2006), and on an individual’s employment status, 
which also affects their financial security. Similar to the use of the Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas by Osili and Paulson (2006, 2008), the inclusion of MSR fixed effects captures the 
effect of a community whose residents could have a common economic environment and 
possibly similar preferences. All personal variables are described in Table A.1 in Appendix 
A. 
To meet the purpose of this analysis, some transformations of the sample were performed. 
For example, in panel data estimations or whenever the samples for 2002 and 2006 were 
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combined, household wealth and income were converted into 2002 prices to account for 
inflation. The sample size was limited to individuals aged 15 and older, assuming that 
children under this age do not have enough wealth to take financial risk. Furthermore, 
observations with negative values of disposable income were dropped, as such individuals 
were assumed to be unable to take financial risk, and the observations without any 
information on country of origin were not included. These restrictions reduced the sample 
sizes to 13,002 persons in 2002 and to 12,853 in 2006.  
Table 2.1 (Panel A) compares some of the characteristics of the immigrants and native-born 
Australians surveyed in 2002. The average immigrant is five years older, has slightly fewer 
children in the household and is better educated than an average person born in Australia. 
Compared to individuals born in Australia, immigrants have a similar gender distribution
6
, a 
higher percentage of married individuals, a lower employment rate and the same income. 
However, in agreement with a number of studies (Cobb-Clark & Hildebrand 2008; Doiron & 
Guttman 2009), the mean value of the wealth of immigrant households is lower than that of 
native-born Australians. In terms of financial risk-taking, despite the fact that both groups are 
prepared to take similar financial risks (1.6 out of 4), more of the Australian-born population 
own stocks than immigrants do, with an average value of 45 per cent compared to 38 per 
cent.  
A similar analysis is carried out in Panel B and Panel C of Table 2.1, which compares the 
characteristics of immigrants and Australian-born individuals using data collected in 2006 
and the combined data for 2002 and 2006, respectively. The comparison shows an identical 
picture for the combined dataset to that found for the 2002 data, with a couple of exclusions 
in the 2006 responses. First, in 2006, unlike in 2002, the mean financial year gross income is 
significantly higher for immigrants by almost $1,300. Another difference is that in 2006 the 
levels of household wealth do not differ between immigrants and native-born individuals, 
whereas in 2002 there is a wealth advantage in favour of the latter group. This wealth 
advantage of native-born individuals is also present in the combined dataset. Specifically, in 
                                                 
6
 Comparison of age and gender ratio data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics reveals similar results. For 
example, immigrants surveyed in 2002 and 2006 are older than Australian-born residents (with median age 
recorded in both periods as 46 for overseas-born and 33 for Australian-born residents). A slightly higher median 
age in HILDA could be attributed to the exclusion of children below the age of 15 from the sample. Similar to 
HILDA, both groups in both periods also have an approximately equal percentage of male and female 
respondents (ABS 2011). This suggests that the HILDA dataset is a good representative sample of the 
Australian population. 
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the combined dataset, mean income per person for both groups is above $27,000 and 
households with Australian-born members are wealthier by $27,400 on average.  
Table 2.1 Characteristics of foreign and Australian-born individuals 
Panel A) 2002 data 
Characteristics Australian-born  Foreign-born 
Age 42.36  47.67*** 
 (17.97)  (16.78) 
% male 47.38  48.60 
% married (or de-facto) 60.05  70.73*** 
% employed 63.97  55.59*** 
Number of resident children 14 y.o. or younger 0.54  0.50** 
 
 (0.100)  (0.94) 
Disposable income for financial year ($) 24,187 
 
 24,274 
 (21,911)  (23,438) 
Household wealth ($) 452,922 
 
 419,285** 
 (676,976)  (671,913) 
Level of highest education achieved (%)    
No post-school qualification 55.22  48.83*** 
Bachelor degree or higher 17.06  22.77*** 
Other post-school qualification 27.72  28.40 
Financial risk-taking    
Preparedness to take financial risk (scale 1-4) 1.64 
 
 1.61 
 (0.70)  (0.72) 
% investing in equity 44.89  38.34*** 
Number of individuals 9,924  3,078 
 
Notes: Mean values are reported unless otherwise stated. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. The sample is restricted to 
individuals aged 15 or older who have non-missing data country of origin. *** indicates a significant difference from a 
native-born Australian at at least the 1% level, ** at at least the 5% level, * at at least the 10% level, when mean-comparison 
t-test is used. 
Panel B) 2006 data 
Characteristics Australian-born  Foreign-born  
Age 42.29 
 
 49.50*** 
 (18.64)  (16.96) 
% male 47.02  47.37 
% married (or de-facto) 58.94  69.92*** 
% employed 66.29  58.94*** 
Number of resident children 14 y.o. or younger 0.48 
 
 0.45*  
 (0.93)  (0.86) 
Disposable income for financial year ($) 30,009.06 
 
 31,271.56** 
 (26,391)  (29,858) 
Household wealth($) 675,141 
 
 671,639 
 (1,251,811)  (1,232,013) 
Level of highest education achieved (%)    
No post-school qualification 51.72  43.74*** 
Bachelor degree or higher 18.71  26.55*** 
Other post-school qualification 29.58  29.71 
Financial risk-taking    
Preparedness to take financial risk (scale 1-4) 1.64 
 
 1.64 
 (0.71)  (0.74) 
% investing in equity 41.71  37.09*** 
Number of individuals 10,130  2,723 
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Notes: Mean values are reported unless otherwise stated. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. The sample is restricted to 
individuals aged 15 years or older who have non-missing data country of origin. *** indicates a significant difference from a 
native-born Australian at at least the 1% level, ** at at least the 5 % level, * at at least the 10% level, when mean-
comparison t-test is used. 
Panel C) combined data 
Characteristics Australian-born Foreign-born  
Age 42.33 
 
48.53*** 
 (18.31) (16.89) 
% male 47.20 48.02 
% married (or de-facto) 59.49 70.35*** 
% employed 65.14 57.16*** 
Number of resident children 14 y.o. or younger 0.51 
 
0.47*** 
 (0.96) (0.91) 
Disposable income for financial year ($) 27,128  
 
27,559  
 (24,451) (26,870) 
Household wealth($) 565,173  537,740*     
 
 (1,015,210) (983,728) 
Level of highest education achieved (%)   
No post-school qualification 53.45 46.44*** 
Bachelor degree or higher 17.89 24.55*** 
Other post-school qualification 28.66 29.01 
Financial risk-taking   
Preparedness to take financial risk (scale 1-4) 1.64 
 
1.63 
 (0.71) (0.73) 
% investing in equity 43.28 37.75*** 
Number of individuals 20,054 5,801 
 
Notes: Mean values are reported unless otherwise stated. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. The sample is restricted to 
individuals aged 15 or older who have non-missing data country of origin. *** indicates a significant difference from a 
native-born Australian at at least the 1% level, ** at at least the 5 % level, * at at least the 10% level, when mean-
comparison t-test is used. 
Table 2.2 summarises some features of immigrants for all three datasets. More than half of all 
immigrant respondents were born in Europe. Asia has the second highest number of people 
migrating to Australia, followed by immigrants from New Zealand and Pacific Island 
countries with 12 per cent emigration. A quarter of the immigrants arrived in Australia before 
1964, and after that arrivals were fairly evenly distributed until the end of the century except 
for a drop in immigration in the late 1970s and peak arrivals observed in the late 1980s. 
According to the combined data and the data collected in 2002, the smallest percentage of the 
immigrant sample arrived in the country after the start of the survey. Just over half of the 
immigrant population migrated when they were over 20. 
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Table 2.2 Characteristics of immigrants 
Immigrant Characteristic 2002 data 2006 data Combined data 
Year of arrival in Australia (%)    
Before 1964 24.91 23.06 24.04 
1965-1969 10.71 10.33 10.54 
1970-1974 10.39 10.56 10.47 
1975-1979 5.54 5.52 5.53 
1980-1984 9.48 10.19 9.81 
1985-1989 14.16 13.57 13.89 
1990-1994 10.19 10.00 10.10 
1995-1999 10.26 10.08 10.17 
2000-2002 (2006) 4.36 6.69 5.46 
Age at migration (%)    
5 years or younger 14.00 15.92 14.90 
6 to 10 years 10.77 11.16 10.95 
11 to 15 years 8.38 8.83 8.59 
16 to 20 years 11.13 10.71 10.93 
over 20 years 55.73 53.38 54.63 
Continent of origin (%)a    
Asia 23.57 23.42 23.50 
Africa 5.43 5.92 5.66 
North America 2.34 2.68 2.50 
South America 1.85 1.88 1.86 
Europe 55.07 53.86 54.50 
Oceania (excl. Australia) 11.74 12.24 11.97 
 
Notes: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 15 or older who have non-missing data on country of origin.  
a Although there are few observations with Antarctica as continent of origin, this is treated as a recording error and only six  
continents (all except Antarctica) are used in this study.  
 
2.3.3 Country data 
Data from international databases were employed for understanding the effects of 
immigrants’ home countries’ characteristics. A complete list of independent country variables 
with definitions is presented in Table A.2 in Appendix A. Table A.3 summarises the statistics 
for each of the country variables used. Of the 120 countries represented as a country of birth 
in HILDA, full country data is available for only 56 countries. 
The Worldwide Governance Indicators created by the World Bank (Kaufmann, Kraay & 
Mastruzzi 2008b) and institutional characteristics from other studies were used as sources for 
institutional data. Unlike individuals, a goverment has the power to coordinate standards and 
enforce non-monetary punishments such as jail terms, as acknowledged by Rajan and 
Zingales (2003). They argued that this ability of a government enables it to create a sound 
financial system characterised by respect for property rights, transparent accounting and 
disclosure systems, contract-enforcing legal systems, protected consumers, a competitive 
environment and control of egregious risk-taking. The World Bank’s Aggregate Governance 
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Indicators cover most of these aspects and include Voice and Accountability, Political 
Stability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of 
Corruption. All these variables measure perceptions about the quality of a country’s 
government, such as freeedom of expression, respect for civil liberties, and free and fair 
elections, as measured by Voice and Accountability (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi 2008a). 
These indicators, originally measured from about -2.5 to 2.5, were normalised by adding 4 to 
convert them to positive numbers to enable further transformation into logarithms, so they 
became positive numbers less than 2. Similarly to the study of Osili and Paulson (2008), 
Constraints on the Executive measuring the degree of institutional constraints on the 
decision-making powers of chief executives on a scale from 1 to 7 was taken from the Polity 
IV Project database (INSCR 2009). Data on British legal origin and geographic latitude were 
taken from La Porta et al. (1999). The former accounts for a greater protection of 
shareholders in countries with a British legal tradition, and the latter for stronger institutions 
in countries located further from the equator (Osili & Paulson 2008). Human capital was 
suggested by Osili and Paulson (2008) as an important factor for developing strong 
institutions in a country. Hence, a country’s school enrolment from the World Bank 
Development Indicators (World Bank 2010) was another measure of institutional quality used 
in this reseach. 
Country characteristics such as gross domestic product (GDP), market capitalisation and 
workers remittances were also taken from the World Bank Development Indicators (World 
Bank 2010), whereas the English Speaking variable was taken from Bleakley and Chin 
(2004) and the dominant religion of a country from the World Christian Encyclopedia (2007). 
While these variables may not directly influence home institutions, they could possibly be 
correlated with country-of-origin institutional quality. As argued by Rodrik, Subramanian and 
Trebbi (2004), countries with better institutions have a higher GDP. According to Osili and 
Paulson (2008), the market capitalisation of a country is also normally higher in countries 
with strong institutions. The ability to speak English, they argued, can also be associated with 
a higher institutional quality in immigrants’ home countries when these countries are former 
British colonies. In contrast, remittances received by immigrants’ home countries can be 
negatively correlated with the quality of institutions (Osili & Paulson 2008). For example, 
demand for remittances may be high for countries with weak institutions due to limited 
formal sources of insurance and investment funds. The effect of religion on a country’s 
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institutional quality, proposed by Stulz and Williams (2003), was also tested by adding a 
country’s dominant religion.  
Similarly to the study by Osili and Paulson (2008), the effect of each institutional 
characteristic on the variables of interest was examined separately. The reason for this is the 
high correlation between different measures of institutional quality. Institutional 
characteristics may vary from country to country; however, they are also highly correlated 
with each other, with the highest correlations observed between the Aggregate Governance 
Indicators, as indicated in Table A.4 in Appendix A
7
.  
The following sections present results grouped into two main categories. The first category 
presents the results of the estimations with the dependent variable being equity investment, 
and the second presents the results of the SRFRT model. Identical approaches were used for 
both models. The models were applied to the 2002, 2006 and combined datasets to 
investigate whether the financial risk-taking behaviour of immigrants is different from that of 
native-born residents. A significant difference was found, so the data were analysed to 
determine if institutional factors could possibly have caused it. 
2.4 Equity investment: results and analysis 
The goal of this chapter is to investigate the factors that affect immigrants’ participation in 
the Australian financial markets. Any financial activity is accompanied by a financial risk; 
thus, the level of financial risk-taking in this study represents the intensity of financial 
behaviour. Financial risk-taking, in turn, can be defined by a household’s disposition for 
relatively risky financial investments, such as investments in the share market. Accordingly, 
this section examines the financial risk-taking behaviour of Australian residents represented 
by their participation in the Australian share market. It is first investigated what determines 
the decision of Australian residents to participate in the share market, and whether the 
probability of buying shares by immigrants differs from that of native-born Australians. Then 
the role of immigrants’ home institutions in causing any difference in their share market 
participation is examined.    
                                                 
7
 The correlation coefficients range from 0.734 between Political Stability and Voice and Accountability to 
0.999 between Government Effectiveness and Control of Corruption. 
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2.4.1 Difference in equity investment between immigrants and native-born individuals 
The analysis of the determinants of stock market participation was carried out by applying 
probit model (2.1) to 2002 and 2006 data, excluding the institutional variables
8
 and including 
a dummy which is equal to 1 if an individual was born in Australia and 0 otherwise. The 
random effects logit model with the same independent variables was used for estimating the 
panel data model as the more complicated probit model failed to converge. The results of this 
exercise are presented in Table 2.3.  
Table 2.3 Factors affecting the probability of equity investment by Australian residents 
(aged 15 or older)  
VARIABLES 2002 20069 Panel data 
Age 0.0167*** 0.00631 0.0381*** 
 (0.00413) (0.00409) (0.0101) 
Age2 -0.0001** 0.0000225 -0.000189* 
 (0.0000419) (0.0000414) (0.000103) 
Wealth 0.00887*** 0.00493*** 0.0214*** 
 (0.000261) (0.000052) (0.000621) 
Income -0.0155** -0.0188*** -0.0766*** 
 (0.00701) (0.00694) (0.0154) 
Employment status (Employed = base case): 
Unemployed -0.473*** -0.336*** -0.873*** 
 (0.0682) (0.0762) (0.151) 
Not in labour force -0.220*** -0.185*** -0.545*** 
 (0.0335) (0.0350) (0.0785) 
Level of highest education achieved (No post-school qualification = base case): 
Bachelor degree or higher 0.0941*** 0.0861*** 0.206*** 
 (0.0289) (0.0293) (0.0738) 
Other post-school qualification 0.374*** 0.302*** 1.043*** 
 (0.0340) (0.0330) (0.0883) 
    
Gender (1 if male) -0.0188 0.00394 0.0276 
 (0.0247) (0.0245) (0.0645) 
Marital status (Married = base case): 
Previously married -0.331*** -0.319*** -0.953*** 
 (0.0375) (0.0390) (0.0946) 
Never been married -0.0598 -0.0926** -0.320*** 
 (0.0397) (0.0405) (0.0934) 
    
No. of children -0.0163 -0.0796*** -0.138*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0153) (0.0348) 
Born in Australia 0.244*** 0.253*** 0.809*** 
 (0.0294) (0.0299) (0.0802) 
Constant -0.886*** -0.667*** -2.190*** 
 (0.112) (0.111) (0.268) 
Observations 13005 12853 25858 
Log likelihood -7563 -7582 -13954 
Pseudo R-squared 0.150 0.127  
 
Notes: In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also include MSR controls, which are not reported due 
to low significance. The sample is limited to individuals aged 15 or older who have non-missing data on country of origin. 
Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. *** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
                                                 
8
 Country of origin variables controlling for the quality of institutions were not included since Australian-born 
individuals form the majority of the sample. 
9
 The convergence of the 2006 model was achieved when the Berndt-Hall-Hall-Hausman algorithm was used for 
likelihood function maximisation instead of the default Newton-Raphson algorithm.   
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The coefficients for all three regressions are similar except that, unlike in the other two cases, 
a negative effect from having resident children is not significant in 2002. Additionally, the 
age factor does not play any role in defining a household’s investment strategy in 2006, 
whereas in 2002 and when panel data are used, older individuals are associated with a higher 
participation in the Australian share market, peaking at the age of 84. However, the 
probability of investing in the share market in 2006, unlike in 2002, decreases when the 
number of resident children increases.  
A similar probit model is applied to a more specific dataset which excludes individuals aged 
35 and younger. As older individuals are more likely to have a stable job and a permanent 
home, additional variables describing occupation types and household location have been 
included. These variables were not significant when the whole data set was used, most 
probably because the younger respondents have less settled careers and residences. Table 2.4 
presents the results of this exercise. 
These results confirm that individuals born outside Australia have a lower propensity to 
invest in shares than native-born Australians. Both tables also suggest that a higher equity 
investment is associated with a higher level of wealth. As expected, people in a committed 
relationship report a higher participation in the stock market than others, and individuals who 
have no post-school qualification do not invest as much as those who have at least some post-
school education. Understandably, unemployed people do not have as many resources as their 
employed counterparts to buy equities. The gender of the respondents does not play a 
significant role in affecting the equity investment decisions in 2006 in either table. Positive 
age affect is more prominent when a younger generation is excluded from the dataset. The 
negative effect of having an additional resident child is present in 2006 estimates only, and its 
borderline significant positive effect detected in 2002 in the 36+ dataset estimates can be 
ignored.  
Compared to Table 2.3, additional parameters defining occupational status and household 
location are reported in Table 2.4. These factors affect equity investment in different ways. 
For example, associate professionals, tradespersons, advanced clerical workers and labourers 
have a lower probability of holding equities than managers and administrators in 2006 and 
the combined dataset. The fact that there is no evident difference in the equity investment 
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between representatives of various occupations in 2002
10
, but there is a presence of the 
gender effect in this year, could be explained by an inefficiency of the estimates caused by 
possible collinearity between occupation and gender. Even though there are expectations of 
declining occupational sex segregation, there are still many occupations in Australia that 
reflect historical gender roles (Preston & Whitehouse 2004). In addition, residents of 
households located in major urban regions are more likely to invest in equities than 
households in other urban regions in both periods. However, the probability of them investing 
in equities does not differ from that of rural area residents.  
The income effect on the probability of holding shares by individuals from the 15+ and 36+ 
samples is different, possibly due to the varying spending priorities of people across 
generations. For example, the negative effect in the first dataset could be due to young 
individuals spending on life-style choices rather than investment. Priorities though change 
with age; hence, there is a positive correlation of income and equity investment in the 36+ 
sample.  
                                                 
10
 The difference in equity investment participation between managers and administrators, tradespersons and 
advanced clerical workers is borderline significant in 2002, and thus can be ignored.  
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Table 2.4 Factors affecting the probability of equity investment by Australian residents 
(aged 36 or older) 
VARIABLES 2002 2006 Panel data 
Age 0.0490*** 0.0356*** 0.103*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0104) (0.0271) 
Age2 -0.000367*** -0.000217** -0.000737*** 
 (0.0000908) (0.0000851) (0.000226) 
Wealth 0.00842*** 0.00360*** 0.0169*** 
 (0.000340) (0.000182) (0.000747) 
Income 0.0568*** 0.0836*** 0.128*** 
 (0.0122) (0.0139) (0.0288) 
Employment status (Employed = base case):    
Unemployed -0.512*** -0.556*** -1.251*** 
 (0.124) (0.141) (0.289) 
Not in labour force -0.218*** -0.247*** -0.782*** 
 (0.0747) (0.0729) (0.176) 
Occupation (Managers and administrators = base case):    
Professionals 0.00597 -0.0635 -0.108 
 (0.0767) (0.0728) (0.177) 
Associate professionals 0.00552 -0.156** -0.323* 
 (0.0829) (0.0791) (0.188) 
Trades persons -0.163* -0.235*** -0.734*** 
 (0.0877) (0.0862) (0.210) 
Elementary clerical workers 0.0866 0.0910 -0.0135 
 (0.121) (0.119) (0.282) 
Intermediate clerical workers -0.0357 -0.0596 -0.304 
 (0.0825) (0.0784) (0.190) 
Advanced clerical workers -0.159* -0.285*** -0.888*** 
 (0.0950) (0.0933) (0.227) 
Production workers -0.0767 -0.0366 -0.326 
 (0.105) (0.107) (0.246) 
Labourers and related workers -0.122 -0.387*** -0.851*** 
 (0.0972) (0.0969) (0.226) 
Level of highest education achieved (No post-school 
qualification = base case): 
   
Bachelor degree or higher 0.155*** 0.160*** 0.459*** 
 (0.0360) (0.0356) (0.0967) 
Other post-school qualification 0.289*** 0.281*** 1.021*** 
 (0.0485) (0.0467) (0.130) 
    
Gender (1 if male) -0.0688** -0.0470 -0.112 
 (0.0338) (0.0335) (0.0908) 
Marital status (Married = base case):    
Previously married -0.361*** -0.407*** -1.203*** 
 (0.0404) (0.0403) (0.106) 
Never been married -0.224*** -0.287*** -0.950*** 
 (0.0630) (0.0609) (0.167) 
    
No. of children 0.0364* -0.0485** -0.0300 
 (0.0194) (0.0209) (0.0500) 
Location of household (Major urban =base case):    
Other urban -0.160*** -0.140*** -0.561*** 
 (0.0521) (0.0504) (0.135) 
Bounded locality -0.00835 -0.104 -0.301 
 (0.0846) (0.0866) (0.222) 
Rural balance -0.0856 -0.0436 -0.271* 
 (0.0599) (0.0562) (0.150) 
Born in Australia 0.249*** 0.284*** 0.898*** 
 (0.0349) (0.0352) (0.0986) 
Constant -2.467*** -2.297*** -5.306*** 
 (0.349) (0.350) (0.867) 
Observations 8286 8132 16418 
Log likelihood -4819 -4867 -8902 
Pseudo R-squared 0.160 0.131  
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Notes: In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also include MSR controls, which are not reported due 
to low significance. The sample is limited to individuals aged 36 or older who have non-missing data on country of origin. 
Occupation and household location variables are added to account for specifics of a more mature generation compared to 
individuals aged 15 or older. Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. *** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * 
indicates p<=0.1 
The main conclusion drawn from the tables above is that even when controlling for personal 
characteristics, immigrants are less likely than native-born Australians to invest in equities. 
Equity investment depends on a number of personal characteristics including age, wealth, 
income, education, employment status and marital status. The nature of the effects of these 
variables can be explained by their effects on household wealth, which, in turn, affects the 
amount allocated for equities. However, the explanation of the different equity investments 
for Australian-born and foreign-born individuals is not so clear. Osili and Paulson (2008) 
argued that home institutions affect participation in the stock market by US immigrants; thus, 
an institutional effect could also be the cause of the difference in Australia. The next section 
analyses whether immigrants’ propensity to invest in equities is affected by their home-
country institutions and to what extent.  
As before, the estimation of the institutional effect on the equity investment by immigrants in 
2002 and 2006 used the probit model. This model was selected to allow direct comparison 
with the results obtained by Osili and Paulson (2008). Similarly, the random effect logit 
model was used for estimating the panel data. Since the results obtained from using the 
different samples restricted by age provide similar results, the 15+ data sample was used as 
the main set hereafter due to its larger size, which allows narrowing the data to the 
immigrant-only sample. The results were also compared to those obtained using the 36+ data 
for a more extensive analysis.  
2.4.2 Equity investment and institutional quality: baseline findings 
The relationship between equity investment in 2002 and immigrants’ personal attributes and 
their country-of-birth characteristics is explored in Table 2.5 (Panel A). These findings on the 
whole confirm the results obtained by Osili and Paulson (2008) for the US. In particular, 
almost all institutional qualities have a positive and significant influence on stock market 
participation. The two exceptions are enrolment in secondary school and geographic latitude, 
which do not have statistically significant coefficients.  
The estimation of the models applied to the 2006 data and panel data provides similar results 
(Panel B and Panel C of Table 2.5). The last panel presents the results from estimating the 
home institutional effect on equity investment by immigrants aged 36 and over (Table 2.5 
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[Panel D]). Since the positive effects of geographic latitude and school enrolment have 
become borderline significant only for older individuals, it is safe to conclude that country-
of-origin latitude and enrolment in secondary school are not major factors in Australian 
immigrants’ appetite for stock market investment.  
This differs from the results obtained by Osili and Paulson (2008) for the US data. The 
insignificance of geographic latitude’s effect on the stock market investment in Australia 
compared to the positive effect in the US can be explained by the different geographic 
patterns of migration to both countries. Similarly, education, represented here by the ratio of 
children of official school age who are enrolled in school to the population of the 
corresponding official school age in the reported year, does not seem to be important in the 
equity investment decisions of Australian immigrants. However, there is a positive impact of 
average years of schooling in 1960 on an immigrant’s ability to own stock in the US (Osili & 
Paulson 2008). That could possibly be related to the fact that between 1960 and the early 
2000s the proportion of children enrolled in schools worldwide dramatically increased. For 
example, Rogers (2008) argued that, compared to 1960, by 2000 there was a more than three 
times increase in the average years of schooling in developing countries. Hence, improved 
secondary education worldwide makes this criterion less significant in the 21st century. 
Alternatively, that could mean that participation in the stock market depends on the number 
of years of tertiary education only.  
Among the institutional characteristics used in the estimation, Rule of Law is one of the most 
popular measures of institutional quality. Furthermore, the results obtained here show that it 
has a high significance and positive impact on the equity investment decision. Thus, this 
variable was used as a representative measure for further examination.  
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Table 2.5 Quality of institutions' effect on the probability of equity investment by immigrants 
Panel A) 2002 data (individuals aged 15 or older) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Age 0.0202** 0.0193** 0.0196** 0.0196** 0.0194** 0.0196** 0.0234** 0.0216** 0.0412*** 0.0210** 
 (0.00951) (0.00951) (0.00951) (0.00951) (0.00951) (0.00951) (0.00962) (0.00961) (0.0112) (0.00977) 
Age2 -0.000155* -0.000138 -0.000150 -0.000150 -0.000145 -0.000149 -0.000181* -0.000156* -0.000310*** -0.000164* 
 (0.0000932) (0.0000930) (0.0000932) (0.0000932) (0.0000931) (0.0000931) (0.000943) (0.0000941) (0.000108) (0.0000956) 
Wealth 0.00909*** 0.00913*** 0.00900*** 0.00900*** 0.00905*** 0.00909*** 0.00896*** 0.00905*** 0.00798*** 0.00875*** 
 (0.000556) (0.000555) (0.000556) (0.000556) (0.000556) (0.000556) (0.000557) (0.000559) (0.000609) (0.000560) 
Income 0.0129 0.0137 0.0112 0.0112 0.0117 0.0122 0.0150 0.0185 0.0104 0.0195 
 (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0155) (0.0156) (0.0190) (0.0163) 
Employment status ( Employed = base case):        
Unemployed -0.472*** -0.472*** -0.463*** -0.463*** -0.465*** -0.465*** -0.478*** -0.472*** -0.374** -0.439*** 
 (0.141) (0.140) (0.141) (0.141) (0.141) (0.141) (0.145) (0.143) (0.171) (0.146) 
Not in labour force -0.159** -0.178** -0.165** -0.165** -0.170** -0.166** -0.162** -0.187*** -0.243*** -0.166** 
 (0.0705) (0.0701) (0.0703) (0.0703) (0.0702) (0.0703) (0.0711) (0.0708) (0.0838) (0.0737) 
Level of highest education achieved (No post-school qualification = base case):        
Bachelor degree or higher 0.161*** 0.168*** 0.153** 0.153** 0.160*** 0.158*** 0.156** 0.176*** 0.165** 0.158** 
 (0.0607) (0.0605) (0.0607) (0.0607) (0.0606) (0.0607) (0.0614) (0.0612) (0.0702) (0.0624) 
Other post-school qualification 0.484*** 0.481*** 0.482*** 0.482*** 0.483*** 0.483*** 0.449*** 0.459*** 0.464*** 0.457*** 
 (0.0662) (0.0663) (0.0662) (0.0662) (0.0662) (0.0662) (0.0669) (0.0668) (0.0803) (0.0682) 
Gender (1 if male) -0.0786 -0.0805 -0.0780 -0.0780 -0.0802 -0.0781 -0.0826 -0.0774 -0.0807 -0.0746 
 (0.0525) (0.0525) (0.0525) (0.0525) (0.0525) (0.0525) (0.0531) (0.0529) (0.0626) (0.0541) 
Marital status (Married = base case):       
Previously married -0.293*** -0.292*** -0.292*** -0.292*** -0.293*** -0.291*** -0.287*** -0.291*** -0.309*** -0.269*** 
 (0.0771) (0.0771) (0.0772) (0.0772) (0.0771) (0.0771) (0.0779) (0.0777) (0.0874) (0.0784) 
Never been married 0.0853 0.0756 0.0887 0.0887 0.0842 0.0868 0.0753 0.0709 0.126 0.0743 
 (0.0958) (0.0958) (0.0958) (0.0958) (0.0957) (0.0958) (0.0969) (0.0969) (0.112) (0.0987) 
No. of children -0.00139 0.000621 0.00260 0.00260 -0.000124 0.00105 -0.00787 -0.00864 -0.00758 0.00678 
 (0.0302) (0.0304) (0.0303) (0.0303) (0.0302) (0.0303) (0.0307) (0.0306) (0.0374) (0.0324) 
Qualities of country-of-origin institutions:        
Voice & Accountability 0.433***          
 (0.116)          
Political Stability  0.257**         
  (0.126)         
Government Effectiveness   0.545***        
   (0.121)        
Control of Corruption    0.545***       
    (0.121)       
Rule of Law     0.419***      
     (0.115)      
Regulatory Quality      0.467***     
      (0.116)     
British Legal       0.279***    
       (0.0525)    
Latitude        -0.0796   
        (0.152)   
School Enrolment         -0.00168  
         (0.00204)  
Constraint on Executive          0.0688*** 
          (0.0205) 
Constant -1.925*** -1.654*** -2.086*** -2.086*** -1.884*** -1.967*** -1.530*** -1.364*** -1.593*** -1.778*** 
 (0.305) (0.306) (0.310) (0.310) (0.300) (0.304) (0.265) (0.265) (0.339) (0.295) 
Observations 3070 3062 3073 3073 3073 3073 2998 2995 2180 2874 
 
Notes: In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also include MSR controls, which are not reported due to low significance. Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. All models passed the LR 
Chi-Square test, with the LR statistic ranging from 443.4 to 664.2 and the pseudo R-squared ranging from 0.152 to 0.163.  *** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
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Panel B) 2006 data (individuals aged 15 or older) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Age -0.00183 -0.00184 -0.00225 -0.00225 -0.00247 -0.00226 0.000768 0.000211 0.00350 -0.00307 
 (0.00995) (0.00995) (0.00995) (0.00995) (0.00995) (0.00995) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0124) (0.0101) 
Age2 0.0000779 0.000085 0.0000818 0.0000818 0.0000824 0.0000818 0.0000636 0.0000669 0.0000756 0.0000879 
 (0.000963) (0.0000962) (0.0000963) (0.0000963) (0.0000963) (0.0000962) (0.000097) (0.0000969) (0.000117) (0.0000972) 
Wealth 0.00437*** 0.00437*** 0.00436*** 0.00436*** 0.00437*** 0.00438*** 0.00432*** 0.00433*** 0.00326*** 0.00431*** 
 (0.000331) (0.000331) (0.000332) (0.000332) (0.000332) (0.000332) (0.000332) (0.000332) (0.000366) (0.000333) 
Income 0.0334* 0.0326* 0.0325* 0.0325* 0.0325* 0.0330* 0.0322* 0.0331* 0.0442* 0.0337* 
 (0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0235) (0.0184) 
Employment status ( Employed = base case):        
Unemployed -0.394** -0.418** -0.396** -0.396** -0.390** -0.399** -0.448** -0.465** -0.536** -0.368* 
 (0.190) (0.190) (0.190) (0.190) (0.190) (0.190) (0.193) (0.193) (0.273) (0.193) 
Not in labour force -0.221*** -0.226*** -0.218*** -0.218*** -0.215*** -0.222*** -0.202*** -0.218*** -0.286*** -0.225*** 
 (0.0755) (0.0754) (0.0756) (0.0756) (0.0756) (0.0755) (0.0762) (0.0759) (0.0927) (0.0768) 
Level of highest education achieved (No post-school qualification = base case):      
Bachelor degree or higher 0.0675 0.0759 0.0627 0.0627 0.0655 0.0677 0.0717 0.0771 0.114 0.0807 
 (0.0640) (0.0638) (0.0640) (0.0640) (0.0639) (0.0639) (0.0644) (0.0644) (0.0782) (0.0647) 
Other post-school qualification 0.328*** 0.323*** 0.316*** 0.316*** 0.319*** 0.319*** 0.318*** 0.324*** 0.329*** 0.334*** 
 (0.0679) (0.0678) (0.0678) (0.0678) (0.0678) (0.0678) (0.0682) (0.0683) (0.0861) (0.0693) 
Gender (1 if male) -0.0470 -0.0424 -0.0413 -0.0413 -0.0439 -0.0427 -0.0486 -0.0438 -0.123* -0.0438 
 (0.0544) (0.0543) (0.0544) (0.0544) (0.0544) (0.0543) (0.0548) (0.0548) (0.0680) (0.0553) 
Marital status (Married = base case):       
Previously married -0.237*** -0.231*** -0.231*** -0.231*** -0.230*** -0.231*** -0.244*** -0.242*** -0.248*** -0.225*** 
 (0.0768) (0.0767) (0.0768) (0.0768) (0.0768) (0.0767) (0.0776) (0.0776) (0.0913) (0.0774) 
Never been married -0.0537 -0.0599 -0.0578 -0.0578 -0.0566 -0.0596 -0.0523 -0.0412 0.0864 -0.0501 
 (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.133) (0.103) 
No. of children -0.0253 -0.0270 -0.0244 -0.0244 -0.0271 -0.0260 -0.0342 -0.0295 -0.00768 -0.0224 
 (0.0345) (0.0344) (0.0345) (0.0345) (0.0345) (0.0344) (0.0345) (0.0345) (0.0434) (0.0350) 
Qualities of country-of-origin institutions:      
Voice & Accountability 0.500***          
 (0.116)          
Political Stability  0.348***         
  (0.115)         
Government Effectiveness   0.584***        
   (0.127)        
Control of Corruption    0.584***       
    (0.127)       
Rule of Law     0.557***      
     (0.119)      
Regulatory Quality      0.498***     
      (0.121)     
British Legal       0.168***    
       (0.0553)    
Latitude        0.160   
        (0.157)   
School Enrolment         0.00350  
         (0.00259)  
Constraint on Executive          0.0721*** 
          (0.0211) 
Constant -1.663*** -1.422*** -1.805*** -1.805*** -1.739*** -1.671*** -1.086*** -1.055*** -1.522*** -1.342*** 
 (0.324) (0.317) (0.335) (0.335) (0.327) (0.329) (0.288) (0.289) (0.414) (0.319) 
Observations 2714 2714 2717 2717 2717 2717 2660 2657 1726 2609 
 
Notes: In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also include MSR controls, which are not reported due to low significance. Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. All models passed the LR Chi-Square test, with the  LR 
statistic ranging from 222.3 to 430 and the pseudo R-squared ranging from 0.097 to 0.120.*** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
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Panel C) panel data (individuals aged 15 or older) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Age 0.0430* 0.0398 0.0393 0.0393 0.0392 0.0405 0.0522** 0.0484* 0.0824*** 0.0406 
 (0.0261) (0.0262) (0.0261) (0.0261) (0.0261) (0.0260) (0.0263) (0.0264) (0.0312) (0.0266) 
Age2 -0.000330 -0.000273 -0.000297 -0.000297 -0.000294 -0.000306 -0.000388 -0.000352 -0.000556* -0.000308 
 (0.000255) (0.000255) (0.000254) (0.000254) (0.000254) (0.000253) (0.000257) (0.000257) (0.000297) (0.000258) 
Wealth 0.0221*** 0.0223*** 0.0220*** 0.0220*** 0.0221*** 0.0221*** 0.0217*** 0.0218*** 0.0183*** 0.0215*** 
 (0.00143) (0.00143) (0.00143) (0.00143) (0.00143) (0.00143) (0.00142) (0.00143) (0.00158) (0.00143) 
Income 0.0274 0.0285 0.0244 0.0244 0.0247 0.0258 0.0318 0.0355 0.0574 0.0469 
 (0.0384) (0.0384) (0.0383) (0.0383) (0.0382) (0.0382) (0.0386) (0.0388) (0.0494) (0.0404) 
Employment status ( Employed = base case):        
Unemployed -0.904** -0.927** -0.898** -0.898** -0.894** -0.902** -0.972*** -0.993*** -0.880* -0.850** 
 (0.363) (0.363) (0.363) (0.363) (0.362) (0.361) (0.370) (0.370) (0.468) (0.373) 
Not in labour force -0.484*** -0.522*** -0.490*** -0.490*** -0.492*** -0.498*** -0.469*** -0.526*** -0.752*** -0.534*** 
 (0.178) (0.178) (0.178) (0.178) (0.177) (0.177) (0.178) (0.179) (0.218) (0.183) 
Level of highest education achieved (No post-school qualification = base case):       
Bachelor degree or higher 0.315* 0.349** 0.294* 0.294* 0.311* 0.314* 0.304* 0.346** 0.401** 0.348** 
 (0.173) (0.173) (0.173) (0.173) (0.172) (0.172) (0.174) (0.174) (0.203) (0.176) 
Other post-school  1.300*** 1.301*** 1.268*** 1.268*** 1.276*** 1.267*** 1.204*** 1.255*** 1.335*** 1.255*** 
qualification (0.192) (0.193) (0.191) (0.191) (0.191) (0.190) (0.192) (0.193) (0.238) (0.196) 
Gender (1 if male) -0.125 -0.125 -0.115 -0.115 -0.123 -0.116 -0.141 -0.116 -0.260 -0.122 
 (0.151) (0.151) (0.151) (0.151) (0.150) (0.150) (0.152) (0.152) (0.181) (0.154) 
Marital status (Married = base case):       
Previously married -0.790*** -0.784*** -0.771*** -0.771*** -0.772*** -0.771*** -0.796*** -0.807*** -0.832*** -0.736*** 
 (0.203) (0.203) (0.203) (0.203) (0.202) (0.202) (0.204) (0.205) (0.234) (0.204) 
Never been married -0.182 -0.203 -0.181 -0.181 -0.185 -0.190 -0.199 -0.195 0.148 -0.208 
 (0.252) (0.253) (0.252) (0.252) (0.251) (0.251) (0.253) (0.254) (0.309) (0.258) 
No. of children -0.0526 -0.0537 -0.0434 -0.0434 -0.0527 -0.0508 -0.0829 -0.0755 -0.0676 -0.0555 
 (0.0835) (0.0842) (0.0836) (0.0836) (0.0834) (0.0833) (0.0843) (0.0846) (0.103) (0.0871) 
Qualities of country-of-origin institutions:       
Voice & Accountability 1.766***          
 (0.330)          
Political Stability  1.309***         
  (0.329)         
Government Effectiveness   2.153***        
   (0.355)        
Control of Corruption    2.153***       
    (0.355)       
Rule of Law     1.789***      
     (0.332)      
Regulatory Quality      1.689***     
      (0.335)     
British Legal       0.832***    
       (0.155)    
Latitude        0.428   
        (0.437)   
School Enrolment         0.00602  
         (0.00619)  
Constraint on Executive          0.269*** 
          (0.0579) 
Constant -5.989*** -5.242*** -6.571*** -6.571*** -5.954*** -5.864*** -4.108*** -3.811*** -5.127*** -5.152*** 
 (0.849) (0.832) (0.879) (0.879) (0.845) (0.850) (0.720) (0.723) (0.985) (0.814) 
Observations 5784 5776 5790 5790 5790 5790 5658 5652 3906 5483 
 
Notes: In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also include MSR controls, which are not reported due to low significance. Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. All models passed the Wald 
Chi-Square test, with the Wald statistic ranging from 245.8 to 402.8. *** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
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Panel D) panel data (individuals aged 36 or older)  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Age 0.0429 0.0442 0.0423 0.0423 0.0411 0.0404 0.0657 0.0465 0.110* 0.0323 
 (0.0569) (0.0572) (0.0570) (0.0570) (0.0568) (0.0566) (0.0572) (0.0575) (0.0669) (0.0572) 
Age2 -0.000348 -0.000336 -0.000347 -0.000347 -0.000337 -0.000324 -0.000520 -0.000373 -0.000802 -0.000252 
 (0.000474) (0.000476) (0.000475) (0.000475) (0.000473) (0.000471) (0.000476) (0.000479) (0.000549) (0.000475) 
Wealth 0.0198*** 0.0199*** 0.0196*** 0.0196*** 0.0196*** 0.0197*** 0.0194*** 0.0194*** 0.0162*** 0.0194*** 
 (0.00161) (0.00162) (0.00161) (0.00161) (0.00161) (0.00161) (0.00160) (0.00160) (0.00173) (0.00160) 
Income 0.193*** 0.197*** 0.188*** 0.188*** 0.187*** 0.189*** 0.190*** 0.199*** 0.204*** 0.210*** 
 (0.0575) (0.0578) (0.0575) (0.0575) (0.0573) (0.0573) (0.0574) (0.0583) (0.0682) (0.0591) 
Employment status ( Employed = base case):       
Unemployed -1.251** -1.270** -1.211** -1.211** -1.218** -1.239** -1.302** -1.334** -1.553** -1.215** 
 (0.569) (0.572) (0.570) (0.570) (0.569) (0.567) (0.580) (0.583) (0.700) (0.579) 
Not in labour force -0.819** -0.852** -0.794** -0.794** -0.798** -0.832** -0.678* -0.795** -1.020** -0.803** 
 (0.382) (0.384) (0.383) (0.383) (0.382) (0.381) (0.382) (0.384) (0.454) (0.383) 
Occupation (Managers and administrators = base case):       
Professionals -0.308 -0.341 -0.329 -0.329 -0.329 -0.317 -0.230 -0.250 -0.227 -0.186 
 (0.381) (0.384) (0.382) (0.382) (0.381) (0.380) (0.380) (0.383) (0.457) (0.381) 
Associate professionals -0.790* -0.817** -0.786* -0.786* -0.794** -0.789* -0.668* -0.762* -0.418 -0.705* 
 (0.404) (0.407) (0.405) (0.405) (0.404) (0.403) (0.403) (0.406) (0.477) (0.407) 
Trades Persons -1.105** -1.145** -1.072** -1.072** -1.076** -1.108** -1.008** -1.151** -0.931* -1.089** 
 (0.450) (0.452) (0.451) (0.451) (0.449) (0.448) (0.450) (0.454) (0.539) (0.453) 
Elementary clerical workers -0.773 -0.768 -0.764 -0.764 -0.755 -0.766 -0.596 -0.611 -0.432 -0.658 
 (0.646) (0.650) (0.649) (0.649) (0.647) (0.645) (0.653) (0.654) (0.773) (0.660) 
Intermediate clerical  -0.109 -0.0770 -0.0753 -0.0753 -0.0869 -0.109 -0.0570 -0.0935 -0.160 -0.0148 
workers (0.412) (0.415) (0.412) (0.412) (0.412) (0.410) (0.411) (0.414) (0.492) (0.413) 
Advanced clerical workers -0.715 -0.723 -0.635 -0.635 -0.654 -0.690 -0.602 -0.668 -0.328 -0.614 
 (0.508) (0.510) (0.509) (0.509) (0.508) (0.506) (0.508) (0.512) (0.612) (0.512) 
Production workers 0.218 0.210 0.265 0.265 0.267 0.238 0.389 0.308 0.286 0.351 
 (0.531) (0.534) (0.532) (0.532) (0.531) (0.530) (0.534) (0.539) (0.653) (0.540) 
Labourers and related  -1.073** -1.110** -1.030** -1.030** -1.044** -1.071** -0.858* -0.975** -0.741 -1.098** 
workers (0.486) (0.489) (0.486) (0.486) (0.485) (0.484) (0.487) (0.491) (0.587) (0.489) 
Level of highest education achieved (No post-school qualification = base case):        
Bachelor degree or higher 0.626*** 0.668*** 0.603*** 0.603*** 0.616*** 0.627*** 0.600*** 0.655*** 0.759*** 0.643*** 
 (0.203) (0.204) (0.203) (0.203) (0.202) (0.201) (0.203) (0.205) (0.238) (0.204) 
Other post-school  1.469*** 1.546*** 1.487*** 1.487*** 1.493*** 1.458*** 1.372*** 1.450*** 1.575*** 1.381*** 
qualification (0.255) (0.260) (0.256) (0.256) (0.256) (0.254) (0.254) (0.258) (0.312) (0.257) 
Gender (1 if male) -0.273 -0.278 -0.268 -0.268 -0.271 -0.265 -0.261 -0.252 -0.441** -0.259 
 (0.185) (0.187) (0.186) (0.186) (0.185) (0.184) (0.186) (0.187) (0.219) (0.186) 
Marital status (Married = base case):       
Previously married -1.002*** -0.989*** -0.981*** -0.981*** -0.981*** -0.977*** -0.981*** -1.005*** -1.002*** -0.922*** 
 (0.223) (0.224) (0.223) (0.223) (0.222) (0.221) (0.223) (0.224) (0.258) (0.222) 
Never been married -0.0311 0.00338 -0.0351 -0.0351 -0.0364 -0.0253 -0.0801 -0.00591 0.171 -0.00528 
 (0.401) (0.403) (0.400) (0.400) (0.399) (0.397) (0.402) (0.407) (0.461) (0.407) 
No. of children 0.00406 0.00558 0.0176 0.0176 0.00795 0.00255 -0.00143 -0.00688 0.00953 -0.00644 
 (0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.108) (0.108) (0.110) (0.110) (0.132) (0.112) 
Location of household (Major urban = base case):        
Other urban -0.703** -0.665** -0.748** -0.748** -0.733** -0.698** -0.724** -0.671** -0.789** -0.672** 
 (0.303) (0.304) (0.304) (0.304) (0.303) (0.302) (0.303) (0.306) (0.353) (0.304) 
Bounded locality 0.355 0.416 0.307 0.307 0.321 0.359 0.239 0.384 0.213 0.351 
 (0.541) (0.544) (0.543) (0.543) (0.541) (0.539) (0.537) (0.541) (0.597) (0.535) 
Rural balance -0.276 -0.206 -0.276 -0.276 -0.270 -0.255 -0.286 -0.249 -0.269 -0.330 
 (0.348) (0.350) (0.349) (0.349) (0.348) (0.347) (0.348) (0.351) (0.402) (0.349) 
(continued on next  page) 
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Panel D) continued 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Qualities of country-of-origin institutions:        
Voice & Accountability 1.679***          
 (0.408)          
Political Stability  1.736***         
  (0.427)         
Government 
Effectiveness 
  2.352***        
   (0.440)        
Control of Corruption    2.352***       
    (0.440)       
Rule of Law     2.019***      
     (0.413)      
Regulatory Quality      1.579***     
      (0.414)     
British Legal       0.890***    
       (0.182)    
Latitude        1.003*   
        (0.528)   
School Enrolment         0.0130*  
         (0.00784)  
Constraint on Executive          0.204*** 
          (0.0714) 
Constant -6.849*** -6.998*** -7.953*** -7.953*** -7.317*** -6.678*** -5.610*** -5.019*** -7.413*** -5.619*** 
 (1.893) (1.918) (1.929) (1.929) (1.899) (1.888) (1.822) (1.833) (2.216) (1.870) 
Observations 4401 4400 4405 4405 4405 4405 4296 4292 3082 4204 
 
Notes: In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also include MSR controls, which are not reported due to low significance. Occupation and household location variables are added to account for 
specifics of a more matured generation compared to individuals aged 15 or older. Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. All models passed the Wald Chi-Square test, with the Wald statistic ranging from 203 to 
320.1. *** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
  
44 
 
Table 2.6 Effects of additional country controls on the probability of equity investment by immigrants aged 15 or older (panel data) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Age 0.0392 0.0442* 0.0408 0.0387 0.0417 0.0420 0.0369 0.0691** 0.0728** 
 (0.0261) (0.0261) (0.0261) (0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0307) (0.0315) 
Age2 -0.000294 -0.000319 -0.000313 -0.000284 -0.000309 -0.000336 -0.000300 -0.000480 -0.000483 
 (0.000254) (0.000253) (0.000255) (0.000255) (0.000255) (0.000254) (0.000254) (0.000293) (0.000299) 
Wealth 0.0221*** 0.0218*** 0.0220*** 0.0218*** 0.0218*** 0.0208*** 0.0218*** 0.0185*** 0.0192*** 
 (0.00143) (0.00143) (0.00143) (0.00144) (0.00144) (0.00142) (0.00148) (0.00164) (0.00169) 
Income 0.0247 0.0282 0.0257 0.0318 0.0276 0.0295 0.0320 0.0667 0.0749 
 (0.0382) (0.0383) (0.0385) (0.0388) (0.0388) (0.0384) (0.0384) (0.0487) (0.0500) 
Employment status (Employed = base case):        
Unemployed -0.894** -0.882** -0.876** -0.869** -0.883** -0.791** -0.804** -0.757 -0.837* 
 (0.362) (0.362) (0.363) (0.362) (0.362) (0.373) (0.376) (0.463) (0.471) 
Not in labour force -0.492*** -0.482*** -0.479*** -0.486*** -0.468*** -0.436** -0.416** -0.616*** -0.660*** 
 (0.177) (0.177) (0.178) (0.178) (0.179) (0.179) (0.179) (0.215) (0.220) 
Level of highest education achieved (No post-school qualification = base case):       
Bachelor degree or  0.311* 0.293* 0.306* 0.314* 0.311* 0.272 0.263 0.232 0.247 
higher (0.172) (0.172) (0.173) (0.173) (0.173) (0.172) (0.171) (0.199) (0.204) 
Other post-school  1.276*** 1.195*** 1.262*** 1.266*** 1.271*** 1.188*** 1.170*** 1.166*** 1.152*** 
qualification (0.191) (0.192) (0.192) (0.192) (0.192) (0.192) (0.192) (0.234) (0.240) 
          
Gender (1 if male) -0.123 -0.101 -0.132 -0.118 -0.125 -0.125 -0.148 -0.254 -0.209 
 (0.150) (0.150) (0.151) (0.151) (0.151) (0.150) (0.150) (0.177) (0.181) 
Marital status (Married = base case):       
Previously married -0.772*** -0.770*** -0.777*** -0.795*** -0.800*** -0.795*** -0.774*** -0.773*** -0.774*** 
 (0.202) (0.202) (0.203) (0.203) (0.203) (0.201) (0.200) (0.231) (0.236) 
Never been married -0.185 -0.193 -0.188 -0.216 -0.229 -0.175 -0.147 0.199 0.238 
 (0.251) (0.251) (0.252) (0.254) (0.255) (0.257) (0.257) (0.304) (0.311) 
Children -0.0527 -0.0560 -0.0554 -0.0542 -0.0555 -0.0582 -0.0645 -0.0814 -0.0825 
 (0.0834) (0.0833) (0.0835) (0.0837) (0.0837) (0.0840) (0.0842) (0.103) (0.105) 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 2.6 (continued) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Country-of-origin characteristics:       
LN(Rule  1.789*** 2.724*** 1.569*** 2.215*** 1.774*** 1.115 0.670 3.874*** 4.588*** 
of Law) (0.332) (0.420) (0.375) (0.610) (0.641) (0.687) (0.744) (1.131) (1.374) 
Asia  0.794***       2.760*** 
  (0.296)       (0.647) 
Africa  1.254***       1.759** 
  (0.403)       (0.694) 
North   0.194       0.376 
America  (0.517)       (0.811) 
South   0.0190       1.624* 
America  (0.588)       (0.926) 
Europe  0.0545       0.525 
  (0.242)       (0.418) 
Muslims   -0.171       
   (0.313)       
Buddhists   -0.467       
   (0.320)       
Chinese    0.314       
Universists   (0.487)       
Hindus   0.619       
   (0.427)       
Non-religious   -0.536       
   (0.460)       
GDP    -0.114 -0.148 -0.115 -0.109 -0.236 -0.348 
    (0.118) (0.119) (0.132) (0.132) (0.169) (0.229) 
English      0.419** 0.353* 0.356* 0.132 0.556* 
speaking     (0.197) (0.205) (0.212) (0.257) (0.294) 
Market      0.00331 0.00329 0.00500 -0.000425 
capitalisation      (0.00254) (0.00257) (0.00328) (0.00386) 
Squared market      -0.00000951 -0.00000943 -0.0000143** -0.00000898 
capitalisation       (0.00000618) (0.00000620 (0.000000725) (0.00000802) 
Workers        -0.0332 -0.0234 -0.0700* 
remittances       (0.0238) (0.0326) (0.0378) 
School        -0.0382*** -0.00228 
enrolment        (0.0132) (0.0162) 
Constant -5.954*** -7.886*** -5.612*** -6.525*** -6.011*** -5.013*** -4.170*** -6.990*** -11.91*** 
 (0.845) (1.016) (0.901) (1.073) (1.096) (1.150) (1.252) (1.804) (2.479) 
Observations 5790 5790 5790 5690 5690 5405 5319 3783 3783 
Number of individuals 3511 3511 3511 3454 3454 3288 3235 2486 2486 
 
Notes: In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also include MSR controls, which are not reported due to low significance. Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. All models passed the Wald 
Chi-Square test, with the Wald statistic ranging from 249.3 to 407.8. *** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
46 
 
2.4.3 Robustness checks 
Following Osili and Paulson (2008), the following procedures were performed to check if 
there were other significant country characteristics correlated with institutional quality that 
were not included in the analysis. First, religion and continent controls were added 
individually to the regression testing the effect of Rule of Law, one of the institutional 
characteristics, on the equity investment by immigrants. Second, other country attributes such 
as GDP per capita, English-speaking ability, stock market capitalisation, remittances 
received, secondary school enrolment and once more continent controls were added 
progressively to the basic regression.  
The analysis was carried out using panel data first. The first column of Table 2.6 replicates 
the results of the fifth column of Table 2.5 (Panel C). More precisely, it shows the influence 
of Rule of Law as well as the effects of personal characteristics on equity investment by 
Australian immigrants. The second column presents the results of estimates with the same 
variables and additional continent controls., Only immigrants from Asia and Africa, of the 
five continents, have a higher propensity to invest in equity compared to the base case of 
Oceania; nevertheless, the coefficient of Rule of Law is still highly significant with even 
higher value. Similarly, as reported in the next column, adding religious controls to the basic 
regression to account for the relation between a country-of-origin dominant religion and 
investor rights does not change the significance of the coefficient of interest.  
GDP per capita, which is also often associated with institutional quality (Rodrik, 
Subramanian & Trebbi 2004), was included to test if a higher probability of investment in the 
stock market is undertaken by immigrants from countries with institutions similar to those of 
Australia. Additionally, English-speaking ability accounts for a possible higher participation 
in the Australian share market of immigrants from countries where English is one of the 
official languages. As the results suggest, being an immigrant from an English-speaking 
country plays an important and positive role on the probability to invest in the share market, 
whereas GDP has no effect on it. Similarly, home-country stock market capitalisation and 
workers’ remittances do not play important roles in immigrants’ investment decisions. The 
former characteristic was intended to account for the usage of the stock market in the past and 
the latter to account for investment through remittances in the country of origin. In spite of 
not being statistically significant, the influence from market capitalisation absorbs the 
positive effect of institutional quality until the secondary school enrolment variable is added 
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to the regression. In agreement with findings by Osili and Paulson (2008), a negative and 
significant effect of secondary school enrolment in the home countries suggests that a higher 
school enrolment rate in immigrants’ home countries is associated with their lower 
investment in the Australian equity market. As this effect differs from the statistically 
insignificant effect registered in the absence of the additional controls, it could rather be 
attributed to the high correlation between Rule of Law and secondary school enrolment, as 
indicated in Table A.4 in Appendix A.  
The coefficient for Rule of Law remained positive and significant throughout with two 
exceptions. The addition of the continent controls to the final regression did not change this 
outcome either. These results suggest the robustness of the finding that institutional quality 
affects the equity investment decisions of immigrants to Australia to the inclusion of 
additional country characteristics in the combined 2002 and 2006 data.  
Although the application of 2002 data did not produce similar results (Table A.5 in Appendix 
A), this difference could be attributed to the high correlation between country-of-origin 
variables. For example, due to the high correlation between GDP per capita and Rule of 
Law
11
, the coefficients on Rule of Law are not significant when GDP per capita was added to 
regression. A further redundant variable test confirmed that inclusion of GDP did not 
improve the model
12
; hence, it is not required to control for a home-country’s GDP when 
institutional quality effect is included in the model. Adding the measures of English-speaking 
ability, country-of-origin market capitalisation properties and value of remittances received 
by countries did not drastically change the value of the institutional characteristic. The 
coefficient for Rule of Law became significantly positive again after inclusion of information 
about enrolment in secondary school, although it reduced its value and significance when 
controlling for continents of origin. 
On the other hand, this odd outcome, obtained using 2002 data, did not occur when findings 
for 2006 were analysed for robustness as well (Table A.6 in Appendix A). In particular, 
similar to panel data analysis, the Rule of Law coefficient remained significantly positive 
despite including extra variables in the regressions. This suggests the robustness of the equity 
investment decision to adding more country-of-origin characteristics.  
                                                 
11
 The correlation coefficient between Ln (Rule of Law) and GDP in 2002 is 0.8894 with the significance at at 
least 0.01 level. 
12
 For immigrants aged 15 and older, the null hypothesis is failed to be rejected under the Wald test with p=0.39.  
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2.4.4 Effects and persistence of institutional constraints 
The investigation reported above confirms the existence and significance of home 
institutional effects, yet the questions of when and how these restrictions start affecting an 
individual’s investment choices and how long these influences last has not yet been 
examined. Does the age at migration matter? Do home-country effects persist in both 
immigrants who migrated at an early age and those who migrated at a late age? How long do 
these effects continue to exist under the influence of a new formal institutional framework? 
As before, the following analysis was carried out using the probit model for estimating the 
2002 and 2006 data and the random effect logit model for estimating the panel data. 
Table 2.7 Effects of home institutions on the probability of equity investment by 
immigrants aged 15 or older, depending on their age at migration to Australia (panel 
data) 
  Age at arrival in Australia 
Variables All 1-15 16-20 21+ 
No year of arrival control   
Ln (Rule of Law) 1.789*** 0.279 1.460 2.234*** 
 (0.332) (0.609) (1.104) (0.468) 
Log likelihood -3001 -994.6 -279.5 -1596 
Year of arrival control   
Ln (Rule of Law) 1.788*** 0.0582 1.376 2.236*** 
 (0.332) (0.628) (1.136) (0.468) 
Log likelihood -3001 -988.4 -278.1 -1596 
Number of 
observations 
5790 1862 630 3177 
 
Notes: In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also include controls for age, age squared, wealth, 
income, employment, education, gender, marital status, children and MSR. Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. *** 
indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
Table 2.7 addresses the first question by presenting how the institutional effect changes 
depending on the age of an immigrant at the time of settling in Australia, using the panel 
data
13
. Two sets of estimates are produced: one that does not include a year of arrival control 
                                                 
13
 The application of the 2002 and 2006 data produces similar results; hence, only panel data estimates are 
presented. The other results can be found in Table A.7 Effects of home institutions on the probability of equity 
investment by immigrants aged 15 or older, depending on their age at migration to Australia (2002 and 2006 
data)Table A.7 in Appendix A. 
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and one that does. The sample has been divided into three age groups: the first group consists 
of those who arrived in Australia as a teenager aged under 16, the second group consists of 
individuals aged 16 to 20 at the time of arrival, and the last group consists of those who were 
aged 21 or older at the time of immigration. Similarly to the results produced by Osili and 
Paulson (2008), the effect of country-of-origin institutions is not present in the first group but 
is present in the third group of immigrants who were aged 21 or older at the time of arrival. 
Unlike immigrants to the US though, the investment decisions of Australian immigrants who 
were aged 16 to 20 are not affected by the institutions in their countries of origin. This 
difference could be explained by the different features of populations that are exposed to 
slightly different educational systems and family upbringing in both countries, which, in the 
Australian context, possibly puts less importance on the trustworthiness of home institutions.  
The results of the analysis of the continuance of institutional effect are presented in Table 2.8. 
The sample is divided into five groups and, due to the similarity of results produced with and 
without individual’s age at arrival controls, only those with controls are presented. The panel 
data and the data for 2002 show the strong influence on the equity investment decision in the 
first seven years spent in Australia, although this is not significant according to the data 
collected in 2006. All data samples, however, show no effect for immigrants living in 
Australia for 8 to 12 years and for those living in Australia for 13 to 17 years.  
The striking difference from the US data is that the institutional influence is still persistent 
and significant in immigrants even after spending more than 28 years in Australia. Also, as 
argued by Osili and Paulson (2008), the effect of informal institutions is persistent for all 
immigrants to the US who migrated up to 27 years ago, whereas Australian immigrants do 
not show this tendency. While it is not surprising that recent immigrants are still affected by 
their home institutions, it is unexpected that immigrants with a period of residence of 18 
years and longer are. This may have happened because these immigrants are from an older 
and more conservative cohort, the effects of which are not fully captured by the age variables.   
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Table 2.8 Effects of home institutions on the probability of equity investment by 
immigrants aged 15 or older, depending on years spent in Australia, with age at arrival 
controls 
  Years in Australia 
Variables All 1-7 8-12 13-17 18-27 28+ 
Panel data       
Ln (Rule of Law) 1.391*** 2.719*** 0.0745 0.751 1.686*** 1.499** 
 (0.334) (0.979) (0.506) (1.070) (0.625) (0.602) 
Log likelihood -2963 -305.7 -297.6 -410.9 -515.2 -1401 
Number of 
observations 
5761 666 574 730 1041 2719 
2002       
Ln (Rule of Law) 0.314*** 0.919*** -0.498 -0.374 0.559* 0.400* 
 (0.117) (0.296) (0.374) (0.319) (0.335) (0.207) 
Log likelihood -1696 -204.5 -160.4 -215.5 -195.6 -775.0 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.167 0.195 0.159 0.212 0.376 0.195 
Number of 
observations 
3060 431 309 427 457 1408 
2006       
Ln (Rule of Law) 0.407*** 0.464 0.486 0.352 0.579** 0.406* 
 (0.122) (0.420) (0.387) (0.360) (0.267) (0.212) 
Log likelihood -1545 -96.28 -115.6 -170.2 -297.8 -745.1 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.132 0.182 0.260 0.0888 0.231 0.164 
Number of 
observations 
2701 224 255 290 584 1311 
 
Notes: In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also include controls for age, age squared, wealth, 
income, employment, education, gender, marital status, children, MSR and individual’s age at arrival. Standard errors are 
indicated in parentheses. *** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
For the purpose of comparison and testing of the age factor hypothesis, similar regressions 
were carried out for the 36+ respondents. The results of this exercise are presented in   
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Table A.8 in Appendix A. The home institutions effect in this age group is present only after 
spending more than 17 years in Australia, which is also the case for the main dataset that 
includes younger individuals. These results suggest that immigrants aged 15 to 35 (or 21 to 
35 as reflected in Table 2.7) have a strong institutional influence from their countries of 
origin in the first seven years of living in Australia, but older individuals are not exposed to 
this impact. However, both age groups experience positive institutional influence after being 
nearly 20 years away from the country of origin.  
This implies that during the three decades since the 1970s the characteristics of immigrants 
have changed. In particular, immigrants aged 21 to 35 retain their institutional factors for up 
to seven years but this influence then dies away. However immigrants who arrived a 
substantial time ago (in 1988 or before) do not lose the impact of their home institutional 
controls even after they have been in Australia for 28 years or more. These migrants arrived 
in Australia before the government changed the focus of its migration policy to labour market 
outcomes in the 1980s (Spinks 2010). The above results reflect the possibility that those who 
arrived before this change, mostly immigrants from countries with weak institutions, 
migrated mainly to join their families or as refugees (Walsh 2008), and it is expected that 
they would take a conservative approach to investing.  
2.5 Self-reported financial risk: results and analysis 
The previous section looked at equity investment as a possible measure of financial risk-
taking. The positive effect of institutional quality on immigrant participation in the Australian 
financial markets through immigrants’ increased participation in the share market generally 
agrees with the results obtained by Osili and Paulson (2008) for immigrants in the US. This 
study, however, goes further in the investigation of the institutional effect on the financial 
development of Australian financial markets by considering self-reported financial risk-
taking (SRFRT) as an additional measure of financial risk-taking. As mentioned earlier, 
SRFRT measures the level of financial risk an individual is prepared to take on a scale of 1 to 
4 and is available in the HILDA Survey. The next step involved an assessment of the factors 
influencing SRFRT and, in particular, if it depends on whether an individual was born in 
Australia or overseas.  
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2.5.1 Difference in self-reported financial risk-taking between immigrants and native-
born individuals 
Table 2.9 presents the financial risk estimation results for data collected in 2002 and 2006, 
and the panel dataset using observations for both years. Regressions were run for 2002 and 
2006 data using the ordered probit model (2.2), excluding the institutional variables
14
 and 
including a dummy, which is equal to 1 if an individual was born in Australia and 0 
otherwise. In a similar fashion, the ordered dependent variable model with fixed effects was 
applied to the panel data, assuming that both years have the same error variances and same 
coefficients but different intercepts. Additionally, it was assumed that error terms across 
years are not contemporaneously correlated. The coefficients for both periods are similar 
except that the negative effects of having resident children and being never married on 
financial risk-taking is not significant in 2002. In addition, the higher propensity to take 
financial risk by individuals with a bachelor or higher degree and the lower risk 
predisposition of people born outside Australia is not detected in 2006.  
Increasing the lower limit of the sample to the age of 36 and adding occupation and 
household location variables changed some factors affecting financial risk-taking. For 
example, the Australian-born factor is brought into prominence in 2006. The negative 
association of being unemployed is now accentuated, but the number of resident children and 
the comparison of being never married with being in a committed relationship are not 
statistically significant for the financial risk-taking in all three datasets (Table 2.10). The 
presence of the unemployment factor and the nullification of the marriage factor could be 
attributed to the specifics of 36+ individuals who are unlikely to be never married and more 
likely to be employed than 15+ individuals. The risk-taking activities of younger people 
could also be less dependent on their employment status due to their fewer financial 
commitments. Having dependent children also probably has more effect on the financial risk-
taking ability of the 15+ group, who are less financially stable.  
Occupational status and household location were included in the regressions to account for 
the more settled lifestyle of the older generation. The high significance of the occupational 
parameter confirms the validity of this inclusion. Compared to the base case of managers and 
administrators, representatives of all other eight professional groups are prepared to take 
significantly lower financial risks. Location of household, on the other hand, matters only for 
                                                 
14
 Country-of-origin variables controlling for the quality of institutions were not included since Australian-born 
individuals form the majority of the sample. 
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the urban population, with the residents of major urban areas being ready to take higher risks 
than those living in other urban areas. The negative effect of living in rural areas on SRFRT 
can be ignored due to its weak significance.   
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Table 2.9 Factors affecting SRFRT of Australian residents (aged 15 or older) 
VARIABLES 2002 2006 Panel data 
Age 0.0210*** 0.0182*** 0.0197*** 
 (0.00458) (0.00441) (0.00317) 
Age
2
 -0.000315*** -0.000310*** -0.000312*** 
 (0.000048) (0.0000465) (0.0000333) 
Wealth 0.00268*** 0.00152*** 0.00196*** 
 (0.000171) (0.0000908) (0.000087) 
Income 0.0150** 0.0349*** 0.0241*** 
 (0.00766) (0.00778) (0.00544) 
Employment status (Employed = base case):    
Unemployed -0.00523 0.0179 0.000987 
 (0.0759) (0.0829) (0.0559) 
Not in labour force -0.243*** -0.124*** -0.187*** 
 (0.0363) (0.0365) (0.0257) 
Level of highest education achieved (No 
post-school qualification = base case): 
   
Bachelor degree or higher 0.155*** 0.0255 0.0889*** 
 (0.0302) (0.0299) (0.0212) 
Other post-school qualification 0.468*** 0.392*** 0.431*** 
 (0.0334) (0.0324) (0.0232) 
Gender 0.308*** 0.397*** 0.353*** 
 (0.0256) (0.0251) (0.0179) 
Marital status (Married = base case):    
Previously married -0.0763* -0.145*** -0.115*** 
 (0.0418) (0.0415) (0.0294) 
Never been married -0.0306 -0.0725* -0.0514* 
 (0.0415) (0.0398) (0.0287) 
No. of children -0.0207 -0.0522*** -0.0361*** 
 (0.0145) (0.0155) (0.0106) 
Born in Australia 0.0895*** 0.0252 0.0612*** 
 (0.0303) (0.0308) (0.0216) 
Year=1 if 2006   -0.0467*** 
   (0.0173) 
Observations 9143 9394 18537 
Log likelihood -8331 -8705 -17069 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0743 0.0730 0.0720 
 
Notes: In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also include MSR controls, which are not reported due 
to low significance. The sample is limited to individuals aged 15 or older who have non-missing data on country of origin. 
Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. *** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
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Table 2.10 Factors affecting SRFRT of Australian residents (aged 36 or older) 
VARIABLES 2002 2006 Panel data 
Age 0.0450*** 0.0359*** 0.0421*** 
 (0.0122) (0.0118) (0.00844) 
Age2 -0.000513*** -0.000450*** -0.000494*** 
 (0.000105) (0.0000998) (0.000072) 
Wealth 0.00277*** 0.00136*** 0.00182*** 
 (0.000210) (0.000106) (0.000102) 
Income 0.0414*** 0.0692*** 0.0544*** 
 (0.0131) (0.0149) (0.00980) 
Employment status (Employed = base case):    
Unemployed -0.226* -0.509*** -0.345*** 
 (0.130) (0.165) (0.101) 
Not in labour force -0.530*** -0.405*** -0.476*** 
 (0.0700) (0.0675) (0.0484) 
Occupation (Managers and administrators = base case):    
Professionals -0.248*** -0.169*** -0.214*** 
 (0.0684) (0.0648) (0.0469) 
Associate professionals -0.241*** -0.0891 -0.166*** 
 (0.0752) (0.0714) (0.0517) 
Trades Persons -0.399*** -0.290*** -0.356*** 
 (0.0837) (0.0815) (0.0582) 
Elementary clerical workers -0.217* -0.109 -0.168** 
 (0.114) (0.110) (0.0789) 
Intermediate clerical workers -0.323*** -0.359*** -0.354*** 
 (0.0777) (0.0737) (0.0533) 
Advanced clerical workers -0.435*** -0.453*** -0.452*** 
 (0.0904) (0.0886) (0.0631) 
Production workers -0.422*** -0.513*** -0.473*** 
 (0.105) (0.109) (0.0752) 
Labourers and related workers -0.609*** -0.604*** -0.620*** 
 (0.0994) (0.0963) (0.0689) 
Level of highest education achieved (No post-school qualification= base case) 
Bachelor degree or higher 0.196*** 0.0339 0.114*** 
 (0.0377) (0.0372) (0.0264) 
Other post-school qualification 0.384*** 0.332*** 0.362*** 
 (0.0471) (0.0456) (0.0327) 
    
Gender (1 if male) 0.272*** 0.393*** 0.332*** 
 (0.0352) (0.0344) (0.0245) 
Marital status (Married = base case):    
Previously married -0.0901** -0.133*** -0.120*** 
 (0.0449) (0.0441) (0.0314) 
Never been married 0.00989 -0.0821 -0.0431 
 (0.0665) (0.0646) (0.0462) 
    
No. of children 0.00872 -0.0248 -0.00891 
 (0.0203) (0.0219) (0.0148) 
Location of household (Major urban =base case):    
Other urban -0.0875 -0.180*** -0.135*** 
 (0.0542) (0.0522) (0.0375) 
Bounded locality 0.0404 -0.187** -0.0801 
 (0.0942) (0.0939) (0.0663) 
Rural balance -0.0824 -0.0788 -0.0746* 
 (0.0605) (0.0568) (0.0413) 
Born in Australia 0.0993*** 0.0758** 0.0910*** 
 (0.0361) (0.0362) (0.0255) 
Year=1 if 2006   -0.0646*** 
   (0.0219) 
Observations 5986 6143 12129 
Log likelihood -5178 -5363 -10578 
Pseudo R-squared 0.102 0.106 0.101 
 
Notes: The sample is limited to individuals aged 36 or older who have non-missing data on country of origin. In addition to the 
coefficients reported above, the regressions also include MSR controls, which are not reported due to low significance. Occupation 
and household location variables are added to account for specifics of a more mature generation compared to individuals aged 15 or 
older. Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. *** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
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According to the information presented in Tables 2.9 and 2.10, the difference in SRFRT 
among Australians is affected by personal characteristics such as age, wealth, income, 
employment status, educational attainment, gender, marital status and employment status. 
Most of these variables have a similar effect on equity investment with a few exceptions. As 
before, a better financial situation associated with higher levels of wealth is conducive to an 
individual’s readiness to take higher financial risk. Likewise, people with post-school 
education tend to have more confidence in taking financial risk than those without 
qualifications. Understandably, unemployed individuals or those who are not in the labour 
force tend to give themselves a lower financial risk-taking assessment than their employed 
counterparts. However, only the equity investment decisions of the 15+ group, as discussed 
earlier, but not their SRFRT, are negatively affected by their being unemployed. Also, in 
spite of a higher income being conducive to taking higher financial risk by this group, it tends 
to lower their participation in the stock market. Self-perceived financial risk-taking increases 
with age but only for young individuals, with a turning point, on average, in their early 30s 
for the first set and early 40s for the 36+ set. This effect is different from the positive age 
effect reported for equity investment, which persists in individuals even past retirement age, 
and could be more prominent in individuals born abroad. As the SRFRT of immigrants is 
similar to that of Australian-born individuals when all people are considered but lower when 
the older age group is used, this suggests that immigrants in the 36+ group are more 
conservative in their financial decisions than their Australian-born counterparts. Male 
respondents tend to estimate their financial risk-taking behaviour as higher but, as reflected in 
Table 2.3, their actual stock market participation is not different from, or, as Table 2.4 
reports, in some cases is even lower than, the participation of their female counterparts. 
Although these differences could be to some extent attributed to the various levels of risks 
associated with holding various shares, they also suggests that actual equity investment does 
not always reflect an individual’s perception about their risk-taking capacity and vice versa.  
Despite these differences, the SRFRT of all respondents in 2002 and that of the 36+ 
respondents in 2006, similarly to equity investment, also depends on whether the individuals 
were born in Australia or abroad. In particular, being born in Australia increases the self-
assessed disposition for taking higher financial risk. This conforms with the results obtained 
by Bonin et al. (2007), who investigated the differences in risk attitude between native-born 
and foreign-born individuals using German survey data. They argued that foreign nationals in 
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Germany tend to take less risk than German-born individuals, although their next 
generation’s risk attitudes do not differ.  
Using variables different from personal characteristics but related to countries of origin can 
shed more light on the difference in self-assessed financial risk-taking. Equity investment is 
considered a good proxy for financial risk-taking due to higher financial risk being associated 
with higher returns. Similarly, as argued by Osili and Paulson (2008), stock market 
investment is ‘the logical individual-level counterpart to country-level stock market 
capitalization, the measure of financial development used in many studies’. Following their 
approach led to the previous section’s findings which confirm that the home-country 
institutional environment does influence the financial investment decisions of immigrants. 
The availability of SRFRT, another measure of the financial risk-taking behaviour in HILDA, 
suggests that both equity investment and SRFRT should have similar qualities. Most of the 
personal variables, albeit with some exclusions, have comparable effects on both measures of 
financial risk; hence, it is sensible to test whether the institutional quality in a country of 
origin also affects SRFRT.  
As before, the ordered probit model was used for the estimation of SRFRT of immigrants in 
2002 and 2006, and the ordered dependent variable model with fixed effects was applied to 
the panel data.    
2.5.2 Self-reported financial risk-taking and institutional quality: baseline findings 
Table 2.11 (Panel A) presents estimates of how the institutional quality in the country of 
origin affects immigrants’ self-assessed preparedness to take financial risk in 2002. The 
estimation results for this year are similar to those reported in the previous section. However, 
in contrast with the estimates for stock market participation, the only institutional parameter 
not affecting the SRFRT of immigrants is the measure of the degree of institutional 
constraints on executive authority. Voice and Accountability also becomes insignificant when 
using the panel data (Table 2.11 [Panel C]) but it is still represented by a positive significant 
coefficient when the younger people aged 15 to 35 are excluded from the sample (Table 2.11 
[Panel D])
15
.  
A notable difference in the ways institutional quality affects the equity investment and 
SRFRT by immigrants in 2006 is, as reported in Table 2.11 (Panel B), that none of the 
                                                 
15
 This suggests that Voice and Accountability has a weaker effect on the SRFRT of immigrants, compared to 
other institutional variables, and this effect is less evident in younger individuals.    
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institutional parameters used before is important in the determination of the preparedness to 
risk.
16
 This outcome supports the results presented in Table 2.9. In particular, there is no 
difference in preparedness to take financial risk between native and foreign-born individuals 
in 2006, whereas this difference exists in 2002 and when using combined data for both 
periods. Similarly, as reflected in Panel A to Panel C of Table 2.11, the institutional effect in 
2002 is so strong that it dominates the insignificant effect in 2006 when data for both periods 
are combined. The absence of institutional effect could mean that it is subjected to a finite 
period which could have ended for most of the respondents after they were surveyed in 2002. 
This hypothesis, however, needs to be further verified in the subsequent sections.  
Despite using the same explanatory variables for the determination of equity investment and 
SRFRT, the estimation results are different in both cases. These findings imply that these 
measures of financial risk-taking are not interchangeable and that all equity investments are 
not equally risky. Thus, equity investment may not be a very good proxy for financial risk-
taking behaviour. The low values of correlation coefficients between the two variables, 
varying from 0.22 in 2006 to 0.24 in 2002 with 0.23 for the panel data set, further support this 
argument. 
                                                 
16
 The application of a more restricted dataset containing individuals aged 36 or older interviewed in 2006 
produces similar results. 
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Table 2.11 Quality of institutions' effect on SRFRT by immigrants 
Panel A) 2002 data (individuals aged 15 or older) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Age 0.0236** 0.0229** 0.0229** 0.0229** 0.0225** 0.0229** 0.0285*** 0.0261** 0.0265** 0.0301*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0124) (0.0110) 
Age2 -0.000372*** -0.000367*** -0.000373*** -0.000373*** -0.000368*** -0.000372*** -0.000409*** -0.000396*** -0.000369*** -0.000437*** 
 (0.000110) (0.000110) (0.000110) (0.000110) (0.000110) (0.000110) (0.000111) (0.000111) (0.000125) (0.000112) 
Wealth 0.00295*** 0.00297*** 0.00291*** 0.00291*** 0.00292*** 0.00295*** 0.00291*** 0.00290*** 0.00262*** 0.00287*** 
 (0.000356) (0.000356) (0.000356) (0.000356) (0.000356) (0.000356) (0.000356) (0.000356) (0.000408) (0.000358) 
Income 0.00609 0.00443 0.00254 0.00254 0.00260 0.00362 0.00653 0.00517 0.0273 0.0135 
 (0.0172) (0.0173) (0.0173) (0.0173) (0.0173) (0.0172) (0.0173) (0.0174) (0.0220) (0.0177) 
Employment status (Employed = base case):       
Unemployed -0.0532 -0.0448 -0.0441 -0.0441 -0.0444 -0.0447 -0.0465 -0.0494 -0.176 -0.0505 
 (0.152) (0.152) (0.152) (0.152) (0.152) (0.152) (0.154) (0.154) (0.195) (0.154) 
Not in labour  -0.273*** -0.276*** -0.275*** -0.275*** -0.275*** -0.274*** -0.277*** -0.280*** -0.301*** -0.241*** 
force (0.0761) (0.0761) (0.0761) (0.0761) (0.0761) (0.0760) (0.0768) (0.0768) (0.0900) (0.0790) 
Level of highest education achieved (No post-school qualification = base case):       
Bachelor degree  0.0991 0.0988 0.0900 0.0900 0.0945 0.0952 0.0944 0.0943 0.105 0.0814 
or higher (0.0646) (0.0646) (0.0647) (0.0647) (0.0647) (0.0647) (0.0651) (0.0651) (0.0734) (0.0660) 
Other post-school  0.424*** 0.436*** 0.431*** 0.431*** 0.434*** 0.430*** 0.400*** 0.422*** 0.398*** 0.413*** 
qualification (0.0672) (0.0674) (0.0671) (0.0671) (0.0672) (0.0671) (0.0674) (0.0678) (0.0803) (0.0691) 
Gender (1 if male) 0.348*** 0.350*** 0.349*** 0.349*** 0.348*** 0.349*** 0.340*** 0.345*** 0.318*** 0.343*** 
 (0.0552) (0.0553) (0.0553) (0.0553) (0.0553) (0.0553) (0.0558) (0.0558) (0.0652) (0.0566) 
Marital status (Married = base case):      
Previously  0.0554 0.0570 0.0622 0.0622 0.0596 0.0602 0.0452 0.0382 0.0614 0.0325 
married (0.0853) (0.0854) (0.0854) (0.0854) (0.0854) (0.0854) (0.0862) (0.0862) (0.0963) (0.0874) 
Never been  0.137 0.138 0.150 0.150 0.143 0.147 0.139 0.135 0.262** 0.170* 
married (0.0990) (0.0991) (0.0991) (0.0991) (0.0990) (0.0990) (0.100) (0.100) (0.115) (0.102) 
No. of children -0.0105 -0.00747 -0.00514 -0.00514 -0.00565 -0.00718 -0.0137 -0.0102 0.0132 -0.00730 
 (0.0316) (0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0316) (0.0316) (0.0322) (0.0321) (0.0370) (0.0332) 
Qualities of country-of-origin institutions:      
Voice &  0.302**          
Accountability (0.126)          
Political Stability  0.478***         
  (0.136)         
Government    0.577***        
Effectiveness   (0.133)        
Control of     0.577***       
Corruption    (0.133)       
Rule of Law     0.505***      
     (0.125)      
Regulatory       0.491***     
Quality      (0.129)     
British Legal       0.109**    
       (0.0550)    
Latitude        0.399**   
        (0.157)   
School Enrolment         0.00566**  
         (0.00220)  
Constraint on           0.0353 
Executive          (0.0224) 
Observations 2109 2107 2110 2110 2110 2110 2072 2071 1563 2006 
 
Notes: In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also include MSR controls, which are not reported due to low significance. Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. All models passed the LR 
Chi-Square test, with the LR statistic ranging from 273.1 to 385.4 and the pseudo R-squared ranging from 0.0886 to 0.0921.*** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
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Panel B) 2006 data (individuals aged 15 or older) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Age 0.00557 0.00535 0.00520 0.00520 0.00550 0.00565 0.00699 0.00660 0.0245* 0.00773 
 (0.0112) (0.0113) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0141) (0.0114) 
Age2 -0.000243** -0.000242** -0.000242** -0.000242** -0.000244** -0.000244** -0.000255** -0.000252** -0.000383*** -0.000265** 
 (0.000114) (0.000114) (0.000114) (0.000114) (0.000114) (0.000114) (0.000115) (0.000115) (0.000140) (0.000116) 
Wealth 0.00129*** 0.00128*** 0.00128*** 0.00128*** 0.00129*** 0.00129*** 0.00127*** 0.00128*** 0.000993*** 0.00132*** 
 (0.000199) (0.000199) (0.000199) (0.000199) (0.000199) (0.000199) (0.000199) (0.000199) (0.000236) (0.000205) 
Income 0.0716*** 0.0715*** 0.0711*** 0.0711*** 0.0712*** 0.0714*** 0.0674*** 0.0684*** 0.0513** 0.0805*** 
 (0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0194) (0.0194) (0.0241) (0.0208) 
Employment status (Employed = base case):        
Unemployed -0.0498 -0.0494 -0.0429 -0.0429 -0.0461 -0.0478 -0.0277 -0.0320 -0.296 -0.0153 
 (0.198) (0.198) (0.198) (0.198) (0.198) (0.198) (0.200) (0.200) (0.331) (0.204) 
Not in labour force -0.177** -0.177** -0.174** -0.174** -0.175** -0.176** -0.172** -0.175** -0.214** -0.186** 
 (0.0788) (0.0788) (0.0788) (0.0788) (0.0788) (0.0788) (0.0796) (0.0795) (0.0979) (0.0807) 
Level of highest education achieved (No post-school qualification = base case):       
Bachelor degree or  0.0443 0.0439 0.0439 0.0439 0.0454 0.0460 0.0391 0.0375 0.0314 0.0415 
higher (0.0673) (0.0673) (0.0674) (0.0674) (0.0673) (0.0673) (0.0677) (0.0677) (0.0832) (0.0683) 
Other post-school  0.375*** 0.376*** 0.379*** 0.379*** 0.378*** 0.377*** 0.365*** 0.364*** 0.308*** 0.379*** 
qualification (0.0682) (0.0681) (0.0680) (0.0680) (0.0680) (0.0680) (0.0683) (0.0685) (0.0862) (0.0697) 
Gender (1  if male) 0.363*** 0.363*** 0.361*** 0.361*** 0.361*** 0.361*** 0.358*** 0.362*** 0.293*** 0.363*** 
 (0.0560) (0.0559) (0.0559) (0.0559) (0.0559) (0.0559) (0.0563) (0.0563) (0.0703) (0.0572) 
Marital status (Married = base case):       
Previously married -0.0399 -0.0394 -0.0390 -0.0390 -0.0396 -0.0401 -0.0483 -0.0471 -0.0218 -0.0328 
 (0.0848) (0.0848) (0.0848) (0.0848) (0.0848) (0.0848) (0.0851) (0.0851) (0.103) (0.0859) 
Never been  0.0469 0.0467 0.0491 0.0491 0.0480 0.0474 0.0546 0.0563 0.241* 0.0377 
married (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.135) (0.104) 
No. of children -0.0810** -0.0806** -0.0816** -0.0816** -0.0828** -0.0832** -0.0769** -0.0737** -0.0377 -0.0838** 
 (0.0358) (0.0358) (0.0358) (0.0358) (0.0358) (0.0358) (0.0358) (0.0359) (0.0449) (0.0366) 
Qualities of country-of-origin institutions:       
Voice &  0.00232          
Accountability (0.117)          
Political Stability  0.0374         
  (0.120)         
Government    0.114        
Effectiveness   (0.130)        
Control of     0.114       
Corruption    (0.130)       
Rule of Law     0.0435      
     (0.122)      
Regulatory Quality      0.0132     
      (0.124)     
British Legal       0.0502    
       (0.0572)    
Latitude        0.0531   
        (0.157)   
School Enrolment         -0.000330  
         (0.00264)  
Constraint on           -0.00453 
Executive          (0.0212) 
Observations 1954 1954 1955 1955 1955 1955 1926 1925 1252 1886 
Notes: In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also include MSR controls, which are not reported due to low significance. Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. All models passed the LR Chi-Square test, with the LR statistic ranging from 
200.9 to 365.7 and the pseudo R-squared ranging from 0.0812 to 0.0955.*** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
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Panel C) panel data (individuals aged 15 or older) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Age 0.0168** 0.0164** 0.0162** 0.0162** 0.0163** 0.0165** 0.0200** 0.0186** 0.0272*** 0.0211*** 
 (0.00775) (0.00776) (0.00775) (0.00775) (0.00776) (0.00775) (0.00779) (0.00781) (0.00926) (0.00790) 
Age2 -0.000326*** -0.000323*** -0.000325*** -0.000325*** -0.000324*** -0.000326*** -0.000350*** -0.000343*** -0.000387*** -0.000369*** 
 (0.0000789) (0.0000789) (0.0000789) (0.0000789) (0.0000789) (0.0000789) (0.0000793) (0.0000794) (0.0000925) (0.0000803) 
Wealth 0.00185*** 0.00185*** 0.00183*** 0.00183*** 0.00184*** 0.00185*** 0.00183*** 0.00183*** 0.00155*** 0.00187*** 
 (0.000187) (0.000187) (0.000187) (0.000187) (0.000187) (0.000187) (0.000187) (0.000187) (0.000220) (0.000191) 
Income 0.0370*** 0.0364*** 0.0353*** 0.0353*** 0.0354*** 0.0361*** 0.0345*** 0.0348*** 0.0386** 0.0436*** 
 (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0162) (0.0134) 
Employment status (Employed = base case):       
Unemployed -0.0366 -0.0372 -0.0301 -0.0301 -0.0315 -0.0323 -0.0257 -0.0288 -0.186 -0.0256 
 (0.120) (0.120) (0.120) (0.120) (0.120) (0.120) (0.121) (0.121) (0.167) (0.122) 
Not in labour  -0.228*** -0.227*** -0.226*** -0.226*** -0.226*** -0.226*** -0.226*** -0.230*** -0.267*** -0.214*** 
force (0.0545) (0.0544) (0.0545) (0.0545) (0.0545) (0.0544) (0.0550) (0.0550) (0.0658) (0.0562) 
Level of highest education achieved (No post-school qualification = base case):       
Bachelor degree  0.0784* 0.0772* 0.0732 0.0732 0.0761 0.0771* 0.0711 0.0704 0.0759 0.0667 
or higher (0.0465) (0.0465) (0.0465) (0.0465) (0.0465) (0.0465) (0.0468) (0.0468) (0.0548) (0.0473) 
Other post-school  0.397*** 0.400*** 0.401*** 0.401*** 0.401*** 0.400*** 0.381*** 0.390*** 0.355*** 0.392*** 
qualification (0.0477) (0.0477) (0.0476) (0.0476) (0.0476) (0.0476) (0.0478) (0.0480) (0.0585) (0.0489) 
Gender (1 if male) 0.348*** 0.350*** 0.348*** 0.348*** 0.347*** 0.347*** 0.343*** 0.346*** 0.297*** 0.346*** 
 (0.0391) (0.0391) (0.0391) (0.0391) (0.0391) (0.0391) (0.0394) (0.0394) (0.0475) (0.0400) 
Marital status (Married = base case):      
Previously  -0.000557 0.00226 0.00348 0.00348 0.00274 0.00188 -0.0105 -0.0115 0.0128 -0.00493 
married (0.0599) (0.0600) (0.0599) (0.0599) (0.0599) (0.0599) (0.0604) (0.0604) (0.0700) (0.0611) 
Never been  0.0896 0.0873 0.0964 0.0964 0.0934 0.0932 0.0945 0.0951 0.251*** 0.105 
married (0.0705) (0.0705) (0.0705) (0.0705) (0.0704) (0.0705) (0.0709) (0.0710) (0.0870) (0.0722) 
No. of children -0.0450* -0.0438* -0.0424* -0.0424* -0.0435* -0.0443* -0.0454* -0.0418* -0.00820 -0.0442* 
 (0.0236) (0.0236) (0.0236) (0.0236) (0.0236) (0.0236) (0.0238) (0.0239) (0.0284) (0.0245) 
Year=1 if 2006 -0.00346 0.00373 0.000147 0.000147 -0.00321 -0.00601 -0.00166 0.00104 -0.0231 -0.0102 
 (0.0375) (0.0376) (0.0375) (0.0375) (0.0375) (0.0374) (0.0377) (0.0377) (0.0455) (0.0383) 
Qualities of country-of-origin institutions:      
Voice &  0.138          
Accountability (0.0855)          
Political Stability  0.225**         
  (0.0896)         
Government    0.344***        
Effectiveness   (0.0926)        
Control of     0.344***       
Corruption    (0.0926)       
Rule of Law     0.271***      
     (0.0868)      
Regulatory       0.243***     
Quality      (0.0890)     
British Legal       0.0840**    
       (0.0395)    
Latitude        0.240**   
        (0.111)   
School Enrolment         0.00323*  
         (0.00168)  
Constraint on           0.0138 
Executive          (0.0153) 
Observations 4063 4061 4065 4065 4065 4065 3998 3996 2815 3892 
Notes: In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also include MSR controls, which are not reported due to low significance. Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. All models passed the LR Chi-Square test, with the LR statistic ranging from 
449.1 to 713.5 and the pseudo R-squared ranging from 0.0809 to 0.0880.*** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
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Panel D) panel data (individuals aged 36 or older) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Age 0.0117 0.0118 0.0120 0.0120 0.0122 0.0114 0.0170 0.0121 0.0204 0.0153 
 (0.0174) (0.0174) (0.0174) (0.0174) (0.0174) (0.0174) (0.0176) (0.0175) (0.0203) (0.0178) 
Age2 -0.000290* -0.000289* -0.000295** -0.000295** -0.000296** -0.000290* -0.000332** -0.000295* -0.000336* -0.000326** 
 (0.000150) (0.000150) (0.000150) (0.000150) (0.000150) (0.000150) (0.000151) (0.000151) (0.000172) (0.000153) 
Wealth 0.00170*** 0.00170*** 0.00169*** 0.00169*** 0.00169*** 0.00169*** 0.00170*** 0.00171*** 0.00139*** 0.00174*** 
 (0.000204) (0.000204) (0.000204) (0.000204) (0.000204) (0.000204) (0.000204) (0.000204) (0.000237) (0.000209) 
Income 0.0631*** 0.0628*** 0.0610*** 0.0610*** 0.0610*** 0.0620*** 0.0588*** 0.0598*** 0.0689*** 0.0709*** 
 (0.0189) (0.0190) (0.0190) (0.0190) (0.0190) (0.0189) (0.0191) (0.0191) (0.0225) (0.0194) 
Employment status (Employed = base case):       
Unemployed -0.450** -0.459** -0.440** -0.440** -0.444** -0.445** -0.445** -0.454** -0.536** -0.455** 
 (0.185) (0.185) (0.185) (0.185) (0.185) (0.185) (0.188) (0.189) (0.233) (0.189) 
Not in labour force -0.551*** -0.558*** -0.551*** -0.551*** -0.551*** -0.552*** -0.528*** -0.547*** -0.629*** -0.544*** 
 (0.0993) (0.0992) (0.0993) (0.0993) (0.0993) (0.0993) (0.101) (0.100) (0.117) (0.101) 
Occuoation (Managers and administrators = base case):       
Professionals -0.326*** -0.334*** -0.332*** -0.332*** -0.332*** -0.330*** -0.320*** -0.328*** -0.386*** -0.314*** 
 (0.0953) (0.0954) (0.0953) (0.0953) (0.0953) (0.0953) (0.0962) (0.0962) (0.113) (0.0966) 
Associate professionals -0.298*** -0.302*** -0.297*** -0.297*** -0.299*** -0.297*** -0.275** -0.293*** -0.342*** -0.300*** 
 (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.107) (0.107) (0.126) (0.108) 
Trades Persons -0.296** -0.308*** -0.292** -0.292** -0.294** -0.296** -0.263** -0.278** -0.288** -0.290** 
 (0.117) (0.116) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.118) (0.118) (0.138) (0.118) 
Elementary clerical  -0.279 -0.279 -0.281 -0.281 -0.280 -0.282 -0.273 -0.275 -0.361* -0.314* 
workers (0.181) (0.181) (0.181) (0.181) (0.181) (0.181) (0.182) (0.181) (0.204) (0.185) 
Intermediate clerical  -0.400*** -0.400*** -0.397*** -0.397*** -0.400*** -0.401*** -0.382*** -0.389*** -0.447*** -0.380*** 
workers (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.111) (0.111) (0.132) (0.111) 
Advanced clerical  -0.468*** -0.467*** -0.452*** -0.452*** -0.455*** -0.460*** -0.450*** -0.458*** -0.477*** -0.528*** 
workers (0.136) (0.137) (0.137) (0.137) (0.137) (0.137) (0.138) (0.138) (0.159) (0.140) 
Production workers -0.354** -0.367** -0.349** -0.349** -0.348** -0.350** -0.310** -0.334** -0.318* -0.283* 
 (0.154) (0.153) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.155) (0.155) (0.183) (0.157) 
Labourers and related  -0.514*** -0.519*** -0.497*** -0.497*** -0.501*** -0.503*** -0.487*** -0.507*** -0.640*** -0.546*** 
workers (0.134) (0.134) (0.134) (0.134) (0.134) (0.134) (0.137) (0.137) (0.167) (0.137) 
Level of highest education achieved (No post-school qualification = base case):      
Bachelor degree or  0.117** 0.119** 0.114** 0.114** 0.116** 0.117** 0.108** 0.111** 0.108* 0.110** 
higher (0.0532) (0.0532) (0.0533) (0.0533) (0.0532) (0.0532) (0.0537) (0.0537) (0.0622) (0.0542) 
Other post-school  0.363*** 0.369*** 0.368*** 0.368*** 0.370*** 0.366*** 0.348*** 0.363*** 0.306*** 0.353*** 
qualification (0.0624) (0.0628) (0.0624) (0.0624) (0.0624) (0.0624) (0.0625) (0.0628) (0.0760) (0.0639) 
Gender (1 if male) 0.327*** 0.328*** 0.327*** 0.327*** 0.327*** 0.327*** 0.325*** 0.325*** 0.256*** 0.321*** 
 (0.0483) (0.0483) (0.0483) (0.0483) (0.0483) (0.0483) (0.0488) (0.0488) (0.0574) (0.0494) 
Marital status (Married = base case):       
Previously married -0.0451 -0.0410 -0.0410 -0.0410 -0.0413 -0.0424 -0.0481 -0.0516 -0.0313 -0.0517 
 (0.0635) (0.0635) (0.0635) (0.0635) (0.0635) (0.0635) (0.0640) (0.0639) (0.0738) (0.0648) 
Never been married 0.121 0.123 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.119 0.114 0.121 0.303** 0.157 
 (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.107) (0.107) (0.124) (0.108) 
No. of children -0.0405 -0.0401 -0.0377 -0.0377 -0.0385 -0.0398 -0.0393 -0.0390 -0.0149 -0.0427 
 (0.0302) (0.0302) (0.0302) (0.0302) (0.0302) (0.0302) (0.0307) (0.0307) (0.0357) (0.0313) 
Location of household (Major urban = base case):       
Other urban -0.196** -0.191** -0.206** -0.206** -0.203** -0.202** -0.188** -0.191** -0.226** -0.180** 
 (0.0816) (0.0815) (0.0817) (0.0817) (0.0817) (0.0817) (0.0823) (0.0825) (0.0945) (0.0831) 
Bounded locality -0.0877 -0.0791 -0.0972 -0.0972 -0.0961 -0.0925 -0.105 -0.0935 -0.145 -0.105 
 (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.169) (0.149) 
Rural balance -0.165* -0.157* -0.168* -0.168* -0.166* -0.166* -0.160* -0.160* -0.277*** -0.200** 
 (0.0908) (0.0906) (0.0908) (0.0908) (0.0908) (0.0908) (0.0915) (0.0916) (0.105) (0.0929) 
Year=1 if 2006 -0.0389 -0.0313 -0.0335 -0.0335 -0.0378 -0.0414 -0.0384 -0.0344 -0.0357 -0.0455 
 (0.0434) (0.0436) (0.0434) (0.0434) (0.0434) (0.0434) (0.0437) (0.0437) (0.0518) (0.0442) 
(continued on next page) 
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Panel D) continued 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Qualities of country-of-origin institutions:       
Voice &  0.241**          
Accountability (0.110)          
Political Stability  0.258**         
  (0.117)         
Government    0.390***        
Effectiveness   (0.116)        
Control of     0.390***       
Corruption    (0.116)       
Rule of Law     0.342***      
     (0.109)      
Regulatory       0.320***     
Quality      (0.114)     
British Legal       0.133***    
       (0.0468)    
Latitude        0.286**   
        (0.133)   
School Enrolment         0.00417*  
         (0.00215)  
Constraint on           0.0253 
Executive          (0.0198) 
Observations 3146 3145 3146 3146 3146 3146 3090 3090 2248 3023 
 
Notes: In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also include MSR controls, which are not reported due to low significance. Occupation and household location variables are added to account for 
specifics of a more matured generation compared to individuals aged 15 or older. Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. All models passed the LR Chi-Square test, with the LR statistic ranging from 437.3 to 
659.8 and the pseudo R-squared ranging from 0.0999 to 0.109. *** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
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Table 2.12 Effects of additional country controls on SRFRT by immigrants aged 15 or older (panel data) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Age 0.0163** 0.0160** 0.0157** 0.0165** 0.0170** 0.0209*** 0.0196** 0.0285*** 0.0295*** 
 (0.00776) (0.00777) (0.00777) (0.00781) (0.00782) (0.00799) (0.00805) (0.00946) (0.00948) 
Age2 -0.000324*** -0.000322*** -0.000319*** -0.000328*** -0.000332*** -0.000372*** -0.000358*** -0.000403*** -0.000411*** 
 (0.0000789) (0.0000789) (0.000079) (0.0000794) (0.0000795) (0.0000809) (0.0000814) (0.0000942) (0.0000943) 
Wealth 0.00184*** 0.00184*** 0.00183*** 0.00181*** 0.00180*** 0.00180*** 0.00178*** 0.00153*** 0.00152*** 
 (0.000187) (0.000189) (0.000187) (0.000189) (0.000189) (0.000190) (0.000191) (0.000225) (0.000228) 
Income 0.0354*** 0.0360*** 0.0381*** 0.0390*** 0.0380*** 0.0380*** 0.0380*** 0.0368** 0.0364** 
 (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0129) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0133) (0.0134) (0.0164) (0.0165) 
Employment status (Employed = base case):      
Unemployed -0.0315 -0.0397 -0.0410 -0.0295 -0.0322 0.0107 -0.00740 -0.174 -0.182 
 (0.120) (0.120) (0.120) (0.120) (0.120) (0.125) (0.128) (0.171) (0.172) 
Not in labour 
force 
-0.226*** -0.230*** -0.232*** -0.225*** -0.222*** -0.213*** -0.223*** -0.264*** -0.261*** 
 (0.0545) (0.0545) (0.0546) (0.0550) (0.0550) (0.0561) (0.0565) (0.0671) (0.0672) 
Level of highest education achieved (No post-school qualification = base case):      
Bachelor degree or  0.0761 0.0771* 0.0720 0.0793* 0.0786* 0.0708 0.0698 0.0751 0.0788 
higher (0.0465) (0.0465) (0.0465) (0.0467) (0.0467) (0.0474) (0.0477) (0.0556) (0.0557) 
Other post-school  0.401*** 0.396*** 0.391*** 0.405*** 0.405*** 0.395*** 0.381*** 0.344*** 0.335*** 
qualification (0.0476) (0.0482) (0.0479) (0.0480) (0.0480) (0.0491) (0.0497) (0.0600) (0.0605) 
      
Gender (1 if 
male) 
0.347*** 0.349*** 0.346*** 0.343*** 0.342*** 0.356*** 0.354*** 0.292*** 0.296*** 
 (0.0391) (0.0392) (0.0391) (0.0394) (0.0395) (0.0402) (0.0406) (0.0483) (0.0484) 
Marital status (Married = base case):      
Previously 
married 
0.00274 0.00753 -0.00209 0.000651 0.000496 -0.0104 -0.0140 0.0108 0.00855 
 (0.0599) (0.0600) (0.0600) (0.0602) (0.0602) (0.0608) (0.0609) (0.0710) (0.0711) 
Never been 
married 
0.0934 0.0982 0.0874 0.101 0.0994 0.137* 0.128* 0.258*** 0.259*** 
 (0.0704) (0.0706) (0.0706) (0.0712) (0.0712) (0.0732) (0.0737) (0.0889) (0.0889) 
No. of children -0.0435* -0.0422* -0.0415* -0.0451* -0.0456* -0.0457* -0.0416* -0.0134 -0.0109 
 (0.0236) (0.0236) (0.0236) (0.0238) (0.0238) (0.0242) (0.0244) (0.0289) (0.0290) 
Year=1 if 2006 -0.00321 -0.00216 -0.00469 -0.0119 -0.0111 -0.0265 -0.00980 -0.0606 -0.0348 
 (0.0375) (0.0375) (0.0375) (0.0379) (0.0379) (0.0404) (0.0409) (0.0538) (0.0571) 
(continued on next page) 
65 
 
Table 2.12 (continued) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Country-of-origin characteristics:       
LN(Rule  0.271*** 0.237** 0.347*** 0.192 0.120 0.108 -0.182 -0.402 0.00589 
of Law) (0.0868) (0.110) (0.0987) (0.164) (0.174) (0.190) (0.207) (0.342) (0.417) 
Asia  0.0318       0.244 
  (0.0758)       (0.188) 
Africa  -0.0899       0.0653 
  (0.101)       (0.203) 
North   0.118       0.388* 
America  (0.125)       (0.219) 
South   -0.0483       0.390 
America  (0.164)       (0.265) 
Europe  0.0273       0.115 
  (0.0607)       (0.121) 
Muslims   0.110       
   (0.0826)       
Buddhists   -0.0424       
   (0.0855)       
Chinese    -0.0280       
Universists   (0.118)       
Hindus   -0.0279       
   (0.109)       
Non-religious   0.377***       
   (0.111)       
GDP    0.0250 0.0217 0.0115 0.0164 0.0326 -0.0526 
    (0.0310) (0.0311) (0.0357) (0.0359) (0.0477) (0.0648) 
English      0.0594 0.0348 0.0751 0.118* 0.138* 
speaking     (0.0500) (0.0549) (0.0571) (0.0711) (0.0799) 
Market      0.000863 0.000217 0.000588 0.000259 
capitalisation      (0.000799) (0.000819) (0.00109) (0.00135) 
Squared market      -0.0000023 -0.0000012 -0.00000132 -5.57e-07 
capitalisation       (0.00000194) (0.00000197) (0.00000237) (2.76e-06) 
Workers        -0.0234*** -0.0179 -0.0172 
remittances       (0.00723) (0.0109) (0.0125) 
School        -0.0000286 0.00349 
enrolment        (0.00415) (0.00507) 
Observations 4065 4065 4065 4013 4013 3885 3817 2743 2743 
 
Notes: In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also include controls for age, age squared, wealth, income, employment, education, gender, marital status, children and MSR. Standard errors are indicated in 
parentheses. All models passed the LR Chi-Square test, with the LR statistic ranging from 450.1 to 723.3 and the pseudo R-squared ranging from 0.0832 to 0.0906.*** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
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2.5.3 Robustness checks 
The robustness of the findings was explored in the same way as for equity investment. 
Additional country variables were added one at a time to the primary estimation with the 
Rule of Law as a single measure of institutional quality, and the results are reported in Table 
2.12.  
The results reported in columns 2 to 9 are not straightforward. The coefficient on Rule of 
Law, obtained by applying the ordered dependent variable model with fixed effects to the 
combined dataset, remains positive and significant only in the first three columns when 
controlling for religion and continent of origin. Findings for 2002 (Table A.9 in Appendix A) 
also show that the influence of informal institutions first reduces and then loses its 
significance when  measures of country’s GDP, English-speaking ability, stock market 
capitalisation, remittances received, secondary school enrolment and continents of origin are 
added. The striking observation of the 2006 estimates (Table A.10 in Appendix A) is that the 
coefficient on Rule of Law has turned from positive insignificant into negative significant in 
the last three columns. This unusual outcome, however, only confirms the absence of an 
institutional effect on the SRFRT behaviour of immigrants in 2006.  
As stated before, the strong effect of institutional quality on financial risk-taking in 2002 also 
influences the combined dataset for 2002 and 2006. In a similar way, in both 2002 and panel 
datasets, the coefficient on Rule of Law does not remain significantly positive when 
additional home country attributes such as GDP per capita are included. This outcome could 
be explained by the fact that the correlation between Rule of Law and GDP per capita is 
0.889 in 2002 and 0.880 when the panel data are used. These correlations are the highest 
among all country variables used in the regressions presented in Table 2.12. Hence, the 
redundant variable test reveals that the loss of significance of the institutional coefficient 
when GDP is added to the regression is due to multicollinearity
17
. Further comparison of the 
models shows that the inclusion of GDP does not provide any additional information for the 
explanation of the findings but it rather substitutes for institutional quality. Thus, it can be 
argued that the specification of the SRFRT model includes all the important country-of-origin 
attributes.     
                                                 
17
 The null hypotheses are failed to be rejected under Wald tests with p=0.75 for the 2002 sample and p=0.42 for 
the combined dataset.  
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2.5.4 Effects and persistence of institutional constraints 
By analogy with equity investment analysis, it is useful to analyse how and when institutional 
constraints become ingrained in individuals. For this purpose, as throughout the analysis of 
SRFRT, the ordered dependent variable models were used. Table 2.13 presents the results of 
the analysis of the effect of institutional quality depending on the age at arrival in Australia, 
using panel data. The 2002 estimates are presented in Table A.11 in Appendix A. Data for 
2006 were not used due to the lack of importance of all institutional parameters in the 
primary regressions.  
Table 2.13 Effects of home institutions on SRFRT by immigrants aged 15 or older, 
depending on their age at migration to Australia (panel data) 
  Age at arrival in Australia 
Variables All 1-15 16-20 21+ 
No year of arrival control   
Ln (Rule of Law) 0.271*** -0.245 0.0490 0.568*** 
 (0.0868) (0.153) (0.283) (0.123) 
Log likelihood -3718 -1288 -412.8 -1890 
Pseudo R -squared 0.0871 0.0598 0.113 0.115 
Number of observations 4065 1329 435 2214 
Year of arrival control   
Ln (Rule of Law) 0.279*** -0.266* 0.0514 0.581*** 
 (0.0869) (0.154) (0.283) (0.123) 
Log likelihood -3716 -1287 -412.5 -1888 
Pseudo R -squared 0.0876 0.0604 0.114 0.117 
Number of observations 4065 1329 435 2214 
 
Notes: In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also include controls for age, age squared, wealth, 
income, employment, education, gender, marital status, children and MSR. Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. *** 
indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
Again, two sets of estimates were produced: one that includes a variable controlling for the 
calendar year of an immigrant’s arrival in Australia and one that does not. In both cases 
(2002 and panel data), a country-of-origin effect on the self-reported preparedness to take 
financial risk presented in people who migrated to Australia at the age of 21 or older. 
However, when year of arrival controls were applied to the panel data, there was also a 
weakly significant negative institutional effect in people migrating under the age of 15. This 
unexpected negative sign of the institutional coefficient in this group was also present when 
individual respondents aged 15 to 35 were excluded from the sample (  
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Table A.12 in Appendix A).  
The presence of the weak institutional influence in the SRFRT of immigrants who arrived in 
Australia as children under the age of 15 can be ignored for two reasons. First, this effect 
does not exist in 2002 and in the estimates of panel data without year of arrival controls. 
Second, according to the previous findings, institutions affect immigrants’ SRFRT only in the 
2002 dataset but not in 2006; hence, the panel data coefficients are less reliable than the 2002 
coefficients as they could have been affected by the 2006 data. For these reasons, it is safe to 
base the conclusion about when institutional constraints become ingrained in individuals 
solely on the 2002 results. They suggest that the institutional effect is present only in 
individuals who were at least 21 years old at the time of migration, and that immigrants’ 
perceptions about their financial risk-taking if they arrived in Australia before this age are not 
different from those of native-born people.  
The persistence of the home-country institutional effect on SRFRT was also examined in a 
similar way as in the equity investment model. An additional variable accounting for the age 
of immigrants on arrival in Australia was added to the regression. Due to the similarity of 
estimates using this age-at-arrival variable to the ones without it, only the former results are 
reported in Table 2.14. According to the panel data and the data for 2002, the institutional 
effect exists in people who have spent 13 to 17 years in Australia. The data for 2002 also 
suggest that home institutions affect immigrants in the first seven years of their stay in 
Australia. The model for the trimmed dataset that excluded young immigrants under the age 
of 36 did not shed any more light on the explanation of this phenomenon (Table A.13 in 
Appendix A). In particular, the period of residence of people aged 36+ from the panel dataset 
who are subjected to the influence of home institutions is also 13 to 17 years, similar to the 
period in the 15+ panel dataset. According to the 2002 data, however, only those people from 
this age group are affected who have spent 13 to 27 years in Australia.  
Due to the similarity with the outcome of the analysis of the equity investment decisions, 
these findings could possibly be driven by similar factors. For example, the longer influence 
of home institutions on immigrants aged 36 and older (13 to 27 years) than on immigrants 
aged 21 to 35 (7 years) suggests a change in the immigrant’s profile in the 1980s. This 
coincided with the change of focus of Australian immigration policies initiated in 1979 and 
further refined in subsequent years (Walsh 2008). Migrants who arrived before then were 
mostly in the humanitarian and family programs, and possibly from countries with weak 
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institutions. Hence, their negative experience with home institutions has continued to 
influence their self-assessed financial risk-taking even after living in Australia for more than 
two decades.  
Table 2.14 Effects of home institutions on SRFRT by immigrants aged 15 years or 
older, depending on years spent in Australia, with age at arrival controls  
  Years in Australia 
Variables All 1-7 8-12 13-17 18-27 28+ 
Panel data       
Ln (Rule of Law) 0.238*** 0.306 0.160 0.508** 0.0251 0.0961 
 (0.0882) (0.229) (0.256) (0.235) (0.206) (0.158) 
Log likelihood -3704 -407.2 -347.6 -497.9 -701.4 -1646 
Pseudo R -squared 0.0876 0.0724 0.112 0.104 0.105 0.111 
Number of observations 4048 432 386 518 723 1974 
2002       
Ln (Rule of Law) 0.473*** 0.730** 0.291 0.621* 0.350 0.245 
 (0.127) (0.311) (0.387) (0.329) (0.333) (0.229) 
Log likelihood -1896 -232.1 -183.6 -278.0 -293.6 -826.3 
R -squared 0.0920 0.131 0.113 0.129 0.114 0.126 
Number of observations 2104 268 215 298 313 1005 
 
Notes: In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also include controls for age, age squared, wealth, 
income, employment, education, gender, marital status, children, MSR and individual’s age at arrival. Standard errors are 
indicated in parentheses. *** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
2.6 Conclusions 
This chapter analysed the determinants of financial risk-taking of Australian residents and 
examined whether financial risk-taking differs between native-born and foreign-born 
Australians. As this was the case, this chapter also investigated to what extent this differential 
can be explained by the difference in the quality of immigrants’ home institutions. Financial 
market participation is associated with financial risk: higher for institutionally intensive 
investments such as investing in stock and lower for investments not involving many 
institutions such as opening a savings account. Thus, country-of-origin attributes such as the 
quality of institutions should be one of the key factors affecting the financial risk-taking of 
immigrants.  
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Equity investment is often associated with higher financial risk than other types of 
investments. Hence, it can serve as a measure of financial risk-taking along with an 
individual’s own assessment of their own propensity to take financial risks. Customs and 
experiences with home-country institutions which have influenced immigrants can affect 
their investment decisions in the destination country. Consequently, participation in a more 
risky financial activity such as buying stocks depends to a high degree on whether 
immigrants to Australia had a positive experience in dealing with institutions in their home 
countries prior to their arrival in Australia. This indicates that there could be a close 
relationship between an immigrant’s perception about the degree of financial risk they are 
able to take, their equity investment and the quality of their home institutions.   
The findings are as follows: first, individuals born overseas invest less often in equities than 
people born in Australia; second, the quality of home institutions positively affects the 
probability of equity investment by immigrants; third, an individual’s readiness to take 
financial risk, at some periods, also depends on whether they were born in Australia or 
abroad, with lower values reported for immigrants; fourth, a positive effect of home-country 
institutional quality on the self-reported financial risk-taking by immigrants in Australia is 
evident only in 2002 but it is so strong that it dominates the insignificant one in 2006; fifth, 
self-reported financial risk-taking and equity investment are not interchangeable.  
The purpose of the first step of the analysis was to investigate the difference in financial risk-
taking behaviour between Australian-born and foreign-born individuals. The summary 
statistics show a higher equity investment for native-born but similar levels of self-reported 
financial risk-taking for both groups. More detailed analysis of the 2002, 2006 and panel data 
confirmed a higher participation in the share market by native-born compared to foreign-born 
individuals. Similarly, analysis of the 2002 data revealed a higher self-assessed propensity to 
take financial risk for Australian-born persons than those born overseas, regardless of their 
similar mean values. This difference in the levels of financial risk which individuals are 
prepared to take was also evident when the panel data for 2002 and 2006 were used, despite 
not always being detected in the 2006 survey.  
The differences in the results between the two periods can be attributed to either some event 
that occurred in 2006 or the cohort ageing factor. The significant positive effect of being born 
in Australia on the self-assessed financial risk-taking ability in 2006, obtained by excluding 
individuals under the age of 36, confirmed the persistence of the positive age-related effect 
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until people reach their early 40s. The declining propensity to take financial risk after this 
point could be more prominent in immigrants since it can take some time after their arrival in 
the country before they start participating in the Australian financial market. Thus, 
Australian-born and foreign-born individuals of the same age might have considerable 
differences in their risk-taking levels and investment activities. On the other hand, the 
difference in the financial behaviour between foreign-born and Australian-born individuals 
can be accounted for by the strength of the institutions in a home country. 
The next step focused on the effects of home-country institutions on the equity investment 
and the self-reported financial risk-taking of immigrants in Australia. This resulted in the 
following findings: first, improvement in all institutional attributes except enrolment in 
secondary school and the geographic latitude of the country of origin positively affects the 
extent of equity investment by immigrants in 2002 and 2006; second, a higher preparedness 
of immigrants to take financial risk in 2002 is associated with a better quality of institutions 
in their home country, but the 2006 data do not show this tendency. In contrast with the 
findings for equity investment, a higher geographic latitude of the country of origin and a 
higher percentage of those enrolled in their home country’s secondary schools encourage 
immigrants to take greater financial risk, in which cases the degree of institutional constraints 
on executive authority in their home country do not matter.  
Further analysis revealed that the institutional effect on equity investment was robust to the 
inclusion of additional country variables. The dependence of self-reported financial risk-
taking behaviour on institutional quality in 2002 was not so obvious; however, subsequent 
analysis showed robustness as well. Home-country institutions affect only those individuals 
who arrived in Australia aged 21 or older through both their equity investment decisions and 
their preparedness to take financial risk. The duration of institutional influence is related to 
the length of stay in Australia but it varies for people from different generations with the 
minimum detected period of seven years.  
In summary, both the probability of equity investment and the self-reported financial risk-
taking of immigrants depend on the quality of institutions in their home countries. The effect 
on equity investment is persistent in both periods, whereas it is not so obvious in individuals' 
own estimation of their financial risk-taking. The above conclusion and the low correlation 
between these two dependent variables prove that equity investment is not a perfect proxy for 
self-reported financial risk-taking.  
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Thus, a negative experience with home institutions before migration could explain 
immigrants’ lower propensity to take financial risk compared to that of native-born 
individuals, which, in turn, can help in understanding the reasons for the wealth disadvantage 
of immigrants. Improvements to the institutional environment in an immigrant’s home 
country influence not only that country’s economy but also, through the financial behaviour 
of the immigrant, the financial performance of the country to which the person migrates. A 
greater trust in institutions by immigrants to Australia can increase their participation in the 
financial markets; this, in turn, can eliminate the wealth gap between native-born and foreign-
born in Australia and contribute to the financial development of the country.  
Immigrants’ wealth, however, can be accumulated not only through financial risk but also 
through their ability to save. In addition, immigrants’ risk preferences can also affect their 
saving choices and, accordingly, the above informal institutional effect may play a significant 
role in their saving decisions. The next chapter therefore analyses what factors affect 
immigrants’ saving behaviour and if their home-country characteristics affect their saving 
habits.  
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CHAPTER  3.  THE SAVING BEHAVIOUR OF IMMIGRANTS TO 
AUSTRALIA AND HOME-COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS
18
 
3.1 Introduction 
The mobilisation of savings is one of the important functions of the financial sector. The 
provision of savings facilities enables households to secure their investment future. This 
money can then be loaned to businesses, thus creating a favourable environment for capital 
accumulation and private sector development. Countries with well-developed financial 
systems have greater investment and financial depth mainly due to higher savings (World 
Bank 1989). Thus, understanding the determinants of saving rates is important for creating 
sound policies for a country.  
The differences in countries’ saving performances depend on a number of factors. According 
to Hussein and Thirlwall (1999), variables affecting national saving rates can be grouped into 
two factors: factors that affect the capacity to save and factors that contribute to the 
willingness to save. Each country’s characteristics such as income per capita, growth and 
distribution of income affect the ability to save, whereas inflation and interest rates are 
important components that impact on the willingness to save.     
As total domestic savings are affected not only by government savings but also by personal 
savings (Edwards 1996), cultural diversity can play a major role in defining the level of 
domestic savings in a country. This effect is even more prominent in countries with 
diversified ethnic backgrounds, such as Australia. Customs and traditions from the home 
countries which people bring with them when migrate can affect their way of life in 
Australia, and their saving behaviour in particular.  
The first aim of this chapter is to investigate the determinants of saving rates of Australian 
residents and determine whether the saving patterns of immigrants are different from those of 
native-born Australians. If there is a difference, then this study progresses by exploring how 
the ethnic background of Australian immigrants affects their saving behaviour, and to what 
extent this behaviour can be explained by cross-country differences in national saving rates. 
Similar to the tests reported in the previous chapter, this study also tests whether other 
country-of-origin characteristics such as institutional quality play any significant role in the 
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 A version of this chapter has been accepted for publication by The Australian Economic Review  Journal. 
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formation of personal saving habits. Household saving rates are examined with respect to 
both household heads and all individuals. 
The results of this analysis reveal that immigrant households have lower saving rates than 
native-born households. This difference is present in both the household-heads-only sample 
and the sample including all household members. This variation in saving patterns can be at 
least partially attributed to the institutional environments in immigrants’ home countries: the 
stronger the home institutions, the higher the saving rates of Australian immigrant 
households. Immigrants’ saving rates are also related to other home-country characteristics, 
such as the national saving rates of their home countries; however, this is evident only at an 
individual level. The negative correlation between national saving rates in immigrants’ home 
countries and their saving rates in Australia can be explained either by not accounting for 
remittances due to lack of data or by the change in immigrants’ saving habits after migration. 
This relationship is illustrated using an example of 14 countries.  
Following a review of the literature and description of the data and methodology, this chapter 
proceeds as follows: first, it analyses what determines the household saving rates of 
Australian residents, and whether there is a difference in saving behaviour between 
Australian-born and foreign-born households and individuals; second, the sample is limited to 
immigrants for testing whether there is a home-country effect on their saving habits; and 
finally, the saving rates of immigrants are compared to the saving rates in their respective 
home countries.  
As before, the data used are from the HILDA Survey. Country data are sourced from 
international surveys and databases, such as Worldwide Governance Indicators from the 
World Bank.  
3.2 Literature review 
The explanation for the divergence of economic performance between countries has long 
been an area of interest to economists. Poor countries have lower saving rates than rich ones; 
however, middle-income countries tend to have the highest saving rates (Thirlwall 2003). The 
explanation depends on the preferred method of analysis, which can be drawn from the three 
broad analytical approaches to the role of savings in financial development, as suggested by 
Thirlwall (2003). First is the prior-savings approach, which is the classical approach 
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underlining the role of prior savings for investment. The Keynesian approach, on the 
contrary, emphasises investment as a prerequisite for savings. Third, the quantity theory 
approach suggests accumulation of resources through a government’s intervention in the 
form of forced saving or an inflation tax.  
According to Modigliani (1986), thrift has traditionally been seen as a socially beneficial act. 
However, since the 1930s it has been regarded as potentially disruptive to the economy, in 
accordance with the theory of John Maynard Keynes. From the Keynesian perspective, 
persistent attempts to save more reduce consumption without expanding investment, thus 
creating insufficient demand and, consequently, lower income and output. Hence, saving (S) 
was treated as part of consumption or as one of the items which can be purchased by using a 
consumer’s income and entirely dependent on current income (Y), and not on the rate of 
interest as in classical theory. Correspondingly, the saving function was estimated by the 
linear form and has become known as the Keynesian absolute income hypothesis: 
 sYsS  0 . 
 
This implies that saving ratio (S/Y) is defined as:  
YssYS // 0 , where s is the propensity to save and s0<0 is autonomous saving or saving 
that is unrelated to income (Thirlwall 2003)  
The saving-income relationship was the subject of extensive discussions among the 
economists of the 20th century. In the second half of the 1940s, the definition of saving was 
revised due to the emergence of the relative income hypothesis. The saving rate was 
explained not by the absolute income of the family but rather by its income relative to the 
overall mean income (Modigliani 1986). This explained the paradox of insignificant change 
in the saving ratio since the middle of the 19th century despite the considerable increment in 
per capita income, which was followed by an increase in consumption. Another important 
contribution to this debate in the 1950s, as stated by Modigliani (1986), was based on the 
discovery that consumption was not controlled by current income, but rather by normal or 
permanent income.  
Apart from income, there are other factors affecting the level of saving, such as growth of 
income from the life cycle hypothesis that emerged in the 1950s (Thirlwall 2003). According 
to the life-cycle model proposed by Ando and Modigliani (1963), in a balanced economy 
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with a stable population, saving by young people completely offsets the absence of saving in 
old age. Aggregate savings would occur only when the income of the young population 
exceeds, in relative terms, the retirement income of the old generation during an economic 
boom. Alternatively, savings or lack of savings may result from the majority of the 
population being either very young or old. Hence, income growth determinants such as 
income growth and growth of population are important saving components. Similarly, the 
ratio of active to non-active households, referred to as the dependency ratio, determines 
savings through income growth due to population growth (Thirlwall 2003). 
The current literature also stresses the importance of wealth effects in determining saving 
behaviour. For example, Dreger and Reimers (2006) claimed that wealth effects are essential 
when investigating consumption behaviour, and the inclusion of wealth considerably 
improves their model. The importance of wealth in private saving was also highlighted by 
Salotti (2010), suggesting a negative relationship between housing wealth and household 
saving in developed countries in the period 1980–2005, which is partially explained by the 
housing market boom. However, as she argued, many studies fail to account for household 
wealth due to lack of data.  
Saving rates are defined in different ways depending on assumptions and data availability. 
For example, under the assumption of utility maximisation and infinite life in the life-cycle 
hypothesis, saving mainly reflects transitory income, which is defined as the difference 
between current and permanent income, and this is the same as the definition of saving under 
the Permanent Income Hypothesis. However, in the case of a stationary or steadily growing 
economy with a limited life of households, saving rates reflect change in the aggregate 
private wealth (Modigliani 1986). 
The determinants of saving or saving rates can be broadly classified as factors affecting the 
capacity to save and factors affecting the willingness to save (Hussein & Thirlwall 1999). Per 
capita income, population growth, the dependency ratio as well as the distribution of income 
determine the capacity or ability to save, as argued by Thirlwall (2003). Saving rate 
determinants that influence the willingness to save include monetary factors such as the 
interest rate and the inflation rate. Willingness to save also depends on saving motives, which 
are different for public and private savings. Government saving depends on the willingness to 
tax and spend, whereas private saving depends on the price of current consumption 
represented by the interest rate. Some studies, however, have attached a higher importance to 
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factors contributing to financial development such as financial deepening and credit 
availability in their influence on an individual’s willingness to save.  
The investigation of private saving behaviour in developed countries is increasingly relevant 
in view of the consequences of ageing populations. The saving of a country’s residents 
depends on numerous factors which could also be categorised as those influencing their 
capacity to save and those affecting their willingness to save (Al-Awad & Elhiraika 2003). 
Accordingly, a household’s capacity to save depends on economic variables such as 
household income, and the willingness to save depends primarily on cultural factors. A 
similar grouping of the determinants of household saving behaviour into factors influencing 
labour market outcomes, such as educational attainment and family composition, and cultural 
and institutional factors, such as cultural practices and the socioeconomic strata in which 
individuals grew up, was suggested by Islam, Parasnis and Fausten  (2010).  
The recent literature tends to focus more on culture and the specific characteristics of 
countries of origin as possible determinants of different economic behaviour. For example, 
Stulz and Williamson (2003) argued that immigrants’ culture can affect the financial system 
of their host country through their predominant values, institutions and allocation of 
resources. Culture was defined by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006) as customary beliefs 
and values that are transferred within generations of ethnic, religious and social groups. They 
investigated the effects of culture’s fundamental aspects such as religion and ethnic origin on 
economic outcomes. In particular, they focused on how saving decisions vary between 
various religious groups and argued that cultural variables are important in understanding 
differences in saving rates among countries. Similarly, Carroll, Rhee and Rhee (1999) tested 
how countries of origin affect savings by analysing the saving patterns of immigrants to the 
US. Their findings suggested that the saving patterns of immigrants to the US, to a large 
extent, depend on which country they came from; yet these patterns do not necessarily 
resemble the saving rates of their home countries.   
Understanding the determinants of private saving patterns of people with various 
backgrounds is significant for countries with a high concentration of immigrants. The 
relationship between people’s origin and saving rates has been tested using data from 
different countries. For instance, Al-Awad and Elhiraika (2003), using data on immigrants to 
the United Arab Emirates, investigated the effect of immigrants’ home countries and regions 
on their saving behaviour. Their findings confirmed that saving rates differ between 
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households with different ethnic backgrounds. Likewise, Sinning (2007, p. 21) in a study of 
the saving behaviour of German immigrants, who save less than native-born, argued that ‘the 
unexplained part of the savings gap between immigrants and natives is relatively large if 
interest rates in the countries of origin are higher than in Germany and remittances are not 
considered’. 
Research on the indicators of the financial integration of immigrants into Australian society 
has concentrated predominantly on their wealth. For instance, Cobb-Clark and Hildebrand 
(2008) compared the net worth and asset portfolios of foreign-born and Australian-born 
families. They pointed out that the wealth gap between the two is still present in Australia, 
albeit much smaller than in other immigrant-receiving countries. Likewise, the findings of 
Doiron and Gutman (2009), who studied the difference in wealth distribution of these two 
groups, revealed a wealth disadvantage of immigrant households in Australia.  
This is in line with the argument of Islam, Parasnis and Fausten (2010) that differences in 
wealth are seen as the main reason for the different saving behaviour of native and foreign-
born households. However, as they asserted, immigrants’ wealth accumulation in Australia is 
unlikely to provide a comprehensive view on immigrant wealth holdings as they can have 
financial responsibilities and opportunities in other countries, not necessary limited to their 
countries of origin. For example, they may use their savings to hold assets in their home 
countries which could continue to build up after migration if they plan to return.  
Consequently, Islam, Parasnis and Fausten (2010) explored whether there are systematic 
differences in the saving behaviour between immigrant and native households in Australia, 
and what might be the potential determinants of any observed differentials. By using data 
from four Australian household expenditure surveys, they explained the observed saving gap 
in favour of native households by labour market outcomes. At the same time, they suggested 
that immigrant households tend to save more, when demographic and other characteristics are 
controlled for, across the entire savings distribution, with higher values of savings observed 
at the upper end of the distribution. This research, however, did not account for the cultural 
and institutional dimensions of the saving behaviour of the immigrant population and 
predominantly concentrated on household socio-economic characteristics, thus restricting the 
range of possible factors affecting the saving behaviour of Australian residents. 
This chapter contributes to the research described above by investigating the determinants of 
the saving rates of Australian residents by using a different dataset, and goes further by 
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investigating how the ethnic backgrounds of Australian immigrants affect their saving 
behaviour. With this purpose, a similar model to the one used by Al-Awad and Elhiraika 
(2003) was applied to the HILDA data. Carroll, Rhee and Rhee (1999) argued that saving 
rates differ between different immigrant groups, suggesting the presence of country-of-origin 
effects. Nevertheless, the personal saving rates obtained by them differ from the national 
saving patterns of their respective countries, and thus the international saving rates 
differential remains unexplained. The contribution of this study to the research on the 
determinants of economic performance includes a comparison of the estimated personal 
saving rates of Australian immigrants with the national saving rates of their home countries.  
As discussed above, various factors affecting the saving rate have been discovered, and this 
has led to the development of various approaches to measuring it. This study integrates these 
approaches and selects the life cycle permanent income hypothesis for consumption as a 
foundation for the saving model. This model alone cannot explain all the variations in private 
saving rates across countries, hence, additional variables are added to the regression. Thus, 
private saving behaviour in this research is defined as a function of following variables: 
permanent income; personal factors affecting permanent income, such as age and occupation; 
dependency ratio; wealth; and country-of-origin characteristics.  
Additionally, the research reported in this chapter adds to the findings described in the 
previous chapter on the importance of institutions for financial development. According to 
this research, the quality of institutions affects the Australian financial markets through the 
financial risk-taking behaviour of Australian immigrants and their equity investment 
decisions. Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2002) argued that immigrants’ risk preferences also 
affect their saving choices; hence, this informal institutional effect may play a significant role 
in their saving decisions. To test this hypothesis, country-of-origin attributes in this part of 
the study include institutional quality attributes in addition to general economic indicators 
such as GDP and the national saving rate.  
3.3 Data and methodology 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, no study has ever been carried out using actual 
measured saving rates. These have always been imputed using other variables depending on 
the data available. For example, because Islam, Parasnis and Fausten (2010) used cross-
sectional Australian data, they focused on out-of-pocket saving defined as the difference 
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between consumption and disposable income. A similar definition was used by Al-Awad and 
Elhiraika (2003) for their study of savings by immigrants to the United Arab Emirates, due to 
the country’s laws not allowing foreigners to possess fixed assets and hence their wealth 
holdings data being irrelevant. A different approach was used by Carroll, Rhee and Rhee 
(1999) for their US study. The absence of information about consumption in their data does 
not allow an estimation of personal saving as suggested above. Similarly, since their data 
from the 1980 and 1990 Censuses of Population and Housing were obtained from a 
subsample which is randomly selected every ten years, it is not possible to follow individuals 
across different periods. As a result, they estimated what the wealth level would have been in 
1990 for the people observed in 1980 and what the wealth level would have been in 1980 for 
the people surveyed in 1990. The imputed data were then used for the estimation of an 
individual’s saving as the change in wealth between two periods.  
The method of defining saving in this research is severely constrained by data limitations. 
Despite HILDA’s survey period commencing in 2001, information on household wealth is 
only available for 2002 and 2006. As suggested by Carroll et al. (1999), the panel structure of 
these data allows an estimation of personal saving as the increase or decrease in wealth 
between 2002 and 2006. This change in household wealth was considered for defining 
saving, but application of the model using saving defined this way failed to produce any 
significant results. The possible explanation is that the wealth variable in HILDA includes 
increases in the value of assets such as the family home, and saving, defined as change in 
household wealth, might be highly influenced by changes in property values. Furthermore, as 
argued by Engelhardt (1996), self-measured values of houses reported by home-owners are 
not always accurate and tend to be over-estimated. Household wealth also includes windfalls 
such as inheritances, winnings and termination payments, which arguably make its change a 
poor measure of household saving.  
Fortunately, HILDA’s rich dataset includes household-level data on income in each year 
surveyed and data on expenses since 2005. Hence, following the approach by Al-Awad and 
Elhiraika (2003), saving (S) in this study is equal to the difference between total disposable 
household income (Y) and total household expenditure (E). Accordingly, the saving rate (s) 
used in this study is calculated by using these savings divided by total household disposable 
income: Y
EY
Y
S
s

  .  
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Similarly to the usage by Carroll, Rhee and Rhee (1999) and Al-Awad and Elhiraika (2003), 
observable household disposable income in this research is treated as permanent disposable 
income plus a transitory component. As argued by Carroll (2001), in the presence of 
uncertainty about meaningful labour income, Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis 
describes the optimal behaviour of optimally impatient consumers better than the later 
maximising versions. According to Carroll, Milton Friedman’s definition of permanent 
income that determines current spending is the mean of expected income in the near future 
(Carroll 2001). The measure of permanent income can also be obtained by using past income 
plus income change from the past to the current period (Ramrattan & Szenberg 2008). 
Transitory income, which is defined as the difference between current and lifetime income, 
has a negligible effect on consumption, as asserted by Ramrattan and Szenberg (2008). Since 
this study is limited to the investigation of factors affecting saving behaviour in 2006 (as 
discussed in the subsequent section describing personal data), the annual disposable income 
for 2006 is treated as permanent income.  
Based on data availability, household expenditure in this research includes everyday 
expenses, rent and mortgage payments as well as annual depreciation of durable goods such 
as vehicles and computers. Although it is acknowledged that capital gains can influence 
saving through the so-called ‘wealth effect’ (Islam, Parasnis & Fausten 2010), capital gains 
and losses are not included in the estimates of savings due to the difficulty of identifying 
unrealised and realised gains. Expenditure in this study does not include information about 
remittances as this information was not collected by HILDA. Hence, there is a possibility that 
the household expenditure in HILDA of those immigrants who transfer money overseas could 
be lower than their actual expenditure, which could result in their savings being 
overestimated. A list of all expenditure items is given in Table B.1 in Appendix B. 
This study was carried out for both households and individuals and for two age groups. The 
sample was initially limited to households for consistency with other studies investigating the 
saving behaviour of immigrants (Al-Awad & Elhiraika 2003; Carroll, Rhee & Rhee 1999; 
Islam, Parasnis & Fausten 2010; Sinning 2007). Carroll, Rhee and Rhee (1999) argued that 
the saving objectives of younger immigrants in the US, who are most likely to be temporary 
residents, might not be the same as those of long-term residents. Hence, to remove 
observations related to younger respondents who might save for different reasons than their 
older and more settled counterparts, the sample was restricted to households with the heads 
defined as household members aged 36 or older who earn the highest income. However, due 
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to the different profile of Australian immigrants, the extended sample including young 
household heads aged 16 to 35 was also considered. Similarly, for the purpose of comparison, 
the sample which includes all individuals, and not just household heads, was also analysed.  
Of the two models employed in this part of the study, the first model was used for 
determining if Australian residents born overseas have lower saving rates than their 
Australian-born counterparts: 
iiioi RXS   21  ,      (3.1) 
 
where Si is a saving rate of household i that is defined as the ratio of household saving to the 
total disposable income; Xi is a vector of household characteristics affecting savings such as 
household income, wealth, age, gender, occupation and education of the household head; and 
Ri is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the household head was born in Australia and 0 
otherwise.  
The application of the second model was justified because the saving behaviour of immigrant 
households was, in fact, found to be different from that of native-born households. This 
model tested the significance of the cultural effects in contributing to this variation, using the 
immigrant-only sample: 
iiioi ZXS   21    ,      (3.2) 
 
where, as before, Si is the saving rate of an immigrant household i and Xi is a vector of 
household characteristics; and  Zi is a vector of country-of-origin characteristics including 
GDP, national saving rate, the dependency ratio and the quality of institutions.  
These two models were also applied to the extended dataset that includes all household 
members and not just household heads to determine if different household members have 
different saving patterns. Similarly to the investigations reported in Chapter 2, individual 
characteristics included age, gender, wealth, individual income, education and employment 
variables. Two additional variables accounting for the different contributions by different 
household members to the total amount of household savings were: a dummy variable 
representing whether or not an individual is a household head and a dummy variable 
representing whether or not this individual is the spouse of a household head. All models 
were estimated using STATA 11. 
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A two-stage least squares (2SLS) procedure was used as a result of the endogeneity of 
household income and household wealth. The Hausman test, carried out to test if there is a 
correlation between the explanatory variables and the error terms, confirmed the endogeneity 
of these two variables in agreement with the previous studies (Al-Awad & Elhiraika 2003). 
Hence, the estimation of the models (3.1) and (3.2) using the ordinary least squares method 
will be biased and inconsistent, unlike the more reliable instrumental variable estimations. 
The instruments used here are the lagged value of household disposable income in 2005, the 
previous year, and the lagged value of household wealth in 2002, as this is only surveyed 
every four years. Although there are concerns about the credibility of these instrumental 
variables, such as the possible correlation of lagged income with unobservable determinants 
of the saving rate that are endogenous to current income, these were the best possible 
instruments within existing data constraints. The STATA post-estimation test measuring the 
relevance of the excluded exogenous variables was carried out, and the results confirmed that 
these are good instruments. Similarly, personal disposable income for 2005 and household 
wealth for 2002 were also used as instruments when saving models were applied to 
individuals. The results of the endogeneity tests are reported in Table B.2 in Appendix B. 
3.3.1 Personal data 
The data on individuals were taken from the HILDA Survey and limited to observations in 
2006 as this is the only year that has questions on household expenditure and household 
wealth. Household expenditure was required for the calculation of the saving rate, and 
household wealth was used as an independent variable. Although household wealth was 
surveyed in 2002 as well, there were no questions on household expenditure in that year; 
hence 2002 data were used for instrumental variables only. Data collected in 2006 consists of 
17,454 respondents or 7,139 households. All personal variables with definitions are presented 
in Table B.1 in Appendix B. 
Saving models were first applied to household heads only and then to all household members. 
Both samples were applied to two age groups: aged 15 or older and aged 36 or older. As in 
the previous analysis, independent personal variables included variables influencing a 
financial situation directly, such as household wealth and income, and those that could affect 
the household budget indirectly, such as an individual’s education and their employment 
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status
19
. Wealth, financial income, education, gender, marital status and Major Statistical 
Region (MSR) were used as independent variables in both cases, although household income 
was used in the first population sample and individual income in the second. A variable 
accounting for the number of household members was included in both, assuming that total 
household saving depends on how many people are in a household.  
It is assumed that the household heads, being the major income providers, are more settled, 
with steady occupational careers, than the other household members are. Hence, the first 
dataset, which was used for identification of factors affecting the saving rate at the household 
level, also included occupational status and household location variables. Other studies have 
also used these individual characteristics to describe saving behaviour (Al-Awad & Elhiraika 
2003; Carroll, Rhee & Rhee 1999). In addition, as suggested by Al-Awad and Elhiraika 
(2003), the household dependency ratio was added as another household characteristic into a 
household-level model to account for the effect of having household members who do not 
earn any income.  
The second dataset containing all household members included two additional dummy 
variables: the first dummy variable represented whether or not an individual is considered as 
a household head, and the second dummy variable represented whether or not this individual 
was the spouse of a household head. The amount contributed to total savings depends not 
only on the income of each household member but also on the household responsibilities of 
each member. Being a parent who is the household head or the spouse of the household head, 
for instance, entails the responsibility of providing for children and hence, they could be 
expected to have lower savings. 
As discussed above, the saving rate in this study is equal to the share of net household income 
after paying all household expenses from total disposable income. For meaningful estimates, 
however, income and expenditure variables needed to be modified. The high proportion of 
missing responses under household expenditure suggested a diversified approach to handling 
these variables. All missing values of household expenditures were treated as zero, except for 
inevitable expense items such as groceries, public transport and taxis, electricity bills and gas 
bills. Similarly, missing values of annual rent and mortgage payments were treated as zero, 
                                                 
19
 Since the selection of household heads is based on the highest income, meaning that most of them are 
employed, employment status becomes irrelevant for this group and, accordingly, was excluded from the 
household-level model. The employment variables, however, were still included in the model covering all 
individuals. 
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assuming that those respondents who did not pay rent were house owners and vice versa. 
Household income and personal income were also subject to certain restrictions. 
Observations with negative values of household income and private disposable income were 
deleted as, in this case, consistent saving rates could not be calculated. 
After these manipulations, the saving rates then derived were taken on the extreme values at 
either end of the distribution such as -21,948 per cent as the minimum value and 100 per cent 
as the maximum value. This implied the need for an additional trimming of the sample since 
expenses that are thousands times greater than income, on one hand, and zero expenditures, 
on the other hand, are very unlikely and can cause misleading results. Thus the sample was 
winsorised to 96 per cent with the new lower and upper limits of  -130 per cent and 79 per 
cent respectively and the mean value of 30 per cent.  
This limitation, along with other restrictions, negatively affected the size of the sample used. 
Trimming the sample to individuals aged 15 and over with the non-missing data on countries 
of origin reduced the sample size to 10,196 residents. Further restriction to households heads 
aged 36 and over trimmed the sample to 3,869 households.  
The characteristics of the immigrant and native-born individuals surveyed in 2006 are 
compared in Table 2.1 (Panel B) in Chapter 2. The average immigrant is eight years older, 
has slightly fewer children in the household and is better educated than the average person 
born in Australia. Compared to individuals born in Australia, immigrants have a similar 
percentage of men and women, a higher percentage of married individuals, a lower 
employment rate and a higher income. Unlike 2002, the difference in the mean value of 
wealth between immigrant and native-born households is not significant in 2006.  
The difference in household saving rates is an area of particular interest in this research. 
Hence, the mean values of the saving rates of foreign-born and Australian-born households 
with the heads aged 36 years or older are also compared. The results reveal a difference in 
saving rates in favour of native-born households (29.26 per cent per annum as opposed to 
25.59 per cent saved by an average immigrant household).  
Basic immigrant characteristics including year of and age at arrival in Australia and continent 
of origin are also summarised in Chapter 2. About 23 per cent of respondents migrated to 
Australia before 1964. The remaining three quarters spread over the following period from 
1965 to 2006 with the lowest number migrating in 1975–1979. The proportion of immigrants 
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is the highest among adults older than 20 (53 per cent) and the lowest for children aged 11 to 
15. The majority of the sample originated from Europe and about a quarter of all respondents 
were born in Asia.  
3.3.2 Country data 
The personal variables mentioned above affect the capacity to save by Australian households, 
whereas their willingness to save is affected by country-of-origin attributes, analogous to the 
existing studies (Al-Awad & Elhiraika 2003; Hussein & Thirlwall 1999). Other possible 
determinants of the willingness to save such as the interest rate and inflation are the same for 
all households. With the intention of finding all possible determinants of Australian 
household saving habits, all the country variables used in the estimations reported in Chapter 
2 were also tested for their possible connection with the saving rate. They included factors 
specifically reflecting institutional quality as well as other home-country characteristics. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the variables representing the quality of home institutions in this 
study were derived from international surveys and databases. For example, the Aggregate 
Governance Indicators including Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption were taken from 
the Worldwide Governance Indicators database created by the World Bank. These indicators 
measure perceptions about the quality of a country’s government, such as freeedom of 
expression, respect for civil liberties, and free and fair elections, measured by Voice and 
Accountability. They were originally scored from -2.5 to 2.5 but were converted into positive 
numbers by adding 4 and taking logarithms. Likewise, Constraint on the Executive, which 
measures the degree of institutional constraints on the decision-making powers of chief 
executives from lowest 1 to highest 7, was taken from the Polity IV Project database (INSCR 
2009) as before.  
Other country variables used in this study included religion from the World Christian 
Encyclopedia (2007), English language speaking from Bleakley and Chin (2004), countries’ 
geographic latitude and a variable reflecting whether a country has a British legal system 
from La Porta et al. (1999), as well as variables such as GDP, market capitalisation, workers’ 
remittances and school enrolment from the the World Development Indicators (World Bank 
2010). Since these variables are assumed to be correlated with the quality of institutions and 
some of them also influence the financial risk-taking ability of immigrants, it was also tested 
87 
 
whether they affect immigrants’ saving rates, as saving is directly related to financial wealth 
accumulation.  
Summary statistics of the above home-country variables are presented in Table A.3 in 
Appendix A. Similarly to the analysis described in Chapter 2, the effect of each country 
attribute on the household saving rate was studied separately due to a high correlation 
between these measures.  
This research also tested the relationship of household saving rates with the home country’s 
dependency ratio. According to Keynes cited in Modigliani (1988), the ‘foresight’ saving 
motive includes provision for the anticipated future expenses of an individual or their family 
which are different from the current costs and include expenses related to old age, education 
and provision for dependents. Hence, the home country’s dependency ratio reflecting the 
proportion of the dependent population to the total population of working age can also affect 
saving habits. A relationship between the household saving rate and the proportion of old 
dependents, in particular, can confirm the life-cycle hypothesis, according to which 
consumption in old age with accompanying lack of saving motivates current saving. This old-
age dependency ratio varies from a minimum of 4.16 per cent in Oman to a maximum of 
30.98 per cent in Japan with the average value being 19.17 per cent among 12,811 
respondents from 105 countries. The old-age dependency ratio in Australia is 19.40 per cent. 
An additional country attribute which was also specific to this part of the study was a 
country’s gross adjusted saving rate as a percentage of Gross National Income (GNI). This 
variable was also taken from the World Development Indicators and was included to test if 
household saving habits depend on the home-country saving rate, and to find evidence of the 
importance of country-of-origin effects in explaining the differential of national saving rates. 
According to Bolt, Matete and Clement (2002), gross national savings used for adjusted net 
savings calculation are defined as the difference between GNI and the sum of public and 
private consumption. Consequently, the gross adjusted saving rate (hereafter referred to as the 
‘national saving rate’) represents the proportion of gross national savings from GNI and is 
available for 94 countries with 12,707 respondents. The Australian saving rate, defined this 
way, is equal to 29.97 per cent, which is close to the national saving rate mean value of 28.22 
per cent. Fiji has the minimum saving rate of -3.17 per cent and the highest saving rate of 
72.42 per cent is reported in Equatorial Guinea.   
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The complete list of independent country variables with definitions is presented in Table B.3 
in Appendix B.  
 3.4 Empirical results 
The first goal of the research reported in this chapter was to identify what determines the 
saving behaviour of Australian residents, and whether this behaviour differs between 
residents born in Australia and those who migrated from overseas. Differences were detected, 
so it was subsequently tested if and what immigrants’ country-of-origin characteristics could 
have caused these differentials. The investigation of country-of-origin effects was divided 
into analysis of the effect of home institutions and other home-country characteristics, such as 
a country’s GDP and its national saving rate. The assessment of the outcomes was completed 
with the comparison of the domestic saving rates of immigrants in Australia and the national 
saving rates in their respective countries of origin. The Wald Chi-Square statistic was used to 
test whether at least one of the regression coefficients in the model was not equal to zero and 
all models passed this test.  
3.4.1 Difference in the saving behaviour between Australian-born and foreign-born 
residents: households and individuals 
The model (3.1) estimated using the 2SLS procedure was applied first to the sample of 
household heads and then to the extended dataset that included all household members. As 
suggested by Table B.2 in Appendix B, household income in 2005 and household wealth 
reported in 2002 are good instruments for endogenous household income and wealth when 
the dataset is limited to households, and personal income in 2005 and household wealth from 
the 2002 dataset are suitable when the models are applied to individuals.  
The main conclusion drawn from the results in Table 3.1 is that saving rates are higher for 
Australian-born households. In particular, Australian-born household heads aged 15 or older 
save 3.02 per cent, and those aged 36 or older save 2.43 per cent more per annum than their 
foreign-born counterparts. Other personal parameters, except total number of household 
members, also play important roles in forming the saving habits of Australian households in 
both datasets. For example, although the number of household members is not significant, 
their higher accumulated income increases household saving rates. Understandably, a higher 
dependency ratio suggests additional expenses and lower saving rates. Likewise, married 
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individuals are likely to be paying a house mortgage and higher household expenses and to 
have lower saving rates than their single counterparts.  
Household wealth has a negative effect on household saving rates in both datasets, which can 
be explained by equity and house value being included in household wealth. The increase in 
net worth encourages households to further increase their borrowing due to new lending 
opportunities to maximise the benefits of consumption. In fact, as argued by Salotti (2010), 
the increase in housing wealth and government savings in developed countries for the period 
1980–2005 caused household savings to decline.  
Surprisingly, education also has a negative effect on the saving behaviour of households. In 
line with this, the intermediate clerical workers, production workers and labourers in the 36+ 
dataset save more than do the possibly more educated managers and administrators (base 
category). With the inclusion of younger households, this difference is prominent only 
between labourers and the base category. Although it is generally expected that people with a 
higher education earn a higher income and, accordingly, have higher savings, this, according 
to Morisset and Revodero (1995), might take time to be realised due to the lagged effect of 
education of approximately five years. Younger household heads are more likely to be still 
either paying for their education or freshly graduated, unless they do a job that does not 
require any qualifications such as unskilled labour. Another reason for the negative link 
between education and saving rates, as Morisset and Revodero argued, could be the reduced 
need for precautionary savings as educated people are less likely to be unemployed. If this 
group’s outlook can be called optimistic, then this is also consistent with the research by 
Harris, Loundes and Webster (2002), who argued that economic optimism is negatively 
correlated with household savings.  
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Table 3.1 Factors affecting saving rates of Australian households (household heads 
only) 
Variables 
Household heads 15 
years or older 
Household heads 36 years or 
older 
Household income 0.293*** 0.239*** 
 (0.0253) (0.0275) 
Wealth -0.000462*** -0.000210** 
 (0.0000881) (0.0000904) 
Dependency ratio -0.115*** -0.128*** 
 (0.0407) (0.0472) 
Age -0.00138 -0.00852** 
 (0.00176) (0.00374) 
Age squared 0.0000644*** 0.000116*** 
 (0.0000178) (0.0000307) 
Gender (1 if male) 0.00850 0.0246** 
 (0.0106) (0.0123) 
No. of children -0.00454 -0.0238* 
 (0.0109) (0.0131) 
No. of persons  0.00451 0.00897 
 (0.00815) (0.00933) 
Marital status (Married = base case):   
Previously married 0.0439*** 0.0355** 
 (0.0148) (0.0162) 
Never been married 0.0382** 0.0673*** 
 (0.0176) (0.0224) 
Level of highest education (No post-school qualification = base case): 
Bachelor degree or higher -0.0259** -0.0280** 
 (0.0109) (0.0124) 
Other post-school qualification -0.0320** -0.0332** 
 (0.0147) (0.0165) 
Occupation (Managers and administrators = base case): 
Professionals 0.00206 0.0248 
 (0.0169) (0.0194) 
Associate professionals -0.0128 0.0241 
 (0.0190) (0.0220) 
Trades persons -0.00533 0.0199 
 (0.0196) (0.0232) 
Advance clerical workers -0.0114 0.0293 
 (0.0337) (0.0378) 
Intermediate clerical workers 0.0211 0.0501** 
 (0.0184) (0.0222) 
Production workers 0.0197 0.0452* 
 (0.0218) (0.0248) 
Elementary clerical workers -0.0245 0.0524 
 (0.0289) (0.0359) 
Labourers 0.0391* 0.0570** 
 (0.0225) (0.0270) 
Born in Australia 0.0302*** 0.0243** 
 (0.0111) (0.0121) 
Constant -3.014*** -2.238*** 
 (0.257) (0.323) 
Observations 4634 3598 
Root MSE 0.299 0.300 
R-squared 0.263 0.237 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the household saving rate. In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions 
also include MSR and location of household controls, which are not reported due to low significance. The sample is limited 
to household heads who have non-missing data on country of origin with the household saving rates above -1.28 and below 
0.79. Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. *** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
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Although most of the variables have similar coefficients in both age groups, there are some 
differences. For example, age, gender, number of children and a few occupational variables 
lose significance when household heads aged 15 to 35 are added to the dataset. Household 
heads in this age range are likely to have younger children who require lower expenses than 
the children of their older counterparts. They are also most likely to still be studying; hence, 
they do not yet have a primary occupation. The effect of age on the household saving rate in 
the 15+ dataset is positive. However, in the 36+ sample the saving rate starts to increase once 
the household head reaches 37 years. Likewise, only among household heads aged 36 and 
older, the saving rates are lower for female household heads. This is consistent with the 
argument presented in a number of studies (Conley & Ryvicker 2004; Fisher 2010) that 
female respondents have greater expenses in proportion to their income, and hence they save 
lower amounts. But this is not applicable to household heads aged 15–35 as they, regardless 
of being male or female, probably do not bother about saving yet. 
Table 3.2 presents the results of a similar household saving model applied to the extended 
dataset of all individuals and not just household heads to analyse which individual 
characteristics affect household saving rates. Similar to the accumulation of savings at the 
household level, personal income plays a significantly positive role and the number of 
resident children plays a significantly negative role on the contribution by household 
members to total household saving. Since using personal income is likely to already account 
for an individual’s gender, this variable is no longer significant. Similarly, a positive 
association of age with the household saving rate detected earlier is now captured by using 
personal income instead of household income. Only household saving rates of individuals 
aged 46 and older in the 36+ dataset remain positively associated with their age, with the 
saving rates decreasing until this turning point. At the same time, using personal income 
gives importance to the number of household members. For example, unless the individual is 
a household head or the spouse of a household head, a higher number of members in the 
individual’s household means a higher amount contributed to the total household income, 
resulting in higher aggregate savings. This saving level, in general, does not decrease even if 
a household member becomes unemployed, possibly due to the availability of unemployment 
benefit under the Australian social security system, but the saving level is lower for 
households with members who are not in the labour force.   
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Table 3.2 Factors affecting saving rates of Australian households (all household 
members) 
Variables 
Individuals 15 years or 
older 
Individuals 36 years or 
older 
Income 0.0256*** 0.0371*** 
 (0.00350) (0.00747) 
Wealth 0.0000153 0.000118** 
 (0.0000499) (0.0000527) 
Age 0.00154 -0.00834*** 
 (0.00133) (0.00317) 
Age squared 0.00000377 0.0000923*** 
 (0.0000131) (0.0000264) 
Gender (1 if male) 0.00618 0.00872 
 (0.00760) (0.00952) 
No. of children -0.0494*** -0.0767*** 
 (0.00574) (0.00781) 
No. of persons 0.0292*** 0.0388*** 
 (0.00393) (0.00560) 
Head -0.204*** -0.167*** 
 (0.0165) (0.0221) 
Spouse -0.152*** -0.104*** 
 (0.0175) (0.0225) 
Marital status (Married = base case):   
Previously married -0.0635*** -0.0485*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0139) 
Never been married -0.0906*** -0.0186 
 (0.0136) (0.0197) 
Level of highest education (No post-school qualification = base case) 
Bachelor degree or higher -0.0181** -0.0262*** 
 (0.00850) (0.00986) 
Other post-school  0.0244** -0.00475 
qualification (0.00980) (0.0118) 
Employment status (Employed = base case):   
Unemployed -0.0357 -0.0477 
 (0.0221) (0.0347) 
Not in labour force -0.0654*** -0.0969*** 
 (0.0106) (0.0130) 
   
Born in Australia 0.0389*** 0.0353*** 
 (0.00882) (0.00985) 
Constant 0.0763* 0.174 
 (0.0441) (0.127) 
Root MSE 0.320 0.320 
R-squared 0.0868 0.104 
Observations 8779 6016 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the household saving rate. In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions 
also include MSR controls, which are not reported due to low significance. : The sample is limited to individuals who have 
non-missing data on country of origin with the household saving rates above -1.28 and below 0.79. Standard errors are 
indicated in parentheses. *** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
The lower contribution towards household savings by household heads or their spouses is 
attributable to their higher expenses including interest and mortgage payments. Their 
distinction from other household members could also explain why the negative effect of 
being married compared to being single loses its significance, since household heads and 
their spouses are responsible for the main share of family expenses. The saving rates of the 
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households with married individuals are now even higher than those of the households with 
previously married and never been married for the 15–35 age group individuals. Married 
people have the ability to share their household expenses with their partners and save more. 
This is consistent with the findings of Osili and Paulson (2006), who argued that being 
married has a positive impact on savings account ownership. The biggest share of expenses 
of the married household heads – the highest income earners in the household – however, 
outweighs these benefits, as can be seen in Table 3.1.  
In contrast with the household level results, increase in household wealth is associated with 
the higher household saving rate in the 36+ dataset, and there is no such association in the 
15+ dataset. As argued earlier, the household saving rate is lower for households with high 
debt – one of the determinants of the household wealth. On the other hand, it is expected that 
mortgage and interest payments are primary responsibilities of the household head – the 
highest income earner in the household – and their spouse. Hence, by specifying the status of 
the head and their spouse it is possible to separate this negative debt effect from the otherwise 
positive wealth effect. This wealth effect, however, loses its significance when the dataset is 
extended to include younger household members aged 15-35 years. Younger individuals, on 
average, accumulate less wealth, so adding 2,700 extra observations with low wealth values 
could cause this variable to become insignificant. 
As before, the level of the highest education of household members matters for the household 
saving rates; however, the effect of having a post-school qualification lower than, and 
different from, a bachelor degree changes from negative to positive for household members 
aged 15 and older. This can be explained by the distinction of household heads and their 
spouses who have not only the highest income in the household but also the highest level of 
expenses, including expenses for the education of their children. Hence, younger household 
members, who are not household heads and their spouses, do not experience the lagged effect 
of obtaining post-school qualifications such as trade qualifications, which are not very costly 
anyway. The higher level of responsibilities of household members aged 36 and older, 
however, makes obtaining any post-school qualification more financially difficult and 
challenging. Obtaining a bachelor degree or higher is a longer and more costly process than 
obtaining lesser post-school qualifications and, in most cases, requires a contribution by the 
children as well as their parents. This may be the reason for the negative association of 
holding a bachelor degree or higher by household members in both age groups with the 
household saving rate.  
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Finally, households with native-born members aged 36 or older save 3.53 per cent more than 
those in the same age group who were born abroad. This difference is even higher when 
individuals who were aged 15 to 35 years at the time of interview are included in the sample. 
This contradicts the findings of Islam, Parasnis and Fausten (2010), who observed the 
tendency of immigrant households to save more than native households when they used 
Australian expenditure surveys. On the other hand, the immigrants’ lower propensity to save 
detected in this study is consistent with the findings for immigrant households in Germany 
who on average save 6-10 percentage points less than native-born Germans (Sinning 2007). 
However, once the remittances of temporary immigrants are treated as savings in their home 
countries, the savings gap between them and comparable German-born household heads 
disappears. Due to the absence of information on remittances from Australia, a similar 
analysis cannot be applied in this study. It is evident, however, that if immigrants’ 
remittances were accounted for, their savings, defined as the difference between their after-
tax income and consumption, would even be lower. Accordingly, the difference between the 
savings of immigrant households and native-born households in this analysis could even be 
greater. 
Despite the limitation described above, features of the data used in this research allow a more 
detailed analysis of the reasons for this savings gap in favour of Australian-born households. 
In addition to demographic characteristics, the possible influences of being born in a different 
country with a different institutional environment on immigrants’ saving behaviour was 
investigated. The following analysis limited the sample to immigrants; it started by 
investigating home-country institutional effects and proceeded by including other home-
country variables.  
3.4.2 Country-of-origin effect on household savings  
Country-of-birth variables were separated into institutional characteristics and other home-
country characteristics. Institutional variables were the same as reported in Chapter 2. Other 
home-country characteristics included the national saving rate, a country’s dependency ratio, 
GDP per capita, whether or not English was the official language, market capitalisation, 
workers’ remittances received by the country, and the country’s dominant religion. Due to the 
fact that national saving rates may vary greatly from year to year, the average national saving 
rate of the country for the period 2004–2006 was used in addition to the national saving rate 
for 2006.  
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The analysis of the institutional effect on the saving behaviour of immigrants was carried out 
using model (3.2). Analogous to the previous section, this model was first applied to the 
dataset which included young household heads aged 15–35 and then it was applied to the 
dataset without them. This was followed by a similar analysis applied to all household 
members. As before, 2SLS procedure was used to control for endogeneity of income and 
wealth with household wealth reported in 2002 and household or individual income in the 
previous year being used as instruments. Even though, when tested, household wealth 
appeared to be exogenous using the reduced sample, for consistency, it was treated as 
endogenous
20
.  
The results revealed a positive relationship between the saving rates of immigrant households 
with heads aged 15 or older and all six Aggregate Governance Indicators as well as British 
legal origin as presented in Table 3.3 (Panel A). In addition, the saving behaviour of 
household heads aged 36 and over is also positively influenced by the home country’s 
geographic latitude (Table 3.3 [Panel B]). The ratio of children who are enrolled in school to 
the country’s population of the corresponding official school age and Constraint on Executive 
do not play a significant role in the propensity of immigrant households to save. According to 
the findings reported in Chapter 2, secondary school enrolment also does not have a 
significant effect on equity investment by Australian immigrants. Constraint on Executive, in 
turn, is not important in the assessment of self-reported financial risk-taking by immigrants. 
Since the financial wealth accumulation of immigrants is not affected by these variables, 
there is probably no influence on their saving rates as well. 
These findings confirm that effective institutional arrangements are conducive to an increase 
in financial market participation. A positive relationship between Aggregate Governance 
Indicators, such as Rule of Law or Corruption Control, and the saving rates of immigrants in 
Australia is consistent with the previous results on the importance of trusting institutions for 
financial development. According to Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2008a), individuals 
and enterprises base their investment decisions on their opinions about the investment 
environment and government performance. The profit from participation in the Australian 
financial market is supposed to improve the household financial situation and, accordingly, 
increase the household’s savings. The positive institutional environment in Australia can also 
encourage people to open savings accounts in the country’s financial institutions. Home-
                                                 
20
 There is no significant change in the results of the regression even if wealth is treated as exogenous. 
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country institutional environment can also influence immigrants’ perceptions about the safety 
of financial institutions and, accordingly, their saving decisions in their host countries.   
The significance of the positive effect of geographic latitude on saving rates could be 
explained by the higher saving rates of Australian immigrants originating from countries 
located north of the equator, such as the US and Germany. In accordance with the views 
expressed by Osili and Paulson (2008) and Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004), countries 
located north of the equator tend to have stronger institutions. In particular, the former 
colonies of European countries that have more effective institutional arrangements due to 
different colonisation policies tend to be more distant from the equator (Osili & Paulson 
2008). 
As before, the effect of institutional variables was also investigated with respect to 
individuals aged 15 or older and 36 or older. The 2SLS procedure was applied here as well, 
with the individual’s household wealth in 2002 and their personal income in 2005 being used 
as instruments. Table 3.3 (Panel C) presents the results from model (3.2) applied to the 
extended dataset with young individuals. These results are similar to the ones for the 
immigrant households except that the coefficient on the home country’s executive authority 
constraints has become positive and significant. In other words, a higher level of constraint 
on the executive powers in the home country is associated with a higher household saving 
rate in Australia. This institutional factor supposedly influences saving by encouraging 
financial market participation through its long-run effect on investment, growth and financial 
development (Osili & Paulson 2008). 
The exclusion of young individuals caused some changes to the above outcome. As shown in 
Table 3.3 (Panel D), all institutional variables, including enrolment in secondary school, have 
become significant. The higher the ratio of children enrolled in a country’s secondary school, 
the higher the household saving rate of the individual from this country. This is consistent 
with the conclusion arrived at by Morrisset and Rivodoro (1995) that while university 
education has a positive effect only in industrialised countries, primary and secondary levels 
of education positively influence savings in all regions. This educational effect, however, is 
only evident for older individuals other than household heads.   
This analysis proceeded with an application of the second model with the country-of-origin 
variables other than institutional factors to the immigrant households. Table 3.4 (Panel A) 
and Table 3.4 (Panel B) present the results of the regressions using samples with and without 
97 
 
household heads aged 15–35, respectively. According to these outcomes, out of ten country-
of-origin characteristics, only GDP per capita, English-language-speaking ability and religion 
influence the saving patterns of household heads. First, a higher average per capita GDP in a 
country is associated with the higher household savings of its emigrants in Australia. Second,  
the ability to speak English has a significant positive effect on the saving behaviour of 
immigrant households. Third, according to Table 3.4 (Panel A), among other religions 
followed by the home countries of Australian immigrants aged 15 or older, only household 
heads from Muslim countries have different saving rates from household heads from 
Christian countries. In particular, the saving rates of household heads from countries 
following Islam are lower than the rates of those from the base group. Between older 
household heads, however, as Table 3.4 (Panel B) shows, immigrants from countries with a 
dominant Buddhist religion also have significantly lower saving rates than the base case.   
Surprisingly, all the home-country variables, except the general age dependency ratio and the 
young age dependency ratio, have significant effects on the saving behaviour of individuals, 
unlike when the dataset was limited to households. There are similar outcomes for 
immigrants aged 15 and over (Table 3.4 [Panel C]) and those aged 36 and over, hence only 
estimates from the larger sample are presented
21
. There is a negative correlation between 
immigrant household savings at an individual level and the national saving rate as well as the 
share of received remittances in a country’s GDP. In contrast, a higher percentage of old 
dependent people, a higher country’s GDP per capita and a higher market capitalisation at the 
immigrant’s country of origin result in a higher domestic saving rate when they migrate to 
Australia. In addition, similar to the findings obtained in the analysis of the saving rate at the 
household level, an individual’s ability to speak English is associated with a higher level of 
their savings in Australia. In line with the household level outcomes again, immigrants from 
countries with a dominant Muslim religion have lower household saving rates than 
immigrants from countries with a Christian following. Immigrants from non-religious 
countries aged 36 or over also tend to save less than their counterparts from countries where 
Christianity is dominant. The saving behaviour of immigrants from other dominant religions 
does not differ from the base case.  
                                                 
21
 Results for the 36+ sample are in Table B.4 in Appendix B. 
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Table 3.3 Effects of institutional variables on the saving behaviour of immigrants  
Panel A) aged 15 years or older, household level 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Household  0.254*** 0.252*** 0.252*** 0.252*** 0.253*** 0.252*** 0.249*** 0.256*** 0.189*** 0.264*** 
income (0.0668) (0.0665) (0.0673) (0.0673) (0.0676) (0.0673) (0.0671) (0.0670) (0.0633) (0.0676) 
Wealth -0.000365* -0.000379** -0.000377** -0.000377** -0.000378** -0.000372** -0.000353* -0.000375** -0.000213 -0.000363* 
 (0.000190) (0.000187) (0.000188) (0.000188) (0.000188) (0.000189) (0.000191) (0.000188) (0.000216) (0.000191) 
Dependency ratio -0.106 -0.116 -0.114 -0.114 -0.114 -0.113 -0.123 -0.112 -0.106 -0.0447 
 (0.0878) (0.0881) (0.0879) (0.0879) (0.0880) (0.0879) (0.0890) (0.0887) (0.114) (0.0902) 
Age -0.00439 -0.00430 -0.00432 -0.00432 -0.00435 -0.00428 -0.00323 -0.00393 0.000198 -0.00466 
 (0.00449) (0.00449) (0.00449) (0.00449) (0.00449) (0.00449) (0.00454) (0.00451) (0.00552) (0.00455) 
Age squared 0.0000912** 0.0000901** 0.0000903** 0.0000903** 0.0000904** 0.0000898** 0.0000812* 0.0000869* 0.0000482 0.0000972** 
 (0.0000442) (0.0000443) (0.0000443) (0.0000443) (0.0000443) (0.0000443) (0.0000450) (0.0000445) (0.0000511) (0.0000448) 
Gender (1 if male) 0.0438* 0.0462* 0.0461* 0.0461* 0.0455* 0.0457* 0.0423* 0.0447* 0.0829*** 0.0444* 
 (0.0242) (0.0244) (0.0244) (0.0244) (0.0244) (0.0244) (0.0244) (0.0245) (0.0293) (0.0244) 
No. of children 0.00114 0.00177 0.00233 0.00233 0.00170 0.00274 0.00356 0.00307 0.0243 -0.0113 
 (0.0266) (0.0264) (0.0265) (0.0265) (0.0266) (0.0264) (0.0269) (0.0271) (0.0325) (0.0272) 
No. of persons 0.00838 0.0101 0.00981 0.00981 0.00986 0.00896 0.00738 0.00612 0.00918 0.00404 
 (0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0205) (0.0201) (0.0200) (0.0202) (0.0229) (0.0199) 
Marital status (Married = base case)   
Previously  0.0433 0.0461 0.0457 0.0457 0.0461 0.0446 0.0433 0.0426 0.000183 0.0366 
married (0.0317) (0.0314) (0.0314) (0.0314) (0.0314) (0.0315) (0.0317) (0.0318) (0.0367) (0.0319) 
Never been  0.0258 0.0249 0.0265 0.0265 0.0265 0.0247 0.0158 0.0208 -0.0191 0.0265 
married (0.0425) (0.0425) (0.0425) (0.0425) (0.0425) (0.0427) (0.0431) (0.0427) (0.0522) (0.0427) 
Level of highest education (No post-school education = base case)     
Bachelor degree  -0.00970 -0.00950 -0.00992 -0.00992 -0.00959 -0.00899 -0.0104 -0.00860 -0.0278 -0.0145 
or higher (0.0243) (0.0243) (0.0243) (0.0243) (0.0243) (0.0243) (0.0245) (0.0246) (0.0296) (0.0243) 
Other post-school  0.0323 0.0357 0.0315 0.0315 0.0322 0.0321 0.0286 0.0332 0.0363 0.00928 
qualification (0.0342) (0.0343) (0.0341) (0.0341) (0.0344) (0.0342) (0.0332) (0.0342) (0.0396) (0.0341) 
Occupation (Managers and administrators = base case)     
Professionals 0.0372 0.0326 0.0367 0.0367 0.0357 0.0377 0.0384 0.0392 0.0718 0.0463 
 (0.0373) (0.0369) (0.0373) (0.0373) (0.0372) (0.0374) (0.0375) (0.0378) (0.0452) (0.0376) 
Associate professionals 0.0224 0.0232 0.0235 0.0235 0.0228 0.0251 0.0231 0.0229 0.0587 0.0115 
 (0.0431) (0.0431) (0.0433) (0.0433) (0.0432) (0.0434) (0.0431) (0.0432) (0.0512) (0.0434) 
Tradespersons -0.0308 -0.0348 -0.0317 -0.0317 -0.0313 -0.0312 -0.0262 -0.0301 0.0467 -0.0393 
 (0.0448) (0.0445) (0.0447) (0.0447) (0.0448) (0.0448) (0.0450) (0.0448) (0.0563) (0.0449) 
Advanced clerical workers -0.0764 -0.0721 -0.0749 -0.0749 -0.0744 -0.0752 -0.0727 -0.0681 -0.0657 -0.0784 
 (0.0727) (0.0728) (0.0727) (0.0727) (0.0727) (0.0727) (0.0729) (0.0733) (0.0877) (0.0721) 
Intermediate clerical workers 0.0812** 0.0835** 0.0810** 0.0810** 0.0812** 0.0813** 0.0747* 0.0771* 0.135*** 0.0857** 
 (0.0412) (0.0413) (0.0412) (0.0412) (0.0412) (0.0412) (0.0417) (0.0419) (0.0506) (0.0418) 
Production workers 0.0534 0.0547 0.0567 0.0567 0.0565 0.0575 0.0610 0.0583 0.0631 0.0440 
 (0.0498) (0.0498) (0.0496) (0.0496) (0.0496) (0.0496) (0.0500) (0.0502) (0.0620) (0.0520) 
Elementary clerical workers -0.0154 -0.0177 -0.0165 -0.0165 -0.0164 -0.0149 -0.0268 -0.0198 0.0821 -0.0251 
 (0.0673) (0.0672) (0.0673) (0.0673) (0.0673) (0.0674) (0.0689) (0.0688) (0.0910) (0.0669) 
Labourers 0.0825 0.0845 0.0855 0.0855 0.0852 0.0855 0.0986* 0.0980* 0.167** 0.0782 
 (0.0523) (0.0523) (0.0524) (0.0524) (0.0524) (0.0524) (0.0532) (0.0533) (0.0700) (0.0520) 
(continued on next page) 
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Panel A) continued 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
Qualities of country-of-origin institutions:    
Voice & Accountability 0.0953*          
 (0.0522)          
Political Stability  0.121**         
  (0.0505)         
Government    0.111*        
Effectiveness   (0.0565)        
Control of Corruption    0.111*       
    (0.0565)       
Rule of Law     0.101*      
     (0.0543)      
Regulatory Quality      0.100*     
      (0.0538)     
British Legal       0.0398*    
       (0.0224)    
Latitude        0.0933   
        (0.0669)   
School Enrolment         0.000988  
         (0.00107)  
Constraint on Executive          0.00997 
          (0.00881) 
Constant -2.765*** -2.773*** -2.783*** -2.783*** -2.770*** -2.758*** -2.625*** -2.688*** -2.167*** -2.777*** 
 (0.650) (0.647) (0.647) (0.647) (0.651) (0.652) (0.675) (0.672) (0.630) (0.673) 
Observations 995 995 996 996 996 996 987 986 657 966 
Root MSE 0.298 0.298 0.298 0.298 0.298 0.298 0.298 0.298 0.295 0.295 
R-squared 0.305 0.306 0.305 0.305 0.305 0.304 0.303 0.304 0.300 0.310 
 
Notes: In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also include MSR and location of household controls, which are not reported due to low significance. The sample is limited 
to immigrant household heads aged 15 or older who have non-missing data on country of origin with the household saving rates above -1.28 and below 0.79. Standard errors are indicated in 
parentheses. *** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
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Panel B) aged 36 years or older, household level  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Household  0.219*** 0.219*** 0.218*** 0.218*** 0.217*** 0.219*** 0.206*** 0.210*** 0.193*** 0.230*** 
income (0.0643) (0.0641) (0.0646) (0.0646) (0.0649) (0.0645) (0.0658) (0.0656) (0.0730) (0.0644) 
Wealth -0.000249 -0.000262 -0.000257 -0.000257 -0.000260 -0.000255 -0.000220 -0.000239 -0.000168 -0.000250 
 (0.000190) (0.000188) (0.000189) (0.000189) (0.000189) (0.000189) (0.000193) (0.000191) (0.000236) (0.000191) 
Dependency ratio -0.110 -0.121 -0.115 -0.115 -0.116 -0.114 -0.132 -0.116 -0.0939 -0.0595 
 (0.0976) (0.0980) (0.0978) (0.0978) (0.0979) (0.0978) (0.0996) (0.0988) (0.123) (0.0999) 
Age -0.00754 -0.00758 -0.00746 -0.00746 -0.00747 -0.00753 -0.00663 -0.00789 -0.00213 -0.00671 
 (0.00848) (0.00847) (0.00847) (0.00847) (0.00848) (0.00849) (0.00850) (0.00855) (0.0105) (0.00851) 
Age squared 0.000112 0.000112 0.000111 0.000111 0.000110 0.000111 0.000103 0.000112 6.64e-05 0.000110 
 (0.0000689) (0.0000689) (0.0000689) (0.0000689) (0.0000689) (0.0000689) (0.0000695) (0.0000694) (0.0000846) (0.0000693) 
Gender (1 if male) 0.0580** 0.0594** 0.0606** 0.0606** 0.0602** 0.0601** 0.0579** 0.0595** 0.0972*** 0.0572** 
 (0.0270) (0.0271) (0.0272) (0.0272) (0.0272) (0.0272) (0.0275) (0.0276) (0.0325) (0.0274) 
No. of children 0.00368 0.00394 0.00380 0.00380 0.00280 0.00409 0.00596 0.00368 0.0316 -0.00494 
 (0.0302) (0.0301) (0.0302) (0.0302) (0.0303) (0.0302) (0.0309) (0.0311) (0.0363) (0.0309) 
No. of persons 0.000771 0.00331 0.00212 0.00212 0.00271 0.000952 0.000567 0.000898 -0.00433 -0.00238 
 (0.0212) (0.0215) (0.0214) (0.0214) (0.0216) (0.0212) (0.0214) (0.0216) (0.0269) (0.0213) 
Marital status (Married = base case)     
Previously  0.0361 0.0413 0.0391 0.0391 0.0395 0.0384 0.0344 0.0337 0.0123 0.0300 
married (0.0339) (0.0335) (0.0337) (0.0337) (0.0336) (0.0337) (0.0341) (0.0341) (0.0401) (0.0340) 
Never been  0.0420 0.0442 0.0420 0.0420 0.0422 0.0408 0.0310 0.0386 0.0304 0.0358 
married (0.0517) (0.0515) (0.0517) (0.0517) (0.0517) (0.0518) (0.0526) (0.0521) (0.0645) (0.0518) 
Level of highest education (No post-school education = base case)     
Bachelor degree  -0.00740 -0.00617 -0.00735 -0.00735 -0.00706 -0.00695 -0.00632 -0.00422 -0.0234 -0.00943 
or higher (0.0260) (0.0261) (0.0260) (0.0260) (0.0261) (0.0261) (0.0263) (0.0264) (0.0320) (0.0262) 
Other post-school  0.0320 0.0370 0.0321 0.0321 0.0335 0.0317 0.0302 0.0374 0.0324 0.0145 
qualification (0.0364) (0.0369) (0.0364) (0.0364) (0.0367) (0.0364) (0.0359) (0.0367) (0.0449) (0.0365) 
Occupation (Managers and administrators = base case)     
Professionals 0.0557 0.0497 0.0544 0.0544 0.0535 0.0554 0.0596 0.0601 0.0710 0.0643 
 (0.0406) (0.0402) (0.0405) (0.0405) (0.0404) (0.0406) (0.0412) (0.0413) (0.0500) (0.0410) 
Associate professionals 0.0613 0.0607 0.0609 0.0609 0.0602 0.0628 0.0633 0.0637 0.0798 0.0493 
 (0.0481) (0.0480) (0.0481) (0.0481) (0.0480) (0.0483) (0.0484) (0.0485) (0.0575) (0.0488) 
Tradespersons -0.0176 -0.0238 -0.0201 -0.0201 -0.0190 -0.0197 -0.0114 -0.0161 0.0352 -0.0244 
 (0.0512) (0.0506) (0.0510) (0.0510) (0.0511) (0.0510) (0.0517) (0.0513) (0.0646) (0.0511) 
Advanced clerical workers -0.0806 -0.0737 -0.0761 -0.0761 -0.0766 -0.0780 -0.0765 -0.0705 -0.0391 -0.0826 
 (0.0833) (0.0835) (0.0835) (0.0835) (0.0835) (0.0834) (0.0839) (0.0841) (0.0966) (0.0829) 
Intermediate clerical workers 0.0883* 0.0888* 0.0879* 0.0879* 0.0878* 0.0878* 0.0863* 0.0888* 0.130** 0.0909* 
 (0.0470) (0.0470) (0.0470) (0.0470) (0.0470) (0.0470) (0.0475) (0.0477) (0.0564) (0.0481) 
Production workers 0.0878 0.0861 0.0866 0.0866 0.0863 0.0877 0.0956* 0.0948* 0.0543 0.0670 
 (0.0566) (0.0566) (0.0566) (0.0566) (0.0566) (0.0567) (0.0575) (0.0574) (0.0673) (0.0581) 
Elementary clerical workers 0.103 0.0939 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.103 0.0989 0.101 0.211** 0.0918 
 (0.0779) (0.0774) (0.0778) (0.0778) (0.0778) (0.0780) (0.0799) (0.0799) (0.107) (0.0775) 
Labourers 0.0903 0.0947 0.0948 0.0948 0.0945 0.0946 0.112* 0.111* 0.173** 0.0857 
 (0.0582) (0.0583) (0.0583) (0.0583) (0.0584) (0.0584) (0.0597) (0.0597) (0.0770) (0.0580) 
(continued on next page) 
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Panel B)  continued 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Qualities of country-of-origin institutions:     
Voice & Accountability 0.108*          
 (0.0586)          
Political Stability  0.123**         
  (0.0589)         
Government    0.122*        
Effectiveness   (0.0628)        
Control of Corruption    0.122*       
    (0.0628)       
Rule of Law     0.116*      
     (0.0607)      
Regulatory Quality      0.104*     
      (0.0606)     
British Legal       0.0454*    
       (0.0246)    
Latitude        0.129*   
        (0.0735)   
School Enrolment         0.00133  
         (0.00122)  
Constraint on Executive          0.0107 
          (0.0102) 
Constant -2.301*** -2.313*** -2.314*** -2.314*** -2.299*** -2.293*** -2.044*** -2.081*** -2.153*** -2.349*** 
 (0.728) (0.728) (0.727) (0.727) (0.729) (0.730) (0.764) (0.762) (0.829) (0.741) 
Observations 857 857 857 857 857 857 849 849 578 834 
Root MSE 0.303 0.303 0.303 0.303 0.303 0.303 0.304 0.304 0.298 0.301 
R-squared 0.280 0.280 0.279 0.279 0.279 0.279 0.272 0.274 0.296 0.288 
 
Notes: In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also include MSR and location of household controls, which are not reported due to low significance. The sample is limited 
to immigrant household heads aged 36 or older who have non-missing data on country of origin with the household saving rates above -1.28 and below 0.79. Standard errors are indicated in 
parentheses. *** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
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Panel C) aged 15 years or older, individual level  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Income 0.0437*** 0.0437*** 0.0423*** 0.0434*** 0.0440*** 0.0434*** 0.0430*** 0.0441*** 0.0295** 0.0502*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0130) (0.0112) 
Wealth -0.0000240 -0.0000298 -0.0000333 -0.0000324 -0.0000314 -0.0000284 -0.0000179 -0.0000215 0.0000742 -0.0000140 
 (0.0000927) (0.0000927) (0.0000921) (0.0000927) (0.0000927) (0.0000928) (0.0000921) (0.0000932) (0.000114) (0.0000930) 
Age -0.00331 -0.00359 -0.00451 -0.00337 -0.00346 -0.00345 -0.00368 -0.00300 -0.00498 -0.00301 
 (0.00341) (0.00341) (0.00339) (0.00340) (0.00340) (0.00341) (0.00342) (0.00345) (0.00417) (0.00344) 
Age squared 0.0000472 0.0000504 0.0000579* 0.0000472 0.0000478 0.0000481 0.0000534 0.0000454 0.0000657* 0.0000476 
 (0.0000325) (0.0000325) (0.0000323) (0.0000325) (0.0000325) (0.0000325) (0.0000327) (0.0000329) (0.0000390) (0.0000328) 
Gender (1 if male) 0.0110 0.0118 0.00814 0.0126 0.0116 0.0121 0.00688 0.0131 0.0323 0.0108 
 (0.0175) (0.0175) (0.0174) (0.0175) (0.0175) (0.0175) (0.0176) (0.0178) (0.0212) (0.0178) 
No. of children -0.0429*** -0.0436*** -0.0422*** -0.0433*** -0.0441*** -0.0427*** -0.0444*** -0.0433*** -0.0135 -0.0465*** 
 (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0140) (0.0141) (0.0167) (0.0142) 
No. of persons 0.0253*** 0.0272*** 0.0258*** 0.0270*** 0.0273*** 0.0260*** 0.0256*** 0.0246*** 0.0134 0.0250*** 
 (0.00913) (0.00915) (0.00909) (0.00914) (0.00915) (0.00914) (0.00925) (0.00932) (0.0110) (0.00924) 
Head -0.261*** -0.257*** -0.258*** -0.262*** -0.263*** -0.262*** -0.258*** -0.258*** -0.261*** -0.258*** 
 (0.0380) (0.0379) (0.0378) (0.0379) (0.0379) (0.0380) (0.0387) (0.0389) (0.0472) (0.0383) 
Spouse -0.194*** -0.190*** -0.195*** -0.195*** -0.196*** -0.194*** -0.193*** -0.187*** -0.216*** -0.190*** 
 (0.0387) (0.0386) (0.0386) (0.0387) (0.0387) (0.0387) (0.0393) (0.0395) (0.0473) (0.0390) 
Marital status (Married = base case)     
Previously  -0.0815*** -0.0777*** -0.0824*** -0.0791*** -0.0786*** -0.0794*** -0.0824*** -0.0820*** -0.111*** -0.0846*** 
married (0.0267) (0.0266) (0.0264) (0.0266) (0.0266) (0.0267) (0.0267) (0.0270) (0.0316) (0.0269) 
Never been  -0.0944*** -0.0926*** -0.0980*** -0.0935*** -0.0936*** -0.0944*** -0.0999*** -0.0925*** -0.129*** -0.0914** 
married (0.0351) (0.0350) (0.0351) (0.0350) (0.0350) (0.0351) (0.0353) (0.0354) (0.0448) (0.0358) 
Level of highest education (No post-school education = base case)     
Bachelor degree  -0.00954 -0.0102 -0.0120 -0.0113 -0.0107 -0.0104 -0.00890 -0.00830 -0.0159 -0.00932 
or higher (0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0191) (0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0194) (0.0232) (0.0194) 
Other post-school  0.0444** 0.0456** 0.0464** 0.0424** 0.0433** 0.0423** 0.0419** 0.0415* 0.0446* 0.0366* 
qualification (0.0210) (0.0210) (0.0208) (0.0209) (0.0210) (0.0210) (0.0209) (0.0212) (0.0254) (0.0214) 
Employment status ( Employed = base case)     
Unemployed -0.0473 -0.0485 -0.0480 -0.0470 -0.0479 -0.0491 -0.0458 -0.0513 -0.149** -0.0464 
 (0.0573) (0.0572) (0.0568) (0.0572) (0.0572) (0.0573) (0.0578) (0.0584) (0.0692) (0.0584) 
Not in labour force -0.0864*** -0.0861*** -0.0896*** -0.0852*** -0.0846*** -0.0868*** -0.0895*** -0.0904*** -0.128*** -0.0862*** 
 (0.0245) (0.0245) (0.0245) (0.0245) (0.0245) (0.0245) (0.0248) (0.0249) (0.0294) (0.0249) 
(continued on next page) 
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Panel C) continued 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Qualities of country-of-origin institutions:     
Voice & Accountability 0.112***          
 (0.0367)          
Political Stability  0.139***         
  (0.0371)         
Government    0.147***        
Effectiveness   (0.0393)        
Control of Corruption    0.146***       
    (0.0396)       
Rule of Law     0.135***      
     (0.0371)      
Regulatory Quality      0.122***     
      (0.0378)     
British Legal       0.0668***    
       (0.0167)    
Latitude        0.0784*   
        (0.0476)   
School Enrolment         0.00112  
         (0.000738)  
Constraint on Executive          0.0108* 
          (0.00653) 
Constant -0.117 -0.151 -0.139 -0.177 -0.158 -0.134 0.0103 -0.00386 0.180 -0.0968 
 (0.131) (0.132) (0.134) (0.134) (0.133) (0.133) (0.125) (0.125) (0.162) (0.133) 
Observations 1809 1809 1803 1810 1810 1810 1776 1782 1186 1756 
Root MSE 0.329 0.328 0.326 0.328 0.328 0.329 0.326 0.330 0.321 0.328 
R-squared 0.124 0.127 0.127 0.126 0.126 0.125 0.128 0.121 0.137 0.127 
 
Notes: In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also include MSR controls, which are not reported due to low significance. The sample is limited to immigrant respondents 
aged 15 or older who have non-missing data on country of origin with the household saving rates above -1.28 and below 0.79. Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. *** indicates 
p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
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Panel D) aged 36 or older, individual level  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Income 0.0558*** 0.0556*** 0.0538*** 0.0544*** 0.0547*** 0.0550*** 0.0571*** 0.0577*** 0.0687*** 0.0583*** 
 (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0160) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0171) (0.0173) (0.0222) (0.0160) 
Wealth -0.00000370 -0.00000794 -0.0000124 -0.00000665 -0.00000857 -0.00000616 0.000000757 -0.00000155 0.0000325 0.0000101 
 (0.0000970) (0.0000971) (0.0000969) (0.0000970) (0.0000970) (0.0000971) (0.0000977) (0.0000979) (0.000123) (0.0000976) 
Age -0.00476 -0.00459 -0.00449 -0.00491 -0.00491 -0.00508 -0.00288 -0.00475 -0.00432 -0.00412 
 (0.00696) (0.00696) (0.00695) (0.00696) (0.00696) (0.00697) (0.00700) (0.00704) (0.00852) (0.00705) 
Age squared 0.0000627 0.0000629 0.0000611 0.0000640 0.0000637 0.0000652 0.0000499 0.0000624 0.0000635 0.0000595 
 (0.0000581) (0.0000581) (0.0000581) (0.0000581) (0.0000581) (0.0000582) (0.0000585) (0.0000588) (0.0000702) (0.0000589) 
Gender (1 if male) 0.00975 0.0104 0.00867 0.0114 0.0107 0.0109 0.00823 0.0112 0.0222 0.00864 
 (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0198) (0.0198) (0.0238) (0.0198) 
No. of children -0.0480*** -0.0498*** -0.0484*** -0.0502*** -0.0511*** -0.0499*** -0.0463*** -0.0488*** -0.0229 -0.0484*** 
 (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0175) (0.0175) (0.0217) (0.0175) 
No. of persons 0.0255** 0.0290** 0.0276** 0.0281** 0.0287** 0.0271** 0.0236** 0.0243** 0.0181 0.0244** 
 (0.0116) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0116) (0.0118) (0.0119) (0.0153) (0.0118) 
Head -0.254*** -0.242*** -0.251*** -0.253*** -0.254*** -0.253*** -0.254*** -0.250*** -0.268*** -0.251*** 
 (0.0437) (0.0437) (0.0438) (0.0436) (0.0436) (0.0437) (0.0449) (0.0447) (0.0561) (0.0440) 
Spouse -0.186*** -0.174*** -0.185*** -0.185*** -0.186*** -0.184*** -0.183*** -0.177*** -0.194*** -0.185*** 
 (0.0435) (0.0434) (0.0436) (0.0435) (0.0435) (0.0435) (0.0444) (0.0442) (0.0536) (0.0438) 
Marital status (Married = base case)     
Previously  -0.0795*** -0.0733*** -0.0779*** -0.0756*** -0.0750*** -0.0762*** -0.0789*** -0.0784*** -0.0953*** -0.0843*** 
married (0.0284) (0.0284) (0.0284) (0.0284) (0.0284) (0.0284) (0.0286) (0.0287) (0.0346) (0.0288) 
Never been  -0.0406 -0.0347 -0.0567 -0.0379 -0.0375 -0.0395 -0.0605 -0.0365 -0.0598 -0.0414 
married (0.0462) (0.0462) (0.0468) (0.0462) (0.0462) (0.0462) (0.0470) (0.0465) (0.0602) (0.0473) 
Level of highest education (No post-school education = base case)     
Bachelor degree  -0.00825 -0.00723 -0.00970 -0.00856 -0.00795 -0.00806 -0.00672 -0.00666 -0.0144 -0.00586 
or higher (0.0206) (0.0205) (0.0205) (0.0205) (0.0205) (0.0206) (0.0207) (0.0208) (0.0250) (0.0209) 
Other post-school  0.0345 0.0378 0.0352 0.0327 0.0343 0.0334 0.0281 0.0316 0.0341 0.0317 
qualification (0.0234) (0.0235) (0.0233) (0.0233) (0.0234) (0.0234) (0.0234) (0.0236) (0.0287) (0.0238) 
Employment status ( Employed = base case)     
Unemployed -0.0529 -0.0532 -0.0466 -0.0490 -0.0492 -0.0494 -0.0538 -0.0598 -0.0928 -0.0636 
 (0.0682) (0.0681) (0.0681) (0.0682) (0.0681) (0.0682) (0.0699) (0.0701) (0.0815) (0.0696) 
Not in labour force -0.103*** -0.103*** -0.106*** -0.104*** -0.103*** -0.105*** -0.103*** -0.106*** -0.120*** -0.100*** 
 (0.0272) (0.0272) (0.0273) (0.0272) (0.0272) (0.0272) (0.0280) (0.0281) (0.0343) (0.0276) 
(continued on next page) 
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Panel D)  continued 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Qualities of country-of-origin institutions:     
Voice & Accountability 0.146***          
 (0.0425)          
Political Stability  0.162***         
  (0.0456)         
Government    0.171***        
Effectiveness   (0.0466)        
Control of Corruption    0.168***       
    (0.0466)       
Rule of Law     0.161***      
     (0.0440)      
Regulatory Quality      0.155***     
      (0.0451)     
British Legal       0.0624***    
       (0.0185)    
Latitude        0.120**   
        (0.0541)   
School Enrolment         0.00161*  
         (0.000860)  
Constraint on Executive          0.0181** 
          (0.00763) 
Constant -0.261 -0.303 -0.309 -0.296 -0.284 -0.272 -0.155 -0.115 -0.307 -0.209 
 (0.274) (0.275) (0.275) (0.275) (0.274) (0.275) (0.282) (0.283) (0.351) (0.276) 
Observations 1504 1504 1499 1504 1504 1504 1478 1483 1007 1468 
Root MSE 0.327 0.327 0.326 0.327 0.327 0.327 0.327 0.328 0.324 0.328 
R-squared 0.136 0.137 0.137 0.136 0.137 0.136 0.136 0.132 0.154 0.134 
 
Notes: In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also include MSR controls, which are not reported due to low significance. The sample is limited to immigrant respondents 
aged 36 or older who have non-missing data on country of origin with the household saving rates above -1.28 and below 0.79. Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. *** indicates 
p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
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Table 3.4 Effects of additional country variables on the saving behaviour of immigrants 
Panel A) aged 15 or older, household level 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Household  0.254*** 0.254*** 0.272*** 0.269*** 0.264*** 0.254*** 0.248*** 0.265*** 0.266*** 0.252*** 
income (0.0688) (0.0686) (0.0640) (0.0650) (0.0658) (0.0679) (0.0689) (0.0685) (0.0682) (0.0649) 
Wealth -0.000367* -0.000370* -0.000399** -0.000397** -0.000393** -0.000381** -0.000370* -0.000400** -0.000401** -0.000336* 
 (0.000191) (0.000191) (0.000185) (0.000186) (0.000187) (0.000188) (0.000190) (0.000188) (0.000188) (0.000173) 
Dependency ratio -0.0772 -0.0891 -0.104 -0.105 -0.105 -0.0827 -0.117 -0.0775 -0.0858 -0.114 
 (0.0903) (0.0894) (0.0876) (0.0877) (0.0877) (0.0896) (0.0882) (0.0897) (0.0901) (0.0879) 
Age -0.00332 -0.00289 -0.00330 -0.00366 -0.00395 -0.00423 -0.00373 -0.00300 -0.00373 -0.00416 
 (0.00455) (0.00453) (0.00450) (0.00450) (0.00450) (0.00451) (0.00451) (0.00455) (0.00452) (0.00450) 
Age squared 0.0000830* 0.0000794* 0.0000867* 0.0000885** 0.0000897** 0.0000897** 0.0000857* 0.0000801* 0.0000887** 0.0000895** 
 (0.0000450) (0.0000448) (0.0000443) (0.0000442) (0.0000442) (0.0000444) (0.0000447) (0.0000449) (0.0000445) (0.0000444) 
Gender (1 if male) 0.0432* 0.0441* 0.0445* 0.0451* 0.0455* 0.0437* 0.0438* 0.0489** 0.0404* 0.0455* 
 (0.0247) (0.0246) (0.0243) (0.0243) (0.0243) (0.0244) (0.0242) (0.0244) (0.0243) (0.0244) 
No. of children -0.00597 -0.00307 0.00565 0.00544 0.00347 -0.00652 0.00146 -0.00116 0.000887 0.00362 
 (0.0275) (0.0273) (0.0261) (0.0262) (0.0264) (0.0268) (0.0266) (0.0265) (0.0268) (0.0264) 
No. of persons 0.00554 0.00511 0.00226 0.00306 0.00557 0.00886 0.00972 -0.00229 0.00369 0.0104 
 (0.0200) (0.0199) (0.0189) (0.0192) (0.0196) (0.0201) (0.0204) (0.0195) (0.0202) (0.0197) 
Marital status (Married = base case)      
Previously  0.0391 0.0413 0.0482 0.0478 0.0475 0.0439 0.0436 0.0435 0.0430 0.0446 
married (0.0328) (0.0325) (0.0314) (0.0314) (0.0315) (0.0321) (0.0317) (0.0329) (0.0324) (0.0314) 
Never been  0.0242 0.0254 0.0330 0.0320 0.0321 0.0357 0.0205 0.0165 0.0309 0.0265 
married (0.0440) (0.0437) (0.0425) (0.0425) (0.0425) (0.0428) (0.0433) (0.0436) (0.0433) (0.0420) 
Level of highest education (No post-school education = base case)      
Bachelor degree  -0.00753 -0.00708 -0.00880 -0.00832 -0.00767 -0.00765 -0.00866 -0.0147 -0.00815 -0.0113 
or higher (0.0248) (0.0247) (0.0242) (0.0243) (0.0243) (0.0245) (0.0244) (0.0245) (0.0247) (0.0242) 
Other post-school  0.0298 0.0311 0.0229 0.0253 0.0300 0.0274 0.0294 0.00920 0.0231 0.0307 
qualification (0.0347) (0.0347) (0.0328) (0.0334) (0.0341) (0.0343) (0.0338) (0.0337) (0.0344) (0.0333) 
Occupation (Managers and administrators = base case)       
Professionals 0.0370 0.0376 0.0356 0.0360 0.0372 0.0372 0.0405 0.0333 0.0370 0.0377 
 (0.0378) (0.0376) (0.0372) (0.0374) (0.0375) (0.0376) (0.0378) (0.0375) (0.0383) (0.0368) 
Associate professionals 0.0181 0.0196 0.0183 0.0196 0.0197 0.0161 0.0263 0.0209 0.0108 0.0251 
 (0.0432) (0.0433) (0.0429) (0.0430) (0.0430) (0.0429) (0.0437) (0.0432) (0.0432) (0.0428) 
Tradespersons -0.0314 -0.0298 -0.0344 -0.0348 -0.0333 -0.0319 -0.0276 -0.0368 -0.0383 -0.0340 
 (0.0450) (0.0449) (0.0444) (0.0445) (0.0446) (0.0449) (0.0452) (0.0441) (0.0453) (0.0442) 
Advanced clerical workers -0.0986 -0.0972 -0.0975 -0.0962 -0.0960 -0.0993 -0.0724 -0.102 -0.101 -0.0748 
 (0.0748) (0.0748) (0.0745) (0.0746) (0.0746) (0.0746) (0.0729) (0.0738) (0.0747) (0.0726) 
Intermediate clerical workers 0.0730* 0.0743* 0.0804* 0.0811** 0.0831** 0.0811** 0.0824** 0.0682* 0.0785* 0.0797* 
 (0.0417) (0.0416) (0.0411) (0.0412) (0.0414) (0.0413) (0.0413) (0.0414) (0.0425) (0.0412) 
Production workers 0.0699 0.0736 0.0591 0.0602 0.0591 0.0648 0.0562 0.0713 0.0833 0.0544 
 (0.0522) (0.0519) (0.0502) (0.0502) (0.0502) (0.0515) (0.0496) (0.0526) (0.0527) (0.0493) 
Elementary clerical workers -0.0439 -0.0225 -0.0222 -0.0193 -0.0172 -0.0445 -0.0213 -0.0461 -0.0444 -0.0165 
 (0.0708) (0.0689) (0.0671) (0.0672) (0.0673) (0.0689) (0.0673) (0.0683) (0.0689) (0.0671) 
Labourers 0.0903* 0.0922* 0.0808 0.0827 0.0833 0.0855 0.0878* 0.0891* 0.0824 0.0783 
 (0.0530) (0.0529) (0.0522) (0.0523) (0.0522) (0.0525) (0.0526) (0.0530) (0.0526) (0.0520) 
(continued on next page) 
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Panel A) continued 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Country-of-origin characteristics:    
National Saving Rate -0.00141          
 (0.00122)          
Average National Saving Rate  -0.00151         
  (0.00133)         
Age Dependency Ratio   0.0000517        
   (0.00131)        
Age Dependency Ratio (young)    -0.000573       
    (0.000856)       
Age Dependency Ratio (old)     0.00190      
     (0.00155)      
GDP      0.0179*     
      (0.00981)     
English Speaking       0.0464*    
       (0.0240)    
Market Captitalisation        0.000183   
        (0.000136)   
Workers’ Remittances         -0.00270  
         (0.00308)  
Muslims          -0.0994** 
          (0.0425) 
Buddhists          -0.0688 
          (0.0462) 
Chinese           -0.00928 
Universists          (0.0718) 
Hindus          -0.0904 
          (0.0569) 
Non-religious          -0.0357 
          (0.0734) 
Constant -2.606*** -2.618*** -2.847*** -2.780*** -2.780*** -2.649*** -2.602*** -2.764*** -2.750*** -2.595*** 
 (0.712) (0.710) (0.667) (0.675) (0.662) (0.690) (0.694) (0.701) (0.700) (0.660) 
Observations 972 977 992 992 992 982 996 964 968 998 
Root MSE 0.298 0.298 0.297 0.297 0.298 0.297 0.298 0.294 0.297 0.297 
R-squared 0.301 0.301 0.311 0.310 0.309 0.302 0.303 0.307 0.304 0.308 
 
Notes: In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also include MSR and location of household controls, which are not reported due to low significance. The sample is limited 
to immigrant household heads aged 15 or older who have non-missing data on country of origin with the household saving rates above -1.28 and below 0.79. Standard errors are indicated in 
parentheses. *** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
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Panel B) aged 36 or older, individual level  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Household  0.209*** 0.211*** 0.227*** 0.225*** 0.223*** 0.217*** 0.207*** 0.213*** 0.223*** 0.219*** 
income (0.0663) (0.0658) (0.0629) (0.0635) (0.0638) (0.0648) (0.0671) (0.0657) (0.0660) (0.0626) 
Wealth -0.000241 -0.000246 -0.000258 -0.000257 -0.000260 -0.000261 -0.000242 -0.000251 -0.000274 -0.000235 
 (0.000191) (0.000191) (0.000189) (0.000189) (0.000189) (0.000189) (0.000192) (0.000191) (0.000191) (0.000174) 
Dependency ratio -0.0966 -0.0972 -0.113 -0.113 -0.113 -0.103 -0.122 -0.113 -0.0980 -0.106 
 (0.100) (0.0997) (0.0978) (0.0978) (0.0978) (0.0993) (0.0985) (0.0996) (0.1000) (0.0976) 
Age -0.00655 -0.00656 -0.00641 -0.00717 -0.00747 -0.00716 -0.00635 -0.00841 -0.00658 -0.00683 
 (0.00861) (0.00857) (0.00850) (0.00854) (0.00852) (0.00858) (0.00845) (0.00858) (0.00858) (0.00842) 
Age squared 0.000103 0.000103 0.000106 0.000111 0.000112 0.000108 0.000101 0.000116* 0.000105 0.000107 
 (0.0000700) (0.0000698) (0.0000691) (0.0000693) (0.0000692) (0.0000695) (0.0000690) (0.0000695) (0.0000697) (0.0000687) 
Gender (1 if male) 0.0562** 0.0568** 0.0595** 0.0600** 0.0603** 0.0568** 0.0603** 0.0612** 0.0524* 0.0585** 
 (0.0278) (0.0277) (0.0272) (0.0273) (0.0273) (0.0274) (0.0273) (0.0276) (0.0273) (0.0271) 
No. of children 0.000246 0.000810 0.00649 0.00602 0.00475 0.000255 0.00343 -0.00122 0.00228 0.00751 
 (0.0313) (0.0313) (0.0300) (0.0301) (0.0302) (0.0304) (0.0303) (0.0303) (0.0308) (0.0302) 
No. of persons -0.000214 -0.00109 -0.00326 -0.00253 -0.000626 0.00241 0.00298 -0.000855 -0.000568 -0.000240 
 (0.0214) (0.0213) (0.0205) (0.0207) (0.0210) (0.0214) (0.0216) (0.0208) (0.0219) (0.0208) 
Marital status (Married = base case)       
Previously  0.0280 0.0297 0.0391 0.0393 0.0394 0.0371 0.0356 0.0367 0.0338 0.0327 
married (0.0351) (0.0348) (0.0337) (0.0337) (0.0337) (0.0342) (0.0340) (0.0345) (0.0346) (0.0339) 
Never been  0.0300 0.0315 0.0458 0.0455 0.0464 0.0440 0.0316 0.0221 0.0418 0.0388 
married (0.0534) (0.0530) (0.0516) (0.0516) (0.0516) (0.0520) (0.0528) (0.0523) (0.0522) (0.0515) 
Level of highest education (No post-school education = base case)     
Bachelor degree  -0.00144 -0.00128 -0.00612 -0.00557 -0.00553 -0.00329 -0.00611 -0.00623 -0.00416 -0.00874 
or higher (0.0266) (0.0265) (0.0261) (0.0261) (0.0261) (0.0263) (0.0262) (0.0264) (0.0265) (0.0259) 
Other post-school  0.0372 0.0374 0.0252 0.0275 0.0314 0.0321 0.0301 0.0186 0.0295 0.0290 
qualification (0.0371) (0.0371) (0.0356) (0.0361) (0.0366) (0.0367) (0.0362) (0.0363) (0.0371) (0.0356) 
Occupation (Managers and administrators = base case)      
Professionals 0.0581 0.0561 0.0564 0.0565 0.0569 0.0555 0.0612 0.0590 0.0569 0.0594 
 (0.0415) (0.0412) (0.0408) (0.0408) (0.0409) (0.0410) (0.0414) (0.0409) (0.0417) (0.0401) 
Associate professionals 0.0598 0.0596 0.0597 0.0604 0.0601 0.0549 0.0671 0.0657 0.0499 0.0665 
 (0.0487) (0.0488) (0.0481) (0.0481) (0.0481) (0.0482) (0.0489) (0.0486) (0.0488) (0.0480) 
Tradespersons -0.0166 -0.0171 -0.0229 -0.0231 -0.0209 -0.0193 -0.0142 -0.0245 -0.0286 -0.0179 
 (0.0518) (0.0517) (0.0507) (0.0508) (0.0510) (0.0514) (0.0517) (0.0508) (0.0520) (0.0504) 
Advanced clerical workers -0.0822 -0.0817 -0.0782 -0.0769 -0.0770 -0.0784 -0.0782 -0.0795 -0.0837 -0.0809 
 (0.0839) (0.0838) (0.0835) (0.0835) (0.0835) (0.0837) (0.0837) (0.0832) (0.0839) (0.0829) 
Intermediate clerical workers 0.0826* 0.0822* 0.0871* 0.0878* 0.0895* 0.0864* 0.0896* 0.0751 0.0875* 0.0923** 
 (0.0476) (0.0475) (0.0470) (0.0471) (0.0472) (0.0472) (0.0473) (0.0476) (0.0484) (0.0470) 
Production workers 0.0960* 0.0970* 0.0985* 0.0991* 0.0968* 0.0922 0.0865 0.103* 0.0964* 0.0867 
 (0.0582) (0.0581) (0.0575) (0.0575) (0.0574) (0.0575) (0.0568) (0.0593) (0.0582) (0.0564) 
Elementary clerical workers 0.0896 0.104 0.0917 0.0945 0.0962 0.0733 0.0963 0.0713 0.0700 0.0992 
 (0.0834) (0.0805) (0.0776) (0.0777) (0.0777) (0.0801) (0.0778) (0.0797) (0.0804) (0.0774) 
Labourers 0.103* 0.103* 0.0911 0.0920 0.0919 0.0942 0.100* 0.0931 0.0926 0.0889 
 (0.0596) (0.0595) (0.0583) (0.0583) (0.0583) (0.0587) (0.0588) (0.0585) (0.0590) (0.0580) 
(continued on next page) 
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Panel B) continued 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Country-of-origin characteristics:      
National Saving Rate -0.00230          
 (0.00143)          
Average National Saving Rate  -0.00236         
  (0.00156)         
Age Dependency Ratio   0.000177        
   (0.00160)        
Age dependency Ratio (young)    -0.000635       
    (0.000999)       
Age Dependency Ratio (old)     0.00196      
     (0.00169)      
GDP      0.0195*     
      (0.0107)     
English Speaking       0.0518**    
       (0.0254)    
Market Capitalisation        0.000218   
        (0.000158)   
Workers’ Remittances         -0.00372  
         (0.00348)  
Muslims          -0.0804* 
          (0.0469) 
Buddhists          -0.128** 
          (0.0566) 
Chinese           -0.0529 
Universists          (0.0814) 
Hindus          -0.0697 
          (0.0618) 
Non-religious          -0.0757 
          (0.0804) 
Constant -1.999** -2.020** -2.263*** -2.186*** -2.213*** -2.154*** -2.063*** -2.045*** -2.189*** -2.130*** 
 (0.793) (0.786) (0.760) (0.764) (0.747) (0.764) (0.775) (0.778) (0.777) (0.739) 
Observations 841 844 855 855 855 849 857 837 840 859 
Root MSE 0.305 0.305 0.303 0.303 0.303 0.304 0.304 0.302 0.304 0.302 
R-squared 0.271 0.272 0.281 0.280 0.280 0.277 0.275 0.273 0.277 0.284 
 
Notes: In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also include MSR and location of household controls, which are not reported due to low significance. The sample is limited 
to immigrant household heads aged 36 or older who have non-missing data on country of origin with the household saving rates above -1.28 and below 0.79. Standard errors are indicated in 
parentheses. *** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
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Panel C) aged 15 or older, individual level  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Income 0.0440*** 0.0438*** 0.0447*** 0.0446*** 0.0438*** 0.0426*** 0.0407*** 0.0434*** 0.0441*** 0.0415*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0109) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0105) (0.0104) 
Wealth -0.0000217 -0.0000224 -0.0000102 -0.0000136 -0.0000179 -0.0000321 -0.0000346 -0.0000246 -0.0000327 -0.00000930 
 (0.0000920) (0.0000924) (0.0000921) (0.0000922) (0.0000922) (0.0000917) (0.0000920) (0.0000912) (0.0000922) (0.0000884) 
Age -0.00416 -0.00368 -0.00403 -0.00424 -0.00438 -0.00473 -0.00403 -0.00414 -0.00462 -0.00384 
 (0.00343) (0.00343) (0.00340) (0.00340) (0.00340) (0.00339) (0.00339) (0.00342) (0.00341) (0.00339) 
Age squared 0.0000573* 0.0000526 0.0000568* 0.0000574* 0.0000579* 0.0000595* 0.0000557* 0.0000540* 0.0000611* 0.0000538* 
 (0.0000327) (0.0000327) (0.0000324) (0.0000324) (0.0000324) (0.0000323) (0.0000323) (0.0000325) (0.0000324) (0.0000324) 
Gender (1 if male) 0.00758 0.00938 0.00941 0.00958 0.00879 0.00783 0.00620 0.0129 0.00676 0.00728 
 (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0175) (0.0175) (0.0175) (0.0174) (0.0174) (0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0174) 
No. of children -0.0458*** -0.0455*** -0.0435*** -0.0434*** -0.0436*** -0.0467*** -0.0438*** -0.0471*** -0.0432*** -0.0407*** 
 (0.0140) (0.0141) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0138) 
No. of persons 0.0239*** 0.0238*** 0.0241*** 0.0243*** 0.0250*** 0.0260*** 0.0263*** 0.0214** 0.0246*** 0.0252*** 
 (0.00920) (0.00924) (0.00909) (0.00909) (0.00909) (0.00904) (0.00909) (0.00909) (0.00911) (0.00911) 
Head -0.258*** -0.254*** -0.258*** -0.257*** -0.257*** -0.260*** -0.259*** -0.255*** -0.256*** -0.251*** 
 (0.0386) (0.0387) (0.0378) (0.0378) (0.0378) (0.0376) (0.0378) (0.0382) (0.0379) (0.0378) 
Spouse -0.190*** -0.187*** -0.189*** -0.189*** -0.190*** -0.195*** -0.196*** -0.187*** -0.191*** -0.189*** 
 (0.0392) (0.0394) (0.0386) (0.0386) (0.0386) (0.0384) (0.0386) (0.0388) (0.0386) (0.0385) 
Marital status (Married = base case)       
Previously  -0.0890*** -0.0845*** -0.0810*** -0.0804*** -0.0807*** -0.0835*** -0.0823*** -0.0840*** -0.0878*** -0.0829*** 
married (0.0267) (0.0268) (0.0265) (0.0265) (0.0265) (0.0264) (0.0264) (0.0266) (0.0266) (0.0265) 
Never been  -0.0901** -0.0891** -0.0892** -0.0897** -0.0898** -0.0862** -0.100*** -0.0969*** -0.0876** -0.0962*** 
married (0.0356) (0.0357) (0.0352) (0.0352) (0.0352) (0.0352) (0.0351) (0.0356) (0.0356) (0.0351) 
Level of highest education (No post-school education = base case)     
Bachelor degree  -0.00339 -0.00661 -0.00808 -0.00852 -0.00800 -0.00538 -0.00824 -0.00974 -0.00499 -0.0109 
or higher (0.0193) (0.0193) (0.0191) (0.0191) (0.0191) (0.0190) (0.0191) (0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0191) 
Other post-school  0.0491** 0.0486** 0.0454** 0.0465** 0.0496** 0.0477** 0.0471** 0.0379* 0.0471** 0.0467** 
qualification (0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0209) (0.0209) (0.0210) (0.0209) (0.0208) (0.0210) (0.0211) (0.0209) 
Employment status ( Employed = base case)      
Unemployed -0.0572 -0.0568 -0.0557 -0.0545 -0.0532 -0.0549 -0.0537 -0.0622 -0.0539 -0.0476 
 (0.0576) (0.0579) (0.0570) (0.0570) (0.0569) (0.0564) (0.0568) (0.0594) (0.0583) (0.0569) 
Not in labour force -0.0888*** -0.0897*** -0.0902*** -0.0897*** -0.0909*** -0.0893*** -0.0914*** -0.0845*** -0.0889*** -0.0918*** 
 (0.0248) (0.0248) (0.0244) (0.0244) (0.0244) (0.0243) (0.0244) (0.0245) (0.0245) (0.0244) 
(continued on next page) 
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Panel C) continued 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Country-of-origin characteristics:     
National Saving Rate -0.00180**          
 (0.000880)          
Average National Saving Rate  -0.00166*         
  (0.000973)         
Age Dependency Ratio   -0.000162        
   (0.000991)        
Age Dependency Ratio (young)    -0.000687       
    (0.000628)       
Age Dependency Ratio (old)     0.00204*      
     (0.00114)      
GDP      0.0239***     
      (0.00696)     
English Speaking       0.0631***    
       (0.0164)    
Market Capitalisation        0.000381***   
        (0.000107)   
Workers’ Remittances         -0.00473**  
         (0.00205)  
Muslims          -0.0928*** 
          (0.0336) 
Buddhists          -0.0431 
          (0.0344) 
Chinese           0.00267 
Universists          (0.0559) 
Hindus          -0.0641 
          (0.0434) 
Non-religious          -0.0673 
          (0.0530) 
Constant 0.102 0.0863 0.0567 0.0807 0.0336 0.0649 0.0634 0.0442 0.0888 0.0857 
 (0.129) (0.130) (0.134) (0.127) (0.125) (0.122) (0.123) (0.125) (0.125) (0.124) 
Observations 1749 1761 1795 1795 1795 1778 1803 1742 1750 1806 
Root MSE 0.325 0.326 0.326 0.326 0.326 0.323 0.326 0.322 0.324 0.326 
R-squared 0.121 0.118 0.120 0.121 0.121 0.124 0.127 0.124 0.122 0.126 
 
Notes: In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also include MSR controls, which are not reported due to low significance. The sample is limited to 
immigrant respondents aged 15 or older who have non-missing data on country of origin with the household saving rates above -1.28 and below 0.79. Standard errors are 
indicated in parentheses. *** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
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An explanation for these results is as follows. Individuals from wealthy countries represented 
by a higher GDP per capita are more likely to have higher financial wealth when they migrate 
to Australia. This can provide them additional income in the form of bank interest or 
dividends and hence their ability to accumulate more savings. Immigrants who speak English 
will be at more ease with using the services of financial institutions. Likewise, there is a 
higher likelihood for immigrants from countries with developed stock markets to participate 
in financial markets and thus accumulate more financial wealth.  
The negative relationship between the saving rate of immigrants and remittances received by 
their home countries is contrary to expectations. The household saving rate in this research, 
by definition, does not account for remittances sent to the home country. Hence, if 
individuals remit some part of their income, then their higher domestic saving rate is 
positively correlated with the amount they send from Australia and accordingly received by 
their home country. Therefore, the relationship between immigrants’ saving rates and 
remittances received by their countries of origin is not so straightforward and there are 
probably other factors causing this negative influence. 
The differences in the saving rates of immigrants from countries having a dominant religion 
of Islam or Buddhism from the saving rates of the base group are driven by just a few 
observations due to underrepresentation of the respondents from countries following any 
other religion, except Christianity, in HILDA. For example, when the dataset is limited to the 
36+ household heads, there are 766 respondents from countries where Christianity is 
dominant compared to 54 respondents from countries where Islam is the dominant religion, 
36 for Buddhism, 15 for Chinese Universists and 27 for Hinduism. Hence, although religion 
is an important determinant of saving behaviour, it is not possible to make a true comparison 
due to the small number of observations in the HILDA dataset. 
The negative association of the aged dependent population ratio in an immigrant’s home 
country with their household saving rates in Australia confirms the foresight motive of the 
life-cycle hypothesis, according to which households save to pay for the inevitable expenses 
of the future. A higher percentage of aged population who are not in the labour force means 
that individuals are encouraged to save more to provide for their retirement. Interestingly, the 
ratio of dependent young and aged population to the working-age population and the ratio 
representing only young dependents do not affect immigrant savings. This could mean that 
higher savings are particularly encouraged in countries that have an ageing population.  
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The negative coefficient on the national saving rate shows that immigrants from countries 
that save more have a tendency to save less than immigrants from countries with a lower 
saving rate. This phenomenon could be explained either by the fact that immigrants change 
their saving habits once they settle in Australia or by the lack of information on the 
remittances sent to the home countries. One of the reasons that immigrants from countries 
with high saving rates do not save as much as they used to once they move to Australia could 
be the high level of Australian social security. As opposed to living in countries with low 
social security provision where they had to rely on their savings in an emergency, immigrants 
in Australia do not need to save so much due to the availability of support schemes such as 
age and disability pensions, unemployment benefit and paid sick leave. Alternatively, the 
saving rates of immigrant households are defined as the proportion of their disposable income 
after all household expenses are paid from total disposable income, so remittances could be 
included in the total saving rate if a certain unreported share of their income is sent to their 
home country. In this case, a high household saving rate in Australia could mean that the 
recipient country’s economy is not stable and has low savings. The last argument, however, 
contradicts the negative influence of remittances received by home countries on the 
household saving rates of their emigrants in Australia. In addition, a lack of data does not 
allow testing of both propositions, which might be of interest in the future.  
A similar pattern in the saving rates of individuals from different countries is observed in 
Table 3.5, where their household saving rates in Australia, averaged for each country of 
origin, are compared with their respective country-of-origin national saving rates. This 
comparison is limited to individuals from 14 countries which are represented by at least 30 
respondents. A high negative correlation coefficient of -0.81 between the national saving rate 
and the average household saving rate of migrants from those 14 countries, including all 
household members and not just household heads, also confirms the findings.  
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Table 3.5 Comparison of immigrants’ household saving rates in Australia averaged by 
their countries of origin, with the respective countries-of-origin national saving rates 
Country name 
No. of 
respondents 
Average 
household 
saving rate in 
Australia 
Standard 
deviation 
Country-of-
origin national 
saving rate 
 
China 37 10.50 0.63 53.77 
Italy 61 21.95 0.42 20.03 
Sri Lanka 40 24.56 0.29 22.37 
Vietnam 48 25.42 0.40 37.08 
India 48 25.97 0.42 36.03 
Netherlands 65 26.23 0.38 29.38 
Malaysia 35 27.51 0.41 38.41 
Ireland 31 28.76 0.31 29.83 
Philippines 69 30.38 0.30 30.79 
New Zealand 219 30.94 0.28 16.11 
United Kingdom 682 30.83 0.32 15.38 
South Africa 56 33.88 0.28 14.77 
Germany 69 35.11 0.31 23.55 
United States 34 36.09 0.32 14.74 
 
Notes: The sample is restricted to respondents aged 15 or older who have non-missing data on country of origin 
with the household saving rates above -1.28 and below 0.79. The number of countries is limited to those with at 
least 30 representatives. 
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 3.5 Conclusions 
The main goal of the analysis reported in this chapter was to determine what characteristics 
of household heads and other Australian residents affect their household saving rates. 
Another goal was to see if ethnic diversity is one of these determinants, thus contributing to 
the existing research on the importance of country-of-origin effects for economic outcomes. 
Home-country proxies in this research were represented by the quality of home-country 
institutions, national saving rates, GDP per capita and other country-of-origin characteristics, 
and economic outcomes were represented by the saving rates of immigrants in Australia. The 
presence of country-of-origin effects was investigated by testing whether household saving 
rates differ between native-born and foreign-born Australians, controlling for characteristics 
of household heads as well as all individuals. A more detailed analysis was then applied to 
immigrant households and individuals. The average immigrant saving rates in Australia, 
obtained for each country of origin, were also compared with their respective national saving 
rates, thus testing whether the saving differentials across countries stem not only from 
economic factors but also from country-specific differences.  
The empirical results reported in this chapter show that: first, immigrant households have 
lower saving rates than native-born households, which is also applicable when household 
savings are examined with respect to all household members; second, a country’s strong 
institutional environment positively influences the saving-related decisions of its people who 
migrate to Australia, and this effect is present at the household level as well as the individual 
level; and third, a negative correlation between a country’s national saving rate and the 
household saving rates of its emigrants to Australia exists when the sample is extended to 
include all household members.  
The initial step of the analysis identified the factors affecting the saving rates of Australian 
households and detected different saving rates for foreign-born households. An average 
Australian household has a higher saving rate if it has a higher income, a lower wealth 
accumulation, fewer children and a lower number of dependents. Furthermore, saving rates 
are lower for households with female household heads than for male-headed households. 
Those who work as managers or administrators save less than labourers, production workers 
or intermediate clerical workers. This is consistent with the lower saving rates associated with 
higher education levels. Lower saving rates are observed for the household heads in a 
permanent relationship compared to their single or divorced counterparts. At the same time, 
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saving rates are significantly higher for household heads born in Australia than for those born 
abroad. This is also applicable to the outcome of the analysis of household savings at an 
individual level. Owing to the saving definition used in this research, the observed savings 
gap would be expected to be even greater should data on immigrants’ remittances be 
available and accounted for.  
By limiting the sample to immigrants and including their home country characteristics, it was 
possible to identify the country-of-origin effects on their household saving rates in Australia. 
While all immigrants are subject to the same formal regulation in Australia, their home 
institutions can still influence them even after migration. For example, their saving rates are 
positively associated with the higher values of the Aggregate Governance Indicators for their 
home countries such as Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Corruption Control. The saving rates are 
also higher for the households whose heads are from countries that follow the British legal 
system traditions. These factors and a few additional institutional factors also influence the 
saving rates of immigrant households when these rates are investigated with respect to all 
household members. These results are consistent with the findings reported in Chapter 2 on 
the positive correlation of country-of-origin institutional quality and financial market 
participation of immigrants in Australia.  
The investigation of other country-of-origin factors affecting household saving at an 
individual level revealed the following findings. The household saving rates of immigrants to 
Australia are positively correlated with the ratio of the aged dependent population, GDP per 
capita and the level of market capitalisation in their home countries. Furthermore, originating 
from English-speaking countries also positively influences the saving ability of immigrants. 
In contrast, remittances received by a home country have a negative association with the 
saving rates of its people when they migrate to Australia. An effect from religion is evident 
only when immigrants from countries that follow Islam are compared to immigrants from 
countries following Christianity, with significantly lower saving rates being recorded for the 
former group. This is also applicable to the analysis of saving rates at the household level. 
When young household heads are excluded from the sample, only immigrants from the 
countries following the Buddhist religion have significantly lower saving rates than the base 
group following the Christian religion. These results though can be misleading; they are 
driven by just a few observations since there is an insufficient representation from countries 
with dominant religions other than Christianity. The saving rates of immigrant households in 
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Australia are also positively associated with their household heads originating from countries 
with a high GDP per capita and countries with English as an official language.  
The negative correlation between the household saving rates in Australia and the national 
saving rates for all members of immigrant households is another rather surprising finding of 
this research. However, this is consistent with the empirical evidence (Carroll, Rhee & Rhee 
1999) that has failed to find a resemblance between the saving patterns of American 
immigrants and their respective national saving rates. Carroll, Rhee and Rhee (1999) 
explained these results by either the different reasons for migration of individual immigrants 
with different social backgrounds from different countries or a strong correlation between 
immigrants’ saving behaviour in the US and their initial socioeconomic strata.  
The contribution of this research to the explanation of the national saving rates differential is 
the evidence of a negative relationship between the domestic saving rates of immigrants to 
Australia and their home countries’ national saving rates. These results suggest that either the 
domestic saving rates do not account for the amounts remitted to their home countries by 
Australian immigrants or that their saving patterns change when they migrate (possibly 
driven by low-income countries). One possible reason for this change could be that due to the 
lack of social security in their home countries immigrants were forced to save more there 
than they do once they migrate to Australia. In addition, immigrants’ high savings in 
Australia could mean that they remit high amounts to their less developed home countries 
that have low national saving rates. These hypotheses, however, require deeper analysis and 
could be the direction of future research.  
The limitations of the current version of the HILDA data do not allow testing of the changes 
in the saving behaviour of immigrants over time. It is possible that with changes in social and 
economic conditions, people’s perception of the importance of savings might also change. 
Hence, the inclusion of another set of observations on the same individuals (when available) 
that has information on both household wealth and household expenses might account for this 
possible change over time. Likewise, the absence of data on remittances in HILDA might 
affect the analysis of the saving behaviour of those immigrants who transfer money overseas 
to support their families. These data, fortunately, are available in the survey carried out by the 
Department of Immigration and Citizenship and were used for the analysis reported in the 
next chapter.  
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CHAPTER  4.  REMITTANCES OF AUSTRALIAN IMMIGRANTS: 
DO IMMIGRATION LAWS MATTER? 
4.1 Introduction 
The focus of this chapter is on the remittance outflows initiated by immigrants in Australia. A 
discussion of the economic impact of immigration cannot be complete without analysing their 
willingness and ability to remit. Previous chapters analysed aspects of the financial behaviour 
of Australian immigrants that are conducive to wealth accumulation such as saving behaviour 
and the propensity to take financial risk. For a balanced view, it is beneficial to also analyse 
the wealth-dissipating aspects of immigrants’ financial situation, such as the financial 
assistance provided to their families and friends overseas.  
The increase in migration flows from developing to developed countries increases remittance 
flows in the opposite direction. Indeed, as argued by Abdih et al. (2008), there has been a 
rapid growth in remittances to many developing countries since the 1990s. Recent reports 
from the World Bank show a surge in the outward remittances from Australia, in line with 
this global increase, starting from 2001. This coincides with the changes in the Australian 
immigration policy introduced in 1999, which tightened entry requirements and put more 
emphasis on the business category. Due to the lengthy process of application for permanent 
residency, it is possible that the consequences of the new laws only came into full effect a 
few years later and, hence, can be observed from 2001. 
These changes in the law could have impacted on the profile of new immigrants and thus 
affected their remittances. Most skilled migrants are subjected to the points test which has 
become more difficult to pass since the Review of the Independent and Skilled-Australian 
Linked Categories in 1999. The Review was supposed to discourage unqualified applicants 
from applying for skilled visas and to attract individuals with a higher earning ability. Unlike 
applicants for other visa types, such as family visas, skilled independent applicants are 
expected to be better off and to have fewer dependents left in their home countries. Thus, the 
rapid increase in the arrivals of independent migrants to Australia from 1998, registered by 
the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (2008), could have contributed to the rise in 
outward remittances from the country.  
This possible link of the size of outward remittances to immigration policies underlines the 
importance of a detailed analysis of the determinants of remitting behaviour. Although 
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remittances are beneficial for the economies of the recipient countries, uncontrolled high 
remitted amounts can have a detrimental effect on the host economy. Knowledge of the 
factors affecting remittance outflows could be useful in managing government policies of the 
outflow countries for an optimum economic outcome. If the possible relation between 
remittances and immigration policies proved to be true, government policies could be also 
used to control remitting outflows through the management of immigration inflows to the 
country. Despite its importance, the remitting performance of immigrants remains relatively 
understudied. 
The factors that determine immigrants’ willingness and ability to remit were investigated, 
with the focus on the effects of recent changes in Australian immigration policies. First, the 
most suitable approach for examining immigrants’ remitting behaviour was identified based 
on three popular models: the two-part model, the Tobit model and the Heckman two-step 
model. Based on this selection, the importance of the personal factors that determine the 
remitting behaviour of immigrants was investigated, including the category of their entry visa 
to Australia. The different visa effects on the remitting behaviour before and after the change 
to immigration laws might reflect a changed pattern of immigrants with different levels of 
willingness and ability to remit. A comparison of the components of the remittances of two 
cohorts of immigrants arriving in Australia during different policy regimes, with special 
emphasis on their entry visa, should be able to shed light on how the recent change in the 
immigration policy has influenced immigrants’ remitting behaviour.  
Data from the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia (LSIA) fitted the purpose of 
this investigation better than the previously used Household, Income and Labour Dynamics 
in Australia (HILDA) Survey. Unlike the HILDA survey, LSIA’s specific focus on migrant 
population provides information about their remittances, the types of visa they used to enter 
Australia and their relatives not living in Australia, in addition to providing the common 
demographic characteristics used throughout this thesis, such as age, gender and education. 
Whether or not immigrants have relatives in their countries of origin relates to the demand-
side pressures from these countries (Brown 1997). Together with the supply-side variables, 
such as income and wealth, affecting migrants’ capacity to remit, these variables cover most 
factors influencing their decision to remit. Remittances in this research are defined as the 
amounts of money sent to relatives and friends overseas. It is assumed that if immigrants 
provide financial help to their family members not living in Australia, then those family 
members live in the immigrants’ countries of origin. 
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The findings reported in this chapter revealed that: first, the Heckman two-step was the most 
suitable approach for the analysis of the remitting behaviour of the immigrants of the first 
cohort from LSIA and the two-part model with the ordered dependent model used for the 
analysis of remitted amount was the best model for the second cohort; and second, the 
changes to the points test described above did not affect immigrants’ remitting probability but 
they did impact on the amounts transferred by those who decided to remit. The stricter entry 
requirements shortlisted applicants for an Independent Visa in the later cohort to more skilled 
and educated individuals compared to the first cohort, which arrived in Australia before these 
changes. As a result, Independent Visa holders in the second cohort can earn a higher income 
than applicants for a Family Visa, an income which is comparable to that earned by Business 
Visa holders. According to the findings, the change in the recent immigrant’s profile 
triggered by an increase in the number of independent applicants can explain the rapid 
increase in outward remittances from Australia from 2001. As a result of amendments to the 
points test, these immigrants are more financially stable than the independent applicants who 
arrived in Australia before the reform.  
The remaining content of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 describes recent 
trends in immigration to Australia; Section 4.3 presents the relevant literature review; Section 
4.4 describes the data and methodology used in this part of the study; Section 4.5 presents 
results, which are followed by the conclusions section.  
4.2 Recent immigration patterns 
Immigration policies do not have an equal effect on every applicant for an Australian visa but 
their influence is similar for people holding similar types of visa. Based on data availability 
and following the classification used in recent studies (Chiswick & Miller 2004; Cobb-Clark 
& Chapman 1999; Thapa & Gorgens 2006), all immigrants in this research were grouped into 
categories based on their entry visa. One of the broad classifications proposed by LSIA, a 
primary dataset used in this chapter, created five main categories named here as Family, 
Humanitarian, Skilled-Independent, Skilled-Sponsored and Skilled-Business. The description 
of these categories is summarised in Table 4.1
22
.  
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 The names of visa categories have changed between surveys. For example, Skilled-Australian Sponsored 
category, which allowed admission of skilled migrants who had close family ties in Australia, was formerly 
known as Skilled-Australian Linked category and before that termed the Concessional Family Category. 
Following Chiswick and Miller (2004), the names used in the late 1990s are used in this study. 
121 
Table 4.1 Visa categories available in LSIA 
Visa categories  
Family. Preferential Family (spouses, dependent children, parents meeting balance of family 
test, last remaining relatives etc.) 
Humanitarian. Offshore resettlement program and onshore protection for those persons 
already in Australia. 
Skilled: 
- Independent. Unsponsored applicants. Points tested. 
- Sponsored. Skilled-Australian Sponsored or Concessional Family before 1997 
(Allows sponsoring nondependent children, brothers or sisters, parents not meeting the 
balance family test etc.), Skilled-Regional Designated Area Sponsored (introduced in 
1997, allows sponsorship of skilled relatives to designated areas of Australia). Points 
tested. 
- Business. Business Skills, Distinguished Talents and Employer Nomination Scheme 
(ENS) (Successful business persons intending to migrate as shareholders or sole 
owners of a business; individuals with special or unique talents; highly skilled workers 
sponsored by Australian employers to work in their business).  
 
Source: Australian Immigration Consolidated Statistics (2002), Antecol, Cobb-Clark and Trejo(2003), 
Chiswick and Miller (2004) and DIAC (2008). 
The amendments to the Australian immigration policy in the late 1990s mainly affected the 
points-tested Independent Visa and Concessional Family Visa classes. First, the Concessional 
Family category was replaced with the new Skilled-Australian Linked category in 1997, 
resulting in a decrease of Family stream migration in favour of Skilled migration (Richardson 
& Lester 2004). Second, the increased emphasis on skills by the Australian Government was 
evident in the change in the nature of the points test made effective on 1 July 1999 
(Hawthorne 2005). For example, as argued by Thapa and Gorgens (2006), in addition to 
satisfying an aggregate minimum score, applicants had to pass other requirements such as not 
being older than 45 at the time of application and having a specified level of English 
proficiency. Likewise, awarding additional points for having an occupation from the Priority 
Occupation List, not practised since October 1992, was re-introduced in the points test in 
1999 (Chiswick & Miller 2004). Table 4.2 compares the points test requirements before and 
after the July 1999 changes.  
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Table 4.2 Comparison of the points testing system before and after amendment on 1 
July 1999 
Characteristics August 1993 July 1999 
Pass mark for Skilled-Independent 110 110 
Pass mark for Skilled-Sponsored 100 110 
Maximum age requirement 59 female, 64 male 44 
Minimum English language proficiency No limit Vocational English  
Maximum points for:   
Skills 80
a
 60 
Age 30 30 
English language proficiency 20
b
 20 
Specific work experience  10 
Occupational demand/job offer  15 
Australian qualification  15 
Regional Australia / Low population  5 
Spouse Skills  5 
Sponsorship (Skilled-Sponsored only) 15 15 
Australian Citizenship of sponsor (Skilled- 
Sponsored only) 
15  
Settlement of sponsor in Australia (Skilled- 
Sponsored only) 
10  
Sponsor location (Skilled- Sponsored only) 5  
Total maximum points 175 175 
 
Notes: 
a
 Also accounts for post-qualification work experience for those who completed tertiary education. 
b
 Applies to Skilled-Independent immigrants only. 
Source: Chiswick and Miller (2004) and Walsh (2008). 
Immigration flows to Australia, however, did not decrease after the introduction of these 
restrictions to the selection criteria; instead, they increased, probably reflecting the increase in 
immigration flows worldwide. As Figure 4.1 shows, this general trend applied to the 
Independent Visa holders but not to those immigrants who were sponsored by their relatives. 
The number of sponsored immigrants decreased in 2000, reflecting their inability to get 
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additional points for having an Australian sponsor as well as the additional age and English 
language proficiency requirements introduced in the new points test. The decrease in 
immigration rates prior to these reforms could be credited to other government initiatives 
such as the waiting period for receiving social security payments for newly arrived 
immigrants being extended from six months to two years from May 1996 (Social Security 
Legislation Amendment [Newly Arrived Resident's Waiting Period and Other Measures]Bill). 
As a result, the decline in immigration in 1996–1998 was mostly attributable to a decrease in 
the number of migrants in the Family category. After that decline, immigration flows showed 
a growth tendency, reflecting an increase in the biggest visa groups, that is, the Family and 
Independent categories.  
Figure 4.1 Immigration flows to Australia, 1990–2007 (in persons) 
 
Notes: Does not include immigrants arrived under Special Eligibility Program and non-program migration 
mostly used for migration by New Zealand citizens. 
Source: DIMIA(2002), DIAC (2008). 
In general, the rises and falls in the remitting outflow from Australia have coincided with the 
rises and falls in the immigration flow to Australia, suggesting that new migrants are the main 
remitting participants. Moreover, the growth of the remittance outflow during 2000–2007 
was stronger than the growth in the immigrant population of Australia, as Figure 4.2 reflects 
(187 per cent versus 72 per cent, according to data from the World Bank (2011) and DIAC 
(2008)). The most recent decrease in the remitting outflow was registered in the early 2000s, 
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just a few years after the 1996–1998 fall in the migrant flow to Australia. After that, the 
remittance outflow soared in response to an increase in immigration to the country. This 
increase in the remittance outflow, however, was more than proportional to the increase in 
immigration, suggesting that there could be other influencing factors. The change in the 
recent immigrant’s profile due to the amendments to the Australian immigration policies 
could be one of the explanations for the change in remitting behaviour.  
Figure 4.2 Remittances outflows from Australia, 1990–2008 (in million USD) 
 
Source: World Bank (2011). 
4.3 Literature review 
The motives for the pursuit of better well-being overseas are based on push and pull factors, 
intervening obstacles and personal factors (Lee 1966). Unfavourable characteristics of the 
area where one lives are push factors whereas pull factors are the attractive qualities of 
another area. Wars, loss of wealth, lack of political or religious freedom, lower wages or 
fewer opportunities can push an individual to leave their country. However, not all countries 
are equally attractive for relocation or ready to accept new settlers. The selection of a new 
home depends on a number of pull factors such as political or religious freedom, living 
conditions and job opportunities as well as personal preferences and obstacles such as a 
country’s immigration laws. 
Following political pressures in the mid-1990s and adapting within the global system, since 
1996 there has been shift in the Australian immigration laws towards the skilled migration. In 
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particular, as reported by Walsh (2008), globalisation demanded an expansion of certain 
economic sectors such as information technology and advanced business and producer 
services. This resulted in a 30 per cent increase in the relative size of the skills intake after 
1996, despite a reduction in the overall migration program (non-humanitarian) from 82,000 to 
74,000 per annum (Borooah & Mangan 2007). At the same time, to ensure that new 
immigrants would not be a burden on society, the period before they could access social 
security payments was increased from six months to two years (Shah & Burke 2005). 
Migration decisions are often not just individual choices but rather taken within the family 
context. The difference in immigrants’ wages before and after migration is supposed to be 
sufficient not only to compensate for the temporary hardship and personal sacrifices of the 
new immigrants but also to support their families. The complicated process of migration can 
make it impossible to bring some family members, or those family members who meet the 
eligibility requirements might wait for a substantial time to join the primary applicants for 
Australian residency. Therefore, sometimes remitting cash is the only way to provide 
financial assistance to the family members left in the home country.  
These transfers are not only crucial for households’ well-being but also for the recipient 
economies. Moreover, Fan (2009) admitted that in some labour-exporting countries, such as 
Mexico and Indonesia, remittances account for a significant part of their national income. 
Tonga and Samoa were top remittance recipients in 2009 with the former receiving 
remittances corresponding to 27.7 per cent of its GDP and the latter 22.3 per cent. These 
Pacific Island countries are among those classified as MIRAB states where Migration, 
Remittances, Aid and the resultant Bureaucracy are central to their socio-economic systems 
(Brown, Leeves & Prayaga 2012). Despite some shortcomings such as this bureaucratic 
effect, increase in government corruption (Abdih et al. 2008) or a decline in labour supply 
(Acosta, Lartey & Mandelman 2009), numerous studies have suggested welfare-enhancing 
benefits from remittances in the receiving countries (Abdih et al. 2008; Acosta, Lartey & 
Mandelman 2009; Gupta, Pattillo & Wagh 2009).  
The World Bank (2006c) data demonstrates that the increase in emigration flows from 
developing to developed countries has been accompanied by a surge in remittances from 
migrants to their friends and families overseas. In particular, remittances received by 
developing countries rose almost threefold from 1995 to 2005, from 58 to 167 billion USD. 
Similarly, according to the data, remittance growth for this decade outran private capital 
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flows and official development assistance. The World Bank’s data in Figure 4.2 also 
demonstrates a steady increase in the outward remittances from Australia from 1993 to 2008, 
with a single small decline registered in 2000 (World Bank 2011).  
The comparison of Figures 4.1 and 4.2 reveals that remittances from Australia in general 
increase with the rise in the number of immigrant arrivals and decrease when immigration to 
Australia declines. For example, a decline in remittances from 1,055 to 1,053 million USD 
was observed in 2000 (World Bank 2011), just a few years after the recorded decline in 
immigration to Australia, which was probably caused by the increase in the waiting period to 
receive government benefits. Likewise, there was a surge in remittances from Australia 
starting in 1999, mirroring an upward trend in the number of immigrants starting in the same 
year. This implies that newly arrived immigrants are the major contributors to these outward 
transfers. 
This increase in the remittance outflow from Australia, however, cannot be explained solely 
by an increase in the number of immigrants. For example, even though there was a 72 per 
cent increase in the immigrant intake in Australia from 2000 to 2007 (DIAC 2008), the surge 
in remittances for the same period exceeded 180 per cent (World Bank 2011). As presented in 
Figure 4.1, the increase in immigration is not equal among all categories, with the fastest 
growing group being the Independent Visa category despite tighter entry requirements. The 
amendments to the points system were supposed to attract qualified and educated immigrants 
who would not be dependent on the government social security system. Hence, skilled 
immigrants who arrived in Australia after 1999 are likely to have a higher earning potential 
than immigrants who arrived earlier. Therefore, a change in the distribution of visa categories 
and a consequent change in the dominant profile of a recent immigrant could contribute to the 
increase in remittances from Australia. Thus, the reasons for immigrants’ motives to remit, 
and accordingly the determinants of the remittance outflows from Australia, can also change.  
An extensive literature describes the motives for migrants’ remittances not only as altruistic 
but also based on self-interest such as security of inheritance or investment in assets at home 
(Sinning 2011). The degree of altruism has been evaluated by income effects in the majority 
of the empirical studies on remittances. However, there is insufficient evidence to suggest a 
direct proportionate relationship between a unit income change and a unit transfer (Altonji, 
Hayashi & Kotlikoff 1997). ‘Tempered altruism or enlightened self-interest’ motives such as 
repayments of loans or the degree of risk to income, in addition to its size, can also impact on 
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immigrants’ capacity to remit (Sinning 2011). Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006), in their 
study of Mexican immigrants in the US, contended that migration for work to cushion home 
economic fluctuations is one of the rationales for sending remittances. They showed that 
income risks may increase the amount immigrants remit to their home countries in order to 
smooth future consumption.  
Brown (1997), in addition to using motivational and income-influencing variables, also used 
variables reflecting demand-side pressure from immigrants’ home countries and the length of 
their absence in the estimation of the remittances of Pacific Islanders living in Australia. 
According to Brown, it is believed that the longer the duration of the migrant’s stay abroad 
and the fewer dependents left at home, the weaker is the migrant’s decision to remit. Brown’s 
results revealed that, in addition to income, self-interest is important for the remittance 
behaviour of both Western Samoan and Tongan communities, with the former also subjected 
to financial obligation to the home community. There is also a positive relationship between 
the remittances of migrants from the Pacific Islands and their having a surviving parent or 
spouse overseas, but there is no effect from the time spent in Australia.  
Similarly, Sinning (2011), in his study of the determinants of savings and remittances of 
immigrants to Germany, reported a positive influence of having close relatives in a home 
country on the size of immigrants’ remittances. Additionally, an intention to return increases 
the financial transfers of migrants to their countries of origin, whereas adding a family 
member to their household in Germany decreases the size of these payments. His estimates 
also suggested different saving and remitting patterns for migrants from different countries, 
with migrants from Turkey being more likely than migrants from Italy, Yugoslavia or Greece 
to save in their home country.     
Considering the above, the recent changes in outward remittances from Australia may be 
caused not only by the change in immigration rates but also by the personal circumstances of 
immigrants. Hence, this chapter aims to identify the factors that influence the remitting 
behaviour of immigrants to Australia. Current empirical evidence from other developed 
countries, such as the US and Germany, reveals a number of remitting motives varying from 
altruistic to risk-sharing purposes. As argued in the previous chapters, however, these 
findings might not necessarily be applicable to the Australian immigrant population due to 
different reasons for migration and different migration policies and sources of migrants. On 
the other hand, research on the determinants of the remittances of immigrants to Australia has 
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been applicable mostly to immigrants from specific countries or regions, such as Tonga and 
Western Samoa, as in the study conducted by Brown (1997). Furthermore, existing studies 
have often adopted a single approach (as reflected in the Data and Methodology section of 
this chapter), whereas this study conducts the first comprehensive analysis of remittances 
using three appropriate models: the two-part model, the Tobit model and the Heckman two-
step model.  
Another distinctive contribution of this research is that it attempts to examine Australian 
immigrants’ remittance outflows controlling not only for the personal characteristics of 
immigrants but also for Australian Government policies. Immigrants’ ability to remit can be 
also influenced by the economic and political situations in the remitting country; however, to 
the best of the author’s knowledge, this relationship has not yet been investigated, at least in 
an Australian setting. Changes in the numbers of visas issued in different visa categories 
demonstrate the effects of changes in Australian immigration policies. Hence, the category of 
entry visa can serve as a proxy for the changes in immigration laws. Continents, and not 
immigrants’ former countries of residence, have been used to represent immigrants’ origin 
due to the large number of countries represented and the insufficient number of observations 
for many of them
23
.  
4.4 Data and methodology 
This section is divided into three subsections. First, the LSIA data and variables are 
discussed; the second subsection presents summary statistics; and the third subsection 
specifies models for investigating the factors influencing the probability of new immigrants 
in Australia to remit money overseas as well as the amount of their transfers.  
4.4.1 Description of data and variables 
Observations on the two independent cohorts of immigrants from LSIA were used for this 
part of the study. As discussed in Chapter 1, LSIA is a longitudinal study of newly arrived 
immigrants, which is intended to provide data for monitoring and evaluating immigration and 
settlement policies, programs and services. While the first cohort (LSIA1) was selected by 
the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs from immigrants 
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 Of the 127 former countries of residence of the first cohort of immigrants arrived in 1993–1995, only 72 
countries have more than 30 observations. This number is even lower in the second survey of 1999–2000 
arrivals (49 out of 123). 
129 
who arrived from September 1993 to August 1995, the second cohort of LSIA (LSIA2) was 
used by the Department to evaluate the effects of policy changes introduced in 1996 on 
immigrants arriving from September 1999 to August 2000. Hence, using these datasets, 
which cover arrivals both before and after the amendments to immigration laws, enabled the 
effects of the legislative changes to be evaluated. Each individual in LSIA1 was observed 
three times: first, in March 1994 – February 1996, second, in March 1995 – February 1997, 
and third, in March 1997 – April 1999 (hereafter referred to as first interview, second 
interview and third interview respectively). Likewise, two sets of data collected for the 
second cohort of immigrants in February 2000 – January 2001 and February 2001 – March 
2002 were also used in this analysis (hereafter referred to as first interview and second 
interview respectively).  
Remittances in this research are defined as the amounts of money sent to relatives and friends 
overseas. This is consistent with the only question about remittances asked in all interviews 
except the first interview in LSIA1, where the question asked about money sent to relatives 
overseas only. Money sent to friends abroad could be included in the answer to the second 
question about money sent to business associates or others which was asked in this interview. 
In order to avoid any misinterpretation and due to the small percentage of immigrants  who  
transferred monies to people other than their relatives
24
, only the answers to the first question 
are considered in the first interview. Likewise, to prevent any confusion between remittances 
and financial assets sent from Australia, it is assumed that financial assets sent overseas are 
for investment and other purposes different from providing financial assistance to family or 
friends. Financial assets in this research include funds, personal effects and capital 
equipment.  
Hence, the variables of interest were the probability that individuals transfer any amounts of 
money to relatives or friends abroad and the size of these amounts. The first dependent 
variable was created based on the answer to the question common to all interviews. The 
question asked if a respondent (or his/her spouse) remitted any amount of money to their 
relatives overseas since arrival or last interview. This variable is equal to 1 if they provided a 
positive answer and 0 otherwise. 
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 Only 1% of Primary Applicants in the first interview.  
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The remitted amount is reflected in three different ways in LSIA : 
 In the first two interviews of LSIA1, it is grouped into levels with 1 indicating zero, 2 
– an amount up to $8,000, 3 – an amount between $8,001 and $16,000, 4 – an amount 
in the range of $16,001 to $25,000, 5 – $25,001 to $35,000, 6 – $35,001 to $50,000, 
and 7 – an amount greater than $50,000.  
 In the third interview of LSIA1, the actual amount of remittances is recorded.  
 In both interviews in LSIA2, the actual amount is rounded to the nearest thousand.  
These different classifications of remittances in LSIA can be an impediment to the panel data 
estimates using LSIA1 and to the comparison of the results obtained using data from each of 
the two surveys. As a solution, the actual amount of remittances from the third interview of 
LSIA1 was grouped into levels to enable panel data estimates for the combined first, second 
and third interviews data with an ordered dependent variable model. Alternatively, the 
midpoints of the groupings in each level of remittances recorded during the first and second 
interview of LSIA1 were combined with the third interview data to enable the application of 
a linear panel data model. These could then also be compared with the panel data estimates 
from LSIA2, albeit with the rounded amounts used in the latter. Likewise, for the purpose of 
comparison, these rounded amounts in LSIA2 were also grouped into levels to allow the 
application of the ordered dependent variable model and comparison with the similar panel 
data estimates of LSIA1.  
Therefore, three dependent variables were used in the research reported in this chapter: 
1. binary variable which is equal to 1 if any money is sent to relatives or friends 
overseas and 0 otherwise; 
2. remitted amount expressed in levels from 1 to 7 with 1 representing zero amount and 
7 – higher than $50,000; 
3. actual remitted amount (includes midpoints of remittances levels in first and second 
interviews in LSIA1, and remitted amounts rounded to the nearest thousand in 
LSIA2). 
As suggested by Brown (1997), the variables affecting remittance behaviour can be classified 
as: demand-side, supply-side, motivational factors and the duration of a migrant’s absence 
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from the home country. The duration of stay in Australia or absence from the home country is 
not considered important due to the fact that all surveyed immigrants arrived shortly before 
the start of each survey. Respondents from the first survey were first interviewed from March 
1994 to February 1996, which was about six months since their arrival. Likewise, the second 
cohort was first surveyed five months after their arrival, during the period February 2000 to 
January 2001. 
The behavioural variables used in the research by Brown (1997) were: individuals’ opinion 
on whether their parents are poor; their intention to return home for both under the age of 55 
and retired respondents; whether they expect to inherit assets from their parents overseas; 
whether they own land or non-land assets in their former countries; whether they received 
financial assistance for migration from relatives overseas; and the respondents’ level of 
education. Due to the limitations of the coverage of the LSIA survey, only two variables of 
this kind were included: indications of respondents’ intentions to return to their home 
countries or emigrate from Australia to other countries permanently; and the level of their 
education before migration. The first variable is expected to have a positive effect on 
remittances by encouraging savings outside Australia. Similarly, having a post-school 
education compared with the base case of having no post-school education, if positive and 
significant, could mean that money sent overseas is used for repayment of a loan taken for 
education.  
Compared to motivational variables, the supply-side factors were represented in a more 
comprehensive way. Brown (1997) used three supply-side variables: household annual 
income; assets held by the household; and the number of persons living in the household. 
Similarly, based on the availability of the LSIA data, the supply-side variables used in this 
research were: household annual income grouped into levels; the financial assets migrants 
arrived with, transferred to and transferred from Australia; and the number of household 
members. Additional variables were: information about age, gender, number of resident 
children, employment status and marital status; and whether the respondent owns a home, 
rents or lives rent-free. These variables might have indirect supply-side impacts through their 
effects on the ability to accumulate funds.  
Demand-side variables used by Brown (1997) included: whether a household head has 
parents or spouse in the country of origin; whether a household head received guests to stay 
during the preceding 12 months; and whether a household head migrated to Australia via a 
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third country. Although the questions about staying guests and migration via a third country 
were not asked during the surveys, fortunately, the LSIA surveys data have information about 
relatives overseas including children, spouse, parents  and siblings. Additional demand-side 
variables specific to this research included the continent of origin
25
, which can also represent 
the degree of remoteness from the original home community, and the visa category used by 
the Primary Applicant to enter Australia. The second variable can account for the situation in 
the migrant’s home country and the motives for migration. The information about visa type is 
also useful for testing the hypothesis about the relationship between remittances and 
immigration policies. Consistent with other studies (Chiswick & Miller 2004), there are five 
major visa categories: Family, Humanitarian, Skilled-Independent, Skilled-Sponsored and 
Skilled-Business. The description of these categories is presented in Table 4.1 and the 
complete list of variables used is presented in Table C.1 in Appendix C. 
4.4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Only data collected for the 5,192 Primary Applicants for Australian residency (hereafter 
referred to as Primary Applicants) in LSIA1 and the 3,118 Primary Applicants in LSIA2 were 
used due to the limited number of questions addressed to other respondents. The definition 
used in LSIA describes Primary Applicants as persons upon whom the approval to immigrate 
to Australia was based. Their basic characteristics are described in Table 4.3.  
The average age of new migrants in both groups is 36 to 37, with the majority being in a 
committed relationship. There are slightly more men than women, and less than half the 
respondents are employed. Although there are three to four people on average in each 
household, not all households have resident children. They rely on the financial assets they 
arrived with or transferred to Australia after migration with their average annual income 
being less than $50,000. More than a third of Primary Applicants have a higher education but 
the second biggest group has no post-school qualification. Due to the fact that they are new to 
the country, in more than half the cases, Primary Applicants rent accommodation. Almost 
half the sample is represented by immigrants from Asia, followed by just above 30 per cent 
from Europe. Most of the immigrants have relatives overseas but only 2 per cent have left 
their spouses and 10–11 per cent have left children in their home countries.  
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 Based on the former country of residence of Primary Applicant. Using continents based on the countries of 
birth provided similar results. 
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Despite there being only five to six years difference between the arrivals of these two cohorts, 
there are significant variations in their responses. In the second survey, there are more female 
respondents, a higher percentage of married individuals and a higher employment rate for 
participants. They are also financially better off with a higher household income and a greater 
value of assets arrived with and transferred to Australia post-migration. The average values of 
remitted amounts (around $2000) and financial assets (around $200) transferred out of 
Australia do not differ between the two cohorts. Considering the level of inflation between 
the two periods, the real values of these outward transfers carried out by later arrivals could 
even be lower than for the first cohort. Reflecting this trend, the percentage of those who 
remit was reduced from 19 to 13 per cent in the second cohort. Despite that, only 20 per cent 
of immigrants in this cohort could afford their own housing compared to 22 per cent of those 
in the first group. There are slightly different patterns of immigrants in both groups, with an 
increased percentage of immigrants from Pacific Island countries from 2 to 4 per cent 
accompanied by a decrease from 5 to 2 per cent in the percentage of migrants from South 
America.  
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Table 4.3 Characteristics of Primary Applicants for Australian residency, LSIA1 and 
LSIA2 (combined data) 
Characteristics 1993-1995 arrivals 1999-2000 arrivals 
Age 35.86 36.83*** 
 (11.58) (13.11) 
% male 57.19 53.95*** 
% married (or de-facto) 61.65 63.37** 
% employed 41.42 44.93*** 
Number of children 0.74 0.67*** 
 (1.05) (1.06) 
Number of residents in household 3.50 3.56** 
 (1.72) (1.75) 
% planning to leave Australia permanently 4.79 1.53*** 
   
Median annual household income category $25,001-$35,000 $35,001-$50,000*** 
   
Financial assets arrived with($)  29,945     40,432***    
 (109,649) (135,449) 
Financial assets transferred to AUS ($)  9,828     16,095***  
 (90,013) (141,440) 
Financial assets transferred from AUS ($)  192     263     
 (3,676) (4,317) 
Level of highest education achieved (%)   
No post-school qualification 33.46 35.41*** 
Bachelor degree or higher 38.54 38.39 
Other post-school qualification 28.00 26.20*** 
Housing arrangements (%)   
Own /pay mortgage 22.16 19.79*** 
Rent 64.50 59.14*** 
Live rent free 13.33 21.07*** 
Continent of origin (%):   
Asia 48.00 47.08 
Africa 8.96 9.17 
North America 5.29 5.16 
South America 4.71 2.47*** 
Europe 30.76 32.26** 
Oceania (excl. Australia) a 2.29 3.85*** 
% of those who remit 19.10 13.00*** 
Amount of remittances ($) for those who remitb 1,999 2,008 
 (3,721) (11,908) 
Visa category (%)   
Skilled - Independent 16.41 12.16*** 
Skilled - Sponsored 14.98 09.20*** 
Skilled - Business  10.32 11.10* 
Humanitarian 16.01 17.90*** 
Family 42.28 49.65*** 
Have relatives overseas (%)   
Spouse 2.32 2.08 
Children 10.19 11.45*** 
Parents 81.44 78.22*** 
Brothers and sisters 89.04 85.82*** 
Number of individuals 15,576 6,236 
 
Notes: Mean values are reported unless otherwise stated. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. The sample is limited to the Australian 
immigrants who were Primary Applicants for Australian Residency and who are aged 15 or older. *** indicates a significant difference 
between cohorts at at least the 1% level, ** at at least the 5 % level 0.05, * at at least the 10% level, when mean-comparison t-test is used. 
a Includes Primary Applicants for Australian visas who were born in Australia but whose former country of residence is different from 
Australia.  
b Due to a lack of data on actual remitted amount during 1st and 2nd interview in LSIA2, it is calculated using midpoints of recorded 
remittances levels. 
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Likewise, possibly following the Review of the Independent and Skilled-Australian Linked 
Categories in 1999 by the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (Hawthorne 
2005), there was a change in the distribution of different visa groups. The goal of this Review 
was to evaluate the effectiveness of the points test through modifications such as the rigorous 
expansion of pre-migration English language testing and mandatory qualification assessment. 
Hence, it is likely that at the start of the reform, the number of Primary Applicants from 
the LSIA under the Skilled-Independent and Skilled-Sponsored categories, which are subject 
to points testing, decreased, unlike Primary Applicants from the Family, Business and 
Humanitarian visa streams, whose numbers even increased  
Following Chiswick and Miller (2004) and due to the Skilled-Independent Visa category 
being the biggest group among the two points-tested categories, this category was used as a 
benchmark group for visa categories in the estimations that follow. Since under points 
testing, additional points are awarded for Australian sponsorship for the Skilled-Sponsored 
category only, applicants for Skilled-Independent Visas are subjected to tighter entry 
requirements and therefore, a higher proportion of change in this category could be attributed 
to the changes in the immigration laws.   
The next sub-section presents the models used for the analysis of remittances. The analysis of 
factors affecting the amounts remitted by Australian immigrants was based on two sequential 
and possibly interrelated decisions faced by individuals: first, whether or not to send money 
overseas and second, how much money to send. There are different approaches to analysing 
these decisions but the most frequently used are the two-part model, the Tobit model and the 
Heckman two-step model.  
4.4.3 Models 
Three different models were considered for the estimation of the remitting behaviour of 
Australian immigrants. All models were estimated using STATA version 11.  
The first model was based on the assumption that the amount that immigrants decide to remit 
is independent of their decision whether to send any money overseas or not. In this case, 
immigrants’ probability of remitting could be estimated by using a probit model, and the 
remitted amount could be estimated by running either an ordered dependent model or a linear 
panel model only for those individuals who participated in the remitting process.  
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In the first stage, the dependent variable was the binary variable which is equal to 1 if a 
respondent sent any money overseas since migration to Australia or last survey, and 0 
otherwise. Hence, the probability that an individual transfers money overseas was described 
by the following probit model:  
)()0Pr(),|1Pr( itititiit XXXRemit    , (4.1) 
where t=1,..,3 for LSIA1 and t=1,2 for LSIA2; 
in addition,  (εit) is the probit function, which is the standard normal cumulative distribution 
function; Remitit is the money sent overseas by an immigrant i which is equal to 1 if Primary 
Applicant or his/her partner sent any money to relatives or friends overseas, and 0 otherwise; 
Xit includes individual controls such as age, income and education as well as respondents’ 
type of visa used to migrate to Australia. 
In the second stage, an ordered probit model was applied to the remittances grouped into 
levels and a linear panel data model was applied to the actual amount of remittances. The 
ordered dependent variable, computed as described earlier, was the amount of remittances 
measured on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 representing no payments and 7 more than $50,000 
sent overseas. These levels of remitted amount were analysed by the ordered probit model 
with normal distribution:  
)(1),,|Pr( 11 tiMitit XXMLevel    ,   (4.2) 
where Levelit represents levels of remitted amount recorded by an immigrant i or his/her 
partner in period t with M=1,...,7 and t=1,..,3 for LSIA1 and t=1,2 for LSIA2; M are the 
threshold amounts that reflect the range for each level of remitted amounts 
)000,50$,...,000,8$,0( 621   ; Xit , as before, includes individual controls.  
As discussed, a remitted amount can be also expressed by a continuous function. A linear 
panel data model could be applied to the subsample consisting of remitting individuals, with 
the same independent variables as in the first and second model: 
 ititiit XAmount    ,      (4.3) 
where t=1,..,3 for LSIA1 and t=1,2 for LSIA2, 
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and Amountit is the amount of money sent overseas by an immigrant i or his/her partner in 
period t and the independent variables are the same as above. 
Since the independent variables might not account for all personal characteristics, a fixed 
effects estimator was used to remove unobserved effects as part of linear panel data model 
estimation. However, time-constant variables such as gender, education or continent of 
former country of residence were then removed with the unobserved effects. Hence, the 
random effects method was also applied under the assumption that unobserved effects are not 
correlated with the explanatory variables (Wooldridge 2002a).  
This approach of running a separate probit or logit model for the whole sample followed by a 
regression for a reduced subsample is referred to in the literature as the two-part model 
(Manning, Duan & Rogers 1987). Even though this was considered the most straightforward 
approach in a number of studies (Duan et al. 1983; Manning, Duan & Rogers 1987; Vaara & 
Matero 2011), there are some concerns about its application. These concerns could be 
justified because the dependent variable in the second part, which, in this case, is the amount 
of remittances, contains a large number of item non-responses and is only available for a 
subset of the sample. This is a sample selection problem sometimes called incidental 
truncation, as suggested by Wooldridge (2002b), because the remitted amount is missing as a 
result of the outcome binary variable representing the probability to remit by immigrants. 
Thus, whether or not the remitted amount is observed depends on the individual’s decision to 
remit. Hence, using a linear regression model in this context, as argued by Brown (1997), 
leads to biased and inconsistent estimates. The effect of immigrants’ socio-demographic 
characteristics on their remitted amount might be underestimated since the subsample of 
those who remit is underrepresentative of the immigrant population.  
As a solution to the sample selection problem, the literature has suggested the application of 
sample selection models which can be broadly classified as the Tobit model and the Heckman 
selection model. In the standard Tobit model, the decision to remit and the decision of how 
much to remit are generated through the same mechanism using data on both remitting and 
non-remitting migrants. Hence, as an alternative to the two-part model, some researchers 
(Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo 2006; Brown 1997) have applied the Tobit model to the 
assessment of both the probability of a migrant being a remitter and the remitted amount, 
which is described as below:  
138 
itiit XitAmount  
*
, 
where  


 
otherwise,0
0 if,* ititiit
it
XAmountAmount 
  ,   (4.4) 
and t=1,..,3 for LSIA1 and t=1,2 for LSIA2. 
As before, Amountit is the amount of money sent overseas by an immigrant i or his/her partner 
in period t; Xit, includes individual controls; and error term it is assumed to be a normal 
random variable with mean zero and variance
2 .  
Brown (1997) asserted that in the Tobit model each regressor has the same effect on the 
probability of a migrant being a remitter and on the level of remittances, but this might not be 
a realistic assumption. As argued by Vaara and Matero (2011), there might be a problem with 
the Tobit approach especially when the actual effects of independent variables on probability 
to remit and the actual amount are of the opposite sign. For example, the stochastic process 
that represents the individual decision to remit may greatly differ from the one that describes 
the decision about how much to transfer (Sinning 2011). Similarly, Vaara and Matero (2011) 
presented another reason to reject the Tobit model, asserting that this model is appropriate 
only if the main dependent variable – in this research the amount of remittances – contains 
missing or negative values censored to zero.  
Another selection model, the Heckman model, has also been widely employed in the research 
(Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo 2006; Jang 2006; Vaara & Matero 2011). Although it can be 
estimated by a two-step procedure or Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE), the Heckman 
two-step procedure was applied in this study. The primary reason was that, despite MLE 
being more efficient under stronger assumptions than the more general two-step procedure, it 
is less robust and may have problems with convergence (Wooldridge 2002b). Unlike the 
Tobit model, the Heckman two-step procedure, according to Vaara and Matero (2011), has 
one set of variables for selection equation and a second set for the outcome equation. As 
Vaara and Matero also argued, the Heckman two-step model presumes two interdependent 
decisions, unlike the Tobit model with a single decision procedure or the two-part model with 
two independent decisions.  
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Following other studies (Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo 2006; Jang 2006; Vaara & Matero 2011), 
the Heckman two-step estimates were obtained by applying first a probit model (4.1) and 
subsequently a linear panel data model (4.3). A slightly different set of covariates was used at 
the second step, excluding at least one independent variable used in the first step but 
including a sample correction bias term. This term is known as the Inverse Mills ratio  , or 
as the hazard rate in reliability theory (Heckman 1976), and is commonly applied to correct 
the selection bias which can be viewed as an omitted variable problem in the selected sample 
(Wooldridge 2002b). People who choose to remit may differ in some ways from those who 
do not and, if the variable controlling for these factors is omitted at the selection stage, it 
could produce biased estimates for the remitted amount. The Inverse Mills ratio controls for 
these unmeasured characteristics and, according to Wooldridge (2002b), it is equal to the 
probability density function over the cumulative distribution function of a distribution 
obtained after running the probit model:   
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At the outcome stage, this ratio was included as an independent variable in a linear regression 
described by model (4.3). Because this factor reflects the effect of all unmeasured 
characteristics related to an immigrant’s decision to remit, the coefficient on the Mills ratio 
catches the part of this effect related to the remitted amount. 
A necessary condition for applying the Heckman procedure, as pointed out by Sartori (2003), 
is that there should be at least one independent variable which influences an immigrant’s 
decision to remit but not the size of these remittances. The absence of such a variable may 
cause problems of multicollinearity and dubious estimates. It is assumed that the amount of 
the remittances is more dependent on the supply-side factors, such as income and being 
employed, or motivational factors, such as a respondent’s intention to return to their home 
country. Hence, information about relatives left overseas, which represents the demand-side 
factor, was included only in the estimation of the probability of remitting but not in the 
remitted amount.  
If the assumption is proved false, however, this can lead to an incorrect exclusion choice of 
variables at the outcome stage. Likewise, a reliance on normality and homoskedasticity in 
latent variables can lead to the incorrect acceptance of selection models. Therefore, the 
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conclusion drawn from the Heckman model estimates is sensitive to the model specification 
and to the choice of independent variables (Vaara & Matero 2011). Further undermining the 
appropriateness of the Heckman model, Sartori (2003) argued that the ‘extra’ explanatory 
factor that affects the selection equation, but not outcome equation, often does not exist. 
There is no single solution to this debate on the most appropriate model, and the choice is 
highly case specific. Hence, similarly to the usage by Vaara and Matero (2011), all three 
approaches are presented and compared in the following Empirical Results section. All 
estimates in this section are applied to the panel data from LSIA1 and LSIA2 separately and 
the results are then compared with each other. The Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square statistic or 
Wald Chi-Square statisic was used to test whether at least one of the regression coefficients 
in the model was not equal to zero and all models passed one or the other test.   
4.5 Empirical results 
The findings of the analysis carried out in this chapter are grouped by the applied model and 
presented below.  
4.5.1 Two-part model 
The factors affecting remittances sent by recent immigrants to their home countries were first 
investigated by using the two-part model. The approach began with the analysis of the 
likelihood that recent immigrants remit money overseas by applying probit model (4.1) to the 
panel data from LSIA1 and LSIA2.  
As can be seen in Table 4.4, in both cohorts a higher income increases, but a higher value of 
financial assets arrived with in Australia decreases, the probability of remitting by these 
immigrants. While the first effect is expected, the negative effect from bringing more 
financial assets to Australia can indicate that the owners of these assets are wealthy 
individuals whose families in their home countries need less financial assistance. The 
probability of remitting increases for young individuals as they grow older with the turning 
point at the age of 32 in LSIA1 and 26 in LSIA2, when it starts to decrease. Obtaining a post-
school qualification before migration does not imply a higher probability of remitting, as 
expected. On the contrary, it has a negative effect on the probability of immigrants sending 
money overseas, possibly also reflecting that families of tertiary-educated individuals have a 
higher level of wealth in their home countries. Not surprisingly, being employed means a 
higher chance of an individual remitting some money to their home country. Living rent-free, 
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on the contrary, implies a lower likelihood of these transfers, which could be a sign of an 
individual’s poor financial situation with an inability to buy a house or pay rent. 
Representatives of both cohorts are more likely to remit if they have children overseas.  
Table 4.4 Results of the probit model predicting determinants of immigrants' decision 
to remit money overseas, LSIA1 and LSIA2 (panel data) 
 
Variables 
1993–1995 
arrivals 
1999–2000 
arrivals Variables 
1993–1995 
arrivals 
1999–2000 
arrivals 
   Housing arrangements 
(Own/Pay mortgage=base case): 
Income 0.116*** 0.0566** Rent -0.115** -0.0514 
 (0.0176) (0.0284)  (0.0527) (0.0941) 
Fin. assets arrived with -0.0152*** -0.0115** Rent free -0.247*** -0.292** 
 (0.00338) (0.00449)  (0.0944) (0.149) 
Fin. assets transferred to 
AUS 
-0.0155*** -0.00681 Continents (Oceania (excl. Australia)=base case): 
 
 (0.00513) (0.00567) Asia 0.115* -0.288* 
Fin. assets transferred 
from AUS 
0.00924 0.0750**  (0.0602) (0.168) 
 (0.0262) (0.0337) Africa -0.212** -0.266 
Age 0.0256* 0.0353  (0.0999) (0.197) 
 (0.0147) (0.0233) North America -0.261** -1.076*** 
Age squared -0.000416** -0.000667**  (0.125) (0.245) 
 (0.000175) (0.000282) South America -0.0864 -0.0472 
Gender (1 if male) 0.0554 -0.0475  (0.131) (0.261) 
 (0.0528) (0.0816) Europe -0.451*** -0.771*** 
No. of children 0.0962*** 0.0277  (0.0696) (0.180) 
 (0.0292) (0.0480) Visa Category (Skilled - Independent=base case) 
No. of persons -0.0636*** -0.0158    
 (0.0202) (0.0318) Skilled - Sponsored -0.0339 0.111 
Plan to leave 0.138 0.306  (0.0822) (0.151) 
 (0.0893) (0.251) Skilled - Business  -0.345*** -0.340** 
Marital status (Married=base case):  (0.101) (0.170) 
Previously married 0.0328 -0.177 Humanitarian 0.638*** 0.546*** 
 (0.0854) (0.154)  (0.0893) (0.161) 
Never been married -0.143** -0.152 Family -0.0266 0.139 
 (0.0696) (0.111)  (0.0787) (0.131) 
Level of highest education (No post-school 
qualification=base case): 
Relatives overseas:   
Bachelor degree or higher -0.140** -0.158 Spouse 0.134 -0.129 
 (0.0648) (0.101)  (0.137) (0.269) 
Other post-school  -0.150** -0.213** Children 0.543*** 0.642*** 
qualification (0.0647) (0.100)  (0.0826) (0.143) 
   Parents 0.236*** 0.0255 
Employment status (Employed=base case):  (0.0699) (0.125) 
Unemployed -0.673*** -0.756*** Brothers and sisters 0.171** 0.0515 
 (0.0705) (0.151)  (0.0819) (0.135) 
Not in labour force -0.500*** -0.711*** Constant -1.750*** -1.425*** 
 (0.0613) (0.105)  (0.342) (0.549) 
   Observations 10302 4353 
   Log likelihood -4520 -1534 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is probability of remitting. In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also 
include Australian state of residence controls, which are not reported due to low significance. The sample is limited to 
Primary Applicants for Australian Residency aged 15 or older who have non-missing data on former country of residence. 
Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. *** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
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Migrants from North America and Europe have a lower propensity to remit than the base case 
of Oceania. At the same time, the probability of remitting by immigrants from the base group 
is not much different from that of immigrants from South America. Since Europe is mostly 
represented by immigrants from developed countries such as United Kingdom, Greece, Italy 
and Germany, and North American immigrants mostly come from the US and Canada, this 
suggests that distance does not play a role in decisions to remit. These decisions are affected 
rather by the level of prosperity of immigrants’ home countries which, in turn, influences 
their reason for migration (most immigrants from Europe and North America migrate for 
family unification or as skilled migrants). This is supported in LSIA1 by the higher remitting 
probability of Asian immigrants than immigrants from Oceania. The negative effect of 
originating from Asia in the second cohort could be attributed to the higher percentage of 
immigrants from China, the main source of Skilled-Independent migrants from Asia (17 per 
cent in LSIA2). The lower remitting probability of African immigrants compared to the base 
group could be due to the dominance of migrants from South Africa (around 40 per cent in 
both cohorts) who migrated only under Skilled and Family categories. However, in the 
second cohort this negative effect was counterbalanced by the increase in the number of 
refugees from 24 to 36 per cent of the overall intake from Africa.  
Cohort differences are reflected in the variation between their coefficients. For example, the 
negative effect of having financial assets transferred to Australia is evident only for the first 
cohort and the positive effect of having financial assets transferred from Australia is evident 
only for the second cohort. The negative effect of having an additional adult in the household 
(contrasting with the positive effect of an additional child) is evident only for the first cohort. 
Likewise, being single without any previous relationships, having a higher degree and paying 
rent compared to the benchmark cases means a lower likelihood to remit for Primary 
Applicants from the first cohort only. The existence of a positive effect of having parents, 
brothers or sisters overseas in the first cohort, but not in the second, could be due a higher 
percentage of migrants who have parents, brothers or sisters overseas in the former group.  
Similar visa coefficients for the two cohorts reveal that immigration policies in the late 1990s 
did not greatly affect immigrants’ probability to remit. For example, in both cohorts, Business 
Visa holders are less likely, and those who arrived under Humanitarian programs are more 
likely, to send some money overseas compared to the benchmark group of Independent Visa 
holders. This could be attributed to the individuals under Business Visa having higher skills 
and accordingly better financial situations of their families in the home country compared to 
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the applicants for the Independent Visa. In contrast, the refugee status of migrants who were 
forced to leave their home countries presumes a higher level of financial difficulty than for 
those who consciously applied for Australian residency based on their abilities and skills.    
The next stage of the analysis involved an assessment of the amount remitted by the Primary 
Applicants. As mentioned before, this could be done in two ways: by using the ordered probit 
model (4.2) or by applying the linear panel data model (4.3) depending on the description of 
the transferred amount. Although originally remittances in various interviews in LSIA1 and 
LSIA2 were described either in actual amounts or in levels, they were either grouped into 
levels or recorded as the midpoints of the groupings to enable the panel data estimates and the 
comparison between the two cohorts.  
There are some similarities in the factors affecting the remitted amount between the two 
cohorts, as can be seen from Table 4.5. For example, in both cohorts being employed and 
having a higher income are associated with a higher level of remitted amount. These factors 
are also positively associated with the probability of remitting by Australian immigrants, as 
discussed earlier. Contrary to the previous estimates though, having a higher value of 
financial assets, either brought when migrating or subsequently sent from Australia, is 
associated with higher amounts remitted by immigrants from LSIA1 and LSIA2. This 
suggests that those respondents who remit already have sufficient liquid assets, and the higher 
value of these assets allows them to conduct financial transactions on a greater scale. 
Distance does not influence the size of remittances, and Asian migrants who remit also send 
more money than immigrants from the Pacific Islands. A longer stay in Australia, on the 
other hand, is positively associated with the amounts remitted by immigrants in both cohorts, 
probably owing to their initial settling-in expenses and unclear employment prospects in the 
beginning. Having children overseas means not only a higher likelihood of remitting but also 
transactions of a higher value. This is not the case for having other relatives abroad.  
At the same time, these estimates show significant differences between cohorts. For example, 
immigrants from South America in the later survey, unlike in the first survey, remit higher 
amounts than the base category of immigrants from the Pacific Islands. Likewise, immigrants 
from North America transfer higher amounts than immigrants from the Pacific Islands, but 
only in the second cohort. On the other hand, there are a number of parameters, such as 
gender, number of household members, marital status and paying rent as opposed to owing a 
house, which affect the remitted amount by immigrants from the first cohort but not from the 
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second. In contrast with the second survey, gender plays a significant role in the decision 
about how much to remit in LSIA1, with male Primary Applicants remitting higher amounts 
than their female counterparts. Similarly, a higher number of household members is 
associated with a lower amount of financial help to relatives and friends of Primary 
Applicants from LSIA1, but not from LSIA2. Even though single applicants from the first 
cohort who have never been married have a lower probability of sending some money 
overseas, they send higher amounts than married individuals. Likewise, the first-cohort 
individuals with post-school qualifications obtained before arrival in Australia who transfer 
money overseas send more than their less educated counterparts, reflecting a lower risk of 
redundancy and higher earning potential. Similarly, living rent free compared to owing a 
house by immigrants from the first cohort allows them to remit higher amounts, despite being 
negatively correlated with the likelihood of their remitting overseas.  
Respondents under Skilled-Sponsored, Humanitarian and Family Visas in both surveys send 
less than the benchmark group of Independent Visa holders. Indeed, Humanitarian Visa 
holders, who are more likely to remit than Independent Visa holders, have fewer 
qualifications and lower chances of finding a secure job than skilled migrants. Likewise, 
those who migrated to reunite with their families were not assessed based on their 
employability and hence might not have the skills required in the Australian labour market. 
Applicants for a Skilled Visa who had an Australian family member sponsoring them needed 
lower point scores, allowing individuals less qualified than independent applicants to pass the 
test.  
Compared to Independent Visa holders in the first cohort, only respondents in the Business 
Visa category send higher amounts, even though they are less likely to remit. The fact that 
this is not applicable to the second cohort could either be attributable to cohort differences or 
could reflect the change in the financial situation of the Skilled-Independent group due to the 
amendments to the points test. The higher requirements for a pass mark narrow the selection 
of applicants to more qualified individuals who are comparable in their skills with Business 
Visa holders and who could potentially earn a similar income.  
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Table 4.5 Results of the ordered probit model predicting factors affecting the amounts 
immigrants remit overseas, LSIA1 and LSIA2 (panel data) 
 
Variables 
 
1993-1995 
arrivals 
1999-2000 
arrivals 
 1993-1995 
arrivals 
1999-2000 
arrivals 
   Continents (Oceania (excl. Australia)=base case): 
Income 0.131*** 0.138** Asia 0.121* 0.616** 
 (0.0258) (0.0577)  (0.0730) (0.265) 
Fin. assets arrived with 0.00768*
* 
0.0144** Africa -0.0294 0.463 
 (0.00378) (0.00673)  (0.129) (0.320) 
Fin. assets transferred to 
AUS 
0.0216**
* 
0.0123 North America -0.254 0.789* 
 (0.00736) (0.00929)  (0.168) (0.411) 
Fin. assets transferred from 
AUS 
0.592*** 1.121*** South America -0.152 1.147*** 
 (0.101) (0.167)  (0.177) (0.389) 
Age -0.0248 0.0356 Europe -0.109 0.396 
 (0.0225) (0.0455)  (0.0906) (0.301) 
Age squared 0.000329 -0.000464 Visa Category (Skilled-Independent=base case): 
 (0.000277
) 
(0.000572)    
Gender (1 if male) 0.220*** 0.0895 Skilled - Sponsored -0.344*** -0.473** 
 (0.0697) (0.146)  (0.0980) (0.227) 
No. of children -0.00548 -0.0843 Skilled - Business 0.208* 0.294 
 (0.0400) (0.0892)  (0.121) (0.253) 
No. of persons -0.0642** -0.0330 Humanitarian -0.216** -0.899*** 
 (0.0287) (0.0536)  (0.104) (0.281) 
Plan to leave 0.0708 0.581 Family -0.218** -0.601*** 
 (0.124) (0.382)  (0.0975) (0.219) 
Marital status (Married=base case): Relatives overseas:   
Previously married 0.0372 0.394 Spouse 0.247 -0.154 
 (0.119) (0.271)  (0.169) (0.508) 
Never been married 0.287*** 0.291 Children 0.380*** 0.680*** 
 (0.0902) (0.185)  (0.105) (0.225) 
Level of highest education 
(No post-school qualification=base case): 
Parents 0.133 -0.111 
Bachelor degree or higher 0.156* 0.0332  (0.101) (0.233) 
 (0.0836) (0.180) Brothers and sisters 0.203 0.119 
Other post-school  0.310*** -0.113  (0.124) (0.261) 
qualification (0.0827) (0.183)    
Employment status (Employed=base case): Year1=1 for 2
nd
 interview  0.369*** 0.427*** 
Unemployed -0.306*** -0.528  (0.102) (0.145) 
 (0.116) (0.353) Year2=1 for 3
rd
 interview 0.869***  
Not in labour force -0.199** -0.520***  (0.104)  
 (0.0888) (0.199)    
Housing arrangements(Own/Pay mortgage=base case): Log likelihood -1556 -324.3 
Rent 0.0172 0.0198 Pseudo R -squared 0.133 0.252 
 (0.0734) (0.173)    
Rent free 0.267* 0.124    
 (0.138) (0.283) Observations 2009 580 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is amount of money sent overseas in levels. In addition to the coefficients reported above, the 
regressions also include Australian state of residence controls, which are not reported due to low significance. The sample is 
limited to Primary Applicants for Australian Residency aged 15 or older who have non-missing data on former country of 
residence. Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. *** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
Another way to estimate the second stage of the two-part model would be to apply model 
(4.3) to the actual amount of remittances. As discussed, both random and fixed effects 
estimators were applied to the panel datasets from LSIA1 and LSIA2. Due to their time-
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constant nature, however, most of the variables including those crucial for this research, such 
as categories of arrival visas, were dropped when the fixed effects panel model was applied, 
as demonstrated in Table 4.6. Hence, only the random effects estimates are considered and 
discussed hereafter
26
.  
Table 4.6 reveals fewer significant determinants than Table 4.5. For example, only the value 
of financial assets transferred from Australia, being male, being never married compared to 
being in a committed relationship, and migrating from South America compared to migrating 
from the neighbouring Pacific countries have positive effects on the remitted amount in the 
second cohort. There is no effect from gender, marital status or originating from South 
America on the remitted amounts by immigrants from LSIA1, but these estimates have a few 
more significant parameters than those carried out using LSIA2. They include a higher 
income and having financial assets in Australia, both of which promote greater remittances. 
Additionally, having a post-school qualification below bachelor degree as opposed to having 
no qualifications increases the remitted amount by immigrants from the first cohort. Whereas 
being jobless compared to being employed means that they remit lower amounts. Age also 
has a negative effect for the first-cohort individuals aged under 33. Similarly, the negative 
effect of being sponsored by an Australian family member and the positive effect of having a 
spouse overseas on the size of remittances are evident only for immigrants in the first cohort. 
                                                 
26
 The signs and values of estimated coefficients available for fixed effects are consistent with those of the 
random effects model. This suggests that the unobserved effects problem may not be present. 
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Table 4.6 Results of the linear panel model predicting factors affecting the amounts 
immigrants remit overseas, LSIA1 and LSIA2  
 
Variables 
 
1993-1995 arrivals 1999-2000 arrivals  
 Random Effects Fixed Effects Random 
Effects 
Fixed Effects 
     
Income 0.0210*** 0.0230 0.0134 0.0148 
 (0.00731) (0.0150) (0.0167) (0.0183) 
Fin. assets arrived with 0.00648*** - 0.0113 - 
 (0.00140) - (0.00788) - 
Fin. assets transferred to AUS 0.0201*** 0.0414*** -0.0122 -0.0500** 
 (0.00236) (0.00469) (0.00977) (0.0195) 
Fi.n assets transferred from AUS 0.242*** 0.0934* 0.658*** 0.608*** 
 (0.0333) (0.0521) (0.0579) (0.0739) 
Age -0.00956 0.00886 -0.0107 -0.186** 
 (0.00662) (0.0439) (0.0368) (0.0878) 
Age squared 0.000146* 0.000664 0.000285 0.00305** 
 (0.000082) (0.000591) (0.000469) (0.00131) 
Gender 0.0144 - 0.273* - 
 (0.0212) - (0.141) - 
No. of children 0.00509 0.00357 0.0121 0.0605 
 (0.0115) (0.0326) (0.0346) (0.0409) 
No. of persons -0.0121 -0.0149 -0.0237 -0.0358** 
 (0.00823) (0.0184) (0.0157) (0.0165) 
Plan to leave -0.0115 -0.000535 0.00671 0.0582 
 (0.0356) (0.0697) (0.0838) (0.0913) 
Marital status (Married=base case):     
Previously married 0.0225 0.0347 -0.0414 -0.0544 
 (0.0350) (0.104) (0.0784) (0.0819) 
Never been married 0.0399 0.00631 -0.142* -0.213** 
 (0.0275) (0.0697) (0.0847) (0.0937) 
Level of highest education (No post-school qualification=base case):  
Bachelor degree or higher 0.0232 - 0.170 - 
 (0.0250) - (0.176) - 
Other post-school  0.0712*** - -0.0223 - 
qualification (0.0250) - (0.179) - 
     
Employment status (Employed=base case):  
Unemployed -0.0687** -0.00145 0.0274 0.0319 
 (0.0303) (0.0552) (0.0634) (0.0652) 
Not in labour force -0.0386 -0.0223 -0.0387 -0.0204 
 (0.0247) (0.0500) (0.0496) (0.0536) 
Housing arrangements (Own/Pay mortgage=base case):   
Rent -0.0507** -0.0270 -0.0275 -0.00936 
 (0.0212) (0.0473) (0.0694) (0.0800) 
Rent free -0.0380 0.0563 0.0277 0.0557 
 (0.0397) (0.0736) (0.0883) (0.102) 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 4.6 (continued) 
 
Variables 
 
1993-1995 arrivals 1999-2000 arrivals  
 Random Effects Fixed Effects Random 
Effects 
Fixed Effects 
Continents (Oceania (excl. Australia)=base case):   
Asia 0.0305 - 0.0622 - 
 (0.0225) - (0.258) - 
Africa -0.00455 - -0.0234 - 
 (0.0393) - (0.321) - 
North America -0.0631 - 0.0808 - 
 (0.0501) - (0.424) - 
South America -0.0206 - 1.521*** - 
 (0.0510) - (0.411) - 
Europe -0.0141 - 0.00551 - 
 (0.0277) - (0.288) - 
Visa Category (Skilled-Independent=base case):    
Skilled - Sponsored -0.0864*** - -0.104 - 
 (0.0317) - (0.259) - 
Skilled - Business 0.0631 - -0.0197 - 
 (0.0412) - (0.315) - 
Humanitarian -0.0215 - -0.133 - 
 (0.0326) - (0.258) - 
Family -0.0457 - 0.00593 - 
 (0.0312) - (0.229) - 
Relatives overseas:     
Spouse 0.156*** 0.0727 0.00339 - 
 (0.0498) (0.107) (0.462) - 
Children 0.0373 -0.0261 -0.165 - 
 (0.0314) (0.0880) (0.233) - 
Parents 0.0164 0.0327 0.159 - 
 (0.0289) (0.0677) (0.230) - 
Brothers and sisters 0.0274 -0.0641 -0.142 - 
 (0.0355) (0.0946) (0.258) - 
     
Constant 0.247* -0.987 0.0494 2.801* 
 (0.147) (0.837) (0.766) (1.455) 
R-squared (overall) 0.185 0.0332 0.141 0.0148 
R-squared (within) 0.120 0.211 0.655 0.703 
Observations 2009 2009 580 580 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the amount of money sent overseas. In addition to the coefficients reported above, the 
regressions also include Australian state of residence controls, which are not reported due to low significance. The sample is 
limited to Primary Applicants for Australian Residency aged 15 or older who have non-missing data on former country of 
residence. Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. *** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
A comparison of the outcomes from the ordered multinominal probit model and the linear 
panel model shows support for the former model. The ordered probit model has an advantage 
over the linear panel model in the number of significant coefficients influencing the remitted 
amount, which enables the presentation of a more realistic picture
27
. Besides, it is highly 
unlikely that parameters such as income and financial assets brought into Australia have no 
                                                 
27
 This lack of significance of coefficients in the linear panel model estimates could be caused by errors in 
variables due to using the midpoints of the grouping of remitted amounts in the first and second interviews of 
LSIA1 and by using rounded values in LSIA2. 
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influence on immigrants’ decisions about the size of remitted amounts. These factors, 
however, do not show any significance in the case of the linear panel model estimates using 
LSIA2 data. Thus, according to the results presented in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6, the ordered 
probit model produces more plausible estimates, at least for individuals from LSIA2.  
4.5.2 Tobit model 
Similar to the research by Brown (1997) and Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006), the 
determinants of migrants’ remittances were investigated by applying the Tobit model (4.4) to 
LSIA1 and LSIA2. Since the random effects model failed to converge when LSIA2 data were 
used, a fixed effects model was applied to the second cohort. Table 4.7 presents the results.  
In line with previous findings that higher income means both a higher likelihood of remitting 
and a higher remitted amount, the income coefficient from the Tobit estimate is positive and 
significant in both surveys. This also applies to being employed as opposed to being 
unemployed or not in the labour force. Marital status and education do not have a significant 
role when the decision to remit and the decision on how much to remit are taken 
simultaneously although they affect each decision individually. Young individuals remit 
more as they become older, reflecting a similar trend in the probability to remit. The turning 
point in the Tobit model in LSIA2 is the age of 33, seven years more than in the probit model 
analysis in Table 4.4, whereas the turning point in LSIA1 remains unchanged at the age of 
32. The effect of the development of the country of origin is also evident in this case. For 
example, immigrants from North America and Europe are less likely to remit than 
immigrants from less prosperous Pacific countries. As found earlier, the probability and the 
size of remittances from both cohorts are both higher when migrants have left their children 
in their home country. The results of the Tobit model also confirm the ordered probit model 
results, showing that immigrants tend to remit higher amounts with every additional year in 
Australia.  
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Table 4.7 Results of the Tobit model predicting factors affecting the remittances of 
immigrants, LSIA1 and LSIA2 (panel data) 
 
Variables 
1993-1995 
arrivals 
1999-2000 
arrivals  Variables 
1993-1995 
arrivals 
1999-2000 
arrivals  
   Continents (Oceania (excl. Australia)=base case): 
 Income 0.0499*** 0.128** Asia 0.0536** -0.113 
 (0.00673) (0.0538)  (0.0227) (0.273) 
Fin. assets arrived with -0.00385*** -0.00160 Africa -0.0691* -0.151 
 (0.00112) (0.00641)  (0.0378) (0.324) 
Fin. assets transferred to AUS -0.00105 -0.00922 North America -0.110** -0.875** 
 (0.00132) (0.00957)  (0.0478) (0.388) 
Fin. assets transferred from AUS 0.000884 0.182*** South America -0.0334 0.614 
 (0.00338) (0.0474)  (0.0502) (0.409) 
Age 0.00872 0.0950** Europe -0.155*** -0.888*** 
 (0.00560) (0.0424)  (0.0263) (0.295) 
Age squared -0.000137** -0.00146*** Visa Category (Independent=base case): 
 (0.0000662) (0.000521)    
Gender 0.0293 0.0943 Skilled - Sponsored -0.0416 -0.0627 
 (0.0201) (0.142)  (0.0311) (0.240) 
No. of children 0.0286** -0.0263 Skilled - Business -0.110*** -0.466* 
 (0.0112) (0.0896)  (0.0376) (0.271) 
No. of persons -0.0257*** -0.0632 Humanitarian 0.198*** -0.0186 
 (0.00781) (0.0622)  (0.0334) (0.272) 
Plan to leave 0.0493 0.318 Family -0.0361 -0.0891 
 (0.0343) (0.422)  (0.0298) (0.213) 
Marital status (Married=base case): Relatives overseas:   
Previously married 0.0285 -0.140 Spouse 0.128** -0.371 
 (0.0330) (0.280)  (0.0506) (0.474) 
Never been married -0.0385 -0.143 Children 0.221*** 1.065*** 
 (0.0265) (0.193)  (0.0311) (0.234) 
Level of highest education  
(No post-school qualification=base case): 
Parents 0.0905*** 0.0369 
Bachelor degree or higher -0.0374 -0.0755  (0.0270) (0.220) 
 (0.0246) (0.176) Brothers and sisters 0.0721** -0.0235 
Other post-school  -0.0230 -0.0808  (0.0318) (0.230) 
qualification (0.0245) (0.171)    
Employment status (Employed=base case): Year =1 for 2
nd interview (only 
for 1999-2001 arrivals) 
 1.034*** 
Unemployed -0.245*** -0.794***   (0.139) 
 (0.0276) (0.292) Constant -0.778*** -4.958*** 
Not in labour force -0.170*** -0.615***  (0.130) (1.004) 
 (0.0234) (0.184)    
Housing arrangements (Own/Pay mortgage=base case):    
Rent -0.0553*** 0.117 Log likelihood -3983 -1289 
 (0.0201) (0.164) Pseudo-R-squared  0.0871 
Rent free -0.0902** -0.0284    
 (0.0364) (0.273) Observations 10302 4353 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is money sent overseas. In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also 
include Australian state of residence controls, which are not reported due to low significance. The sample is limited to 
Primary Applicants for Australian Residency aged 15 or older who have non-missing data on country of origin. Standard 
errors are indicated in parentheses. *** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. Author’s robustness 
checks indicate that these estimations are not converged on the corner solutions at at least 1% level. 
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As before, there are more significant coefficients for estimates obtained using LSIA1 than 
using the later cohort data. For example, according to Table 4.7, every additional dollar of the 
financial assets immigrants from LSIA1 brought with them to the country decreases their 
probability of remitting as well as the remitted amount. The value of these assets, however, is 
not significant for immigrants from LSIA2 due to its opposite effects on  an immigrant’s 
decision to remit and their remitted amount as reflected in Tables 4.4 and 4.5, which could 
counterbalance each other. Surprisingly, the negative effect of having an additional resident 
child on an immigrant’s likelihood to remit in LSIA1 turned positive when the probability of 
remitting and remitted amounts are analysed simultaneously. This is not applicable to the 
number of residents in immigrant households in the same cohort as it negatively affects both 
an immigrant’s probability of remitting and their simultaneous decisions on whether to remit 
and how much to remit. Not owning a house decreases the propensity of immigrants in 
LSIA1, unlike in LSIA2, to remit as well as their remitted amounts. These results are similar 
to the results from the probit model, even though the ordered probit and linear panel model 
estimates reflect this effect only partially. Likewise, a strong negative effect of originating 
from Africa and a strong positive effect of originating from Asia on immigrants’ propensity 
to remit are evident only for immigrants from LSIA1. Having a spouse overseas, in this 
survey, affects the size of remittances but not the likelihood of remitting, and this effect is 
also evident in the Tobit model results. Having parents or siblings abroad also shows a 
positive influence in the Tobit model estimates for the first cohort, although having any 
relative of this kind positively affects their propensity to remit but not the amount.  
Although the negative effect of arriving on a Business Visa is present for both cohorts, a 
positive influence of entering Australia as refugee, compared to the benchmark group of 
independent applicants, does not influence the remitting decisions of LSIA2 immigrants. This 
positive effect, despite being present in the probabilities to remit of both groups, is less 
powerful for migrants from the second survey and could have been nullified by the negative 
effect on their remitted amount (Table 4.5) when both the probability and the amount are 
analysed simultaneously. The varying influence of a visa category on the remitting behaviour 
of immigrants arriving in Australia at different periods, as reflected in the Tobit model 
estimates, could also be attributed to the change in immigration laws.  
This model, however, might not be the best fit for the description of the remitting behaviour 
of Australian immigrants. As can be seen from Table 4.4 to Table 4.7, by using the Tobit 
model, it is possible to overlook some factors which could affect either the probability of 
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remitting or the remitted amount, but not both. Additionally, as in the case of financial assets 
transferred to Australia by LSIA1 immigrants, if the estimated coefficients in the probit 
model and in the ordered probit model (or the linear panel model) are of opposite signs, these 
effects can cancel each other. Even if they do not, the dominant effect might be misleading as 
it may conceal less prominent effects. These hidden effects may be significant for at least one 
decision-making process but not when both decisions are linked. The Heckman model, on the 
other hand, accounts for the difference in the factors affecting selection and outcome models 
while these two models are still related to each other.        
4.5.3 Heckman two-step model 
As discussed in the Data and Methodology section, the Heckman two-step procedure in this 
research involved first the estimation of the likelihood of remitting by Australian immigrants 
from LSIA1 and LSIA2 by applying model (4.1) to both samples separately. This allowed the 
estimate of the Inverse Mills ratio for both cohorts using formula (4.5), which could then be 
substituted into the linear panel model (4.3) and applied only to those immigrants from 
LSIA1 or LSIA2 who remitted at least some amount. Initially, information about relatives 
overseas was to be excluded from the outcome model to avoid multicollinearity and to 
generate credible estimates. However, Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 show that having a spouse 
overseas increases the remitted amounts by immigrants from LSIA1 and having children 
overseas increases the remitted amounts by both cohorts. These two variables, accordingly, 
were also included in the outcome stage; however, the variable of having children overseas 
did not show any significance and was dropped. Hence, only information about having a 
spouse overseas was included in the final estimates of the remitted amount. A single 
command in STATA allows the estimation of the Heckman two-step procedure, providing 
outcomes for both the selection and outcome stages which are presented in Table 4.8. 
The outcomes from the selection stage shown in Table 4.8 are very similar to the ones in 
Table 4.4 obtained by using the probit model (4.1), with a few exceptions. The first exception 
is that, unlike in the probit model, paying rent compared to owning a house in the Heckman 
model does not negatively affect the remitting probability for immigrants in the first cohort. 
The probability of remitting by immigrants from LSIA2, in turn, is not negatively associated 
with their living rent free. In contrast, plans by LSIA1 respondents to leave the country 
positively affect their likelihood of remitting only when the Heckman model is applied. 
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Likewise, men from LSIA1 are more likely to remit than women in the Heckman model 
estimates but not when this probability is estimated independently.  
Table 4.8 Results of the Heckman model predicting factors affecting the choice of 
participating and the choice of amounts immigrants remit overseas, LSIA1 and LSIA2 
(panel data) 
  1993-1995 arrivals 1999-2000 arrivals 
 
Variables 
 
Is money 
remitted 
Amount of 
money 
Is money 
remitted 
Amount of 
money 
     
Income 0.0796*** 0.0121 0.0400* 0.0424 
 (0.0127) (0.00829) (0.0209) (0.0487) 
Fin. assets arrived with -0.00980*** 0.00649*** -0.00866*** 0.00754 
 (0.00215) (0.00131) (0.00328) (0.00832) 
Fin. assets transferred to AUS -0.0121*** 0.0211*** -0.00637 0.00664 
 (0.00382) (0.00248) (0.00458) (0.0107) 
Fin. assets transferred from AUS 0.0108 0.260*** 0.0578** 0.827*** 
 (0.00949) (0.0334) (0.0254) (0.110) 
Age 0.0127 -0.0113* 0.0291* 0.0409 
 (0.00991) (0.00628) (0.0166) (0.0384) 
Age squared -0.000274** 0.000179** -0.000539*** -0.000452 
 (0.000119) (0.0000781) (0.000202) (0.000487) 
Gender (1 if male) 0.0573* 0.0175 -0.0281 0.217* 
 (0.0348) (0.0200) (0.0573) (0.125) 
No. of children 0.0608*** -0.00312 0.00762 -0.0746 
 (0.0205) (0.0115) (0.0344) (0.0693) 
No. of persons -0.0419*** -0.00666 -0.00102 0.0129 
 (0.0146) (0.00856) (0.0233) (0.0452) 
Plan to leave 0.126* -0.0260 0.272 0.0850 
 (0.0660) (0.0360) (0.190) (0.384) 
Marital status (Married=base case):   
Previously married -0.00000867 0.0215 -0.140 0.0799 
 (0.0608) (0.0334) (0.113) (0.245) 
Never been married -0.101** 0.0602** -0.109 -0.000576 
 (0.0482) (0.0272) (0.0785) (0.167) 
Level of highest education (No post-school qualification=base case):  
Bachelor degree or higher -0.111*** 0.0344 -0.103 0.184 
 (0.0419) (0.0238) (0.0701) (0.152) 
Other post-school  -0.118*** 0.0879*** -0.152** -0.0257 
qualification (0.0419) (0.0241) (0.0697) (0.165) 
Employment status (Employed=base case):    
Unemployed -0.507*** -0.0232 -0.566*** -0.238 
 (0.0525) (0.0384) (0.111) (0.330) 
Not in labour force -0.330*** -0.00340 -0.512*** -0.127 
 (0.0443) (0.0292) (0.0735) (0.247) 
Housing arrangements (Own/Pay mortgage=base case):   
Rent -0.0277 -0.0526** 0.0128 0.0520 
 (0.0381) (0.0211) (0.0692) (0.145) 
Rent free -0.140** -0.0363 -0.171 -0.00436 
 (0.0698) (0.0402) (0.109) (0.238) 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 4.8 (continued) 
  1993-1995 arrivals 1999-2000 arrivals 
 
Variables 
 
Is money 
remitted 
Amount of 
money 
Is money 
remitted 
Amount of 
money 
Continents (Oceania (excl. Australia)=base case): 
 
  
Asia 0.0859** 0.0210 -0.214* 0.0391 
 (0.0388) (0.0209) (0.115) (0.226) 
Africa -0.152** 0.0160 -0.187 -0.0293 
 (0.0644) (0.0365) (0.136) (0.265) 
North America -0.209*** -0.0422 -0.785*** -0.0838 
 (0.0812) (0.0469) (0.167) (0.433) 
South America -0.0839 -0.0102 -0.0180 1.298*** 
 (0.0859) (0.0479) (0.180) (0.341) 
Europe -0.331*** 0.0161 -0.553*** -0.140 
 (0.0448) (0.0301) (0.122) (0.316) 
Visa Category (Independent=base case): 
     Skilled - Sponsored -0.0193 -0.0848*** 0.0877 -0.0489 
 (0.0532) (0.0291) (0.104) (0.213) 
Skilled - Business  -0.239*** 0.0878** -0.252** -0.0755 
 (0.0654) (0.0390) (0.118) (0.277) 
Humanitarian 0.463*** -0.0642* 0.370*** 0.0828 
 (0.0576) (0.0370) (0.111) (0.272) 
Family -0.0302 -0.0376 0.0842 0.0929 
 (0.0513) (0.0288) (0.0907) (0.200) 
Relatives overseas:     
Spouse 0.0569 0.161*** -0.112 -0.0899 
 (0.0989) (0.0492) (0.190) (0.387) 
Children 0.521***  0.492***  
 (0.0575)  (0.0978)  
Parents 0.213***  0.0381  
 (0.0498)  (0.0883)  
Brothers and sisters 0.147**  0.0172  
 (0.0571)  (0.0939)  
     
Constant -1.245*** 0.486*** -1.165*** -1.534 
 (0.231) (0.168) (0.390) (1.166) 
     
Inv. Mills ratio  -0.133**  0.252 
  (0.0665)  (0.503) 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0822  0.0859  
Observations 10289 10289 4350 4350 
 
Notes: The dependent variables are the probability of remitting and the remitted amount. In addition to the coefficients 
reported above, the regressions also include Australian state of residence controls, which are not reported due to low 
significance. The sample is limited to Primary Applicants for Australian Residency aged 15 or older who have non-missing 
data on country of origin. Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. *** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * 
indicates p<=0.1. Author’s robustness checks indicate that these estimations are not converged on the corner solutions at at 
least 1% level.  
As for the outcome stage, reflecting the previously observed trend, there are more factors 
affecting the remitted amounts in the first cohort than in the second cohort. At the same time, 
the Heckman model estimates for the first cohort have fewer significant factors than the 
ordered probit estimates of their remitted amounts reported in Table 4.5. For example, even 
though a U-shaped effect of age with the turning point at the age of 32 and a negative effect 
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of paying rent as opposed to owning a house are detected using the Heckman model but not 
the ordered probit model, a number of other factors have lost their significance. These are the 
positive influences of income, being male, having a bachelor degree or higher as opposed to 
having no post-school education, being employed, living rent-free as opposed to living in 
one’s own house, and originating from Asia. Similarly, Family Visa holders do not remit 
lower amounts than the Independent Visa group, unlike in the ordered probit model outcome. 
Having left a spouse overseas is associated with a higher remitted amount by individuals 
from the first cohort in the Heckman model. This is consistent with the linear panel model 
estimates but not apparent when the ordered dependent model is applied.  
Similar to LSIA1 results, LSIA2 results reveal a lower number of significant coefficients than 
the ordered probit model estimates of their remitted amounts. Although, unlike in the ordered 
dependent model, being a male is associated with higher remitted amounts, the positive 
effects of income, assets arrived with, age, originating from Asia and North America as 
opposed to coming from Oceania, and being employed as opposed to not being in labour 
force lose their significance when the Heckman model is applied to LSIA2. Likewise, 
holding a visa from the Skilled-Sponsored, Humanitarian and Family categories for 
immigrants from this cohort does not negatively influence their remitted amounts, unlike 
when the ordered probit model is employed.  
The results in Table 4.8 also suggest that changes in immigration policy may not be 
significant in determining the remitting probability but can influence the remitted amounts. In 
LSIA2, the Skilled-Independent immigrants do not remit greater amounts than immigrants 
under the Skilled-Sponsored or Humanitarian Visas, as is the case for the first cohort. 
Likewise, they do not send less money than Business Visa holders. As discussed earlier, the 
first and second cohorts were subject to different immigration laws, mainly affecting Skilled 
Visa applicants. Specifically, there are about 35 per cent of immigrants on Skilled-
Independent Visa and 20 per cent of immigrants on Skilled-Sponsored Visa in the second 
cohort who entered on visas assessed prior to the new points test of 1 July 1999 (Chiswick & 
Miller 2004). Hence, the majority of immigrants from the second cohort on points-tested 
visas were subjected to a new test, and a comparison of the remittances of the two groups can 
provide some insight into how these amendments affected the remitting decisions of 
immigrants.  
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Considering that different outcomes are achieved by the application of different models, a 
conclusion can be drawn only when the most appropriate models – the two-part model, the 
Tobit model or the Heckman two-step model – were applied to each cohort. The process for 
selecting the most efficient models to describe both the remitting probability and the remitted 
amount for immigrants from LSIA1 and LSIA2 is described in the next subsection.  
4.5.4 Summary 
As there are three different models reviewed in this chapter, this subsection first presents the 
outcomes from these approaches and discusses what is the best model to describe the 
remitting behaviour of each cohort. Based on the selected models, the factors that determine 
the willingness and ability to remit by the immigrants from LSIA1 and LSIA2 are then 
discussed. Finally, whether any discrepancies in these determinants between the two cohorts 
can be explained by the changes in the Australian immigration policy introduced in 1999 is 
analysed.  
To begin with, the results from the two-part model, the Tobit model and the Heckman two-
step model applied to LSIA1 and LSIA2 are summarised in Tables 4.9 and 4.10. These tables 
present only those coefficients that show significance in at least one regression. For the sake 
of completeness, the list of variables that appeared to be insignificant for the remitting 
decisions is presented in Table 4.11.  
The differences in sign and magnitude of quite a few of the coefficients on independent 
variables in the analyses of remitting probability and the remitted amount, detected in Table 
4.9 and Table 4.10, emphasise the benefits of the two-step analysis. This excludes the Tobit 
model, which assumes that decisions on whether to remit and how much to remit occur 
simultaneously, and narrows the selection to either the two-part model or Heckman two-step 
model. There are advantages and disadvantages of both approaches. The two-part model, 
although being the more straightforward and easy to use, does not account for the sample 
selection problem common in survey data; whereas the Heckman approach specifically 
designed to tackle this issue excludes at least one independent variable from the outcome 
model and, as argued by Vaara and Matero (2011), this exclusion may be based on 
insufficient theoretical justification. Hence, according to the practical advice given by Puhani 
(2000), the preferred method should be decided on a case-by-case basis.  
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Table 4.9 Summary of results for all models applied to 1993–1995 arrivals, LSIA1 
Variables 
Two-part model 
Tobit 
Heckman two-step 
Probit Ordered 
probit 
RE linear 
model 
Selection 
stage 
Outcome stage 
       
Income 0.116*** 0.131*** 0.0210*** 0.0499*** 0.0796*** 0.0121 
Fin. assets arrived with -0.0152*** 0.00768** 0.00648*** -0.00385*** -0.00980*** 0.00649*** 
Fin. assets transferred to AUS -0.0155*** 0.0216*** 0.0201*** -0.00105 -0.0121*** 0.0211*** 
Fin. assets transferred from AUS 0.00924 0.592*** 0.242*** 0.000884 0.0108 0.260*** 
Age 0.0256* -0.0248 -0.00956 0.00872 0.0127 -0.0113* 
Age squared -0.000416** 0.000329 0.000146* -0.000137** -0.000274** 0.000179** 
Gender (1 if male) 0.0554 0.220*** 0.0144 0.0293 0.0573* 0.0175 
No. of children -0.0962*** -0.00548 0.00509 0.0286** 0.0608*** -0.00312 
No. of persons -0.0636*** -0.0642** -0.0121 -0.0257*** -0.0419*** -0.00666 
Plan to leave 0.138 0.0708 -0.0115 0.0493 0.126* -0.0260 
Marital status (Married=base case):     
Never been married -0.143** 0.287*** 0.0399 -0.0385 -0.101** 0.0602** 
Level of highest education: 
(No post-school 
qualification=base case) 
      
Bachelor degree or higher -0.140** 0.156* 0.0232 -0.0374 -0.111*** 0.0344 
Other post-school  -0.150** 0.310*** 0.0712*** -0.0230 -0.118*** 0.0879*** 
Employment status (Employed=base case):    
Unemployed -0.673*** -0.306*** -0.0687** -0.245*** -0.507*** -0.0232 
Not in labour force -0.500*** -0.199** -0.0386 -0.170*** -0.330*** -0.00340 
Housing arrangements (Own/Pay mortgage=base case):     
Rent -0.115** 0.0172 -0.0507** -0.0553*** -0.0277 -0.0526** 
Rent free -0.247*** 0.267* -0.0380 -0.0902** -0.140** -0.0363 
Continents (Oceania (excl. Australia)=base case): 
 
    
Asia 0.115* 0.121* 0.0305 0.0536** 0.0859** 0.0210 
Africa -0.212** -0.0294 -0.00455 -0.0691* -0.152** 0.0160 
North America -0.261** -0.254 -0.0631 -0.110** -0.209*** -0.0422 
South America -0.0864 -0.152 -0.0206 -0.0334 -0.0839 -0.0102 
Europe -0.451*** -0.109 -0.0141 -0.155*** -0.331*** 0.0161 
Visa Category (Skilled-Independent=base case):    
Skilled - Sponsored -0.0339 -0.344*** -0.0864*** -0.0416 -0.0193 -0.0848*** 
Skilled - Business -0.345*** 0.208* 0.0631 -0.110*** -0.239*** 0.0878** 
Humanitarian 0.638*** -0.216** -0.0215 0.198*** 0.463*** -0.0642* 
Family -0.0266 -0.218** -0.0457 -0.0361 -0.0302 -0.0376 
Relatives overseas:       
Spouse 0.134 0.247 0.156*** 0.128** 0.0569 0.161*** 
Children 0.543*** 0.380*** 0.0373 0.221*** 0.521***  
Parents 0.236*** 0.133 0.0164 0.0905*** 0.213***  
Brothers and sisters 0.171** 0.203 0.0274 0.0721** 0.147**  
       
Constant -1.750***  0.247* -0.778*** -1.245*** 0.486*** 
       
Inv. Mills ratio      -0.133** 
Year1=1 if 2nd interview  0.369***     
Year2=1 if 3rd interview  0.869***     
Observations 10302 2009 2009 10302 10289 10289 
 
Notes: Only coefficients which are significant in at least one model are included. The sample is limited to Primary 
Applicants for Australian Residency aged 15 or older who have non-missing data on country of origin. *** indicates 
p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
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Table 4.10 Summary of results for all models applied to 1999–2000 arrivals, LSIA2 
Variables 
Two-part model Tobit Heckman two-step 
Probit Ordered 
probit 
RE linear 
model 
 Selection stage Outcome stage 
       
Income 0.0566** 0.138** 0.0134 0.128** 0.0400* 0.0424 
Fin. assets arrived with -0.0115** 0.0144** 0.0113 -0.00160 -0.00866*** 0.00754 
Fin. assets transferred 
from AUS 
0.0750** 1.121*** 0.658*** 0.182*** 0.0578** 0.827*** 
Age 0.0353 0.0356 -0.0107 0.0950** 0.0291* 0.0409 
Age squared -0.000667** -0.000464 0.000285 -0.00146*** -0.000539*** -0.000452 
Gender (1 if male) -0.0475 0.0895 0.273* 0.0943 -0.0281 0.217* 
Marital status (Married=base case):   
Never been married -0.152 0.291 -0.142* -0.143 -0.109 -0.000576 
Level of highest education (No post-school qualification=base case):   
Other post-school  -0.213** -0.113 -0.0223 -0.0808 -0.152** -0.0257 
Employment status (Employed=base case):    
Unemployed -0.756*** -0.528 0.0274 -0.794*** -0.566*** -0.238 
Not in labour force -0.711*** -0.520*** -0.0387 -0.615*** -0.512*** -0.127 
Housing arrangements (Own/Pay mortgage=base case)   
Rent free -0.292** 0.124 0.0277 -0.0284 -0.171 -0.00436 
Continents (Oceania (excl. Australia)=base case)    
Asia -0.288* 0.616** 0.0622 -0.113 -0.214* 0.0391 
North America -1.076*** 0.789* 0.0808 -0.875** -0.785*** -0.0838 
South America -0.0472 1.147*** 1.521*** 0.614 -0.0180 1.298*** 
Europe -0.771*** 0.396 0.00551 -0.888*** -0.553*** -0.140 
Visa Category (Skilled-Independent=base case):    
Skilled - Sponsored 0.111 -0.473** -0.104 -0.0627 0.0877 -0.0489 
Skilled - Business -0.340** 0.294 -0.0197 -0.466* -0.252** -0.0755 
Humanitarian 0.546*** -0.899*** -0.133 -0.0186 0.370*** 0.0828 
Family 0.139 -0.601*** 0.00593 -0.0891 0.0842 0.0929 
Relatives overseas:       
Children 0.642*** 0.680*** -0.165 1.065*** 0.492***  
       
Constant -1.425***  0.0494 -4.958*** -1.165*** -1.534 
       
Inv. Mills ratio      0.252 
Year1=1 if 2nd interview  0.427***  1.034***   
Observations 4353 580 580 4353 4350 4350 
 
Notes: Only coefficients which are significant in at least one model are included. The sample is limited to Primary 
Applicants for Australian Residency aged 15 or older who have non-missing data on country of origin. Standard errors are 
indicated in parentheses. *** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
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Table 4.11 Independent variables not influencing remitting decisions, LSIA1 and LSIA2 
1993–1995 arrivals 1999–2000 arrivals 
Previously married (Married= base case) Financial assets transferred to Australia 
 No. of children 
 No. of persons 
 Plan to leave 
 Previously married (Married= base case) 
 Bachelor degree or higher (No post-school 
qualification=base case) 
 Rent (Own/Pay mortgage=base case) 
 Africa (Oceania excl. Australia=base case) 
 Spouse 
 Parents 
 Brothers and sisters 
 
Notes: The sample is limited to Primary Applicants for Australian Residency aged 15 or older who have non-
missing data on country of origin.  
The selection of the most appropriate model depends on whether there is an issue with the 
data such as the presence of selection bias – equivalent to an omitted variable problem 
(Wooldridge 2002b) – and on the assumptions about the significance of the excluded 
variables in the Heckman model. According to Achen (1986), the selection problem does not 
exist in two types of situation. First, it might be the case when the unmeasured factors 
influencing the selection equation are uncorrelated with the unmeasured factors influencing 
the outcome equation. In this case, it would be assumed that the unmeasured personal 
characteristics that affect the probability of remitting do not influence the amount of this 
transaction. Second, there is no selection problem if every variable affecting the selection 
equation is also controlled in the outcome stage. If these two types of situations occur, then 
there is no selection bias problem and a two-part model can be applied.   
The Inverse Mills ratio was used to identify whether there was selection bias and if the 
application of the Heckman two-step model was necessary (Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo 2006; 
Vaara & Matero 2011). The negative and significant value of the Inverse Mills ratio in the 
LSIA1 estimates suggested a negative correlation between the error terms in the selection and 
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outcome equations. It meant that there were some unobserved characteristics that affected the 
probability of remitting and the remitted amount in the opposite directions, and this implied 
the presence of selection bias. Therefore, the Heckman model described the remitting 
behaviour of immigrants from the first cohort better than the two-part model. Following the 
same logic, the p-value of the Mills ratio in the Heckman model estimates for LSIA2 
indicated that there was no omitted variable bias, hence the implementation of the Heckman 
estimation was not required. The two-part model used the same independent variables in both 
stages, thus the second condition of the absence of selection bias was also met.  
In this model, the probit model estimates the probability of remitting and either the ordered 
dependent model or the linear panel model are used to estimate the remitted amount. 
Although using the linear panel model is more straightforward, the low number of significant 
coefficients when this model is applied compared to the ordered probit estimates suggests 
that the latter model is more efficient
28
. Therefore, for the second cohort, the two-part model 
with the probit and the ordered dependent variable approaches was a better alternative. 
The outcomes of these selected models applied to both cohorts were used to identify the 
personal characteristics that influence the remitting behaviour of immigrants.  
The probability of remitting by immigrants from LSIA1, as can be seen in the estimates from 
the selection stage of the Heckman model in Table 4.9, is positively influenced by income, 
being employed, being older for individuals up to the age of 23, and the number of resident 
children. The last effect could probably be the result, and not the reason, for certain levels of 
remitting performance with those individuals who remit more also being able to afford more 
children. Likewise, a lower likelihood of remitting for those individuals who do not pay any 
rent as opposed to living in their own house could be a consequence of a poor financial 
situation not allowing them to send money overseas rather than its cause. A negative 
correlation of the value of financial assets with the probability of sending money overseas 
could be attributed to the lower need for financial support by families of individuals who 
have more financial assets. Male respondents are more likely to remit, reflecting the 
stereotypical role of the provider. A higher number of people in the household reduces the 
likelihood of remitting but planning to leave Australia for good gives more incentives to 
                                                 
28
 A lower plausibility of estimates produced when the linear panel model was applied to LSIA2, could be 
attributed to the use of values rounded to the nearest thousand in this survey and not the actual remitted 
amounts.  
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transfer money overseas. Being married as opposed to never being in a relationship suggests 
higher responsibility and accordingly higher chances of sending money to support families in 
the home country. Individuals without any post-school qualification are also more likely to 
remit than their more educated counterparts. The possible reason is that the families of those 
individuals who could afford the high cost of post-school education are better off than the 
families of less educated individuals. Having arrived from Asia increases, and having arrived 
from Africa, North America and Europe reduces, the likelihood of this financial support 
compared to the benchmark group of immigrants from Oceania. The probability to remit by 
all immigrants, however, increases if they have relatives overseas other than spouses. Lastly, 
this probability also depends on the type of visa used by immigrants to enter Australia. For 
example, immigrants under the Business Visa are less likely, and those under the 
Humanitarian Visa are more likely, to remit than the base case of immigrants holding the 
Skilled-Independent Visa.  
Unlike the first cohort, the remitting probability of immigrants from LSIA2 is not influenced 
by the value of financial assets transferred to Australia, gender, number of children, number 
of household members, plans to leave Australia permanently and marital status. However, 
like those in LSIA1, employed, well-paid, uneducated and living rent free immigrants in 
LSIA2 are more likely to remit, according to the results in the first column of Table 4.10. The 
value of financial assets transferred from Australia positively affects their remitting 
probability in contrast with the null effect for the first cohort. Similarly to LSIA1, the 
remitting probability of LSIA2 immigrants originated from North America and Europe is 
lower than that of immigrants from the Pacific Islands but, in contrast with LSIA1, this 
applies to immigrants from Asia as well. Only having left their children in their home 
countries influences the decision to remit of the second cohort of immigrants, whereas having 
the spouse, parents or siblings overseas does not matter in this context. Similar to immigrants 
from LSIA1, LSIA2 immigrants under the Business Visa are less likely, and immigrants 
arrived under the Humanitarian Program are more likely, to remit overseas. This suggests that 
there are cohort differences between the estimates of these two surveys; however, the changes 
in immigration policies in the late 1990s did not affect the likelihood of remitting by 
immigrants. 
Next, factors affecting immigrants’ decisions about how much to remit were identified and 
compared between the cohorts. The insignificance in the later arrivals of some effects 
detected for the first cohort, such as the positive effects from having a higher value of 
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financial assets transferred to Australia and from having post-school education below 
bachelor degree, and the negative effect from being older for individuals up to the age of 32 
can be attributed to the differences between these cohorts. Likewise, the negative effect of 
paying rent as opposed to having one’s own house, attributable only to LSIA1 migrants, and 
the higher remitted amounts for migrants from South America, North America and Asia than 
for migrants from Oceania, detected only in LSIA2, could be caused by cohort differences. 
The positive influence on the remitted amount of having left the spouse in the home country 
in the first cohort is not present in the second. Instead, in the second cohort, individuals with 
children overseas send higher amounts than those without children overseas, which is not 
applicable to the survey carried out earlier.   
Changes in the factors affecting remitted amounts, on the other hand, can also be explained 
by the change in the pattern of newly arrived immigrants as a result of the immigration 
reforms in the late 1990s. Specifically, tightening the requirements for passing the points test 
could have affected the qualities of new skilled migrants to Australia. The employability and 
financial stability of immigrants in the Skilled-Independent category in LSIA2 allow them to 
send higher amounts than Family Visas holders can afford. This difference, however, is not 
present in the first cohort, suggesting that the financial abilities of both groups did not differ 
much before the new points test. Similarly, the positive effect of holding a Business Visa 
compared to an Independent Visa is evident only in the first cohort. The negative effect of 
entering Australia under the Skilled-Sponsored Visa, and the positive effect of entering 
Australia as refugee, however, persist in both surveys.  
These findings suggest that stricter migration requirements reduced the sample of applicants 
for the Skilled-Independent Visa to the most skilled individuals with the highest chance of 
finding a stable and well-paid job in Australia. This made them superior to Family Visa 
holders, and comparable with Business Visa holders, in terms of their financial well-being. 
This proposed explanation can also be supported by the loss of significance of a positive 
effect on the remitted amount of holding a post-school qualification below bachelor degree in 
LSIA2. Education could play an important role for independent applicants and business 
persons applying for migration to Australia; it could give more points to the Skilled-
Independent Visa holders and increase the employability of the Business category. Hence, 
once respondents from the former group become as qualified and educated as the latter group, 
the role of education loses its importance. The acquired positive effect of income due to these 
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changes suggests that after the differences between applicants from these categories are 
erased, only their capacity to earn income has become significant.  
4.6 Conclusions 
In the preceding chapters, the saving rates and financial risk-taking of immigrants were 
analysed. The issue of remittances has been considered in this chapter to investigate a 
different aspect of immigrants’ financial behaviour. The worldwide increase in remittance 
flows from the developed world in the last two decades, as reported by the World Bank, 
reflects an increase in migration from developing countries. While the surge in remittance 
outflows from Australia after revision of the points test in 1999 can be also attributed to the 
increase in the immigration inflows to the country, there could be other contributing factors. 
This chapter analyses what influences the remitting decisions of immigrants to Australia, and 
whether changes to Australian immigration policy had an effect on their remittances.  
The chapter began with an investigation of the type of model that would be the most suitable 
to describe the remitting decisions of Australian immigrants by using the LSIA data. Using 
the selected models, it was then investigated what factors influence immigrants’ remittances, 
and whether these effects differ between immigrants who arrived before the amendments to 
Australian immigration laws and those who arrived after.  
The LSIA data were used since, unlike the HILDA Survey, the respondents in LSIA were 
asked a set of questions on remittances and financial help. The first question of interest asked 
respondents if they or their partners sent any money to relatives or friends overseas and the 
second question clarified the amount sent. The answers to these two questions constitute 
dependent variables: the probability to remit overseas and the remitted amount. Furthermore, 
LSIA has valuable data on the type of visa used to migrate to Australia. This additional 
information provided a different insight into the financial behaviour of immigrants. The 
remitting patterns of two independent cohorts arrived in 1993–1995 and 1999–2000 were 
examined and compared with each other.  
The findings of this chapter revealed that: first, the Heckman two-step model is the most 
appropriate model for the estimation of the remitting performance of the first cohort, and the 
two-part model is the best approach for the second cohort; and second, the effect of holding 
certain visa categories on the remitted amount by immigrants, but not their remitting 
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probability, changes between cohorts. This change could be attributable to the change in the 
profile of Independent Visa holders triggered by the amendments to the skilled migration 
points test introduced in the late 1990s.  
Consistent with other studies, three approaches were used for the analysis of the remitting 
behaviour of immigrants to Australia. They were the two-part model, the Tobit model and the 
Heckman two-step model. The outcomes obtained from applying these models were 
compared to identify the most suitable model. Using the value and the significance of the 
Inverse Mills Ratio, the Heckman two-step model was selected for the description of the 
remitting behaviour of immigrants from LSIA1, and the two-part model, with the probit 
model used in the first part and the ordered probit model in the second, was selected for 
LSIA2. Although both the Heckman two-step model and the two-part model use a two-stage 
analysis, the former model presumes two interdependent decisions on whether to remit and at 
what level, whereas the latter model assumes that these decisions are taken independently. 
The selected models were used to identify and compare factors affecting the remitting 
decisions of immigrants from the two cohorts.  
The results obtained suggest that the probability of remitting by immigrants to Australia and 
the amount remitted by them do not depend only on their financial situation. Being 
financially well off is important for both decisions, although having financial assets can be 
negatively associated with the likelihood of remitting. Age has a positive effect on the 
probability of remitting but only up to a certain point, with the maximum participation rate 
observed for individuals in their 20s, suggesting that immigrants in this age group are most 
likely to have dependents overseas. Motivational factors such as an individual’s plan to leave 
the country permanently and the level of education obtained before migration to Australia do 
not show the expected results. In particular, a plan to leave increases the remitting 
participation but not the amount, and only in the first cohort. Likewise, the probability of 
remitting is not higher but lower for individuals with post-school education than for those 
without it. This does not support the implicit co-insurance hypothesis of Stark (1991), 
consistent with the findings by Brown (1997). On the contrary, it suggests that the families of 
those individuals who are able to pay high education fees require less financial assistance 
than families of less educated immigrants. 
Demand-side factors such as having relatives overseas, originating from a particular continent 
and being on a particular type of visa when entering Australia also influence the remitting 
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performance of immigrants. Being from North America or Europe is associated with a lower 
remitting probability compared to originating from Oceania in both cohorts, implying that 
migrants from more prosperous countries are less likely to migrate on humanitarian grounds 
and hence there is less need for financial support for their families. Changes in the country 
distribution between LSIA2 and LSIA1 can explain why originating from other continents 
affects the probability of remitting differently in each cohort. Having children overseas 
increases the likelihood of remitting by immigrants in both LSIA1 and LSAI2, but positively 
affects the remitted amount only for immigrants in the second cohort. In contrast, the fact that 
an individual has left their spouse in their former country of residence positively influences 
their remitted amount but not their remitting probability, although this is only evident in 
LSIA1.  
The effect of being on a certain type of visa on the probability of remitting by immigrants can 
be explained by demand from their countries of origin; and the visa effect on the remitted 
amount can be attributed to the security of their jobs and potential earning abilities. For 
example, refugees to Australia are more likely, and Business Visa holders are less likely, to 
need to support their families in their home countries than the benchmark group of 
independent immigrants. The lower remitted amounts by the Humanitarian Visa and Skilled-
Sponsored Visa holders, and the higher amounts by the Business migrants, compared to the 
Independent Visa holders in LSIA1, suggest that the size of remitted amounts depends on 
whether individuals have a secure and stable job. The chances of the Independent Visa 
holders in LSIA2 finding a job are higher than for those in LSIA1 since they were subjected 
to stricter skills and education requirements under the new skilled migration points test. As a 
result, their earning potential is comparable with that of the Business Visa holders and 
exceeds that of respondents from other categories.  
To sum up, the changes in the immigration policy did not affect the probability of immigrants 
to remit abroad, but did affect their remitted amount. The more skilled and educated 
Independent immigrants in LSIA2, unlike those in LSIA1, are able to send higher amounts of 
money abroad than the Family Visa holders and they send similar amounts to those sent by 
the Business category. This suggests that the independent applicants who arrived later were 
likely to be financially better off than their counterparts who arrived in 1993–1995. The 
lower reported mean values of the remitted amounts for LSIA2 then could be attributed to the 
decreased relative proportion of Independent immigrants compared to LSIA1, possibly 
reflecting an initial negative reaction to more stringent entry requirements to Australia.  
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The increase in the outward remittances from Australia, hence, can be attributed not only to 
the overall increase in settlers’ arrivals but also to the change in the characteristics of the 
Skilled-Independent Visa holders. According to the statistics from the Department of 
Immigration and Citizenship (2008), the increase in the numbers of immigrants since 1997 is 
mostly caused by the rise in arrivals under the Independent Visa. The remittances from 
Australia consequently depend more on the qualities of this category of immigrants. Hence, 
the improvement in an immigrant’s earning ability after modifications to the points test such 
as the rigorous expansion of pre-migration English language testing and the mandatory 
qualification assessment could have contributed to the surge in the remittance outflows from 
Australia.  
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CHAPTER  5.  DOES MONEY BUY HAPPINESS? FINANCIAL AND 
GENERAL WELL-BEING OF IMMIGRANTS IN AUSTRALIA 
5.1 Introduction 
The effects of increasing immigration on global well-being are a subject of debate among 
policy-makers. The evidence from the World Bank (2006b) attests that an increase in 
international migration causes a significant rise in global welfare. They argue that, despite a 
modest decline in wages in the short run, destination countries benefit through an increase in 
native wages in the long run and an increase in the overall income of native households due 
to increased returns to capital. New immigrants and their countries of origin benefit mainly 
from the wages in the destination countries being higher than the wages in their home 
countries. At the same time, research shows that immigrants in developed countries are less 
wealthy than native-born residents, and this could hinder the positive effects of migration. 
Thus, the immigration phenomenon seems far more complex and diverse than it appears to be 
at first glance (World Bank 2006a).  
This chapter examines the financial and general aspects of immigrants’ well-being. The 
findings reported in Chapter 4 suggested that, due to recent immigration reforms, the 
financial situation of recent immigrants to Australia has improved. This could imply that 
immigrants’ financial well-being is becoming comparable to that of native-born Australians. 
Indeed, according to DIAC (2011), the average annual earnings of a recently arrived skilled 
migrant exceed that of an average Australian by $3,000. However, the changes in 
immigrants’ general well-being are generally overlooked. An improvement in their financial 
well-being does not guarantee an improvement in the general well-being of immigrants who 
are also subject to various, not always tangible, costs related to the immigration process. 
Unhappy residents are not as productive as their happy counterparts (Oswald, Proto & Sgroi 
2008), thus making themselves and a country’s economy financially worse off than it would 
otherwise be. Hence, it is important to identify and analyse the factors affecting the general 
well-being of immigrants in addition to their financial situation. 
The purpose of this chapter is to determine the factors affecting the well-being of Australian 
residents, and to examine whether the well-being of Australians born overseas is different 
from that of native-born Australians. Well-being in this study is defined by the respondents’ 
own assessments of their satisfaction with life. As the ultimate goal of most people going 
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through the complicated process of migration is to improve their economic situation, the role 
of financial well-being in overall well-being is also analysed. Financial well-being in this 
research is measured by both objective and subjective measures to reflect the role of higher 
income in the host countries as well as an individual’s own perception of financial success. 
Objective measures are whether households experienced problems paying basic bills and 
whether they would have difficulty in raising an adequate amount of money in an emergency. 
Subjective assessments of financial satisfaction and financial prosperity are less specific and 
are based on an individual’s own judgement measured by levels in an ascending order.  
The findings described in this chapter indicate that Australian-born individuals are generally 
more satisfied with their lives than immigrants to Australia, although the levels of their 
financial satisfaction and their difficulties with timely payments of basic bills are not 
different. The assessment of one’s own financial prosperity, in contrast, is higher for 
immigrants despite their greater difficulty in raising $2,000 in an emergency relative to the 
native-born population.  
The positive effects of income and wealth on life satisfaction imply that financial well-being 
is an important domain of general well-being. However, this chapter concludes that the 
relationship between income and wealth, well-being and financial well-being is not 
straightforward. As expected, income and wealth both play a positive role in the financial 
satisfaction and financial prosperity of Australian residents, and a negative role in their 
inability to pay bills and the degree of their difficulty in raising $2,000 in an emergency. 
However, only a relative improvement in an immigrant’s financial position positively affects 
their financial well-being. This is reflected in the equal levels of financial satisfaction of 
Australian immigrants and Australian-born residents due to their similar levels of income and 
wealth. A high level of immigrants’ self-reported financial prosperity is due to the 
improvement in their financial circumstances compared to their pre-migration financial 
situations in their home countries. Similarly, an increase in an immigrant’s absolute income 
may be enough to cover basic expenses but may not be sufficient for the ability to raise 
adequate emergency funds compared to native-born Australians.  
It is also investigated whether an immigrant’s geographic origin is one of the factors affecting 
their general well-being, as is the case for their financial well-being. For example, it is found 
that immigrants from Africa experience greater difficulty in raising $2,000 in an emergency 
and lower financial prosperity than immigrants from the Pacific Islands. However, the results 
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show that the life satisfaction of immigrants depends not on which continent they originated 
from, but rather on the degree of the difference between immigrants’ culture and Australian 
culture. Culture in this context is defined by the dominant religion practised in a country.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: the second section providing a 
literature review is followed by the third section describing the data and methodology used in 
this part of the study; the fourth section presents results; and the fifth presents concluding 
remarks. The findings are grouped into three subsections: first, what determines the general 
well-being of Australian residents and whether it differs between foreign and Australian-born 
individuals is investigated; second, their financial well-being is compared; and finally, if 
applicable, whether immigrants’ origins affect differences in general well-being and financial 
well-being is analysed.  
The analysis of immigrants’ well-being was carried out using observations on the second 
cohort of immigrants from LSIA and the two-year data from the HILDA Survey. While the 
HILDA survey follows a sample of thousands of Australian households, LSIA provides 
immigrants-only data, and this facilitates a more in-depth analysis.  
5.2 Literature review 
The reasons for international migration have evolved from the initial colonisation goals to 
seeking better living standards (Tehranian 2003). In the first colonial wave of migration, 
Europeans moved into hypothetically uninhabited territories where they often either 
destroyed indigenous populations or brought them back as slaves to work in the New World. 
Following World War II, North America and Europe became primary destinations of 
postcolonial migration for Asians, Africans and Latin Americans. The current third wave 
described as ‘globalised migration’ began with the oil shock in 1973. In addition to North 
American and West-European countries, the choice of host countries has extended to 
Australia, New Zealand and oil-producing countries in South West Asia. The globalisation of 
migration has also created international travellers such as transnational employees, guest 
workers, refugees and tourists.  
Resettlement is supposed to make migrants happier. Traditionally, it is assumed that a higher 
income and higher consumption provide higher utility, and that people’s satisfaction is 
positively correlated with the financial value of their assets (Stutzer & Frey 2010). Thus, 
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overall well-being is supposed to be highly dependent on an individual’s financial situation. 
Indeed, as argued by Van Praag, Frijters and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2003), financial satisfaction 
is the most important component of the general well-being of German residents represented 
by their own assessment of their life satisfaction. Hence, financial well-being is an important 
indicator of overall well-being. 
A number of studies, however, have claimed that immigrants in Australia and other 
developed countries are in an economically inferior position to native-born people. Amuedo-
Dorantes and Pozo (2002), for example, argued that immigrants in the US accumulate less 
wealth than comparable US-born people do. In particular, they claimed that native-born 
people have a higher level of precautionary savings, which could, in part, be explained by the 
immigrants’ remittances to their home countries. It has also been argued that between 1984 
and 1999 the average wealth of Canadian immigrant families decreased whereas the average 
wealth of their Canadian-born counterparts substantially increased (Schellenberg & Hou 
2005). In addition, Sinning (2007) confirmed that German-born individuals are wealthier than 
foreign-born individuals in Germany. Similarly, Cobb-Clark and Hildebrand (2008) and  
Doiron and Guttman (2009) found that Australian immigrant households accumulate less 
wealth than native-born families do.  
This relative disadvantage can undermine the positive effects from immigrants’ supposedly 
improved well-being because an individual’s happiness also depends upon their position 
relative to others. The relative deprivation theory, although popular in social science for a 
long time, was first mentioned in the economic literature only in the early 1970s by Easterlin 
(1974, 1995), who initially analysed the happiness of Americans and later expanded his 
analysis to include Europeans and Japanese. He suggested that, although income growth in a 
society does not increase its happiness, people with a higher income in a country at a given 
time are more likely to report being happy. This is because they get utility from a comparison 
of themselves with others around them. This concept was supported by the negative 
correlation of happiness at work reported by British respondents with the level of income 
against which they compare their own income (Clark & Oswald 1996). These findings 
suggest that the overall impact of migration to an industrialised country on an immigrant’s 
well-being can even be negative if the negative impact from their financial inferiority 
outweighs the benefits.  
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Apart from the absolute and relative change in their income, an immigrant’s well-being 
depends on their own assessment of their financial situation, which can change with 
assimilation with the local population. Slutzer (2004) reported evidence that the happiness of 
residents of industrialised countries does not increase proportionally with economic growth. 
What is more, as argued by Easterlin (1995), sometimes the two can even move in opposite 
directions. As one of the potential explanations for the lack of improvement in an individual’s 
well-being with a higher income, they suggest that this increase is also associated with higher 
aspirations. Income aspirations increase when people get used to their consumption and 
income level and strive for more stimulation. Living in a new society suggests conforming to 
the socially accepted norms, and the acquisition of the prevailing aspirations is inevitable. 
These new acquisitions in turn can impact on the level of happiness of immigrants.    
This underlines the importance of research on the determinants of the well-being of 
individuals and its correlation with their financial situation. A comparison of the determinants 
of the well-being of people with different backgrounds is of particular importance for 
Australia, a country with a high concentration of immigrants. Although its economy is one of 
the strongest and has the third highest Human Development Index in the world, Australia 
performs fairly poorly compared to 34 other nations on a range of subjective happiness 
indicators (Blanchflower & Oswald 2005). More precisely, Australia ranks between 11th and 
15th in terms of three well-being indicators. Differences in culture and individual experience 
could also affect an individual’s assessment of their well-being. Hence, apart from the 
drawbacks of economic development such as an increase in material aspirations, a low level 
of the subjective well-being of the Australian population could also be explained by the 
prevalence of the low assessments of those experiencing difficulties with immigration and 
adaptation to the local culture.  
Measuring well-being is a difficult and relatively unconventional task (Oswald 1997). As 
there are no ready statistics on happiness, some studies have employed statistics on the 
suicide death rate to examine the other extreme. Suicidal behaviour is found to be positively 
associated with unemployment and marital problems, and is more common among men 
(Oswald 1997). Use of these data, however,  might not be appropriate, as claimed by Oswald 
(1997), because suicide represents a response to unhappiness that is more enforced than any 
response to happiness, and also because it can be a reflection of mental illness. Subjective 
measures of well-being, according to Oswald (1997), could be generated from answers to 
questions asking respondents to rate their level of happiness, life satisfaction and mental 
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distress. Using satisfaction with life as a whole, or with a specific domain, to measure 
subjective well-being has also been mentioned by Van Praag, Frijters and Ferrer-i-Carbonell 
(2003) as a common practice. In a similar fashion, the measurement of well-being by 
Blanchflower and Oswald (2005) involved an individual’s assessment of their happiness, 
satisfaction with their family life, job satisfaction, job stress and the frequency of coming 
home from work too tired to do domestic chores. Using a subjective measure of well-being 
accounts for the individual values that do not have a dollar price, such as an individual’s 
relative position in a society or their cultural differences. On the other hand, according to 
Stutzer and Frey (2010), people constantly compare their past with their future expectations, 
and thus are unable to produce absolute judgments. This suggests that the subjective measure 
of well-being should be complemented by objective measures.  
Financial well-being is an integral element of general well-being and is characterised by 
measurements specifically related to finances. Objective measures of the financial situation 
can be expressed in different ways. Schellenberg and Feng (2005) suggested that the financial 
well-being of an individual or a family can be measured by the amount of wages and earnings 
they receive as well as by the wealth or assets accumulated by them. They also mention 
success in the labour market as a major component of financial well-being. Likewise, 
Buchler, Haynes and Baxter (2009) examined how financial well-being depends on the type 
of work the individuals are employed in. They showed that casual employees, who have 
fewer privileges in the labour market than permanent employees, also have a greater financial 
burden.  
Financial well-being can also be measured by an individual’s own perceptions about their 
financial situation. The conceptual framework for using these measures is similar to that used 
for estimating overall well-being. Material wealth and income might reveal only one aspect 
of an immigrant’s well-being and not their own perception about their economic condition. In 
the last few decades, as argued by Stutzer and Frey (2010), individual happiness, mainly 
studied in sociology and psychology, has become relevant in economics. In the predominant 
approach, happiness is measured by the utility derived from preferences which are ‘choice-
connected rankings of outcomes’ (Stutzer & Frey 2010, p. 682). Other approaches have 
included non-objective theoretical analysis, which includes emotions, self-esteem, goal 
completion, mastery, meaning and status. 
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Determinants of the well-being of residents of various countries tend to be mostly similar. 
According to Oswald (1997), in general, happiness is high among women, those who are 
married, earning high income, white, well-educated, self-employed, retired individuals and 
those who look after their home. Across different countries, he argued, happiness tends to 
decrease with age, reaching its lowest around the 30s, and then it starts to increase. Research 
on European countries has shown that unemployment is another factor that affects life 
satisfaction, with unemployed people being reported as very unhappy (Oswald 1997). The 
findings of research based on the British Household Panel Survey data were that joblessness 
also has a strong negative effect on one’s well-being but income does not (Clark & Oswald 
1994; Oswald 1997). Van Praag, Frijters and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2003), who analysed the 
well-being of German residents, argued that financial, health and job satisfactions are the 
main determinants of the general satisfaction of workers and non-workers from East and 
West Germany. Financial satisfaction in this study was found to be lower for men, positively 
influenced by income and negatively affected by the number of adults and children living in 
the household. Savings have a positive effect for the satisfaction of all respondents whereas a 
positive impact of education is evident only for West Germans. The financial satisfaction of 
both groups is convex-shaped in age, with minimum satisfaction registered in the late 30s for 
non-workers, and at the ages of 45 and 54 for Western and Eastern workers, respectively.  
There is a considerable amount of literature investigating the differences between Australian-
born and foreign-born individuals and households in terms of various measures of financial 
well-being. Cobb-Clark and Hildebrand (2008) as well as Doiron and Guttman (2009) looked 
at the variation in the structure and distribution of wealth. Both studies concluded that 
immigrant couples have less wealth than native-born couples. Thapa (2004) compared the 
risk of unemployment for male immigrants to Australia with that for comparable native-born 
Australians. He predicted a higher probability of unemployment for immigrants with both an 
English-speaking and a non-English-speaking background than for the native-born 
individuals. Likewise, the general conclusion of Boorah and Mangan (2007), who 
investigated the economic outcomes of immigrants to Australia, was that immigrants who 
have arrived in Australia relatively recently are worse off than both the immigrants who 
arrived before 1996 and native-born Australians in terms of household income, employment 
status and housing conditions.  
Nevertheless, to the best of the author’s knowledge, there is no research that examines the 
difference in general well-being between native and overseas-born Australians, and its 
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correlation with their financial well-being. The costly and at times risky decision of an 
individual to move to another country is based on their expectations of significant income 
gain, in addition to other factors
29
. However, their well-being does not necessary improve in 
terms of both objective and subjective measures. For example, the expected increase in 
earnings depends on the probabilities and prospects of employment in both the country of 
origin and the country of destination (World Bank 2006a), which can postpone the 
achievement of the desired material benefits by immigrants. Similarly, as reported by 
Strumpel (1976), the subjective measure of economic welfare differs between various social 
groups. This suggests that an immigrant’s own perception of economic welfare might change 
if their socioeconomic status in Australia is different from their status before migration.  
Thus, subjective measures such as life satisfaction, financial satisfaction and financial 
prosperity can account for individual experience as well as reflect the different level of 
expectations of immigrants compared to native-born Australians. Financial difficulty in 
making the timely payment of basic bills and possible difficulty in raising a certain amount of 
cash on short notice are objective measures that allow reflection of the actual experience of 
financial problems (Buchler, Haynes & Baxter 2009). Using these measures should 
contribute to the analysis of the difference between the financial well-being of native and 
foreign-born Australians.  
5.3 Data and methodology 
The well-being of Australian immigrants was investigated by using the discrete dependent 
variable models and individual data from HILDA and LSIA surveys. Since these surveys 
have different purposes and questionnaires, not all variables in HILDA are available in LSIA, 
and vice versa. Therefore, the data and applied methods with respect to each survey are 
described separately in the following two subsections.  
5.3.1 HILDA survey 
Similarly to the analyses described in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, data from the HILDA survey 
were used to identify the determinants of well-being of Australian residents. As before, the 
panel data analysis was applied to only two years of data, 2002 and 2006, which contain 
information about household finances.  
                                                 
29
 These factors are described in detail in Section 4.3 of the thesis. 
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General well-being in this research is expressed by individuals’ own assessment of their 
satisfaction with life, consistent with most studies (Oswald 1997; Van Praag, Frijters & 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2003). This is the main dependent variable and is measured in HILDA on 
a scale from 0 to 10. Other dependent variables focus on the financial aspect of well-being. 
Specifically, financial prosperity measures individuals’ self-assessed prosperity given current 
needs and financial responsibilities. Variables measuring financial satisfaction, inability to 
pay bills on time and raising $2000 in an emergency are the same as the dependent variables 
used by Buchler, Haynes and Baxter (2009). The list of dependent variables is as follows
30
: 
Table 5.1 Dependent variables (HILDA) 
Subjective dependent 
variables 
Range of 
measurement 
Objective dependent 
variables 
Range of 
measurement 
Life satisfaction 0-10 Inability to pay bills 1(Yes)/ 0(No) 
Financial satisfaction 0-10 Raising $2,000 1-4 
Financial prosperity 1-6   
  
The discrete dependent variable models in this chapter are similar to the ones employed 
earlier. ‘Inability to pay bills’ and ‘raising $2,000’ in an emergency objectively describe the 
extent of financial difficulties faced by HILDA respondents. The ‘inability to pay bills’ on 
time is a dichotomous variable which is equal to 1 if an individual in the previous year had 
difficulty with paying basic bills on time, pawned something, went without meals or asked 
for financial help, and 0 otherwise. Therefore, the probability that an individual is not able to 
pay bills on time is described by the probit model as:  
)()0Pr(),|1Pr( 111 ititititit XXXBills    , (5.1) 
where t=1,2; 
in addition,  (εit) is the probit function, which is the standard normal cumulative distribution 
function; Billsit is the inability to pay bills on time by an individual i, which is equal to 1 for a 
positive answer to any of the seven questions relating to the ‘inability to pay’, and 0 
otherwise; Xit includes individual controls such as age, income and education.  
                                                 
30 The complete description of the variables from HILDA Survey is presented in Table D.1 in Appendix D.  
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Similarly to the ‘inability to pay bills’, ‘raising $2000’ measures objective financial well-
being. It describes potential financial difficulty in raising $2,000 should an emergency arise 
on a scale from 1 to 4. Other dependent variables – life satisfaction, financial prosperity and 
financial satisfaction – are also ordinal dependent variables but they represent an individual’s 
own assessment of their well-being. Thus, the ordered dependent variable model with normal 
distribution was used for the analysis of an immigrant’s life satisfaction, financial 
satisfaction, financial prosperity and their difficulty in raising $2,000:  
)(1),,|Pr( 11 itMitit XXMWellbeing    ,   (5.2)  
where Wellbeingit represents measures of well-being, such as life satisfaction, financial 
satisfaction, financial prosperity and difficulty in raising $2000 if urgently required, with:  
10,...,0 MM   for ‘life satisfaction’ and ‘financial satisfaction’ (1-lowest and 10-
highest ); 
6,...,1 MM   for ‘financial prosperity’(1-lowest and 6-highest); 
and 4,...,1 MM   for ‘raising $2000’(1-lowest and 4-highest). 
The sample was limited to household heads aged 15 or older with non-missing data on the 
country of origin. Similar to the definition given in Chapter 3, household heads are defined as 
household members who earn the highest income. This is consistent with the definition of 
householders by Plagnol (2011, p. 9), who argued that they ‘are in a good enough financial 
situation to own or rent the place they reside in’. This limitation excludes dependent 
household members and focuses on the highest income earner who, in general, also has a 
bigger say in the household financial decisions. Accordingly, the financial well-being of these 
people should reflect the financial situation of the whole household.  
The independent variables were similar to the ones used in the previous sets of analysis. In 
addition to income and wealth, which themselves serve as indicators of a household’s 
financial situation, the independent variables included factors that could indirectly influence 
household finances such as age, gender, marital status, highest education level, the 
employment status of the household head, and the number of resident children in the 
household. These characteristics were also expected to show significance in the analysis of 
overall well-being. The summarised findings of Oswald (1997) indicated that happiness is 
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high among women, those who are married, well-educated, earning a high income and self-
employed individuals, and low for unemployed people. According to Oswald, happiness is U-
shaped in age, with the lowest levels registered for those in their 30s. The negative effects of 
having an additional child or adult in a household on financial, housing and leisure 
satisfactions detected by Van Praag, Frijters and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2003) could also be 
evident in general satisfaction. Similarly, since general life satisfaction in their study was 
found to be highly dependent on financial satisfaction, which, in turn, was found to be lower 
for male respondents, this gender effect can also be present in general life satisfaction.  
The well-being of households can also be affected by housing arrangements, the household 
location and its size. According to Headey, Warren and Wooden (2008), housing is the major 
component of asset portfolios in Australia. Similarly, Schellenberg and Feng (2005) named 
home ownership as a significant contributor to financial well-being. As a result, independent 
variables indicating whether the individual lives in their own home, is paying rent or living 
rent-free were included in the regression. The Major Statistical Region (MSR) of the dwelling 
could potentially influence the household head’s job prospects and accordingly their well-
being. Household size is also expected to influence the economic situation of the household. 
More people in the household means an increased financial burden on the household head 
and presumably a negative effect on the well-being of households (Walson 1991). 
A few additional variables were applied to the immigrant-only data. They included the 
continent of their country of birth, the dominant religion in their home country and the 
number of years in Australia since migration. Continents rather than immigrants’ countries of 
birth were used to represent immigrants’ origin due to the large number of countries 
represented and the small number of observations for many of them
31
. The detailed 
description of independent variables from HILDA is in Table D.1 in Appendix D.  
The examination of the well-being of Australian residents included a comparison of the life 
satisfaction and financial well-being of immigrant household heads with those of native-born 
household heads. Table 5.2 compares these and other characteristics of these sample groups 
from the HILDA survey. On average, foreign-born household heads are approximately four 
years older than their Australian-born counterparts, more educated but equally wealthy and 
earn a similar income. Immigrants have similar number of people residing in the same house 
but slightly fewer children under the age of 15. There are more males, fewer employed, more 
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 Out of 120 countries of birth, only 37 countries are represented by more than 30 observations.  
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house-owners and a higher percentage of married individuals among immigrants than among 
Australian-born people. Despite no difference in the earnings between these groups, 
immigrants are less likely to experience problems with paying basic bills, are more 
financially satisfied and have a higher level of self-reported financial prosperity. However, 
the higher level of financial well-being of immigrants does not imply that they experience 
greater life satisfaction. On the contrary, immigrants, in general, are less satisfied with their 
lives than their native-born counterparts, and this further justifies the need for detailed 
analysis of the causal relationship between income, financial well-being and overall well-being.  
Table 5.2 Characteristics of foreign-born and Australian-born household heads, HILDA 
(combined data for 2002 and 2006) 
Characteristics Australia-born Foreign-born  
Age 46.56 50.67*** 
 (17.40) (16.25) 
% male 58.86 60.81* 
% married (or de-facto) 54.52 61.92*** 
% employed 69.32 64.01*** 
Number of resident children   0.52 0.47** 
 (0.96) (0.90) 
Number of residents in household 2.43 2.46 
 (1.42) (1.37) 
Disposable income for financial year ($) 36,562 36,197 
 (27,611) (30,291) 
Household wealth ($) 488,797 506,242 
 (927,079) (998,157) 
Level of highest education achieved (%)   
No post-school qualification 45.37 40.47*** 
Bachelor degree or higher 21.22 27.06*** 
Other post-school qualification 33.41 32.47 
Housing arrangements (%)   
Own /pay mortgage 65.77 68.59*** 
Rent 30.71 29.15** 
Live rent free 3.53 2.26*** 
Life satisfaction (scale 0-10) 7.80 7.75* 
 (1.54) (1.61) 
Financial well-being    
% experienced inability to pay bills 24.67 19.30*** 
Raising $2,000 (scale 1-4) 1.70 1.68 
 (1.02) (1.02) 
Financial satisfaction (scale 0-10) 6.24 6.34** 
 (2.36) (2.27) 
Financial prosperity (scale 1-6) 3.72 3.78*** 
 (0.78) (0.81) 
Number of individuals 10,523 3,101 
179 
Notes: Mean values are reported unless otherwise stated. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. The sample is limited to the 
household heads aged 15 or older who have non-missing data on country of origin. *** indicates a significant difference 
from a native-born Australian at at least the 1% level, ** at at least the 5 % level 0.05, * at at least the 10% level, when 
mean-comparison t-test is used. 
As described in Chapter 2, a quarter of all immigrants surveyed in 2002 and 2006 were 
residents who arrived in Australia at least four decades ago. The arrival of the remaining 
three quarters was spread almost evenly from 1965 until the start of the survey, with the only 
substantial decrease in immigration (by half) in the late 1970s. More than half of the 
immigrants migrated as adults aged 20 or older. Finally, more than half of the foreign-born 
respondents originated from Europe and about quarter are from Asia.  
5.3.2 LSIA survey 
For the purposes of comparison and thoroughness, the above models were also applied to the 
second cohort from LSIA. The LSIA survey monitored three cohorts of immigrants; however, 
in this analysis only the second cohort was considered. This group was selected because of 
the detailed questionnaire used for interviews and the closeness of its survey period to the 
two years of the HILDA data. Although the immigrants in HILDA and LSIA arrived at 
different periods of time, their life satisfaction is likely to depend on the prevailing economic 
and social conditions at the time of their interviews. Hence, choosing similar survey periods 
allowed a comparison of the satisfaction of newly arrived immigrants as well as those who 
had been living in Australia for decades. LSIA2 observed immigrants interviewed shortly 
after their arrival from September 1999 to August 2000 and covered a wide variety of topics. 
LSIA1 had as many interview questions as LSIA2 for arrivals from September 1993 to 
August 1995 but it ended two years before the start of the HILDA survey in 2001. LSIA3, in 
contrast, included later arrivals between December 2004 and March 2005 but it had far fewer 
questions than LSIA1 and LSIA2. LSIA2 is thus the closest match to HILDA’s 2002 and 2006 data. 
Respondents from LSIA2 were also observed for two years, enabling a comparison with the 
results obtained using HILDA data. Because most of the LSIA questions were aimed at 
Primary Applicants for Australian Residency (hereafter referred to as Primary Applicants), 
the sample size for this part of the study was limited to 3,118 Primary Applicants whose 
former country of residence was different from Australia. This restriction makes this sample 
comparable to the immigrants in HILDA’s household-heads-only sample.  
Due to the absence of data on financial well-being, ‘life satisfaction’ is the only dependent 
variable in LSIA that matches closely the dependent variables in HILDA used for this 
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analysis. Similar to ‘life satisfaction’ in HILDA, it also expresses an individual’s own 
assessment of their satisfaction with life in Australia, albeit on a scale from 0 to 5, whereas 
10 is the maximum value in HILDA. Therefore, this ordered dependent variable can also be 
described by model (5.2).  
The independent variables in LSIA are similar to the independent variables in HILDA with a 
few exceptions. First, due to the absence of questions on the value of household wealth in 
LSIA, this characteristic is captured by information about financial assets brought to 
Australia on arrival and transferred to and from Australia. Second, income in LSIA, unlike in 
HILDA, is not described by exact values but only by levels and rounded to the nearest 
thousand. Third, the number of resident children of school age or under in LSIA2 substitutes 
for the number of resident children under the age of 15 in HILDA. Finally, Major Statistical 
Regions controls used in HILDA are replaced by State of Residence controls in LSIA due to 
the absence of the former in LSIA. All the variables used from LSIA are described in Table 
D.2 in Appendix D.  
Table 5.3 reports that, compared to immigrant household heads from HILDA, Primary 
Applicants surveyed under LSIA are younger by 14 years, have slightly fewer children, have 
a bigger household size and are less likely to be employed. The significant difference in age 
and the lower employment rate can be attributed to the LSIA sample consisting solely of 
newly arrived immigrants who had spent at most two and a half years in Australia. Due to the 
shorter residence of LSIA immigrants, higher percentage of Primary Applicants from this 
survey live with their extended families and friends rent-free (21 % compared to 2 % of 
household heads from HILDA) and only 20% of them, as opposed to 69% of comparable 
HILDA respondents, can afford their own housing. The percentage of male Primary 
Applicants is lower than the percentage of the male household heads, although the percentage 
of married individuals is not different. There is a higher proportion of bachelor or higher 
degree holders and a lower proportion of respondents without any post-school qualification 
among the Primary Applicants than among the immigrant household heads in HILDA (38% 
compared to 27%, and 36% compared to 41%, respectively). However, the household heads 
in HILDA have a higher percentage of those with other post-school qualifications (32% 
compared to 26% of Primary Applicants). Unlike in HILDA, most of the Primary Applicants 
in LSIA originate from Asia, with Europe having the second largest number of people 
migrating to Australia.   
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Table 5.3 Comparison of characteristics of Primary Applicants from LSIA (2001–2002 
data) and immigrant household heads from HILDA (2002 and 2006 data) 
Characteristics Primary Applicants 
(LSIA) 
Immigrant household 
heads (HILDA) 
Age 36.83 50.67*** 
 (13.11) (16.25) 
% male 53.95 60.81*** 
% married (or de-facto) 63.37 61.92 
% employed 44.93 64.01*** 
Number of resident children   0.31 0.47*** 
 (0.79) (0.90) 
Number of residents in household 3.56 2.46*** 
 (1.75) (1.37) 
Annual income  23,191  
 (27,130)  
Financial assets arrived with ($)  40,432     
 (135,449)  
Financial assets transferred to AUS ($)  16,095  
 (141,440)  
Financial assets transferred from AUS ($)  263  
 (4,317)  
Level of highest education achieved (%)   
No post-school qualification 35.88 40.47*** 
Bachelor degree or higher 38.31 27.06*** 
Other post-school qualification 25.81 32.47*** 
Housing arrangements (%)   
Own /pay mortgage 19.79 68.59*** 
Rent 59.14 29.15*** 
Live rent free 21.07 2.26*** 
Continent of origin (%):   
Asia 44.07 20.03*** 
Africa 8.76 5.42*** 
North America 4.57 2.10*** 
South America 2.47 1.90* 
Europe 29.12 57.40*** 
Oceania
a
 3.40 13.06*** 
Number of individuals 6,236 3,101 
 
Notes: Mean values are reported unless otherwise stated. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. The LSIA sample is limited 
to the Australian immigrants who were Primary Applicants for Australian Residency and who are aged 15 or older. The 
HILDA sample is limited to the household heads aged 15 or older who have non-missing data on country of origin. 
***indicates a significant difference between Primary Applicants (LSIA) and household heads (HILDA) at at least the 1% 
level, ** at at least the 5 % level 0.05, * at at least the 10% level, when mean-comparison t-test is used. 
 
aIncludes 2798 Primary Applicants for Australian visa from LSIA who were born in Australia but whose former country of 
residence is different from Australia.  
 
182 
Most of the Primary Applicants’ financial assets were brought into Australia during migration 
with only a small amount of less than $300 being transferred from the country after their 
migration. The average of their annual income is just above $20,000, which is well below the 
average disposable income received by Australian household heads interviewed under 
HILDA. This is consistent with the Primary Applicants having a lower employment rate than 
the household heads in HILDA. 
5.4 Empirical results 
The findings are presented in the following order in this chapter: first, using HILDA and 
LSIA data, what determines the well-being of Australian residents, and whether it differs for 
Australians born overseas, was examined; second, a similar examination was carried out for 
the financial well-being of Australian residents using HILDA data only; and finally, whether 
the detected differences in financial and general well-being can be explained by 
characteristics of immigrants’ home countries was investigated by using the immigrant-only 
sample from HILDA and the LSIA sample. The Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square statistic was 
used to test whether at least one of the regression coefficients in the ordered dependent 
variable model was not equal to zero and all models passed this test. Similarly, the probit 
model used for the estimation of the inability to pay bills passed the Wald Chi-Square test. As 
before, all analyses were performed with STATA version 11. 
5.4.1 General well-being of Australian residents 
This analysis commenced with the comparison of living standards of LSIA immigrants in 
Australia with their standards of living in their home countries in the year prior to migration. 
Table 5.4 indicates that almost 80 per cent of Primary Applicants in the sample were at least 
able to meet all their basic needs in their home countries. This percentage is equally 
distributed between those who could afford spending on goods and services beyond basic 
needs and those who were just making ends meet (40 per cent each). The Australian lifestyle 
changes this pattern, putting the majority of Primary Applicants (55 per cent) into the middle 
group whose weekly available money is just enough to cover all basic expenses. P-value for 
the Person’s chi-square test indicates that these differences in the distribution of Primary 
Applicants before and after migration are significant. 
As shown in Table 5.4, immigrants do not benefit in terms of their relative well-being when 
they resettle, at least in accordance with Australian standards. In particular, the percentage of 
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those who were more than able to meet all basic needs in their home countries has fallen and 
the percentage of people who had difficulty in paying essential expenses remains almost 
unchanged.  
Table 5.4 Distribution of LSIA respondents by levels of living standards in Australia 
and living standards before migration (combined data for 2001–2002) 
Amount of money 
available each week 
after migration 
Living standards in the former country of residence in 
the last 12 months before migration 
Total 
Less than able to 
meet all basic needs 
Able to meet 
all basic needs 
More than able to 
meet all basic needs 
Not enough to meet all 
basic needs 
462 
 
460 
 
210  
 
1,132 
(19.65%)                
Enough to meet all 
basic needs 
652 
 
1,447 
 
1,045 
 
3,144 
(54.57%)          
More than enough to 
meet all basic needs 
70 
 
388 
 
1,027 
 
1,485 
(25.78%)            
Total 1,184 
(20.55%)       
2,295 
(39.84%)       
2,282 
(39.61%) 
5,761 
(100%)         
 
Notes: Results are based on the data from the LSIA survey. The sample is limited to the Australian immigrants 
who were Primary Applicants for Australian Residency and who are aged 15 or older. )14.994(
2 P =0.00 on 4 
degrees of freedom.  
This proposition was also tested by comparing the life satisfaction of Australian-born 
individuals with that of foreign-born Australian residents using HILDA data. The model (5.2) 
with a dummy, which is equal to 1 if an individual was born in Australia and 0 otherwise, 
was applied to the 2002 and 2006 data from the HILDA dataset. Table 5.5 presents the 
outcome of this estimate. 
In agreement with the summary statistics in Table 5.2, these results suggest that foreign-born 
Australian residents are less satisfied with their lives than their native-born counterparts. 
There are other personal characteristics of Australian residents that determine their well-
being. For example, people with post-school qualifications report lower levels of satisfaction 
than their less educated counterparts. Living in their own house makes people more satisfied 
than renting, but this satisfaction decreases with every additional adult added to the 
household. In addition, married household heads demonstrate a higher life satisfaction than 
their single counterparts. Participation in the workforce, a higher income and a higher level of 
wealth are also positively associated with an individual’s life satisfaction. Men are less 
satisfied with life than women and, with age, this unhappiness increases. From the age of 37, 
however, the happiness level starts to increase, indicating that at this age it is at its minimum.  
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Table 5.5 Factors affecting life satisfaction of Australian households, HILDA (panel 
data for 2002 and 2006) 
 
Variables 
 
Life 
satisfaction Variables 
Life 
satisfaction 
Income 0.0310*** Employment status (Employed=base case): 
 (0.0119) Unemployed -0.238*** 
Wealth 0.000600***  (0.0568) 
 (0.000113) Not in labour force -0.0835*** 
Age -0.0316***  (0.0281) 
 (0.00320) Housing arrangements: 
(Own/Pay mortgage=base case) 
Age squared 0.000428*** Rent -0.0851*** 
 (0.0000313)  (0.0227) 
Gender (1 if male) -0.0461** Rent free -0.00444 
 (0.0197)  (0.0515) 
No. of children 0.00713   
 (0.0152) Born in Australia 0.0370* 
No. of persons -0.0303***  (0.0220) 
 (0.0117) Year (=1 if 2006) 0.00768 
Marital status (Married=base case):  (0.0208) 
Previously married -0.397***   
 (0.0274) Log likelihood -23344 
Never been married -0.286*** Pseudo R -squared 0.0235 
 (0.0292)   
 Level of highest education: 
(No post-school qualification=base case) 
   
Bachelor degree or higher -0.0660*** Observations 13618 
 (0.0212)   
Other post-school  -0.114***   
qualification (0.0248)   
 
Notes: Results are based on the data from the HILDA survey. The dependent variable is life satisfaction. In 
addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also include MSR controls, which are not reported 
due to low significance. The sample is limited to the household heads aged 15 or older who have non-missing 
data on country of origin. Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. *** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates 
p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
Many of the above effects on well-being are consistent with the findings in other countries 
(Oswald 1997). For example, the higher levels of happiness reported by women, employed 
and married individuals in HILDA reflect a general pattern worldwide. As is the case for 
other countries, the relation of the happiness of Australian household heads to their age is 
also U-shaped with a similar minimum point. Although the negative effect of having post-
school education by HILDA respondents contradicts general findings, it is supported by the 
evidence obtained by Clark and Oswald (1996). They suggested that the satisfaction of 
British workers decreases with the increase in their educational attainment due either to 
higher aspirations induced by education or to other unknown factors. Similarly, in agreement 
with Van Praag, Frijters and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2003), every additional member of a 
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household, except children, reduces the life satisfaction of a household head, possibly by 
affecting their financial, housing and leisure satisfactions.  
The higher levels of happiness among respondents with a higher income, reported worldwide 
(Oswald 1997), are also evident among HILDA respondents. This suggests that the life 
satisfaction of immigrants should increase if their income in Australia is higher than what it 
used to be before migration. In fact, Table 5.2 shows that their average income is comparable 
with that of Australian-born residents. Nevertheless, immigrants are less satisfied with their 
lives, implying that some qualities of their well-being deteriorate after migration. The 
subsequent analysis concentrated on the financial aspects of the well-being of Australian 
residents and examined whether these aspects differ for those born outside Australia.  
5.4.2 Financial well-being of Australian household heads   
The analysis of the financial well-being of Australian residents was carried out by using both 
objective and subjective measures. Financial well-being can be objectively measured by an 
individual’s material conditions, such as their ability to pay bills and their ability to raise 
$2,000 in an emergency. Using individual beliefs about their financial situation can provide a 
different perspective on their financial well-being. For example, recent economic research 
has suggested that people’s well-being depends on their position relative to others around 
them (Clark & Oswald 1996; Easterlin 1995; Stutzer & Frey 2010). Hence, using people’s 
own assessment of their financial satisfaction and financial prosperity, in addition to objective 
measures, should enable a more comprehensive analysis of their financial well-being.  
Consequently, the next step of the analysis examined the determinants of the financial well-
being of Australian residents represented by four dependent variables. As discussed in the 
Data and Methodology section, ‘inability to pay bills’ is a dichotomous variable which is 
equal to 1 if the household head experienced difficulties with paying essential expenses in the 
previous year; ‘raising $2,000’ measures their difficulty with raising $2,000 in an emergency; 
‘financial satisfaction’ is an individual’s own assessment of their satisfaction with their 
financial situation on a scale from 0 to 10; and ‘financial prosperity’ is self-assessed 
individual prosperity given current needs and financial responsibilities on a scale from 1 to 6. 
These variables are not available in LSIA, hence model (5.1) and model (5.2) were applied 
only to HILDA data. To investigate whether financial well-being differs between native-born 
and foreign-born household heads, these models were augmented with a dummy which is 
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equal to 1 if an individual was born in Australia and 0 otherwise. The findings are reported in 
Table 5.6.  
Table 5.6 Factors affecting inability to pay bills on time, difficulty in raising $2,000, 
financial satisfaction and financial prosperity of Australian households, HILDA (panel 
data for 2002 and 2006) 
Variables 
 
 
Inability to pay bills 
 
Raising $2,000 
 
Financial 
satisfaction 
Financial 
prosperity 
Income -0.0724*** -0.179*** 0.136*** 0.173*** 
 (0.0222) (0.0151) (0.0118) (0.0136) 
Wealth -0.00489*** -0.00547*** 0.00221*** 0.00328*** 
 (0.000483) (0.000286) (0.000118) (0.000130) 
Age 0.0187** 0.0250*** -0.0602*** -0.0543*** 
 (0.00813) (0.00420) (0.00317) (0.00372) 
Age squared -0.000559*** -0.000420*** 0.000753*** 0.000572*** 
 (0.0000853) (0.0000421) (0.0000312) (0.0000365) 
Gender (1 if male) -0.181*** -0.248*** 0.0651*** 0.0224 
 (0.0473) (0.0252) (0.0194) (0.0223) 
No. of children 0.0953*** -0.0258 -0.0259* -0.0421** 
 (0.0344) (0.0195) (0.0150) (0.0175) 
No. of persons 0.0631** 0.147*** -0.0547*** -0.0621*** 
 (0.0272) (0.0152) (0.0115) (0.0136) 
Marital status (Married=base case):    
Previously married 0.574*** 0.414*** -0.302*** -0.352*** 
 (0.0666) (0.0348) (0.0269) (0.0310) 
Never been married 0.314*** 0.239*** -0.124*** -0.212*** 
 (0.0663) (0.0368) (0.0287) (0.0335) 
Level of highest education (No post-school qualification=base case): 
Bachelor degree or higher -0.0762 -0.101*** 0.00982 0.0324 
 (0.0503) (0.0270) (0.0209) (0.0241) 
Other post-school  -0.462*** -0.449*** 0.131*** 0.362*** 
qualification (0.0622) (0.0331) (0.0245) (0.0280) 
     
Employment status: (Employed=base case)    
Unemployed 1.122*** 0.715*** -0.758*** -0.580*** 
 (0.123) (0.0690) (0.0566) (0.0661) 
Not in labour force 0.499*** 0.449*** -0.259*** -0.235*** 
 (0.0658) (0.0361) (0.0278) (0.0318) 
Housing arrangements (Own/Pay mortgage=base case):   
Rent 0.562*** 0.545*** -0.333*** -0.376*** 
 (0.0516) (0.0287) (0.0225) (0.0261) 
Rent free -0.0649 -0.0645 -0.0364 0.0907 
 (0.123) (0.0679) (0.0507) (0.0588) 
Born in Australia 0.0892 -0.0676** -0.0255 -0.0647*** 
 (0.0553) (0.0290) (0.0217) (0.0250) 
Year (=1 if 2006)  -0.330*** 0.223*** 0.192*** 
  (0.0270) (0.0206) (0.0237) 
Constant -0.426*    
 (0.295)    
Log likelihood -5208 -10933 -28192 -12809 
Pseudo R -squared  0.150 0.0519 0.0953 
Observations 11798 11977 13618 12087 
 
Notes: Results are based on the data from the HILDA survey. The dependent variables are inability to pay bills on time, 
difficulty in raising $2,000 in an emergency, financial satisfaction and financial prosperity. In addition to the coefficients 
reported above, the regressions also include MSR controls, which are not reported due to low significance. The sample is 
limited to the household heads aged 15 or older who have non-missing data on country of origin. Standard errors are 
indicated in parentheses. *** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
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Similarly to the general well-being of Australian residents, their financial well-being is 
positively associated with their income and wealth and negatively associated with adding an 
additional person to the household. As is the case for general well-being, greater levels of 
financial well-being are also experienced by employed and married individuals, and this well-
being declines up to a certain age when it starts to increase. These turning points, however, 
vary for different measures of financial well-being. Specifically, the ‘inability to pay bills’ 
and ‘raising $2,000’ are highest at the age of 17 and 29 respectively and decline after that. 
This suggests that the initial increase in financial difficulty could be attributable to a young 
age and a lack of experience. Financial prosperity and financial satisfaction reach minimum 
values much later in life – at the ages of 48 and 40 respectively – and start to increase after 
these turning points. Plagnol (2011) suggested that the increase in financial satisfaction in old 
age could be explained by less emotional strain due to decreases in debt. 
Men experience less financial difficulty with paying bills and raising cash in an emergency 
and higher financial satisfaction, in contrast with the findings by Van Praag, Frijters and 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2003). Levels of financial prosperity do not differ between male and 
female respondents. Having resident children under the age of 15 negatively affects 
households’ financial prosperity and financial satisfaction and increases their odds of not 
paying bills on time but does not impact on their ability to raise adequate emergency funds 
when required. Paying rent, compared to owning a house, is associated with higher levels of 
financial difficulty, which could reflect the inability to buy a house rather than be caused by 
renting per se. Subsequently, paying rent is also associated with lower financial satisfaction 
and financial prosperity, which explains the negative effect on general life satisfaction.  
Overall, the effects of personal characteristics on financial well-being are similar to the 
effects on general well-being, with a few exceptions. The first exception is that men 
experience higher financial satisfaction but report lower life satisfaction. This suggests that 
the factors which decrease their life satisfaction are not related to finances but to other issues 
which are strong enough to counter-balance men’s financial advantages. Additionally, 
although every additional resident child decreases the financial well-being of the household 
head, this is not so important as to affect their overall life satisfaction. Another exception is 
that post-school education, mostly below bachelor degree, improves the financial well-being 
of Australian residents but reduces their general well-being. Its positive effect on financial 
well-being could be explained by better job prospects with a post-school qualification, 
although it is not always the case for bachelor or higher degree holders. This positive effect, 
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however, can be outweighed by the negative effects of education on other areas, such as 
unrealistically high expectations of housing conditions or not having sufficient leisure time 
(Van Praag, Frijters & Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2003). Similarly, although being born in a country 
other than Australia affects an individual’s assessment of their life satisfaction, it matters for 
only two out of four measurements of their financial well-being. 
The financial difficulty in raising $2,000 in an emergency and financial prosperity are the 
measurements which differ for Australians born overseas. Compared with the data in Table 
5.2, the differences in the mean values of the inability to pay bills and financial satisfaction 
disappear once explanatory variables are included. The inclusion of regressors also shows 
that immigrants’ difficulty in raising $2,000 exceeds that of Australian-born residents despite 
their equal mean values. Immigrants’ assessment of their own prosperity is higher than that of 
Australian-born individuals, consistent with the data in Table 5.2. Unlike the estimation of 
life satisfaction, the estimation of financial satisfaction does not show any difference between 
immigrants and native-born household heads. Thus, a change in life satisfaction does not 
necessarily mean a change in financial satisfaction since overall well-being depends on the 
satisfaction experienced in various domains of life (Plagnol 2011).  
According to the estimates of the objective measures of financial well-being in Table 5.6, 
immigrants do not have more financial problems with paying basic expenses such as food and 
electricity than Australian-born residents. Nevertheless, they might struggle more with raising 
emergency funds when required. Provided that there is no significant difference in the income 
and wealth between native and foreign-born Australians, this could mean that immigrants 
have fewer assets that could easily be converted to cash or that they do not have as many 
friends who can lend them money as native-born residents do. This is consistent with the 
findings that immigrants in the US have lower precautionary savings than US-born people 
(Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo 2002) and, as argued in Chapter 3, it is also consistent with 
immigrant households in Australia saving less than comparable Australian-born households. 
In addition, higher living expenses in Australia reduce the importance of the absolute value of 
income and put more emphasis on its relative value. For example, the presumably higher 
income of immigrants to Australia relative to their income in their home country is just 
enough to cover their basic needs in Australia but not sufficient for raising adequate funds in 
an emergency.  
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The analysis of the subjective measures of financial well-being suggests that although 
immigrants’ financial satisfaction is not different from that of native-born residents, 
immigrants report a higher level of financial prosperity. This seeming contradiction in the 
results may be caused by the increased income aspirations associated with a higher income in 
Australia. High enough aspirations can counterbalance a reported positive effect of income 
on an individual’s financial satisfaction. Financial prosperity, on the other hand, is not 
affected, as it is possibly more related to immigrants’ assessment of their prosperity based on 
their status before arrival in Australia.  
Stutzer (2004) identified the adjustment of individuals to their past experience and their 
social comparison with others as the two key processes which form individual aspirations. 
Firstly, according to him, satisfaction depends on change and disappears with continued 
consumption. This means that HILDA immigrants have already adjusted to their improved 
financial position since arrival in Australia and hence their assessment of their own financial 
satisfaction is not different from that of Australian-born residents. At the same time, they are 
still making comparisons with the past and this is reflected in their view of their own 
financial prosperity.  
Secondly, according to Stutzer, individual aspirations are also affected by people’s relative 
position in society: having rich fellow residents increases one’s aspirations (Stutzer 2004). 
Although income has a positive effect on both financial satisfaction and financial prosperity, 
equal levels of income between native and foreign-born Australians imply equal levels of 
financial satisfaction. In contrast, the higher self-assessed level of financial prosperity by 
immigrants reflects their comparison with their financial situation before migration. Hence, 
some characteristics of immigrants’ home countries can also play an important role in 
determining their financial well-being in Australia. Immigrants carry their own customs and 
beliefs when they migrate to another country and this might be reflected in their assessment 
of their own financial situation.  
5.4.3 Country-of-origin effects on general well-being and financial well-being 
The findings described above show that self-assessed general well-being is higher for native-
born Australians than for foreign-born Australians. This tendency is shown in only one 
component of financial well-being: immigrants experience greater financial difficulty in 
raising $2,000 for an emergency than their native-born counterparts. On the other hand, the 
levels of financial satisfaction of both groups and their ability to pay basic bills do not differ. 
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Moreover, financial prosperity is rated higher for foreign-born than for Australian-born 
residents. This suggests that differences in the general well-being of immigrants to Australia 
relative to native-born Australians could be driven by factors different from finances, such as 
the characteristics of immigrants’ home countries. Home-country effects can also be present 
in immigrants’ assessment of their financial situation; hence, the presence of these effects 
was investigated for both the general well-being and the financial well-being of immigrants. 
HILDA data were applied to both analyses, whereas the limitation of the LSIA data permitted 
only an analysis of immigrants’ general well-being.    
5.4.3.1 Country-of-origin effects on life satisfaction and financial well-being of 
immigrant household heads from HILDA 
First, it was  investigated whether home-country effects could contribute to the difference in 
general well-being and components of financial well-being between Australian-born and non-
Australian-born residents by using HILDA data. For this purpose, model (5.2) was applied to 
the immigrant-only sample with ‘raising $2,000’, ‘financial prosperity’ and ‘life satisfaction’ 
as variables of interest. Additional independent variables included the continent of the 
immigrant’s home country and the length of their residence in Australia. Continent of origin 
is supposed to capture home-country effects and the duration of Australian residence is 
supposed to account for the degree of assimilation with the local population. The results of 
this exercise are reported in Table 5.7.  
According to this table, the effect of personal characteristics on immigrants’ well-being is 
similar to those for all Australian residents, with a few exceptions. The first exception is that, 
although immigrants’ well-being and their financial well-being are both U-shaped in age, 
their minimum points, on average, are reached later in life than for whole population. For 
example, the greatest difficulty in raising emergency funds is experienced by 38-year-old 
immigrants (9 years later than that experienced by an average Australian resident), whereas 
the least financially prosperous and the least satisfied with their lives are immigrants aged 50 
and 40 respectively (compared to 48 and 37 year-old Australian residents). Similarly, a 
positive association of never-married status compared to being married with an ability to 
raise $2,000 and its negative association with financial prosperity disappear when the sample 
is limited to immigrants. These two exceptions could probably be explained by immigrants 
being, on average, older and having a higher percentage of married individuals than native-
born Australians, who dominate the HILDA sample. Another exception is that, unlike in the 
average Australian household, the number of resident children in an immigrant household 
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does not affect the household’s financial prosperity. In addition, the absence of the previously 
detected negative effect of having a bachelor degree or higher on the difficulty in raising 
$2,000 and life satisfaction could be explained by the lower percentage of the holders of this 
type of degree among immigrants than among Australian-born people. Similarly, the number 
of household members and paying rent compared to living in one’s own house do not play 
any roles in immigrants’ own assessment of their life satisfaction. This, however, is not the 
case when Australian-born residents are added to the sample.   
The life satisfaction of immigrants does not depend on income but is still dependent on 
household wealth. The independence of income is unexpected as higher income increases 
immigrants’ ability to raise $2,000 in an emergency and their own assessments of their 
financial prosperity. The absence of income effect is even more surprising in view of the 
previously detected positive role that income plays in the life satisfaction of an average 
Australian household head. This finding underlines the importance of non-monetary factors 
in accessing immigrants’ well-being, albeit greater wealth is still positively associated with 
their life satisfaction. Considering the similar mean values of wealth reported by Australian-
born and foreign-born individuals but the lower life satisfaction of the latter group, 
immigrants require a higher value of wealth to be satisfied with their lives in Australia. Their 
greater need for wealth could be attributed to being new to the country and, accordingly, 
having a greater need for capital outlay such as a house or a car. The wealth effect on 
immigrants’ life satisfaction, however, is not as strong as that on their financial well-being. 
Thus, the lower well-being of immigrants relative to native-born Australians cannot be 
caused solely by a change in immigrants’ financial situation but would also be due to other 
immigrant-specific factors.  
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Table 5.7 Factors affecting difficulty in raising $2,000, financial prosperity and life satisfaction 
of immigrants to Australia when continents of origin are controlled for, HILDA (panel data for 
2002 and 2006) 
Variables  Raising $2,000  Financial prosperity Life satisfaction 
Income -0.100*** 0.124*** 0.0271 
 (0.0287) (0.0249) (0.0219) 
Wealth -0.00978*** 0.00339*** 0.000425* 
 (0.000930) (0.000267) (0.000220) 
Age 0.0280*** -0.0669*** -0.0382*** 
 (0.0103) (0.00909) (0.00760) 
Age squared -0.000370*** 0.000663*** 0.000483*** 
 (0.0000995) (0.0000862) (0.0000717) 
Gender (1 if male) -0.283*** 0.0136 -0.0861** 
 (0.0550) (0.0480) (0.0417) 
No. of children -0.0471 -0.0512 0.0337 
 (0.0450) (0.0394) (0.0334) 
No. of persons 0.153*** -0.0552* -0.0107 
 (0.0349) (0.0307) (0.0251) 
Marital status (Married=base case):    
Previously married 0.467*** -0.334*** -0.378*** 
 (0.0731) (0.0642) (0.0555) 
Never been married 0.0651 -0.0338 -0.180*** 
 (0.0909) (0.0804) (0.0696) 
Level of highest education (No post-school qualification=base case): 
Bachelor degree or higher -0.0220 0.0741 -0.0152 
 (0.0594) (0.0517) (0.0453) 
Other post-school  -0.315*** 0.299*** -0.139*** 
qualification (0.0686) (0.0580) (0.0508) 
Employment status(Employed=base case):    
Unemployed 0.803*** -0.631*** -0.489*** 
 (0.161) (0.151) (0.120) 
Not in labour force 0.498*** -0.210*** -0.141** 
 (0.0773) (0.0662) (0.0586) 
Housing arrangements(Own/Pay mortgage=base case):  
Rent 0.339*** -0.355*** -0.0371 
 (0.0645) (0.0546) (0.0474) 
Rent free -0.0736 0.0194 -0.154 
 (0.175) (0.146) (0.128) 
Continents (Oceania=base case):    
Asia 0.0597 -0.0113 -0.146** 
 (0.0920) (0.0801) (0.0695) 
Africa 0.202 -0.274** -0.136 
 (0.128) (0.111) (0.0961) 
North America 0.0901 -0.0977 0.0932 
 (0.200) (0.163) (0.142) 
South America 0.304* -0.239 -0.183 
 (0.185) (0.169) (0.145) 
Europe -0.0150 0.00435 -0.0721 
 (0.0828) (0.0706) (0.0624) 
Years in Australia -0.00567** -0.000051 0.00348** 
 (0.00228) (0.00190) (0.00167) 
Year (=1 if 2006) -0.217*** 0.115** 0.0185 
 (0.0571) (0.0486) (0.0425) 
Log likelihood -2326 -2914 -5397 
Pseudo R -squared 0.153 0.0904 0.0243 
Observations 2635 2670 3091 
 
Notes: Results are based on the data from the HILDA survey. The dependent variables are difficulty in raising $2,000 in an emergency, 
financial prosperity and life satisfaction. In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also include MSR controls, which are 
not reported due to low significance. The sample is limited to the immigrant household heads aged 15 or older who have non-missing data 
on country of origin. Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. *** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
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Immigrants’ well-being also depends on the duration of their residence in Australia. For 
example, immigrants who have spent a longer time in Australia have higher levels of life 
satisfaction and less difficulty in raising $2,000 in an emergency. This indicates that, as time 
passes, there is assimilation with the native-born population in terms of these two measures 
of well-being. The self-assessment of immigrants’ own financial prosperity, in contrast, 
remains unchanged, suggesting that even after long time they are still making comparisons of 
their current financial status with their past status.  
This country-of-origin effect is evident only for immigrants from Africa and Asia, and 
marginally for immigrants from South America. In particular, financial prosperity is lower for 
people who have migrated from Africa relative to the base case of Oceania. However, their 
ability to raise $2,000 and their life satisfaction do not differ from those of the base group. 
Immigrants from South America report similar levels of life satisfaction and financial 
prosperity to those of immigrants from Oceania, but they have slightly higher difficulty in 
raising $2,000 in an emergency. The only group of immigrants who have significantly lower 
satisfaction with life compared to the base group come from Asia, despite there being no 
difference in the components of their financial well-being.  
The robustness of these findings can be checked by including other variables which could 
potentially affect immigrants’ well-being and could also characterise their countries of origin. 
The different backgrounds of immigrants can be described not only by the location of their 
home country but also by their religion. Furthermore, religious denomination, as argued by 
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006), can be treated as exogenous due to delayed cultural 
adjustment, and this can reduce the risks of the reverse causality problem. Hence, the 
dominant religion in the country of origin was added to the previous regressions, and the 
updated results are presented in Table 5.8.   
The inclusion of this variable confirms the results for immigrants from Africa but not from 
other continents. Specifically, the sign and significance of coefficient on African continent 
for the assessment of immigrants’ own financial prosperity does not change. What is more, 
originating from this continent is now also negatively associated with the ability to raise 
$2,000, while this is no longer applicable to immigrants from the South American continent. 
This confirms the financial disadvantage of household heads originated from Africa relative 
to their counterparts from Oceania, which is expressed not only in their lower financial 
prosperity but also in greater difficulty in raising funds in an emergency. In contrast, the life 
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satisfaction of immigrants from Asia is no longer lower than the life satisfaction of 
immigrants from the Pacific Islands, although there is a marginally significant difference in 
the levels of financial prosperity. Life satisfaction, in general, does not differ between 
migrants from different continents.  
Religion does not show any significant effect on immigrants’ ability to raise $2,000 and their 
life satisfaction, but immigrants following Islam, Buddhism or Hinduism report higher 
financial prosperity than Christians. This is not consistent with the findings reported in 
Chapter 3 that Muslims and Buddhists have lower saving rates than Christians; however, the 
dominance of Christians among the respondents and the small size of the sample preclude 
further analysis. Despite religion having no influence on life satisfaction, it absorbs the 
negative effect of the Asian continent detected in Table 5.7, indicating that this negative 
coefficient is caused by Asia having the most diverse religious environment. In particular, as 
can be seen in Table D.3 in Appendix D, immigrants from Asia, unlike immigrants from 
other continents, have representatives from all religious groups. Additionally, Asian 
immigrants have the smallest percentage of Christians, who represent the majority of the 
Australian population and are used as the base case. All the migrants from Oceania and most 
of the migrants from Africa, in contrast, are from countries following the Christian religion 
and, accordingly, have similar levels of life satisfaction in both Table 5.7 and Table 5.8. Their 
ability to raise spare cash and their levels of financial prosperity, however, are different even 
when accounting for their home countries’ dominant religion.  
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Table 5.8 Factors affecting difficulty in raising $2,000, financial prosperity and life 
satisfaction of immigrants to Australia when continents of origin and home country’s 
religion are controlled for, HILDA (panel data for 2002 and 2006) 
Variables  Raising $2,000 
 
Financial prosperity Life satisfaction 
Income -0.103*** 0.124*** 0.0226 
 (0.0289) (0.0250) (0.0220) 
Wealth -0.00977*** 0.00343*** 0.000453** 
 (0.000933) (0.000268) (0.000220) 
Age 0.0286*** -0.0678*** -0.0384*** 
 (0.0104) (0.00911) (0.00761) 
Age squared -0.000376*** 0.000673*** 0.000484*** 
 (0.0000997) (0.0000864) (0.0000717) 
Gender (1 if male) -0.277*** 0.00487 -0.0871** 
 (0.0552) (0.0482) (0.0418) 
No. of children -0.0458 -0.0529 0.0332 
 (0.0451) (0.0395) (0.0334) 
No. of persons 0.153*** -0.0570* -0.0130 
 (0.0350) (0.0307) (0.0252) 
Marital status (Married=base case):    
Previously married 0.469*** -0.340*** -0.381*** 
 (0.0731) (0.0643) (0.0555) 
Never been married 0.0656 -0.0308 -0.180*** 
 (0.0910) (0.0805) (0.0696) 
Level of highest education(No post-school qualification=base case): 
 
 
Bachelor degree or higher -0.0238 0.0784 -0.0146 
 (0.0594) (0.0518) (0.0454) 
Other post-school  -0.311*** 0.301*** -0.131** 
qualification (0.0688) (0.0582) (0.0511) 
Employment status(Employed=base case):    
Unemployed 0.806*** -0.635*** -0.496*** 
 (0.161) (0.151) (0.120) 
Not in labour force 0.505*** -0.222*** -0.143** 
 (0.0775) (0.0664) (0.0587) 
Housing arrangements: 
(Own/Pay mortgage=base case) 
   
Rent 0.337*** -0.359*** -0.0449 
 (0.0647) (0.0548) (0.0475) 
Rent free -0.0731 0.00936 -0.159 
 (0.175) (0.146) (0.129) 
Continents (Oceania=base case):    
Asia 0.151 -0.210* -0.144 
 (0.129) (0.116) (0.101) 
Africa 0.257* -0.392*** -0.159 
 (0.135) (0.117) (0.101) 
North America 0.0857 -0.0944 0.0909 
 (0.200) (0.164) (0.142) 
South America 0.302 -0.237 -0.184 
 (0.185) (0.169) (0.145) 
Europe -0.0184 0.0116 -0.0682 
 (0.0828) (0.0707) (0.0624) 
Religion (Christian=base case):    
Muslims -0.149 0.341*** 0.0589 
 (0.132) (0.118) (0.0998) 
Buddhists -0.0380 0.239* 0.0434 
 (0.153) (0.138) (0.117) 
Chinese  -0.197 0.0728 -0.223 
Universists (0.217) (0.182) (0.161) 
Hindus -0.187 0.318** 0.0745 
 (0.181) (0.158) (0.137) 
Non-religious -0.0673 0.0210 -0.252* 
 (0.182) (0.161) (0.140) 
Years in Australia -0.00553** -0.000498 0.00329** 
 (0.00229) (0.00191) (0.00167) 
Year (=1 if 2006) -0.221*** 0.117** 0.0151 
 (0.0572) (0.0486) (0.0426) 
Log likelihood -2325 -2910 -5394 
Pseudo R -squared 0.153 0.0917 0.0249 
Observations 2635 2670 3091 
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Notes: Results are based on the data from the HILDA survey. The dependent variables are difficulty in raising $2,000 in an 
emergency, financial prosperity and life satisfaction. In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also 
include MSR controls, which are not reported due to low significance. The sample is limited to immigrant household heads 
aged 15 or older who have non-missing data on country of origin. Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. *** indicates 
p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
5.4.3.2 Country-of-origin effect on life satisfaction of Primary Applicants from LSIA 
The approach described in the previous subsection was also applied to the ‘life satisfaction’ 
from LSIA. Accordingly, model (5.2) was first augmented by additional controls for 
immigrant’s continents of origin and applied to the sample of Primary Applicants. Years of 
Australian residence are not relevant in this context since all LSIA respondents, unlike 
immigrants from HILDA, were new to the country at the time of the survey, and their first 
interview was carried out just five or six months after their arrival. At the next stage, 
dominant religion in an immigrant’s home country was added to the regression. Due to the 
similarity of estimates at both stages, only results with both continent of origin and religion 
controls are presented in Table 5.9
32
.  
In contrast with the immigrant sample from HILDA, the analysis using LSIA data found that 
income has a significant positive effect on the life satisfaction of Australian immigrants. 
Different definitions of income in both surveys suggest that it is not the absolute value of 
income that matters but whether a person belongs to a particular income group. Financial 
assets transferred to Australia after arrival are positively associated with immigrants’ life 
satisfaction, but assets arrived with and those transferred from Australia are not associated 
with life satisfaction. The perceived insignificance of the assets arrived with in Australia 
could be attributed to the individuals adjusting to the consumption level provided by these 
assets, and consequently developing higher aspirations. Assets transferred to Australia 
increase immigrants’ satisfaction by providing fresh stimulus, whereas the low value of assets 
transferred out of the country, as reported in Table 5.3, does not allow for any definite 
conclusion.  
  
                                                 
32
 The outcomes of the model controlling for continent of origin, but not home country’s religion, are presented 
in Table D.4 in Appendix D. 
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Table 5.9 Factors affecting life satisfaction of immigrants to Australia when continents 
of origin and home country’s religion are controlled for, LSIA (panel data for 2001–
2002) 
 
Variables 
 
Life 
satisfaction Variables 
Life 
satisfaction 
  Housing arrangements: 
(Own/Pay mortgage=base case) 
Income 0.0415*** Rent -0.0426 
 (0.00582)  (0.0439) 
Fin. assets arrived with -0.000268 Rent free 0.120** 
 (0.00135)  (0.0600) 
Fin. assets transferred to AUS 0.00289* Continents (Oceania=base case): 
 (0.00158) Asia 0.00459 
Fin. assets transferred from AUS 0.00716  (0.0959) 
 (0.0222) Africa 0.0687 
Age -0.0213***  (0.100) 
 (0.00749) North America 0.0608 
Age squared 0.000294***  (0.110) 
 (0.0000833) South America -0.0649 
Gender (1 if male) 0.0252  (0.125) 
 (0.0347) Europe -0.0788 
No. of children -0.0368  (0.0891) 
 (0.0233)   
No. of persons -0.00267 Dominant religion in country of origin: 
(Christian=base case) 
 (0.0107) Muslims -0.165*** 
Marital status (Married=base case):  (0.0516) 
Previously married -0.0522 Buddhists -0.218*** 
 (0.0613)  (0.0719) 
Never been married -0.105** Chinese  -0.239** 
 (0.0435) Universists (0.0944) 
Level of highest education: 
(No post-school qualification=base case) 
Hindus -0.323*** 
Bachelor degree or higher -0.108**  (0.0882) 
 (0.0429) Non-religious -0.564*** 
Other post-school  -0.182***  (0.0686) 
qualification (0.0408)   
  Year (=1 if 2001)  -0.00126 
Employment status (Employed=base case):  (0.0352) 
Unemployed -0.280***   
 (0.0697) Log likelihood -5061 
Not in labour force -0.0369 Pseudo R -squared 0.0354 
 (0.0499) Observations 5641 
 
Notes: Results are based on the data from the LSIA survey. The dependent variable is life satisfaction. In 
addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also include Australian State of Residence controls, 
which are not reported due to low significance. The sample is limited to Primary Applicants for Australian 
Residency aged 15 or older who have non-missing data on country of origin. Standard errors are indicated in 
parentheses. *** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
The effects of other personal characteristics of LSIA immigrants on their life satisfaction are 
similar to those detected earlier in this study and in other studies. The relationship between 
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life satisfaction and age is U-shaped, with minimum satisfaction reached at the age of 36, 
four years earlier than for HILDA immigrant respondents. Similarly to immigrant household 
heads in HILDA, educated Primary Applicants in LSIA have lower life satisfaction and 
employed Primary Applicants have higher life satisfaction than their less educated and 
unemployed counterparts respectively. Being male or female, and being previously married 
compared to being currently married, however, do not cause a significant difference in life 
satisfaction, unlike for immigrants in HILDA. Consistently with HILDA though, Primary 
Applicants who have never been married have lower life satisfaction than their married 
counterparts. This could be explained by the significant average age difference in both 
samples, with the majority of the LSIA sample being young immigrants. Living rent free 
compared to living in one’s own house is positively associated with the life satisfaction of 
immigrants from LSIA, but not from HILDA, since only 2 per cent of those from the latter 
survey live rent-free in somebody else’s house. A higher percentage (21 per cent) of 
relatively recent LSIA immigrants live with friends or extended family, either for cost saving 
or because they are still not familiar with the Australian housing market.   
As in HILDA, being from the Asian continent is initially negatively associated with the life 
satisfaction of LSIA immigrants (Table D.4 in Appendix D) but, as reported in Table 5.9, it 
loses its significance once the home country’s religion is also controlled for. Unlike the 
earlier findings from the HILDA data, however, immigrants from countries following any 
religion different from Christianity, as well as those from non-religious countries, have lower 
life satisfaction than immigrants from Christian countries. This suggests that having a culture 
different from the dominant culture in the host country negatively affects the life satisfaction 
of immigrants, at least in their first few years. This effect is not evident for immigrants from 
HILDA, possibly due to the majority of them living in Australia for a long time.  
5.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has contributed to the growing research on the determinants of well-being. In 
particular, the research concentrated on the well-being of Australian immigrants and 
investigated whether it differs from the well-being of other Australians. Well-being in this 
research is expressed by a self-assessed measure of an individual’s own life satisfaction. This 
subjective measure is supposed to capture an individual’s perception of their situation and 
their experience which could differ for immigrants due to the challenges of their resettlement. 
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Among the various domains of well-being, this research has concentrated on its financial 
component. Since the prospect of earning a higher income is one of the main incentives for 
an individual’s decision to migrate to another country, the financial well-being of immigrants 
should be highly correlated with their general well-being. Financial well-being is normally 
measured by the monetary values of individuals’ possessions that are often expressed by 
income or wealth. This research has measured it differently by using both objective and 
subjective measures. Specifically, a migrant’s inability to pay bills and difficulty in raising 
$2,000 in an emergency were the objective measures, whereas financial satisfaction and 
financial prosperity were subjectively assessed by individuals on an ascending scale.  
The findings show a lower level of life satisfaction of Australian immigrants compared to 
native-born Australians, despite there being no significant difference in income and wealth 
between these two groups. This finding is supported by the reported lack of improvement in 
the relative living conditions of immigrants yet it is not necessarily reflected in their 
perceived financial well-being. For example, the level of financial satisfaction of immigrants 
does not differ from that of native-born Australians, and the level of their self-assessed 
financial prosperity is even higher. In terms of material conditions, even though immigrants’ 
difficulty in paying basic bills does not differ from that of other Australians, they have more 
problems with raising spare cash in an emergency.  
In addition to common factors such as homesickness and starting from scratch in a new 
country, the different perceptions of success and financial difficulties in immigrants’ home 
countries may also explain why their perceived well-being is lower than that of other 
Australians. Thus, this study also tested for the presence of home-country effects on 
immigrants’ general and financial well-being. It was found that immigrants’ cultural 
background, represented by the dominant religion in their home country, is one of the crucial 
factors affecting their life satisfaction. In particular, the life satisfaction of immigrants from 
countries following Christianity is higher than that of immigrants from other countries. 
Hence, originating from a country following a religion different from Christianity – the 
dominant religion in Australia – could contribute to the factors reducing the life satisfaction 
of immigrants, at least in their first few years in Australia.  
Despite having no influence on their general well-being, originating from a particular 
continent can impact on immigrants’ financial well-being in Australia. Specifically, African 
migrants report a lower ability to raise spare cash in an emergency and lower financial 
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prosperity than immigrants from the Pacific Islands. This difference cannot be attributed to a 
different religious background as all the immigrants from the Pacific Islands and the majority 
of the immigrants from Africa have a Christian background. The self-assessment of 
immigrants’ own financial prosperity, on the other hand, tends to be higher for those from 
countries following Islam, Buddhism and Hinduism.  
Thus, there is no definite answer to the question of whether migrants benefit or not when they 
move to a more developed country. It is assumed that individuals become better off after they 
migrate to a country with higher income levels than their home countries. However, it is often 
not considered that immigrants’ own perception of their economic situation can change with 
such a life-changing experience as relocation to another coutry. For example, the adaptation 
to their new income and consumption levels and their social comparisons may cause 
reappraisal of their values and increase their income aspirations. The cultural shock 
experienced by new settlers can also negatively affect immigrants’ life satisfaction, 
irrespective of their country of origin. Furthermore, among all immigrants, African 
immigrants seemed to be the most financially disadvantaged. Hence, a higher income does 
not necessarily cause an improvement in an immigrant’s sense of general well-being nor their 
financial well-being, and other factors also need to be considered for relevant policy 
recommendations.  
It is the nature of human beings to constantly seek improvement in their well-being. The goal 
of migrants who leave behind their homes, friends and sometimes families is to find a better 
life in another country. Nevertheless, some costs of migration might not be so obvious. These 
hidden costs, in addition to foreseen difficulties, could outweigh the positive effects of 
migration on immigrants’ well-being in a newly adopted country.  
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CHAPTER  6.  CONCLUSIONS  
The economies of industrialised countries are increasingly dependent on immigrant flows. 
Australia is one of these countries, with an immigrant population exceeding 25 per cent 
(DIAC 2011). Furthermore, the growing number of people worldwide living outside their 
countries of origin is projected by the World Bank (2006b) to further increase. This mostly 
applies to migration from developing to more prosperous countries such as Australia. 
Although, as reported by DIAC (2011), migrant unemployment rates in Australia are lower 
than in other countries, with the majority of new migrants contributing positively to the 
Australian Government budget, other aspects of immigrants’ financial performance may also 
influence the Australian economy. The primary goal of this thesis was to examine the 
components of the financial behaviour of immigrants to Australia and compare it with the 
financial behaviour of native-born Australians. Whether immigrants’ country-of-origin 
characteristics affect their financial decisions after migrating to Australia was also 
investigated. The role of the Australian Government on immigrants’ financial behaviour in 
Australia, through its immigration policies, and the role of the governments in immigrants’ 
home countries, through the quality of their institutions, were also analysed. 
Consequently, this thesis addressed the following research questions:  
1. What determines the level of financial risk-taking of Australian residents, and 
what is the role of home-country institutions in explaining any difference in 
propensity to take financial risk between Australian-born and non-Australian-born 
residents? (Chapter 2) 
2. Does being born overseas, among other factors, affect Australians’ personal 
saving rates, and do immigrants’ home countries influence their saving habits after 
migration to Australia? (Chapter 3) 
3. What constitutes immigrants’ willingness and ability to remit, and what is the 
effect of Australian Government policies on the outflow of remittances from the 
country? (Chapter 4) 
4. What determines the well-being of Australian residents, and is it different for 
Australians born overseas? How is the general well-being of immigrants related to 
their financial well-being? (Chapter 5) 
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The analysis of the financial behaviour of immigrants to Australia began with the 
investigation of their propensity to take financial risk. An increasing number of Australians 
are born overseas, so understanding the factors affecting their decisions to participate in 
Australian financial markets is crucial for the country’s financial development. The findings 
reported in Chapter 2 reveal that immigrants’ propensity to take financial risk is lower than 
that of native-born Australian residents. For those immigrants who were old enough when 
they arrived in Australia, this difference could be attributed to their mistrust in institutions 
based on their experience before migration. The persistence of this institutional influence 
varies for people from different generations: from a minimum of seven years for relatively 
recent arrivals to more than two decades for those who arrived in the 1980s or earlier. This 
applies to both immigrants’ equity investments and their self-measured financial risk-taking. 
However, home institutions affect immigrants’ investment decisions differently from the way 
they affect immigrants’ self-reported ability to take financial risk. Moreover, the effect of 
home institutions is not always evident when using the self-assessment measure of financial 
risk. This suggests that these two measures cannot be used interchangeably.  
As reported in Chapter 3, the research examined another important aspect of immigrants’ 
financial behaviour: their saving habits. Higher household savings are associated with greater 
levels of business investment and a well-developed financial system. According to the 
findings, the household saving rates of Australian immigrants are lower than the saving rates 
of their Australian-born counterparts at both household and individual levels. In addition to a 
higher income or lower wealth accumulation, a better institutional quality in an immigrant’s 
home country is also positively associated with their saving behaviour. Hence, the lower 
saving rates of immigrants could be attributed to a poor institutional environment in their 
countries of origin. Contrary to expectations, the national saving rates in immigrants’ home 
countries and immigrants’ saving rates in Australia were found to be negatively correlated, 
although only in an extended sample of all household members. This suggests that 
immigrants from high saving countries change their saving habits after they migrate, possibly 
due to the high level of social security in Australia reducing the need for saving. On the other 
hand, the HILDA data used for this analysis do not have information about remittances to the 
country of origin, which should be counted as an expense in the saving rate calculation. This 
limitation could thus overestimate the saving rates – defined as the proportion of disposable 
income after all expenses to total disposable income – of those immigrants who transfer 
money to their home countries. Hence, high saving rates of these immigrants could imply a 
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high need for financial assistance of their family members still in their home country, which 
could also indicate the low level of the country’s economic development characterised by low 
national saving rate.  
The positive effect of the institutional environment on an immigrant’s propensity to take 
financial risk and their saving behaviour described in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 demonstrates 
the benefits of formal government reform for financial development. Should the government 
in an immigrant’s home country have carried out institutional reform before their emigration, 
their participation in the Australian financial markets might be more active. This active 
participation, in turn, would benefit the Australian economy. Although institutional 
constraints might not be evident at first and can unfold over generations, the alteration of the 
formal institutional environment in a host country can overcome this legacy. Hence, the 
Australian Government can use its policies as an instrument to enhance the financial 
prosperity of the country. Immigration policies are extremely important in this context as they 
are the first tool used by the government to screen potential Australian residents. For 
example, applicants for the Skilled Visa are selected based on their possible contribution to 
the Australian economy, mostly measured by their prospective earnings.   
Although, as indicated by DIAC (2011), recent skilled migrants to Australia earn on average 
$3,000 more a year than the average Australian, their need to support their families living in 
their countries of origin reduces the proportion of their income that goes to savings. The 
analysis of the remittances of immigrants to Australia reported in Chapter 4 complemented 
the analysis of their saving behaviour reported in Chapter 3. Not accounting for remittance 
outflows can result in overstating gains from international migration, and knowing the factors 
that affect outward remittances can assist in creating more accurate forecasts of outward 
financial flows and assist in policy-making. The wider spectrum of questions relevant to 
immigrants in LSIA, compared to HILDA, allowed the estimation of their remitting 
behaviour. Hence, the research reported in Chapter 4 concentrated on what constitutes 
immigrants’ willingness and ability to remit.  
The comparison of the estimates for two cohorts arrived in Australia before and after the 
1990s immigration reforms revealed that the effects of being on a certain type of entry visa 
changed after the reforms, but only with respect to remitted amounts. The probability of 
remitting, although different between representatives holding different types of visas, has not 
been affected by these recent reforms because it depends rather on other factors, such as 
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immigrants’ need to support their families still in their home countries. The amount of 
remittance, on the other hand, depends on an immigrant’s financial situation and hence, on 
their reason to migrate to Australia represented by their type of entry visa. Hence, after the 
amendments to the skilled migration points test introduced in 1999, the remitted amounts 
increased as a result of changes in the characteristics of the average independent applicant. 
The possible reason is that the new points test screened out those applicants who did not meet 
the tighter entry requirements and selected more qualified candidates with a higher earning 
potential than the earlier cohort.  
The improved financial situation of recent immigrants compared to immigrants who arrived 
earlier suggests that immigrants to Australia are becoming better off. However, data for 
various developed countries including Australia show that their immigrants are less wealthy 
than their native-born residents, which, according to the existing research, can diminish 
immigrants’ well-being. This contradiction raised the necessity for the analysis of 
immigrants’ well-being and its correlation with their financial situation. The analysis of the 
determinants of the well-being of Australian residents, defined as their satisfaction with life, 
and whether it is different for people born overseas is reported in Chapter 5. Both the 
objective measures of financial well-being, namely, inability to pay bills and raising cash in 
an emergency, and the subjective measures, namely, financial satisfaction and financial 
prosperity, were used for this purpose. The findings for the immigrant-only data from HILDA 
were compared with those for the LSIA data.  
According to the empirical findings described in Chapter 5, immigrants to Australia are less 
satisfied with their lives than their Australian-born counterparts. The similar levels of income 
and wealth and, accordingly, the similar levels of financial satisfaction and difficulty in 
paying bills of these two groups suggest that other factors, apart from absolute income 
increase, do matter for people’s well-being. For example, the difference of immigrants’ 
culture from the dominant Australian culture might decrease their life satisfaction in 
Australia. Although the income of migrants to Australia is presumably higher than their 
income before migration, it might be just sufficient to pay basic bills but not to allow putting 
aside funds for a rainy day. As a result, they experience greater difficulty in raising spare cash 
relative to other Australians. On the other hand, immigrants can use their past life as a point 
of comparison with their current financial situation in Australia, which causes their higher 
assessment of their financial prosperity compared to Australian-born residents. Hence, 
income alone does not determine the well-being of immigrants, and other factors such as the 
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possible relative deterioration of immigrants’ living conditions or their reappraisal of their 
values need to be considered.  
To sum up, some aspects of immigrants’ financial behaviour in Australia differ from those of 
other Australians. For example, they tend to take lower financial risk and to save less than 
those who were born in the country. The beliefs they were brought up with continue to 
influence them after migration to Australia and can discourage them from participating in 
Australian financial markets or using Australian financial institutions if they previously had a 
negative experience. With time though, their views can change and, accordingly, some 
aspects of their behaviour, such as their propensity to take financial risk, can alter. 
Immigrants’ ties with their home countries in the form of providing financial support to their 
families in their home countries might also reduce their funds available for investing in the 
Australian financial markets. Immigrants’ decisions to remit depend on their personal 
characteristics as well as on pressures from their families in their countries of origin and their 
financial abilities. These decisions have also been affected by the recent amendments to the 
Australian immigration policies aimed to attract more qualified skilled individuals – better 
contributors to the development of the Australian economy and less of a burden to the social 
security system. In particular, after the reforms, the amounts which immigrants could afford 
to transfer to their families overseas increased. However, despite being able to earn a higher 
income comparable with the income of other Australian residents, immigrants to Australia 
are less satisfied with their lives than their Australian-born counterparts. Although a higher 
income initially increases an immigrant’s life satisfaction, this effect is weakened by an 
increase in their income aspirations after they adjust to their current financial situation and 
start comparing it with that of other Australian residents. Other factors, such as the degree of 
differences between their culture and the Australian culture could also negatively influence 
an immigrant’s well-being in Australia.  
These empirical results can be considered by Australian policymakers for future government 
reforms. For example, to encourage a more active participation of immigrants in the 
Australian financial markets, it could be beneficial to provide more information about the 
reliability and efficiency of the Australian financial institutions to newly arrived migrants. 
This knowledge, though, is better distributed through community organisations, and not the 
government, considering the detected lack of trust in government institutions in immigrants 
who have low participation in financial markets. Earning their trust this way is worthwhile. If 
immigrants are confident that their rights as investors are protected and that Australia is a 
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stable country with control of corruption and constrained executive authority, then their 
propensity to take financial risk should increase. Greater trust in financial institutions in 
Australia should also encourage immigrants’ savings by counterbalancing their mistrust in 
the financial systems of their home countries.  
Immigrants’ need to support their families overseas could also reduce funds available for 
investment in the Australian economy. Although remittances are beneficial for the 
development of the recipient countries, high amounts of outward transfers can have a 
detrimental effect on a sending country’s economy. As proved in Chapter 4, outward 
remittances can be controlled by immigration policies. For example, the Review of the 
Independent and Skilled-Australian Linked Categories implemented in 1999 had an effect on 
the amounts transferred overseas. Knowing other factors that influence remitting probability 
and the size of the transfers could be also beneficial for future reform planning. As found in 
Chapter 4, having left immediate family members overseas increases the amount of 
remittances and the likelihood of remitting, with the most prominent effect registered for 
immigrants with children still in their home countries. Hence, immigration policies lenient 
towards the migration of family members of primary applicants for an Australian visa, 
especially their children, could result in lower outward remittances from Australia. However, 
the overall effect of such a change on the Australian economy would not necessary be 
positive since there would be other government expenses involved, such as the payment of 
unemployment benefits. The analysis of this expenditure is beyond the scope of this thesis 
but would be of interest for future research. 
In addition to predictable immigration and resettlement expenses, permanent migrants face 
other, mostly intangible, costs, such as losing touch with their friends and families, being far 
away from their native environment and being forced to start from scratch. These costs, often 
not obvious and therefore unexpected, could reduce immigrants’ well-being and accordingly 
affect the Australian economy through their lower productivity. Therefore, it is in the 
Australian Government’s interest to increase future immigrants’ awareness of problems they 
could face after migration, so that they can weigh all the pros and cons of migration before 
making their decision. Although it is not possible to prevent an increase in the income 
aspirations of new settlers – one of the factors reducing their well-being noted in Chapter 5 – 
other factors, such as the possible deterioration in their living standards or their cultural 
differences, can be managed. For example, media portraying Australia as a rich country could 
also give a realistic picture about its higher cost of living than in most developing countries. 
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Likewise, potential immigrants should be advised that, when possible, it would help their 
decision if they could visit Australia first before deciding on permanent migration. 
Integration programs could also provide immigrants opportunities to participate in the social 
life of Australia and to overcome their homesickness.  
The above recommendations are by no means comprehensive and are based on the outcomes 
of the research limited to a few basic aspects of the financial behaviour of immigrants. 
Additional suggestions may arise if the analysis is extended to include other attributes, such 
as immigrants’ receipt of government benefits or their investment in real estate. Similarly, the 
knowledge of immigrants’ financial activities in their home countries, if available, would 
enrich the analysis currently constrained by the limitations of HILDA and LSIA data. 
Although these data sets complement each other well, as shown in Chapter 5, it would also 
have been useful to compare the results obtained using one dataset with the results from 
another in some of the analyses reported in other chapters. For example, the limitation of 
HILDA data does not allow an analysis of the remitting behaviour of immigrants which was 
carried out using LSIA data. Using another dataset that has information on both savings and 
remittances in addition to LSIA data for this analysis could have provided a deeper 
explanation of why the saving rates of immigrants are lower than those of other Australians. 
The restricted coverage of the LSIA questions, in turn, does not allow the examination of 
immigrants’ ability to take financial risk and their saving behaviour, which are thoroughly 
investigated using data from the HILDA survey. Additionally, having more years of data 
would increase the range of observations and improve the reliability of the outcomes.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A Extra tables for Chapter 2 
Table A.1 Definition of variables: individual characteristics 
Variable Definition 
Equity investment Dichtonomous dependent variable: equals to 1 if household has positive 
equity investment and 0 if no equity investment. Equity investment 
includes total shares, managed funds and property trusts for the 
household 
Self-reported financial risk-taking 
(SRFRT) 
Ordered dependent variable measuring financial risk an individual is 
prepared to take on a scale from 1 to 4: 1 - not willing to take financial 
risks; 2 - takes average financial risks expecting average returns; 3 - 
takes above-average risks expecting above-average returns; and 4 - 
takes substantial risks   
Age Age as at 30 June 2002 for wave 2 (2006 for wave 6) 
Wealth Household Net Worth (Assets minus debts for the household)/10,000 
Income Ln(Financial Year Disposable Income +1) 
Employment 3 dummy variables: employed (base case), unemployed and not in labor 
force 
 
 
 
 
employment 1- base case 
Occupation Occupation according to the Australian Standard Classification of 
Occupations (ASCO). Second Edition, 1997. 9 dummy variables: 
managers and administrators (base case), professionals, associate 
professionals, trades persons, elementary clerical workers,  intermediate 
clerical workers, advanced clerical workers, production workers, 
labourers and related workers. 
 
 
 
 
employment 1- base case 
Education Highest education status. 3 dummy variables: no post-school 
qualification (base case), bachelor degree or higher and other post-
school qualification 
Gender Dummy variable which is equal to 1 for male respondent and 0 for 
female 
Marital status Current marital status. 3 dummy variables: married or de-facto (base 
case), previously married and never been married 
No. of children Number of resident children aged 14 years or younger 
MSR Major Statistical Region of the dwelling. 13 dummy variables: Sydney 
(base case), balance of New South Wales, Melbourne, balance of 
Victoria, Brisbane, balance of Queensland, Adelaide, balance of South 
Australia, Perth, balance of Weastern Australia, Tasmania, Northern 
Territory, Australian Capital Territory 
 Location of household 
 
Section of State. 4 dummy variables: major urban (base case), other 
urban, bounded locality (rural area with a population of 200-999) and 
rural balance (ABS 2003) 
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Table A.2 Definition of variables: country variables 
Variable Definition 
Voice and Accountability An assessment of the degree to which citizens play a part in electing their  
government, freedom of association and freedom of speech. Measured by 
positive numbers not exceeding 2, with higher scores corresponding to 
better outcomes. 
 
 
 
 
 
Political Stability  Political Stability and Absence of Violence - an assessment of the 
probability of weakening or changing of the government using violent or 
illegitimate means. Measured by positive numbers not exceeding 2, with 
higher scores corresponding to better outcomes. 
Government 
Effectiveness 
An assessment of the caliber of civil and public services, and the 
governments pledge to permit policy formulation and implementation free 
of political pressure and interferences. Measured by positive numbers not 
exceeding 2, with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes. 
 
 
Regulatory Quality An assessment of the government’s capability to create and apply policies 
encouraging development of private sector.  Measured by positive 
numbers not exceeding 2, with higher scores corresponding to better 
outcomes. 
Rule of Law An assessment of the degree to which people trust and comply with the 
social laws including reinforcement of the contract, property rights, the 
police, the courts and crime prevention.   Measured by positive numbers 
not exceeding 2, with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes. 
 
 
 
 
 
Control of Corruption An assessment of the degree to which public control is used for personal 
benefits as well as governing the state by elite and all kinds of corruption.  
Measured by positive numbers not exceeding 2, with higher scores 
corresponding to better outcomes.  
Constraint on Executive Measure of the degree of institutional constraints on the both individual or 
collective executive authority on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 representing 
unlimited executive authority and 7 – executive parity or subordination. 
GDP GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international USD)/10,000. 
Market Capitalisation Market captitalisation of listed companies (% of GDP). 
Workers Remittances  Received workers remittances and compensation to employees (% of 
GDP).  
School Enrolment Secondary school enrolment (% net). 
British Legal  Dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the country has British legal 
system and 0 otherwise.  
Latitude  Absolute value of the country’s latitude divided by 90.  
English Speaking Dummy variable which is equal to 1 if official languages of the country 
include English and if at least 50 per cent of surveyed immigrants speak 
only English language at home.  
Religion 6 dummy variables measuring if a country has dominant one of the 
following six religious group: Christians (base case), Muslims, Buddhists, 
Chinese Universists, Hindus or non-religious group.  
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Table A.3 Country-level variables summary statistics (combined data) 
Variable No. of 
countries 
No. of 
observations 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max AUS value 
(Av. value 
for 2002 
and 2006) 
Institutional characteristics:   
Ln (Control of 
Corruption) 
115 25844 1.73  0.13 0.59 1.84 1.77 
Ln (Government 
effectiveness) 
115 25844 1.73 0.13 0.59 1.84 1.77 
Ln (Rule of Law)  115 25844 1.71 0.14 0.36 1.79 1.75 
Ln (Political Stability) 114 25830 1.58  0.13 0.10 1.72 1.61 
Ln (Regulatory Quality) 115 25844 1.68 0.13 0.26 1.77 1.72 
Ln (Voice & 
Accountability) 
114 25838 1.65 0.13 0.59 1.73 1.68 
British Legal 111 25712 0.91 0.28 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Latitude  110 25706 0.33 0.10 0.01 0.72 0.30 
School Enrolment 79 23960 87.11 5.98 4.20 99.63 87.40 
Constraint on Executive 101 25537 6.86 0.69 1.00 7.00 7.00 
Other country characteristics:     
GDP 109 25744 2.11 0.63 0.01 4.12 2.27 
Market Capitalisation 83 25459 117.24 41.64 0.62 471.35 125.12 
Workers Remittance 97 25609 0.86 2.23 0.00 44.50 0.45 
English Speaking 115 25844 0.88 0.33 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Religion controls:        
Christians 113 25855 0.95 0.22 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Muslims 113 25855 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Buddists 113 25855 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Chinese Universists 113 25855 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Hindus 113 25855 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Non-religious 113 25855 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00 0.00 
 
Notes: First six variables have been rescaled by adding 4 and converting into logariphms.  
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Table A.4 Correlation between institutional qualities (combined data) 
Variable Ln (Control 
of 
Corruption) 
Ln 
(Government 
Effectiveness) 
Ln (Rule 
of Law) 
Ln (Political 
Stability) 
Ln 
(Regulatory 
Quality) 
Ln (Voice & 
Accountability) 
Constraint 
on 
Executive 
British Legal Latitude School 
Enrolment 
Ln (Control of 
Corruption) 
          
Ln (Government 
Effectiveness) 
0.999***          
Ln (Rule of Law) 0.9820***   0.9820***         
Ln (Political 
Stability) 
0.8474***   0.8474***   0.8510***        
Ln (Regulatory 
Quality) 
0.9689***   0.9689***   0.9549***   0.7883***       
Ln (Voice & 
Accountability) 
0.8813***       0.8813*** 0.8827*** 0.7335***  0.8947***      
Constraint on 
Executive  
 0.7256***     0.7256***  0.7161*** 0.5430*** 0.7778*** 0.9207***     
British Legal  0.6297***  0.6297***   0.6436*** 0.4464*** 0.5649*** 0.5638*** 0.4333***    
Latitude 0.1656***       0.1656***   0.1483***   0.0881***   0.2331*** 0.1900*** 0.2081*** -0.2093***   
School Enrolment 0.7388***   0.7388***  0.7407***  0.6257*** 0.7450*** 0.7674*** 0.6918*** 0.3204*** 0.4923***  
 
Notes: *** indicates significance at at least the 1% level 
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Table A.5 Effects of additional country controls on probability of equity investment by immigrants aged 15 or older (2002 data) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Age 0.0194** 0.0221** 0.0194** 0.0194** 0.0212** 0.0261*** 0.0216** 0.0373*** 0.0386*** 
 (0.00951) (0.00956) (0.00953) (0.00957) (0.00960) (0.00996) (0.0101) (0.0116) (0.0116) 
Age2 -0.000145 -0.000159* -0.000146 -0.000145 -0.000162* -0.000213** -0.000179* -0.000295*** -0.000299*** 
 (0.0000931) (0.0000934) (0.0000933) (0.0000936) (0.0000938) (0.0000969) (0.0000981) (0.000111) (0.000112) 
Wealth 0.00905*** 0.00903*** 0.00905*** 0.00895*** 0.00892*** 0.00847*** 0.00959*** 0.00892*** 0.00897*** 
 (0.000556) (0.000562) (0.000558) (0.000559) (0.000559) (0.000561) (0.000617) (0.000684) (0.000686) 
Income 0.0117 0.0120 0.0120 0.0141 0.0123 0.0119 0.0148 0.0146 0.0144 
 (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0155) (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0160) (0.0163) (0.0197) (0.0198) 
Employment status (Employed = base case):      
Unemployed -0.465*** -0.464*** -0.462*** -0.459*** -0.465*** -0.429*** -0.456*** -0.358** -0.370** 
 (0.141) (0.142) (0.141) (0.141) (0.141) (0.152) (0.155) (0.177) (0.177) 
Not in labour 
force 
-0.170** -0.171** -0.170** -0.176** -0.164** -0.166** -0.145* -0.198** -0.214** 
 (0.0702) (0.0705) (0.0705) (0.0710) (0.0712) (0.0742) (0.0751) (0.0868) (0.0873) 
Level of highest education achieved (No post-school qualification = base case):      
Bachelor degree 
or  
0.160*** 0.152** 0.160*** 0.167*** 0.166*** 0.155** 0.145** 0.114 0.110 
higher (0.0606) (0.0608) (0.0608) (0.0608) (0.0609) (0.0626) (0.0633) (0.0720) (0.0723) 
Other post-school  0.483*** 0.451*** 0.480*** 0.483*** 0.485*** 0.439*** 0.423*** 0.382*** 0.377*** 
qualification (0.0662) (0.0672) (0.0668) (0.0667) (0.0667) (0.0692) (0.0705) (0.0834) (0.0843) 
      
Gender (1 if 
male) 
-0.0802 -0.0730 -0.0844 -0.0808 -0.0827 -0.0693 -0.0729 -0.0638 -0.0610 
 (0.0525) (0.0527) (0.0526) (0.0528) (0.0529) (0.0546) (0.0554) (0.0643) (0.0646) 
Marital status (Married = base case):      
Previously 
married 
-0.293*** -0.293*** -0.294*** -0.293*** -0.295*** -0.287*** -0.263*** -0.277*** -0.269*** 
 (0.0771) (0.0775) (0.0773) (0.0772) (0.0772) (0.0788) (0.0794) (0.0897) (0.0901) 
Never been 
married 
0.0842 0.0839 0.0842 0.0782 0.0703 0.103 0.123 0.168 0.180 
 (0.0957) (0.0960) (0.0959) (0.0967) (0.0967) (0.102) (0.103) (0.115) (0.115) 
          
Children -0.000124 -0.000358 -0.00229 0.00115 -3.03e-05 -0.00598 -0.00703 -0.0134 -0.00984 
 (0.0302) (0.0303) (0.0302) (0.0303) (0.0303) (0.0316) (0.0320) (0.0386) (0.0386) 
(continued on next page) 
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Table A.5 (continued) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Country-of-origin characteristics:      
LN(Rule  0.419*** 0.769*** 0.364*** 0.281 0.141 0.0868 -0.0366 1.026** 0.419 
of Law) (0.115) (0.146) (0.130) (0.217) (0.225) (0.250) (0.278) (0.414) (0.557) 
Asia  0.219**       0.205 
  (0.104)       (0.261) 
Africa  0.434***       0.0811 
  (0.140)       (0.272) 
North   0.0963       -0.492 
America  (0.187)       (0.316) 
South   -0.118       -0.263 
America  (0.208)       (0.402) 
Europe  -0.0641       -0.195 
  (0.0861)       (0.161) 
Muslims   0.0706       
   (0.106)       
Buddhists   -0.203*       
   (0.111)       
Chinese    0.209       
Universists   (0.175)       
Hindus   0.0365       
   (0.151)       
Non-religious   -0.225       
   (0.162)       
GDP    0.0384 0.0194 -0.0629 -0.0532 -0.0270 0.0607 
    (0.0444) (0.0452) (0.0520) (0.0527) (0.0709) (0.0872) 
English      0.160** 0.0343 0.0571 0.117 0.150 
speaking     (0.0671) (0.0758) (0.0798) (0.0977) (0.112) 
Market      0.00586*** 0.00619*** 0.00549*** 0.00611** 
capitalisation      (0.00170) (0.00174) (0.00207) (0.00262) 
Squared market      -0.0000139** -0.0000151** -0.0000162** -0.0000222** 
capitalisation       (0.00000677) (0.00000685) (0.00000765) (0.00000907) 
Workers        0.00550 -0.00541 -0.0260 
remittances       (0.00979) (0.0185) (0.0216) 
School        -0.0236*** -0.0185** 
enrolment        (0.00590) (0.00756) 
Constant -1.884*** -2.560*** -1.788*** -1.753*** -1.604*** -1.701*** -1.530*** -1.581** -1.111 
 (0.300) (0.356) (0.320) (0.380) (0.385) (0.421) (0.471) (0.717) (1.076) 
Observations 3073 3073 3073 3038 3038 2818 2764 2107 2107 
 
Notes: In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also include MSR controls, which are not reported due to low significance. Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. All models passed the LR 
Chi-Square test, with the LR statistic ranging from 483.7 to 679.2 and the pseudo R-squared ranging from 0.158 to 0.174.*** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
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Table A.6 Effects of additional country controls on the probability of equity investment by immigrants aged 15 or older (2006 data) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Age -0.00247 -0.00166 -0.00167 -0.00244 -0.00235 -0.00220 -0.00149 0.00135 0.00113 
 (0.00995) (0.00999) (0.00998) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0102) (0.0103) (0.0127) (0.0128) 
Age2 0.0000824 0.0000809 0.0000739 0.0000836 0.0000829 0.0000794 0.0000733 0.0000878 0.0000917 
 (0.0000963) (0.0000966) (0.0000966) (0.0000971) (0.0000972) (0.0000984) (0.0000988) (0.000119) (0.000120) 
Wealth 0.00437*** 0.00437*** 0.00437*** 0.00434*** 0.00434*** 0.00425*** 0.00426*** 0.00318*** 0.00318*** 
 (0.000332) (0.000333) (0.000332) (0.000337) (0.000337) (0.000338) (0.000340) (0.000373) (0.000373) 
Income 0.0325* 0.0364** 0.0340* 0.0351* 0.0347* 0.0394** 0.0392** 0.0493** 0.0507** 
 (0.0176) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0179) (0.0180) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0239) (0.0240) 
Employment status (Employed = base case):      
Unemployed -0.390** -0.387** -0.385** -0.398** -0.400** -0.325 -0.310 -0.459 -0.478* 
 (0.190) (0.191) (0.191) (0.192) (0.192) (0.197) (0.198) (0.283) (0.284) 
Not in labour 
force 
-0.215*** -0.210*** -0.205*** -0.206*** -0.205*** -0.193** -0.193** -0.252*** -0.256*** 
 (0.0756) (0.0760) (0.0758) (0.0765) (0.0766) (0.0774) (0.0777) (0.0949) (0.0952) 
Level of highest education achieved (No post-school qualification = base case):      
Bachelor degree 
or  
0.0655 0.0595 0.0667 0.0557 0.0557 0.0484 0.0531 0.0639 0.0646 
higher (0.0639) (0.0640) (0.0640) (0.0644) (0.0644) (0.0652) (0.0655) (0.0804) (0.0805) 
Other post-school  0.319*** 0.299*** 0.315*** 0.311*** 0.311*** 0.301*** 0.321*** 0.309*** 0.314*** 
qualification (0.0678) (0.0687) (0.0684) (0.0687) (0.0687) (0.0697) (0.0703) (0.0884) (0.0891) 
          
Gender (male if 1) -0.0439 -0.0378 -0.0449 -0.0350 -0.0351 -0.0455 -0.0529 -0.131* -0.124* 
 (0.0544) (0.0545) (0.0545) (0.0549) (0.0549) (0.0555) (0.0560) (0.0693) (0.0695) 
Marital status (Married = base case):      
Previously 
married 
-0.230*** -0.228*** -0.229*** -0.239*** -0.239*** -0.241*** -0.247*** -0.257*** -0.267*** 
 (0.0768) (0.0770) (0.0769) (0.0773) (0.0774) (0.0781) (0.0783) (0.0930) (0.0932) 
Never been 
married 
-0.0566 -0.0593 -0.0499 -0.0382 -0.0390 -0.0223 -0.0256 0.0918 0.0976 
 (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.102) (0.102) (0.104) (0.105) (0.136) (0.136) 
Children -0.0271 -0.0312 -0.0268 -0.0280 -0.0280 -0.0209 -0.0277 -0.0127 -0.0171 
 (0.0345) (0.0346) (0.0347) (0.0348) (0.0348) (0.0354) (0.0358) (0.0449) (0.0452) 
(continued on next page) 
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Table A6 (continued) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Country-of-origin characteristics:     
LN(Rule  0.557*** 0.830*** 0.530*** 0.761*** 0.735*** 0.792*** 0.843*** 1.291** 1.781** 
of Law) (0.119) (0.151) (0.136) (0.233) (0.253) (0.275) (0.297) (0.632) (0.743) 
Asia  0.245**       0.567* 
  (0.108)       (0.333) 
Africa  0.256*       0.602 
  (0.144)       (0.423) 
North   -0.0229       0.175 
America  (0.180)       (0.392) 
South   0.0758       0.534 
America  (0.219)       (0.395) 
Europe  0.0104       0.248 
  (0.0876)       (0.294) 
Muslims   -0.147       
   (0.119)       
Buddhists   0.0327       
   (0.118)       
Chinese    -0.0311       
Universists   (0.171)       
Hindus   0.344**       
   (0.143)       
Non-religious   -0.0652       
   (0.166)       
GDP/10,000    -0.0605 -0.0614 -0.111** -0.114** -0.105 -0.135 
    (0.0421) (0.0423) (0.0480) (0.0481) (0.0802) (0.107) 
English      0.0197 -0.0502 -0.0796 -0.123 -0.0614 
speaking     (0.0739) (0.0808) (0.0827) (0.127) (0.132) 
Market      0.00272** 0.00293*** 0.00258 0.000362 
capitalisation      (0.00106) (0.00110) (0.00219) (0.00285) 
Squared market      -0.00000425* -0.00000462* -0.00000433 -0.00000132 
capitalisation       (0.00000241) (0.00000246) (0.00000441) (0.0000053) 
Workers        0.000156 -0.00368 -0.00640 
remittances       (0.00858) (0.0116) (0.0145) 
School        -0.00713 -0.000967 
enrolment        (0.00557) (0.00678) 
Constant -1.739*** -2.319*** -1.735*** -2.001*** -1.966*** -2.189*** -2.287*** -2.557*** -3.953*** 
 (0.327) (0.387) (0.350) (0.420) (0.440) (0.477) (0.523) (0.847) (1.222) 
          
Observations 2717 2717 2717 2652 2652 2587 2555 1676 1676 
 
Notes: In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also include MSR controls, which are not reported due to low significance. Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. All models passed the LR 
Chi-Square test, with the LR statistic ranging from 228.2 to 439.5 and the pseudo R-squared ranging from 0.102 to 0.123.*** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
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Table A.7 Effects of home institutions on the probability of equity investment by 
immigrants aged 15 or older, depending on their age at migration to Australia (2002 
and 2006 data) 
  Age at arrival in Australia 
Variables All 1-15 16-20 21+ 
2002 (with year of arrival controls)
a
   
Ln (Rule of Law) 0.419*** 0.00225 0.269 0.465*** 
 (0.115) (0.210) (0.419) (0.161) 
Log likelihood -1717 -553.2 -154.5 -911.3 
Pseudo R-squared 0.161 0.153 0.284 0.191 
Number of 
observations 
3073 957 336 1719 
    
2006(with year of arrival controls)
a
    
Ln (Rule of Law) 0.555*** 0.166 0.510 0.617*** 
 (0.119) (0.212) (0.467) (0.166) 
Log likelihood -1576 -530.6 -133.2 -819.0 
Pseudo R-squared 0.120 0.139 0.260 0.131 
Number of 
observations 
2717 905 285 1458 
 
Notes: In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also include controls for age, age squared, wealth, 
income, employment, education, gender, marital status, children, MSR and year of arrival. Standard errors are indicated in 
parentheses. *** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1.  
a Due to similarity of results produced with and without year of arrival controls, only those with controls are presented. 
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Table A.8 Effects of home institutions on probability of equity investment by 
immigrants aged 36 or older, depending on years spent in Australia (panel data) 
  Years in Australia 
Variables All 1-7 8-12 13-17 18-27 28+ 
No age at arrival control    
Ln (Rule of Law) 2.057*** 2.151 0.435 1.087 2.659*** 1.614** 
 (0.415) (2.087) (0.652) (1.045) (0.894) (0.627) 
Log likelihood -2297 -105.4 -153.3 -243.9 -335.8 -1361 
Number of 
observations 
4426 266 313 468 723 2650 
Age at arrival control    
Ln (Rule of Law) 1.556*** 2.155 0.433 1.096 2.504*** 1.481** 
 (0.418) (1.939) (0.653) (1.055) (0.834) (0.622) 
Log likelihood -2269 -105.3 -153.3 -243.9 -334.7 -1348 
Number of 
observations 
4408 266 313 468 723 2632 
 
Notes: In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also include controls for age, age squared, wealth, 
income, employment, education, gender, marital status, children and MSR. Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. *** 
indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
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Table A.9 Effects of additional country controls on SRFRT by immigrants aged 15 or older (2002 data) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Age 0.0225** 0.0223** 0.0232** 0.0234** 0.0237** 0.0303*** 0.0293*** 0.0287** 0.0297** 
 (0.0108) (0.0109) (0.0108) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0112) (0.0113) (0.0127) (0.0128) 
Age2 -0.000368*** -0.000367*** -0.000373*** -0.000375*** -0.000378*** -0.000442*** -0.000432*** -0.000390*** -0.000399*** 
 (0.000110) (0.000110) (0.000110) (0.000111) (0.000111) (0.000113) (0.000114) (0.000127) (0.000128) 
Wealth 0.00292*** 0.00290*** 0.00290*** 0.00290*** 0.00289*** 0.00287*** 0.00295*** 0.00271*** 0.00262*** 
 (0.000356) (0.000360) (0.000357) (0.000358) (0.000358) (0.000360) (0.000371) (0.000428) (0.000433) 
Income 0.00260 0.00357 0.00606 0.00607 0.00583 0.00727 0.00907 0.0280 0.0295 
 (0.0173) (0.0173) (0.0174) (0.0175) (0.0175) (0.0179) (0.0181) (0.0226) (0.0227) 
Employment status (Employed = base case):      
Unemployed -0.0444 -0.0579 -0.0500 -0.0368 -0.0371 -0.00759 -0.00670 -0.163 -0.164 
 (0.152) (0.152) (0.152) (0.152) (0.152) (0.157) (0.160) (0.196) (0.196) 
Not in labour 
force 
-0.275*** -0.279*** -0.278*** -0.273*** -0.272*** -0.276*** -0.282*** -0.323*** -0.315*** 
 (0.0761) (0.0762) (0.0763) (0.0766) (0.0767) (0.0788) (0.0794) (0.0920) (0.0922) 
Level of highest education achieved (No post-school qualification = base case):     
Bachelor degree 
or  
0.0945 0.0978 0.0919 0.0968 0.0961 0.0780 0.0772 0.0902 0.0919 
higher (0.0647) (0.0648) (0.0648) (0.0649) (0.0649) (0.0662) (0.0666) (0.0745) (0.0748) 
Other post-school  0.434*** 0.425*** 0.425*** 0.438*** 0.437*** 0.399*** 0.381*** 0.367*** 0.343*** 
qualification (0.0672) (0.0683) (0.0676) (0.0675) (0.0675) (0.0696) (0.0706) (0.0830) (0.0840) 
          
Gender (1 if 
male) 
0.348*** 0.349*** 0.348*** 0.345*** 0.345*** 0.360*** 0.364*** 0.317*** 0.316*** 
 (0.0553) (0.0554) (0.0553) (0.0556) (0.0556) (0.0570) (0.0578) (0.0664) (0.0666) 
Marital status (Married = base case):       
Previously 
married 
0.0596 0.0606 0.0547 0.0561 0.0564 0.0494 0.0567 0.0518 0.0445 
 (0.0854) (0.0856) (0.0856) (0.0855) (0.0855) (0.0865) (0.0868) (0.0979) (0.0980) 
Never been 
married 
0.143 0.150 0.142 0.133 0.132 0.188* 0.186* 0.258** 0.264** 
 (0.0990) (0.0991) (0.0991) (0.0998) (0.0998) (0.104) (0.105) (0.117) (0.118) 
          
No. of children -0.00565 -0.00466 -0.00390 -0.00633 -0.00664 -0.00285 0.00186 0.0111 0.00941 
 (0.0316) (0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0324) (0.0327) (0.0376) (0.0379) 
(continued on next page) 
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Table A9 (continued) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Country-of-origin characteristics:       
LN (Rule  0.505*** 0.442*** 0.548*** 0.439* 0.415* 0.377 0.139 -0.0294 -0.0103 
of Law) (0.125) (0.159) (0.141) (0.228) (0.239) (0.260) (0.286) (0.429) (0.568) 
Asia  0.0556       0.121 
  (0.107)       (0.263) 
Africa  -0.0714       0.141 
  (0.144)       (0.262) 
North   0.263       0.583* 
America  (0.176)       (0.300) 
South   -0.233       -0.112 
America  (0.239)       (0.398) 
Europe  0.0668       0.0145 
  (0.0854)       (0.160) 
Muslims   -0.0190       
   (0.116)       
Buddhists   0.0253       
   (0.118)       
Chinese    0.000282       
Universists   (0.177)       
Hindus   0.0359       
   (0.152)       
Non-religious   0.393**       
   (0.157)       
GDP    0.0142 0.0122 -0.0104 -0.00607 -0.0834 -0.155* 
    (0.0453) (0.0457) (0.0526) (0.0532) (0.0689) (0.0855) 
English      0.0237 -0.0289 0.0128 0.0730 0.0594 
speaking     (0.0680) (0.0775) (0.0810) (0.0988) (0.116) 
Market      0.00271 0.00221 0.00374* 0.00405 
capitalisation      (0.00176) (0.00178) (0.00208) (0.00266) 
Squared market      -0.0000104 -0.00000937 -0.0000112 -0.0000113 
capitalisation       (0.00000695) (0.00000701) (0.00000764) (0.00000903) 
Workers        -0.0162 -0.0242 -0.0231 
remittances       (0.0107) (0.0187) (0.0217) 
School        0.00191 0.00882 
enrolment        (0.00592) (0.00772) 
Observations 2110 2110 2110 2091 2091 1999 1959 1521 1521 
 
Notes: In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also include controls for age, age squared, wealth, income, employment, education, gender, marital status, children and MSR. Standard errors are 
indicated in parentheses. All models passed the LR Chi-Square test, with the LR statistic ranging from 276.4 to 389.4 and the pseudo R-squared ranging from 0.0915 to 0.0943.*** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates 
p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
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Table A.10 Effects of additional country controls on SRFRT by immigrants aged 15 or older (2006 data) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Age 0.00550 0.00563 0.00412 0.00464 0.00506 0.00715 0.00521 0.0229 0.0224 
 (0.0112) (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0144) (0.0145) 
Age2 -0.000244** -0.000242** -0.000230** -0.000239** -0.000243** -0.000266** -0.000243** -0.000376*** -0.000372*** 
 (0.000114) (0.000114) (0.000114) (0.000115) (0.000115) (0.000117) (0.000117) (0.000143) (0.000143) 
Wealth 0.00129*** 0.00131*** 0.00128*** 0.00125*** 0.00125*** 0.00124*** 0.00121*** 0.000931*** 0.000990*** 
 (0.000199) (0.000201) (0.000199) (0.000201) (0.000201) (0.000202) (0.000202) (0.000240) (0.000243) 
Income 0.0712*** 0.0713*** 0.0741*** 0.0763*** 0.0736*** 0.0719*** 0.0692*** 0.0487** 0.0445* 
 (0.0192) (0.0193) (0.0194) (0.0197) (0.0198) (0.0200) (0.0201) (0.0244) (0.0246) 
Employment status (Employed = base case):      
Unemployed -0.0461 -0.0545 -0.0655 -0.0478 -0.0585 0.00721 -0.0372 -0.232 -0.288 
 (0.198) (0.199) (0.199) (0.202) (0.202) (0.212) (0.217) (0.371) (0.374) 
Not in labour force -0.175** -0.181** -0.187** -0.177** -0.173** -0.154* -0.172** -0.194* -0.200** 
 (0.0788) (0.0790) (0.0791) (0.0799) (0.0799) (0.0808) (0.0813) (0.0999) (0.100) 
Level of highest education achieved (No post-school qualification = base case):      
Bachelor degree or  0.0454 0.0451 0.0392 0.0483 0.0488 0.0520 0.0494 0.0523 0.0580 
higher (0.0673) (0.0674) (0.0675) (0.0679) (0.0679) (0.0686) (0.0689) (0.0853) (0.0854) 
Other post-school  0.378*** 0.373*** 0.366*** 0.377*** 0.378*** 0.394*** 0.385*** 0.310*** 0.318*** 
qualification (0.0680) (0.0687) (0.0684) (0.0689) (0.0689) (0.0699) (0.0705) (0.0882) (0.0890) 
          
Gender (1 if male) 0.361*** 0.366*** 0.361*** 0.359*** 0.357*** 0.370*** 0.361*** 0.290*** 0.293*** 
 (0.0559) (0.0561) (0.0560) (0.0566) (0.0566) (0.0572) (0.0577) (0.0716) (0.0719) 
Marital status (Married = base case):      
Previously married -0.0396 -0.0358 -0.0450 -0.0387 -0.0408 -0.0554 -0.0688 -0.0213 -0.0261 
 (0.0848) (0.0850) (0.0849) (0.0854) (0.0854) (0.0861) (0.0863) (0.104) (0.105) 
Never been 
married 
0.0480 0.0545 0.0308 0.0705 0.0688 0.0819 0.0684 0.264* 0.263* 
 (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.103) (0.102) (0.104) (0.104) (0.138) (0.139) 
          
No. of children -0.0828** -0.0812** -0.0823** -0.0867** -0.0869** -0.0878** -0.0829** -0.0438 -0.0399 
 (0.0358) (0.0358) (0.0358) (0.0363) (0.0364) (0.0369) (0.0373) (0.0459) (0.0462) 
(continued on next page) 
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Table A10 (continued) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Country-of-origin characteristics:       
LN(Rule  0.0435 0.0491 0.151 -0.134 -0.277 -0.234 -0.570* -1.462** -1.650** 
of Law) (0.122) (0.153) (0.140) (0.239) (0.261) (0.286) (0.306) (0.681) (0.819) 
Asia  0.0306       0.0429 
  (0.109)       (0.326) 
Africa  -0.131       -0.346 
  (0.144)       (0.448) 
North   -0.0281       -0.0681 
America  (0.179)       (0.389) 
South   0.149       0.583 
America  (0.230)       (0.414) 
Europe  -0.0156       0.129 
  (0.0867)       (0.285) 
Muslims   0.231*       
   (0.118)       
Buddhists   -0.0925       
   (0.125)       
Chinese    0.00880       
Universists   (0.161)       
Hindus   -0.111       
   (0.158)       
Non-religious   0.356**       
   (0.158)       
GDP    0.0478 0.0451 0.0334 0.0398 0.193** 0.151 
    (0.0429) (0.0430) (0.0496) (0.0496) (0.0843) (0.116) 
English      0.102 0.0817 0.119 0.130 0.111 
speaking     (0.0748) (0.0822) (0.0843) (0.133) (0.138) 
Market      0.000589 -0.000301 0.00108 0.00383 
capitalisation      (0.00108) (0.00112) (0.00226) (0.00312) 
Squared market      -0.00000142 0.0000000608 -0.00000248 -0.00000669 
capitalisation       (0.00000239) (0.00000244) (0.00000451) (0.00000575) 
Workers        -0.0295*** -0.0175 -0.0183 
remittances       (0.00996) (0.0142) (0.0172) 
School        -0.00191 -0.00373 
enrolment        (0.00650) (0.00776) 
Observations 1955 1955 1955 1922 1922 1886 1858 1222 1222 
 
Notes: In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also include controls for age, age squared, wealth, income, employment, education, gender, marital status, children and MSR. Standard errors are 
indicated in parentheses. All models passed the LR Chi-Square test, with the LR statistic ranging from 207.2 to 375 and the pseudo R-squared ranging from 0.0861 to 0.096.*** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * 
indicates p<=0.1. 
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Table A.11 Effects of home institutions on SRFRT by immigrants aged 15 or older, 
depending on their age at migration to Australia (2002 data) 
  Age at arrival in Australia 
Variables All 1-15 16-20 21+ 
No year of arrival control   
Ln (Rule of Law) 0.505*** -0.0916 -0.165 0.907*** 
 (0.125) (0.218) (0.402) (0.179) 
Log likelihood -1901 -651.0 -217.7 -965.6 
R -squared 0.0915 0.0633 0.131 0.127 
Number of observations 2110 678 238 1159 
Year of arrival control  
Ln (Rule of Law) 0.513*** -0.143 -0.172 0.923*** 
 (0.125) (0.219) (0.402) (0.180) 
Log likelihood -1900 -648.9 -216.8 -964.1 
R -squared 0.0918 0.0664 0.135 0.128 
Number of observations 2110 678 238 1159 
 
Notes: In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also include controls for age, age squared, wealth, 
income, employment, education, gender, marital status, children and MSR. Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. *** 
indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
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Table A.12 Effects of home institutions on SRFRT by immigrants aged 36 or older, 
depending on their age at migration (panel data) 
  Age at arrival in Australia 
Variables All 1-15 16-20 21+ 
No year of arrival control  
Ln (Rule of Law) 0.335*** -0.353 0.617 0.531*** 
 (0.109) (0.224) (0.439) (0.141) 
Log likelihood -2741 -752.5 -252.5 -1637 
Pseudo R -squared 0.105 0.0977 0.159 0.125 
Number of observations 3146 852 289 1956 
Year of arrival control  
Ln (Rule of Law) 0.347*** -0.377* 0.584 0.545*** 
 (0.109) (0.225) (0.441) (0.141) 
Log likelihood -2739 -751.1 -249.9 -1634 
Pseudo R -squared 0.106 0.0994 0.168 0.126 
Number of observations 3146 852 289 1956 
 
Notes: In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also include controls for age, age squared, wealth, 
income, employment, education, gender, marital status, children and MSR. Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. *** 
indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
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Table A.13 Effects of home institutions on SRFRT by immigrants aged 36 years or 
older, depending on years spent in Australia 
  Years in Australia 
Variables All 1-7 8-12 13-17 18-27 28+ 
Panel data(with age at arrival controls)
a
       
Ln (Rule of Law) 0.295*** -0.396 0.0166 0.717** 0.260 0.148 
 (0.111) (0.530) (0.433) (0.341) (0.281) (0.165) 
Log likelihood -2733 -125.4 -178.8 -289.1 -449.4 -1572 
Pseudo R -squared 0.106 0.213 0.186 0.186 0.154 0.114 
Number of observations 3136 162 222 342 496 1912 
       
2002(with age at arrival controls)
a
       
Ln (Rule of Law) 0.593*** 0.203 0.0361 1.391*** 0.916** 0.358 
 (0.160) (0.771) (0.544) (0.459) (0.453) (0.238) 
Log likelihood -1381 -62.97 -99.64 -166.0 -191.7 -780.7 
R -squared 0.113 0.324 0.149 0.214 0.159 0.125 
Number of observations 1604 98 127 201 212 965 
 
Notes: In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also include controls for age, age squared, wealth, 
income, employment, education, gender, marital status, children and MSR. Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. *** 
indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
a Due to similarity of results produced with and without individual’s age at arrival controls, only those with controls are 
presented. 
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Appendix B Extra tables for Chapter 3 
Table B.1 Definition of variables: individual characteristics 
                                                 
33 10 per cent of the capital expenses carried in the current year are added to account for annual depreciation of durable goods (Clarke & Lawn 2008). 
Variable Definition 
Age Age as at 30 June 2006 
Dependency ratio Household Dependency Ratio=(Household size-Number of 
income earners)/Household size 
Wealth Household Net Worth (Assets minus debts for the 
household)/10,000 
Househol income Ln (Household financial year disposable fncome+1)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Income Ln(Financial year disposable income+1) 
 
 
 
 
 
Expenses Household expenses including annual expenses for: groceries, 
alcohol, cigarettes and tobacco, public transport and taxis, meals 
eaten out, motor vehicle fuel, clothing and footwear, 
communication, holidays, insurance, medical treatments and 
medicines, utilities, home and motor repairs, and education plus 
10 % of capital expenses such as cost of new or used vehicle, 
computers, televisions, whitegoods and furniture
33
 plus annual 
rent and mortgage payments 
 
Occupation Occupation according to the Australian Standard Classification of 
Occupations (ASCO). Second Edition, 1997. 9 dummy variables: 
managers and administrators (base case), professionals, associate 
professionals, trades persons, elementary clerical workers,  
intermediate clerical workers, advanced clerical workers, 
production workers, labourers and related workers. 
 
 
 
 
employment 1- base case 
Education Highest education status. 3 dummy variables: no post-school 
qualification (base case), bachelor degree or higher and other 
post-school qualification 
Gender Dummy variable which is equal to 1 for male respondent and 0 
for female 
Marital status Current marrital status. 3 dummy variables: married or de-facto 
(base case), previously married and never been married 
No. of children Number of resident children aged 14 years or younger 
No. of persons  Number of persons in household 
Head Dummy variable which is equal to 1 if respondent is earning the 
highest income in household (household head) and 0 otherwise 
Spouse Dummy variable whcih is equal to 1 if respondent is the spouse 
of household head and 0 otherwise 
MSR Major Statistical Region of the dwelling. 13 dummy variables: 
Sydney (base case), balance of New South Wales, Melbourne, 
balance of Victoria, Brisbane, balance of Queensland, Adelaide, 
balance of South Australia, Perth, balance of Weastern Australia, 
Tasmania, Northern Territory, Australian Capital Territory 
Location of household Section of State. 4 dummy variables: major urban (base case), 
other urban, bounded locality (rural area with a population of 
200-999) and rural balance (ABS 2003) 
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Table B.2 Results of Hausman endogeneity test and post-estimation test measuring the 
relevance of the excluded exogenous variables 
Endogenous variables Hausman test 
F- test 
Post-estimation test 
F -test 
Household level: 
 
  
Heads 15+ years old   
Household income 
 
Wealth 
 
F(2,4595) = 28.70*** 
 
F(2,4594) = 857.28*** 
 
F(2,4594) =  1,535.84*** 
Heads 36+ years old   
Household income  
 
Wealth 
 
F(2,3559) = 28.57*** 
 
F(2,3561) = 1,896.38*** 
 
F(2, 3561) = 1,750.53*** 
Personal level:   
Individuals 15+ years old   
Income 
 
Wealth  
 
F(2,8748)  = 7.98*** 
 
F(2,8750) = 2967.83*** 
 
F(2,8750) = 3044.88*** 
Individuals 36+ years old   
Income 
 
Wealth 
 
F(2,5985) = 9.07*** 
 
F(2,5987) = 2189.75*** 
 
F(2,5987) = 2942.94*** 
 
Notes: Household disposable income in 2005 used as an instrument for household income. Personal disposable 
income is used as an instrument for personal income. Household wealth reported in 2002 used as an instrument 
for household wealth in both cases. Hausman test determines whether endogenous regressors are in fact 
exogenous. Significance of post-estimation F-statistic indicates that instruments have significant explanatory 
power. *** indicates p<=0.01. 
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Table B.3 Definition of variables: country characteristics 
 
Variable Definition 
Voice and Accountability An assessment  of the degree to which citizens play a part in 
electing their  government, freedom of association and 
freedom of speech  
 
 
 
 
 
Political Stability  Political Stability and Absence of Violence- an assessment of 
the probability of weakening or changing of the government 
using violent or illegitimate means  
Government Effectiveness An assessment of the caliber of civil and public services, and 
the governments pledge to permit  policy formulation and 
implementation free of political pressure and interferences. 
 
 
Regulatory Quality An assessment of the government’s capability to create and 
apply policies encouraging development of private sector 
Rule of Law An assessment of the degree to which people trust and 
comply with the social laws including reinforcement of the 
contract, property rights, the police, the courts and crime 
prevention.  
 
 
 
 
 
Control of Corruption An assessment of the degree to which public control is used 
for personal benefits as well as governing the state by elite 
and all kinds of corruption.  
Constraint on Executive Measure of the degree of institutional constraints on the both 
individual or collective executive authority.  
GDP GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international 
USD)/10,000 
Market Captitalisation Market captitalisation of listed companies (% of GDP) 
Workers Remittances  Received workers remittances and compensation to 
employees (% of GDP)  
School Enrolment Secondary school enrolment (% net) 
British Legal  Dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the country has British 
legal system and 0 otherwise  
Latitude  Absolute value of the country’s latitude divided by 90  
English Speaking Dummy variable which is equal to 1 if official languages of 
the country include English and if at least 50 per cent of 
surveyed immigrants speak only English language at home.  
Religion 6 dummy variables measuring if a country has dominant one 
of the following six religious group: Christians, Muslims, 
Buddhists, Chinese Universists, Hindus or non-religious 
group.   
 
 
National Saving Rate Adjusted savings: gross savings (% of GNI) 
 
 
 
Average National Saving Rate Average national saving rate for the 2004-2006 period  
 Age Dependency Ratio Dependent population as % of working-age population 
Age Dependency Ratio (young) Dependent young population as % of working-age population 
Age Dependency Ratio (old) Dependent old population as % of working-age population 
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Table B.4 Effect of additional country variables on the saving behaviour of immigrants aged 36 or older (individual level)  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Income 0.0581*** 0.0583*** 0.0584*** 0.0576*** 0.0565*** 0.0542*** 0.0527*** 0.0545*** 0.0567*** 0.0552*** 
 (0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0158) (0.0160) (0.0160) 
Wealth -0.0000187 -0.0000171 0.00000250 -
0.0000000690 
-0.00000797 -0.0000190 -0.0000106 0.00000320 -0.0000262 0.00000545 
 (0.0000977) (0.0000981) (0.0000973) (0.0000973) (0.0000973) (0.0000968) (0.0000969) (0.0000966) (0.0000972) (0.0000933) 
Age -0.00333 -0.00341 -0.00356 -0.00418 -0.00430 -0.00395 -0.00340 -0.00626 -0.00306 -0.00379 
 (0.00701) (0.00704) (0.00700) (0.00700) (0.00699) (0.00696) (0.00695) (0.00700) (0.00703) (0.00697) 
Age squared 0.0000532 0.0000536 0.0000570 0.0000606 0.0000610 0.0000574 0.0000540 0.0000738 0.0000518 0.0000563 
 (0.0000586) (0.0000588) (0.0000584) (0.0000584) (0.0000584) (0.0000581) (0.0000581) (0.0000584) (0.0000586) (0.0000582) 
Gender (1 if male) 0.00314 0.00633 0.00862 0.00877 0.00809 0.00375 0.00840 0.00910 -0.00000526 0.00759 
 (0.0199) (0.0199) (0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0197) (0.0198) (0.0196) 
No. of children -0.0458*** -0.0462*** -0.0464*** -0.0471*** -0.0475*** -0.0485*** -0.0471*** -0.0518*** -0.0463*** -0.0435** 
 (0.0175) (0.0175) (0.0173) (0.0173) (0.0173) (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0173) (0.0173) (0.0173) 
No. of persons 0.0226* 0.0227* 0.0227* 0.0237** 0.0251** 0.0267** 0.0261** 0.0227** 0.0258** 0.0236** 
 (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0117) (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0117) (0.0117) 
Head -0.251*** -0.249*** -0.244*** -0.244*** -0.244*** -0.250*** -0.252*** -0.242*** -0.243*** -0.249*** 
 (0.0448) (0.0451) (0.0440) (0.0440) (0.0440) (0.0437) (0.0439) (0.0441) (0.0439) (0.0439) 
Spouse -0.180*** -0.179*** -0.171*** -0.172*** -0.173*** -0.183*** -0.185*** -0.175*** -0.175*** -0.182*** 
 (0.0443) (0.0446) (0.0437) (0.0437) (0.0437) (0.0436) (0.0437) (0.0440) (0.0436) (0.0438) 
Marital status (Married = base case)       
Previously  -0.0881*** -0.0834*** -0.0793*** -0.0781*** -0.0779*** -0.0815*** -0.0782*** -0.0783*** -0.0844*** -0.0821*** 
married (0.0287) (0.0288) (0.0285) (0.0285) (0.0285) (0.0285) (0.0284) (0.0285) (0.0286) (0.0285) 
Never been  -0.0658 -0.0639 -0.0530 -0.0516 -0.0509 -0.0541 -0.0624 -0.0651 -0.0562 -0.0576 
married (0.0474) (0.0476) (0.0472) (0.0472) (0.0472) (0.0471) (0.0468) (0.0476) (0.0474) (0.0469) 
Level of highest education (No post-school education = base case)     
Bachelor degree  0.000399 -0.00421 -0.00848 -0.00849 -0.00812 -0.00151 -0.00690 -0.00648 -0.00206 -0.00982 
or higher (0.0208) (0.0208) (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0206) 
Other post-school  0.0392* 0.0375 0.0293 0.0317 0.0355 0.0364 0.0331 0.0239 0.0395* 0.0328 
qualification (0.0237) (0.0237) (0.0233) (0.0234) (0.0235) (0.0234) (0.0233) (0.0234) (0.0236) (0.0233) 
Employment status ( Employed = base case)      
Unemployed -0.0684 -0.0683 -0.0585 -0.0563 -0.0538 -0.0504 -0.0562 -0.0861 -0.0454 -0.0569 
 (0.0698) (0.0701) (0.0684) (0.0684) (0.0683) (0.0679) (0.0681) (0.0715) (0.0709) (0.0682) 
Not in labour force -0.100*** -0.104*** -0.109*** -0.109*** -0.110*** -0.106*** -0.107*** -0.0975*** -0.102*** -0.105*** 
 (0.0281) (0.0282) (0.0275) (0.0274) (0.0274) (0.0274) (0.0273) (0.0274) (0.0275) (0.0273) 
(continued on next page) 
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Table B4 continued 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Country-of-origin characteristics:     
National Saving Rate -0.00266***          
 (0.00102)          
Average National Saving Rate  -0.00262**         
  (0.00113)         
Age Dependency Ratio   -0.000212        
   (0.00122)        
Age Dependency Ratio (young)    -0.000957       
    (0.000756)       
Age Dependency Ratio (old)     0.00255**      
     (0.00129)      
GDP      0.0248***     
      (0.00790)     
English Speaking       0.0658***    
       (0.0181)    
Market Capitalisation        0.000403***   
        (0.000127)   
Workers’ Remittances         -0.00665***  
         (0.00245)  
Muslims          -0.0858** 
          (0.0378) 
Buddhists          -0.0593 
          (0.0409) 
Chinese           -0.0106 
Universists          (0.0682) 
Hindus          -0.0521 
          (0.0484) 
Non-religious          -0.103* 
          (0.0603) 
Constant -0.0537 -0.0540 -0.106 -0.0575 -0.121 -0.0957 -0.0893 -0.0260 -0.101 -0.0509 
 (0.285) (0.286) (0.284) (0.278) (0.274) (0.274) (0.273) (0.275) (0.276) (0.276) 
Observations 1466 1472 1496 1496 1496 1487 1499 1465 1469 1501 
Root MSE 0.326 0.328 0.328 0.327 0.327 0.325 0.326 0.324 0.326 0.326 
R-squared 0.133 0.131 0.131 0.131 0.132 0.135 0.136 0.133 0.135 0.135 
 
Notes: In addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also include MSR controls, which are not reported due to low significance. : Sample is limited to immigrant respondents aged 36 or older who have 
non-missing data on country of origin with the household saving rates above -1.28 and below 0.79. Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. *** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05. 
 
239 
Appendix C Extra tables for Chapter 4 
Table C.1 Definition of variables: individual characteristics 
Variable Definition 
Money remitted Dummy variables which is equal to 1 if any money sent to 
relatives or friends overseas whether on regular or as occasional 
payments since immigrating to Australia/last interview, 0 - 
otherwise 
Levels Remitted amount expressed in levels. Ordered dependent 
variable: 1- none, nil; 2 -$1 to $8,000: 3 - $8,001 to $16,000; 4 - 
$16,001 to $25,000; 5 - $25,001 to $35,000; 6 - $35,001 to 
$50,000; 7 - $50,001 or more. 
Amount of money Amount of money sent to relatives or friends overseas since 
migrating/last interview, divided by 10,000 (includes midpoints 
assessments of the levels of the remitted amount recorded in first 
and second wave of LSIA1  and value of money rounded to the 
nearest thousand and divided by 10,000 in LSIA2) 
Income Household annual income expressed in levels. Ordered variable: 
1- none, nil; 2 -$1 to $8,000 a year: 3 - $8,001 to $16,000 a year; 
4 - $16,001 to $25,000 a year; 5 - $25,001 to $35,000 a year; 6 - 
$35,001 to $50,000 a year; 7 - $50,001 or more a year  
Fin. assets arrived with Total value of financial assets including funds, personal effects 
and capital equipment, arrived with to Australia, rounded to the 
nearest thousand and divided by 10,000  
Fin. assets transferred to AUS Total value of financial assets including funds, personal effects 
and capital equipment, transferred by respondent or his/her 
partner to Australia since immigration (if interviewed in 2000) or 
last interview (if interviewed in 2001), rounded to the nearest 
thousand and divided by 10,000 
Fin. assets transferred from AUS Total value of financial assets including funds, personal effects 
and capital equipment, transferred by respondent or his/her 
partner from Australia since immigration (if interviewed in 2000) 
or last interview (if interviewed in 2001), rounded to the nearest 
thousand and divided by 10,000 
Age Age at the time of interview  
Gender Dummy variable which is equal to 1 for male respondent and 0 
for female 
No. of children Number of resident children of school age or below 
No. of persons Number of persons in household 
Plan to leave Dummy variable which is equal to 1 if respondent is planning to 
leave Australia permanently and 0 otherwise 
Marital status Current marrital status. 3 dummy variables: married or de-facto 
(base case), previously married and never been married 
(continued on next page) 
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Table C.1 (continued) 
Variable Definition 
Education Highest education status achieved before migration. 3 dummy 
variables: no post-school qualification (base case), bachelor 
degree or higher and other post-school qualification 
Employment Current employment situation. 3 dummy variables: employed 
(base case), unemployed and not in labor force 
 
Housing arrangements Individuals’ current housing situation. 3 dummy variables: 
own/currently paying off mortgage, rent/pay board/rent-buy 
scheme and live rent free  
State State of residence. 8 dummy variables: New South Wales (base 
case), Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Weastern Australia, 
Tasmania, Northern Territory, Australian Capital Territory 
 
Continent Continent of the former country of residence. 5 dummy variables: 
Oceania excluding Australia (base case), Asia, Africa, North 
America, South America and Europe  
Visa category Major grouping of visa category. 5 dummy variables: skilled  
points tested  Independent (base case), skilled points tested 
Sponsored, skilled Business Skills/Employer Nomination 
Scheme, Humanitarian and Family  
Spouse  Dummy variable which is equal to 1 if individual have spouse 
living overseas, 0 – otherwise 
Children  Dummy variable which is equal to 1 if individual have children 
living overseas, 0 – otherwise 
Parents  Dummy variable which is equal to 1 if individual have parents 
living overseas, 0 – otherwise 
Brothers and sisters Dummy variable which is equal to 1 if individual have brothers 
and/or sisters living overseas, 0 – otherwise 
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Appendix D Extra tables for Chapter 5 
Table D.1 Definition of variables: individual characteristics (HILDA) 
Variable Definition 
Life satisfaction  Ordered dependent variable measuring the level of individual’s 
life satisfaction on a scale from 0 to 10: 0 – totally dissatisfied; 5 
– neither satisfied nor dissatisfied; 10-totally satisfied  
Financial prosperity Ordered dependent variable measuring the self-assessed 
individual prosperity given current needs and financial 
responsibilities on a scale from 1 to 6: 1 – very poor; 2 – poor; 3- 
just getting along; 4 – reasonably comfortable, 5 – very 
comfortable; and 6 - prosperous  
Financial satisfaction Ordered dependent variable measuring the level of individual’s 
satisfaction with his/her financial situation on a scale from 0 to 
10: 0 – totally dissatisfied; 5 – neither satisfied nor dissatisfied; 
10-totally satisfied 
Inability to pay bills  Binary dependent variable: equals to1 if respondents answered 
‘yes’ to any of the seven questions relating to ‘inability to pay’ in 
the previous year, and 0 otherwise. These questions reflect if the 
respondent was going through any of the following hardships: 
could not pay electricity, gas or telephone bills on time; could not 
pay mortgage/rent on time; pawned or sold something; went 
without meals; was unable to heat home; asked for financial help 
from friends or family; asked for help from welfare/community 
organization 
Raising $2,000  Ordered dependent variable measuring difficulty in raising 
$2,000 in an emergency: 1 - could easily raise $2,000; 2 – could 
raise $2,000, but it would involve some sacrifices; 3 – would 
have to do something drastic to raise $2,000; and 4 – could not 
raise $2,000 
Income Ln(Financial year disposable income+1) 
Wealth Household Net Worth (Assets minus debts for the 
household)/10,000 
Age Age as at 30 June 2002 for wave 2 (2006 for wave 6) 
Gender (1 if male) Dummy variable which is equal to 1 for male respondent and 0 
for female 
No. of children Number of resident children less than 15 years old 
No. of persons  Number of persons in household 
Marital status Current marrital status. 3 dummy variables: married or de-facto 
(base case), previously married and never been married 
Education Highest education status. 3 dummy variables: no post-school 
qualification (base case), bachelor degree or higher and other 
post-school qualification 
(continued on next page)  
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Table D.1 (continued) 
 
Variable Definition 
Employment Current employment situation. 3 dummy variables: employed 
(base case), unemployed and not in labor force 
 Housing arrangements Individuals’ current housing situation. 3 dummy variables: 
own/currently paying off mortgage, rent/pay board/rent-buy 
scheme and live rent free  
MSR Major Statistical Region of the dwelling. 13 dummy variables: 
Sydney (base case), balance of New South Wales, Melbourne, 
balance of Victoria, Brisbane, balance of Queensland, Adelaide, 
balance of South Australia, Perth, balance of Weastern Australia, 
Tasmania, Northern Territory, Australian Capital Territory 
 Continent Continent of the country of birth. 5 dummy variables: Australia 
and Oceania (base case), Asia, Africa, North America, South 
America and Europe 
Years in Australia Number of years spent in Australia since arrival 
Religion 6 dummy variables measuring if a country has dominant one of 
the following six religious group: Christians (base case), 
Muslims, Buddhists, Chinese Universists, Hindus or non-
religious group (source:  World Christian Encyclopedia (2007) 
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Table D.2 Definition of variables: individual characteristics (LSIA) 
Variable Definition 
Life satisfaction  Ordered dependent variable measuring the level of individual’s 
satisfaction with life in Australia on a scale from 1 to 5: 1 – very 
dissatisfied; 2 – dissatisfied; 3 – neither satisfied nor dissatisfied; 4 – 
satisfied; 5-very satisfied  
  Income Ordered independent variable: 1- none, nil; 2 -$1 to $3,015 a year: 3 - 
$3,016 to $5,043 a year; 4 - $5,044 to $8,059 a year; 5 - $8,060 to 
$12,011 a year; 6 - $12,012 to $16,067 a year; 7 - $16,068 to $20,071 a 
year; 8 - $20,072 to $25,063 a year; 9 - $25,064 to $30,055 a year; 10 -  
$30,056 to $35,047 a year; 11 - $35,048 to $40,039 a year; 12 - $40,040 
to $50,023 a year; 13 - $50,024 to $77,999 a year; 14 - $78,000 to 
$103,999 a year; 15 -  $104,000  or  more a year 
Fin. assets arrived with Total value of financial assets including funds, personal effects and 
capital equipment, arrived with to Australia, rounded to the nearest 
thousand and divided by 10,000  
Fin. assets transferred to AUS Total value of financial assets including funds, personal effects and 
capital equipment, transferred by respondent or his/her partner to 
Australia since immigration (if interviewed in 2000) or last interview (if 
interviewed in 2001), rounded to the nearest thousand and divided by 
10,000 
Fin. assets transferred from AUS Total value of financial assets including funds, personal effects and 
capital equipment, transferred by respondent or his/her partner from 
Australia since immigration (if interviewed in 2000) or last interview (if 
interviewed in 2001), rounded to the nearest thousand and divided by 
10,000 
Age Age at the time of interview  
Gender (1 if male) Dummy variable which is equal to 1 for male respondent and 0 for 
female 
No. of children Number of resident children of school age or below 
No. of persons  Number of persons in household 
Marital status Current marrital status. 3 dummy variables: married or de-facto (base 
case), previously married and never been married 
Education Highest education status. 3 dummy variables: no post-school 
qualification (base case), bachelor degree or higher and other post-
school qualification 
Employment Current employment situation. 3 dummy variables: employed (base 
case), unemployed and not in labor force 
 
Housing arrangements Individuals’ current housing situation. 3 dummy variables: 
own/currently paying off mortgage, rent/pay board/rent-buy scheme and 
live rent free  
State State of residence. 8 dummy variables: New South Wales (base case), 
Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Weastern Australia, Tasmania, 
Northern Territory, Australian Capital Territory 
 Continent Continent of the country of birth. 5 dummy variables: Australia and 
Oceania (base case), Asia, Africa, North America, South America and 
Europe 
Religion 6 dummy variables measuring if a country has dominant one of the 
following six religious group: Christians (base case), Muslims, 
Buddhists, Chinese Universists, Hindus or non-religious group (source:  
World Christian Encyclopedia (2007) 
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Table D.3 Distribution of HILDA household heads by continents of origin and dominant 
religion in the country of origin (combined data for 2002 and 2006) 
 Dominant religion in the country of origin  
Continents 
Christianity Islam Buddhism Chinese 
Universists 
Hinduism Not 
religious Total 
Asia 93 
(15.05%) 
177 
(28.64%) 
168 
(27.18%) 
57 
(9.22%) 
71 
(11.49%) 
52 
(8.41%) 
618 
100% 
Africa 107 
(64.07%) 
47 
(28.14%) 
0 
 
0 
 
13 
(7.78%) 
0 
 
167 
(100%) 
North 
America 
65 
(100%) 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
65 
(100%) 
South 
America 
57 
(100%) 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
57 
(100%) 
Europe 1,755 
(98.60%) 
7 
(0.39%) 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
18 
(1.01%) 
1,780 
(100%) 
Oceania 404 
(100%) 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
404 
(100%) 
Total 2,481 
(80.27%) 
231 
(7.47%) 
168 
(5.44%) 
57 
(1.84%) 
84 
(2.72%) 
70 
(2.26%) 
3,091 
(100%) 
 
Notes: Results are based on the data from the HILDA survey. Sample is limited to immigrant households aged 
15 or older. 
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Table D.4 Factors affecting life satisfaction of immigrants to Australia when continents-
of-origin are controlled for, LSIA (panel data for 2001-2002) 
 
Variables 
 
Life 
satisfaction Variables 
Life 
satisfaction 
  Employment status(Employed=base case): 
Income 0.0435*** Unemployed -0.252*** 
 (0.00577)  (0.0687) 
Fin. assets arrived with 0.000112 Not in labour force -0.0516 
 (0.00133)  (0.0485) 
Fin. assets transferred to AUS 0.00261 Housing arrangements (Own/Pay 
mortgage=base case): 
 (0.00160) Rent -0.0470 
Fin. assets transferred from 
AUS 
0.00955  (0.0438) 
 (0.0223) Rent free 0.0952 
Age -0.0205***  (0.0596) 
 (0.00743) Continents (Oceania=base case): 
Age squared 0.000269*** Asia -0.237*** 
 (0.0000825)  (0.0863) 
Gender (1 if male) 0.0111 Africa 0.00202 
 (0.0344)  (0.0986) 
No. of children -0.0333 North America 0.0520 
 (0.0232)  (0.110) 
No. of persons 0.000345 South America -0.0608 
 (0.0107)  (0.125) 
Marital status (Married=base case): Europe -0.106 
Previously married -0.0408  (0.0888) 
 (0.0611)   
Never been married -0.102** Year (=1 if 2001) -0.00262 
 (0.0431)  (0.0351) 
Level of highest education (No post-school 
qualification=base case): 
  
Bachelor degree or higher -0.122***   
 (0.0425) Log likelihood -5096 
Other post-school  -0.190*** Pseudo R -squared 0.0287 
qualification (0.0400) Observations 5641 
 
Notes: Results are based on the data from the LSIA survey. The dependent variable is life satisfaction. In 
addition to the coefficients reported above, the regressions also include Australian State of Residence controls, 
which are not reported due to low significance. Sample is limited to Primary Applicants for Australian 
Residency aged 15 or older who have non-missing data on country of origin. Standard errors are indicated in 
parentheses. *** indicates p<=0.01, ** indicates p<=0.05, * indicates p<=0.1. 
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Table D.5 Distribution of Primary Applicants by continents of origin and dominant 
religion in the country of origin, LSIA (combined data for 2001-2002) 
 Dominant religion in the country of origin  
Continents 
Christianity Islam Buddhism Chinese 
Universists 
Hinduism Not 
religious Total 
Asia 347 
(12.69%)                                                  
890  
(32.55%))  
506  
(18.51%)   
219 
(8.01%) 
237 
(8.67%)       
535 
(19.57%)) 
2,734 
(100%) 
Africa 335 
(61.81%)                                                                                 
202 
(37.27%)
0 0 5 
(0.92%) 
0 542 
(100%)) 
North 
America 
285 
(100%) 
0 0 0 0 0 285 
(100%) 
South 
America 
153 
(99.35%) 
0 0 0 1 
(0.65%) 
0 154 
(100%) 
Europe 1,062  
(80.95%)                                                               
223 
(17.00%)
0 0 0 27 
(2.06%) 
1,312 
(100%) 
Oceania 212 
(100%) 
0 0 0 0 0 212 
(100%) 
Total 2,394 
(45.70%)                                      
1,315        
(25.10%)
506 
(9.66%)        
219 
(4.18%)        
243 
(4.64%)       
562 
(10.73%)) 
5,239 
(100%) 
 
Notes: Results are based on the data from the LSIA survey. Sample is limited to the Australian immigrants who 
were Primary Applicants for Australian Residency and who are aged 15 or older. )3000(
2 P =0.00 on 25 
degrees of freedom. 
 
